Corporate Social Responsibility with Chinese Characteristics: Institutional Embeddedness, Political Logic, and Comparative Theoretical Perspective

Abstract

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in China has evolved from reproducing Western-centric frameworks to engaging with the institutional and political particularities that shape how CSR is reconfigured and practiced. Yet few studies have critically reviewed this growing body of literature to capture the core characteristics and mechanisms of state-corporate coordination in China. This paper fills this gap by reviewing 112 peer-reviewed English-language studies published between 2007 and 2025, synthesizing how CSR in China is conceptualized, embedded, and operationalized across cultural, economic, political, and global dimensions. This review identifies three institutional logics structuring Chinese CSR: (1) moral–cultural framing rooted in Confucian ethics and socialist collectivism; (2) economic coordination under state-led capitalism and selective neoliberalism; and (3) political signaling through Party-state governance and legitimacy negotiation. It also outlines six major research themes—CSR as a legitimacy strategy, CSR reporting, CSR in Chinese multinational enterprises, CSR’s link to financial performance, environmental CSR, and civil CSR—highlighting the mechanisms underlying each. Findings show that CSR in China is different from the managerial-stakeholder framework (e.g., explicit/implicit CSR, pyramid model or integrative model). Instead, it operates as an adaptive political technology within state-led capitalism, reinforcing moral legitimacy and political conformity as firms—especially SOEs and politically connected private enterprises—align with state-defined priorities. Through a comparative perspective, this review demonstrates how China’s CSR model fundamentally recalibrates corporate agency toward political negotiation rather than stakeholder responsiveness, offering a distinct configuration that challenges the presumed universality of Western CSR theories.

1. Introduction

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has emerged as a global business norm, yet its implementation and underlying rationales remain profoundly embedded in distinct social–political systems. The dominant frame of CSR represented by Carroll’s Pyramid Model and Matten and Moon’s theory of explicit and implicit CSR still provides a useful taxonomy [1,2]. Recent scholarship has shifted towards holistic and integrated approaches—such as Creating Shared Value and ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) integration—which emphasize embedding social and environmental objectives into the core of business strategy and long-term value creation [3,4,5]. These approaches move beyond compartmentalized responsibilities to consider the systemic interplay of corporate actions across multiple domains. Nevertheless, these models can be categorized as the managerial-stakeholder framework within liberal democratic contexts where corporate conduct is shaped by market forces, civil society, and shareholder pressures.

The Chinese context presents a critical case that challenges and extends this evolved theoretical discourse. Here, the Party state exerts a dominant influence in defining the substance and practice of CSR, crafting a model that diverges fundamentally from its Western counterparts [6]. Since the reform and opening-up policy and especially its entering the World Trade Organization (WTO), the discourses of CSR were introduced in China as both a regulatory technology and a strategy of integrating into the global capitalist system. However, in China, CSR activities are neither defined by law-based regulation (as in the implicit system in Germany) nor the outcomes of corporate strategies for reputation (as in the explicit system in the US) [7]. Moreover, different from Carroll’s Pyramid Model, which states that CSR emerges from a progressive and ascending sense from economic responsibilities to legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities, the Chinese case reveals a “Politicized Pyramid” where political legitimacy is the foundational layer. In other words, economic responsibilities (e.g., job creation) are frequently mobilized as evidence of political loyalty; the interpretation and enforcement of legal responsibilities are heavily conditioned by shifting policy priorities; and ethical and philanthropic responsibilities function as explicit political expressions in response to state initiatives such as “common prosperity.” As a result, responsibility at each level primarily serves to affirm and reinforce overarching political logics, rather than reflecting an autonomous process of ethical evolution [8,9]. Recent development of an integrative approach to CSR or ESG frame, which assumes regulatory pluralism, civil society monitoring, and corporate agency in aligning social and financial goals, also struggles to explain Chinese CSR because it underestimates the primacy of top-down political imperatives. In China, integration across social, environmental, and economic fields is not a strategic corporate choice but a state-orchestrated mandate. The central logic is political conformity, not shared value creation, rendering stakeholder-driven models inadequate.

In this sense, some scholars consider CSR in China as “another oxymoron”, which cannot be easily captured by “given” and “Western” framework [7]. Instead, a line of research has revealed that corporations actively and visibly engage in explicit CSR programs—publishing reports, launching philanthropic initiatives—but they do so primarily in response to top-down political coercion and as a strategy for institutional survival within a state-dominated landscape. This framework is politically mediated, instrumentally deployed, and institutionally embedded within the country’s unique governance system [10,11]. Although an increasing number of studies have examined CSR in China, few have critically reviewed this body of literature to elucidate the core characteristics and underlying mechanisms of state–corporate coordination, nor have they fully theorized the implications of this model for mainstream CSR theory. This paper addresses this gap by conducting a critical review of peer-reviewed CSR scholarship on China published between 2007 and 2025.

