The Emotional Dimension of the Spanish Far Right and Its Effects on Satisfaction with Democracy
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Emotions as a Social Construct and Their Role in Explaining Voting Behaviour
3. The Rise of the Far Right and Its Threat to Democracy
4. Research Methodology
5. Constructing the Explanation to the Rise of VOX
5.1. The Construction of the Vote for VOX
5.2. The Construction of Hope for Santiago Abascal
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Variable | Type | Interpretation |
---|---|---|
VOX vote | Nominal (dummy) | 1: VOX–0: Other parties |
Socio-demographic and contextual | ||
Gender | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Male–0: Female |
Age | Quantitative | 0–98 |
Level of education | Ordinal | 1: Uneducated–6: University |
Interest-bearing assets | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Interest-bearing assets 0: Other employment situation |
Interest-bearing liabilities | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Interest-bearing assets 0: Other employment situation |
Non-interest-bearing assets | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Interest-bearing assets 0: Other employment situation |
Level of household income | Ordinal | 1: Up to EUR 300–10: +EUR 6000 |
Catholics | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Catholics 0: Other religious affiliation |
Rating personal economic sit. | 0: Really bad–10: Really good | |
Rating current economic sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Rating prospective economic sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Rating current political sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Rating prospective political sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Attitudinal, issues and post-materialist values | ||
Ideological self-placement | Quantitative | 0: Left–10: Right |
Nationalist self-placement (Autonomous Communities) | Quantitative | 0: Minimal nationalism–10: Maximum nationalism |
Spanish nationalist self-placement | Quantitative | 0: Minimal nationalism–10: Maximum nationalism |
Spanish sentiment | Ordinal | 1: Only Spanish–5: Only from Autonomous Community |
Independence | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Independence 0: Other issues |
Sexual freedom | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
European integration | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Trust in political establishment | Quantitative | 0: No trust–10: Maximum trust |
Trust in democratic institutions | Quantitative | 0: No trust–10: Maximum trust |
Representation of interests | Quantitative | 0: None–10: A lot |
Satisfaction with democracy | Quantitative | 0: None–10: A lot |
Multiculturalism—Immigration | Quantitative | 0: Multiculturalism–10: Immigration |
Public services—Taxes | Quantitative | 0: Public services–10: Taxes |
Freedom—Safety | Quantitative | 0: Freedom–10: Safety |
Populism | ||
Will of the people | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
People’s decisions | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Differences elite—people | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Representation of ordinary citizen | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Politicians talk too much | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Consensus | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Disaffection | ||
Search for interests | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Complex politics | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Lack of worry | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Influence of vote | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Informed | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Disaffection | Quantitative | 0: No disaffection–10: A lot of disaffection |
Interest in politics | Quantitative | 0: No interest–10: A lot of interest |
Leadership | ||
Rating political leaders | Quantitative | 0: Very bad–10: Very good |
Sympathy and emotions | ||
Sympathy towards VOX | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Sympathy towards VOX 0: Other parties |
Emotional presence | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Presence of emotion 0: Absence of emotion |
Variable | Type | Interpretation |
---|---|---|