It advances two core contributions. First, we clarify the ways in which CSR is embedded in and operates through China’s unique social–cultural, economic, and political contexts. In doing so, it challenges the presumed universality of the Western managerial-stakeholder framework of CSR, by demonstrating how China’s institutional context produces a hybrid form of CSR that integrates localized ethical-symbolic culture with the instrumental pursuit of political resources. The literature reveals that CSR in China serves a dual purpose: as a vessel for cultural–ethical expression (e.g., he [harmony], li [reciprocity]) and as a strategic-political instrument for signaling compliance and managing risk. This duality places Chinese CSR at the intersection of cultural legitimacy and political utility. Second, we outline key research frontiers, including topics such as state-corporate relations, CSR’s relations to political legitimacy and financial performance, and CSR as a response to globalization.

In general, rather than functioning as a discrete ethical choice, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in China operates as an adaptive political technology. It syncretically integrates Confucian ethics (e.g., relational harmony, collective duty), socialist developmentalism (e.g., state-led redistribution), and neoliberal governance (e.g., competitiveness) to simultaneously serve state and corporate interests. We argue that CSR in China as an adaptive political technology operates through interrelated mechanisms. First, a signaling mechanism enables firms to demonstrate cooperation and compliance with local governments by participating in state-endorsed initiatives such as targeted poverty alleviation. Second, a risk-hedging mechanism allows proactive CSR investments to serve as political safeguards, helping firms obtain regulatory leniency and buffer against policy uncertainty. Third, a resource-conversion mechanism facilitates the transformation of political compliance into tangible economic advantages, including access to critical resources such as credit and land. In general, these three mechanisms constitute the dynamics of corporate-state relationships in China where CSR governance and accountability are embedded [7,12].

However, in contrast to Hofman, Moon, and Wu’s theorization of the Chinese CSR model—where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are seen as more concerned with local reputation, while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reflect political expectations—we argue that SMEs are more likely to engage in CSR as a means of exchanging for political resources. It is important to clarify the scope of this review. The English-language, peer-reviewed literature that we synthesize focuses primarily on large, visible, and often state-influenced corporations—such as listed firms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and politically connected private giants—which are the main carriers and targets of state-driven CSR. This is partially due to the large corporations biased in existing research on CSR in China. Accordingly, our findings may not fully reflect the practices of small and medium-sized private firms (SMEs) whose CSR is likely shaped more by local networks, market pressures, and family values. Accordingly, we call for greater attention to three emerging directions: the locally embedded CSR practices of small and medium-sized enterprises; the reconfiguration of corporate responsibility amid geopolitical fragmentation and supply chain decoupling; and the transformative effects of digital technologies on CSR governance and accountability under China’s digital regime.

2. Materials and Methods

To achieve our research objective of surveying the literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) implementation in China, we adopted a critical literature review approach that highlights the analytical depth required to advance knowledge rather than simply annotating bibliographies [13], making them particularly valuable for mapping the evolving landscape of CSR studies and its utility in Chinese contexts. The objective is to synthesize how CSR has been conceptualized, contextualized, and operationalized in China, particularly under its distinct socio-political and economic institutions.

The search and selection strategy were designed to ensure broad and rigorous coverage of the relevant literature across management, business ethics, and institutional studies. This review focused on peer-reviewed academic literature published between 2007 and early 2025—a period marked by China’s rapid economic liberalization, increasing global integration, and intensified domestic political centralization. 2007 marks the earliest year in which research on Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility can be identified in the Web of Science (WoS) database.

To ensure methodological rigor and reproducibility, this review exclusively utilized the Web of Science core database. This choice prioritizes a replicable search process within a single, authoritative source known for its selective, high-quality coverage of peer-reviewed journals. Concentrating on WoS streamlines the screening process by eliminating complexities from merging multiple databases, ensuring consistency, and allowing for a focused, rigorous evaluation of the most credible and influential literature relevant to CSR in China. To structure the search process, a set of primary and secondary keywords was used in Boolean combinations, tailored to each database’s syntax. The main search strings included (“Corporate Social Responsibility” OR “CSR”) AND (“China” OR “Chinese firm”). Results were restricted to journals in business, management, political economy, and ethics to maintain disciplinary coherence.

The screening and selection process followed a structured, multi-stage protocol, comprehensively documented in the PRISMA flow diagram (Figure 1). Initial searches yielded 1025 records. After deduplication and an initial relevance screening of titles and abstracts, 437 articles remained. These were then subjected to a more detailed evaluation based on inclusion and exclusion criteria. Articles were included if they focused substantively on CSR in the Chinese context, contributed empirical or theoretical insights relevant to management research, and were published in peer-reviewed journals. Exclusions were made for book reviews, editorials, non-peer-reviewed reports, and studies only tangentially related to CSR (e.g., purely environmental regulation or consumer activism without firm-level focus). We subsequently conduct the quality and impact assessment to ensure the credibility of the paper. Papers were prioritized based on (1) Journal ranking (e.g., ABS, FT50, or JCR Q1/Q2 journals); (2) Citation impact (Studies cited fewer than five times within three years of publication are excluded.); (3) Methodological rigor (empirical studies with robust data, theoretical contributions). After full-text quality assessment,112 representative articles were retained for final synthesis. These included both qualitative case studies and quantitative empirical analyses, enabling a cross-method triangulation of findings.