Presence of hope for Abascal | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Presence of hope 0: Absence of hope |
Structural elements | ||
Gender | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Male–0: Female |
Age | Quantitative | 0–98 |
Level of education | Ordinal | 1: Uneducated–6: University |
Interest-bearing assets | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Interest-bearing assets 0: Other employment situation |
Interest-bearing liabilities | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Interest-bearing assets 0: Other employment situation |
Non-interest-bearing assets | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Interest-bearing assets 0: Other employment situation |
Level of household income | Ordinal | 1: Up to EUR 300–10: +EUR 6000 |
Catholics | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Catholics 0: Other religious affiliation |
Attitudes towards politics and institutions | ||
Trust in political establishment | Quantitative | 0: No trust–10: Maximum trust |
Trust in democratic institutions | Quantitative | 0: No trust–10: Maximum trust |
Representation of interests | Quantitative | 0: None–10: A lot |
Satisfaction with democracy | Quantitative | 0: None–10: A lot |
Will of the people | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
People’s decisions | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Differences elite—people | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Representation of ordinary citizen | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Politicians talk too much | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Consensus | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree | |
Complicated politics | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Lack of worry | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Influence of vote | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Informed | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Disaffection | Quantitative | 0: No disaffection–10: A lot of disaffection |
Interest in politics | Quantitative | 0: No interest–10: A lot of interest |
Cultural elements | ||
Multiculturalism–Immigration | Quantitative | 0: Multiculturalism–10: Immigration |
Public services—Taxes | Quantitative | 0: Public services–10: Taxes |
Freedom—Safety | Quantitative | 0: Freedom–10: Safety |
Sexual freedom | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
European integration | Quantitative | 0: Strongly disagree–10: Strongly agree |
Perceptive elements | ||
Rating political leaders | Quantitative | 0: Very bad–10: Very good |
Rating personal economic sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Rating current economic sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Rating prospective economic sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Rating current political sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Rating prospective political sit. | Quantitative | 0: Really bad–10: Really good |
Ideological elements | ||
Sympathy towards VOX | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Sympathy towards VOX 0: Other parties |
Ideological self-placement | Quantitative | 0: Left–10: Right |
Nationalist self-placement (Autonomous Communities) | Quantitative | 0: Minimal nationalism–10: Maximum nationalism |
Spanish nationalist self-placement | Quantitative | 0: Minimal nationalism–10: Maximum nationalism |
Spanish sentiment | Ordinal | 1: Only Spanish–5: Only from Autonomous Community |
Independence | Nominal (dummy) | 1: Independence 0: Other issues |
Media | ||
Frequency of information monitoring in the media | Ordinal | 1: Never or hardly ever–6: Every day or most days |
Social media information | Quantitative | 0: None–10: A lot |
Social media participation | Quantitative | 0: None–10: A lot |
Political landscape | ||
Rating management of government and opposition | Quantitative | 0: Very bad–10: Very good |
Rating inauguration | Quantitative | 0: Very bad–10: Very good |
Rating coalition | Quantitative | 0: Very bad–10: Very good |
1 | For further reading on the terminological debate see: Jaráiz Gulías et al. (2020). |
2 | This is a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) carried out between 14 January and 22 February 2020, with a sample size of 1000 units. The universe is comprised of a population over 18 years of age and residing in Spain and the sampling method is simple random sampling with proportional affixation according to sex and age quotas. The error for the sample +/− 3.1%, for a 95% level of trust and according to the principle of maximum indeterminacy p = q = 0.5. |
3 | In the April 2019 general election, VOX got 2,688,092 votes, which translates into a 10.26% of the valid votes and 24 seats, and in the November general election of the same year, they got 3,656,979 votes, a 15.08% of the valid votes and 52 seats, according to Spanish Ministry of Interior. |
4 | Table 3 shows the values of the odds ratio and the heterocedasticy-robust standard errors. |
5 | Table 4 shows the values of the odds ratio and the heterocedasticy-robust standard errors. |
6 | Degree of agreement with the statement ‘Through voting, people like me can influence what happens in politics’ and ‘Politicians talk a lot but do very little’, respectively. |
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Political Leaders | ||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pablo Iglesias | Pedro Sánchez | Albert Rivera | Pablo Casado | Santiago Abascal | ||||||||||||
Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | ||
Emotions | Pride | 28.8% | 4.00 | 68.8% | 27.4% | 3.46 | 94.1% | 75.7% | 4.59 | 100.0% | ||||||
Fear | 72.6% | 4.50 | 100.0% | 62.2% | 4.38 | 100.0% | 3.1% | 4.00 | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 3.5% | 3.33 | 100.0% | ||
Hope | 58.9% | 3.37 | 28.4% | 56.0% | 3.39 | 90.7% | 93.4% | 4.50 | 98.3% | |||||||
Anxiety | 40.6% | 4.61 | 100.0% | 30.6% | 4.00 | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 3.5% | 2.89 | 100.0% | |||
Enthusiasm | 32.2% | 3.73 | 36.2% | 24.7% | 3.45 | 100.0% | 74.1% | 4.14 | 100.0% | |||||||
Anger | 65.3% | 4.51 | 100.0% | 67.4% | 4.31 | 100.0% | 8.2% | 3.29 | 61.4% | 8.2% | 3.69 | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | ||
Hate | 23.8% | 4.20 | 100.0% | 24.2% | 4.34 | 93.3% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | ||||
Contempt | 40.6% | 4.21 | 100.0% | 49.1% | 4.18 | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | ||||
Worry | 82.5% | 4.59 | 100.0% | 88.1% | 4.46 | 98.2% | 6.7% | 2.70 | 23.3% | 10.0% | 3.16 | 83.9% | 5.1% | 3.31 | 68.9% | |
Peace of mind | 32.1% | 3.90 | 68.1% | 37.8% | 3.60 | 90.7% | 77.1% | 4.26 | 100.0% | |||||||
Resentment | 19.9% | 4.37 | 100.0% | 27.2% | 3.94 | 88.7% | 3.5% | 4.56 | 100.0% | 3.6% | 3.00 | 44.3% | 1.6% | 100.0% | ||
Bitterness | 24.6% | 4.20 | 100.0% | 22.1% | 3.93 | 100.0% | 3.1% | 4.50 | 100.0% | 3.1% | 3.01 | 50.5% | 1.6% | 100.0% | ||
Disgust | 35.5% | 4.14 | 100.0% | 39.7% | 3.88 | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% | 1.6% | 100.0% |
Political Parties | ||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PODEMOS | PSOE | C’s | PP | VOX | ||||||||||||
Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | Presence | Intensity | Permanence | ||
Emotions | Pride | 3.2% | 4.00 | 49.9% | 25.0% | 3.58 | 85.8% | 23.5% | 4.11 | 36.5% | 72.2% | 4.52 | 100.0% | |||
Fear | 62.4% | 4.72 | 100.0% | 46.8% | 4.37 | 96.6% | 2.0% | 3.00 | 100.0% | |||||||
Hope | 6.7% | 2.47 | 58.1% | 3.22 | 63.3% | 67.0% | 3.52 | 70.3% | 91.8% | 4.42 | 98.3% | |||||
Anxiety | 36.7% | 4.73 | 100.0% | 20.3% | 3.95 | 100.0% | 1.6% | 3.00 | 1.5% | 100.0% | 2.0% | 2.00 | 100.0% | |||
Enthusiasm | 3.5% | 2.45 | 31.0% | 3.23 | 52.6% | 37.6% | 3.33 | 59.3% | 74.9% | 4.11 | 100.0% | |||||
Anger | 65.2% | 4.59 | 100.0% | 63.2% | 4.50 | 100.0% | 3.5% | 4.11 | 100.0% | 15.2% | 4.08 | 76.6% | ||||
Hate | 19.9% | 4.92 | 100.0% | 11.9% | 4.59 | 87.2% | 2.0% | 5.00 | 100.0% | |||||||
Contempt | 33.6% | 4.49 | 100.0% | 19.0% | 4.31 | 100.0% | 3.5% | 4.56 | 56.2% | |||||||
Worry | 78.5% | 4.55 | 100.0% | 73.5% | 4.52 | 100.0% | 1.6% | 3.00 | 100.0% | 7.0% | 3.95 | 100.0% | 3.5% | 3.34 | 100.0% | |
Peace of mind | 3.2% | 3.50 | 32.5% | 3.58 | 84.2% | 47.0% | 3.51 | 69.3% | 75.5% | 4.12 | 100.0% | |||||
Resentment | 18.7% | 5.00 | 100.0% | 23.8% | 4.45 | 100.0% | 2.0% | 5.00 | 100.0% | 5.4% | 3.44 | 100.0% | ||||
Bitterness | 19.9% | 4.92 | 100.0% | 20.3% | 4.58 | 100.0% | 3.5% | 5.00 | 55.3% | |||||||
Disgust | 33.4% | 4.45 | 100.0% | 23.3% | 4.00 | 100.0% | 2.0% | 5.00 | 100.0% |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Socio-demographic and contextual | ||||||
Gender | 2.629 ** (0.327) | 2.299 * (0.411) | ||||
Catholics | 3.468 ** (0.439) | |||||
Rating current political sit. | 0.711 ** (0.148) | 0.799 * (0.090) | ||||
Rating prospective political sit. | 0.805 * (0.132) | |||||
Attitudinal, issues and post-materialist values | ||||||
Ideological self-placement | 2.313 *** (0.101) | 2.527 *** (0.099) | 2.663 *** (0.106) | 1.801 ** (0.137) | 1.735 ** (0.243) | |
Independence | 5.491 *** (0.411) | 7.698 *** (0.394) | 9.673 *** (0.434) | 6.226 *** (0.489) | 10.236 ** (0.675) | |
Satisfaction with democracy | 0.814 ** (0.080) | 0.857 * (0.080) | ||||
Disaffection | ||||||
Complicated politics | 0.863 * (0.070) | 0.823 ** (0.072) | ||||
Lack of worry | 1.177 * (0.076) | 1.225 ** (0.082) | ||||
Influence of vote | 0.804 ** (0.061) | 0.774 *** (0.068) | 0.837 * (0.077) | |||
Populism | ||||||
Representation of ordinary citizen | 1.126 * (0.057) | |||||
Leadership | ||||||
Rating Santiago Abascal | 2.032 *** (0.105) | |||||
Rating Pablo Casado | 0.611 ** (0.155) | 0.686 * (0.157) | ||||
Rating Albert Rivera | 0.768 * (0.098) | |||||
Rating Pablo Iglesias | 0.747 ** (0.088) | 0.653 ** (0.139) | ||||
Sympathy and emotions | ||||||
Sympathy towards VOX | 39.251 *** (0.761) | |||||
Hope for Abascal | 40.564 ** (0.903) | |||||
Enthusiasm for Casado | 0.095 ** (0.845) | |||||
Enthusiasm for C’s | 0.235 * (0.670) | |||||
Anger towards PSOE | 3.583 * (0.587) | |||||
Constant | 0.108 *** (0.510) | 0.002 *** (0.797) | 0.001 *** (1.039) | 0.000 *** (1.064) | 0.007 *** (0.965) | 0.002 *** (1.153) |
Nagelkerke | 29.0% | 54.7% | 56.8% | 59.5% | 70.8% | 80.8% |
% Correct | 91.4 | 93.9 | 95.3 | 95.1 | 96.7 | 97.0 |
% Correctly predicted VOX observations | 0.0 | 47.3 | 58.2 | 56.9 | 75.0 | 77.8 |
% Correctly predicted Other parties observations | 100.0 | 98.1 | 98.7 | 98.4 | 98.7 | 98.7 |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Structural elements | |||||
Level of studies | 0.817 * (0.092) | 0.809 * (0.100) | |||
Income level | 1.173 ** (0.060) | 1.244 *** (0.067) | 1.375 *** (0.073) | 1.306 ** (0.100) | |
Catholics | 4.644 *** (0.261) | 4.229 *** (0.272) | 2.311 ** (0.298) | ||
Attitudes towards politics and institutions | |||||
Trust in democratic institutions | 0.917 * (0.045) | ||||
Will of the people | 0.831 *** (0.051) | ||||
Politicians talk too much | 1.155 ** (0.052) | ||||
Politics as complicated | 0.931 * (0.034) | ||||
Influence of voting | 0.916 ** (0.034) | 0.908 * (0.040) | 0.864 ** (0.055) | 0.900 * (0.054) | |
Cultural elements | |||||
Multiculturalism—Immigration | 1.256 *** (0.046) | 1.202 ** (0.067) | |||
Public services—Taxes | 1.170 ** (0.053) | ||||
Freedom—Safety | 1.296 *** (0.060) | ||||
Sexual freedom | 0.746 *** (0.060) | 0.722 *** (0.078) | 0.779 ** (0.020) | ||
Perceptive elements | |||||
Rating Santiago Abascal | 2.198 *** (0.080) | 1.899 *** (0.078) | |||
Rating Pedro Sánchez | 0.742 *** (0.102) | 0.757 *** (0.068) | |||
Rating Pablo Iglesias | 0.818 * (0.101) | ||||
Ideological elements | |||||
Ideological self-placement | 1.646 *** (0.133) | ||||
Sympathy towards VOX | 10.802 *** (0.569) | ||||
Constant | 0.062 *** (0.568) | 0.282 (0.896) | 0.020 (0.938 ***) | 0.136 *** (1.151) | −3.508 ** (0.867) |
Nagelkerke | 10.2% | 17.8% | 35.9% | 71.3% | 73.4% |
% Correct | 84.7 | 84.8 | 86.5 | 92.7 | 93.7 |
% Correctly predicted VOX observations | 0.0 | 5.5 | 25.4 | 68.0 | 72.4 |
% Correctly predicted Other parties observations | 100.0 | 99.2 | 97.0 | 97.1 | 97.4 |
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Jaráiz Gulías, E.; Castro Martínez, P.; Colomé García, G. The Emotional Dimension of the Spanish Far Right and Its Effects on Satisfaction with Democracy. Soc. Sci. 2022, 11, 475. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11100475
Jaráiz Gulías E, Castro Martínez P, Colomé García G. The Emotional Dimension of the Spanish Far Right and Its Effects on Satisfaction with Democracy. Social Sciences. 2022; 11(10):475. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11100475
Chicago/Turabian StyleJaráiz Gulías, Erika, Paloma Castro Martínez, and Gabriel Colomé García. 2022. "The Emotional Dimension of the Spanish Far Right and Its Effects on Satisfaction with Democracy" Social Sciences 11, no. 10: 475. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11100475