Table 1. Articles with the highest citation count in the literature on CSR in China.

Rank	Author and Year	Title	Journal	Citations	Major Concerns
1	Marquis C. and Qian CL. 2014 [14]	Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance?	Organization Science	1158	political governance, corporate–state nexus, state-own enterprises
2	Li WJ. and Zhang R. 2010 [15]	Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Political Interference: Evidence from China	Journal of Business Ethics	491	political interference in state-owned and non-state-owned firms
3	Lau CM., Lu Y. and Liang Q. 2016 [11]	Corporate Social Responsibility in China: A Corporate Governance Approach	Journal of Business Ethics	355	CSR and corporate governance mechanisms
4	Tian Z., Wang, R. and Yang W. 2011 [16]	Consumer Responses to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in China	Journal of Business Ethics	339	consumer response and corporate performance
5	Liao L., Lin T. and Zhang YY. 2018 [17]	Corporate Board and Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance: Evidence from China	Journal of Business Ethics	333	corporate board and voluntary CSR assurance decision
6	Yin JY. and Zhang YL. 2012 [18]	Institutional Dynamics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in an Emerging Country Context: Evidence from China	Journal of Business Ethics	323	institutional embeddedness of CSR in China
7	Ye KT. and Zhang R. 2011 [19]	Do Lenders Value Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence from China	Journal of Business Ethics	246	CSR and financial performance
8	Wei ZL. et al. 2017 [20]	How Does Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility Matter in a Dysfunctional Institutional Environment? Evidence from China	Journal of Business Ethics	235	environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) and environmental governance
9	Liu X. and Zhang C. 2017 [21]	Corporate governance, social responsibility information disclosure, and enterprise value in China	Journal of Cleaner Production	203	CSR reporting and environment governance
10	Hao J and He F. 2022 [22]	Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance and green innovation: Evidence from China	Financial Research Letters	190	CSR reporting and environment governance

Source: Web of Science core database.

presents the most highly cited articles in the literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in China.

To critically explore how CSR knowledge and practices are embedded in China’s unique institutional contexts and identify dominant research themes, we employed a qualitative thematic coding approach that blended inductive and deductive logic. Guided by an interpretivist framework, our analysis foregrounded the interplay between firm-level CSR behaviors and China’s socio-political structures—a perspective critical for contextualizing CSR within state-led capitalism. Articles were imported into NVivo for iterative coding, beginning with first-level contextual annotations capturing how CSR intersects with China’s institutional realities (e.g., political legitimacy dynamics, Confucian ethics, state capitalism). Subsequent second-level coding identified recurring mechanisms through which these contexts shape CSR, such as regulatory signaling, Party-state alignment, and socialist value socialization.

The coding process explicitly engaged embeddedness theory and political economy perspectives to theorize how CSR functions amid China’s coercive (e.g., state mandates), normative (e.g., socialist moralization), and mimetic (e.g., peer imitation) institutional pressures. This framework rejected assumptions of CSR as purely voluntary or stakeholder-driven, instead positioning it as an adaptive practice within China’s top-down governance model. Through axial coding, we synthesized findings into three interconnected domains of contextual embeddedness: (1) Socio-cultural foundations, where CSR is mediated by Confucian relationalism and socialist collectivism; (2) Economic institutions, highlighting how state-owned enterprise reforms and neoliberal policy tools reconfigure CSR incentives; (3) Political governance, exposing Party-state supervision and ideological mobilization of CSR.

This method enabled us to transcend descriptive synthesis toward contextual theorization. By prioritizing China’s institutional logics—rather than applying Western-derived CSR frameworks—we uncovered how thematic patterns in the literature (e.g., CSR as political legitimacy, CSR and financial performance, CSR in globalizing Chinese firms, and civil CSR, etc.) reflect distinct national governance pathways. The systematic yet interpretively grounded design proved essential for isolating structural mechanisms obscured in purely quantitative reviews, while thematic clustering exposed tensions between global CSR norms and local institutional imperatives. Ultimately, this approach advanced our core objective: to de-Westernize CSR theory by mapping its embeddedness in China’s non-liberal ecosystem, revealing CSR as a site of state-firm negotiation rather than universalist ethics. A full coding process is displayed in Figure 2.

3. The Local Embeddedness of Corporate Social Responsibility in China

3.1. The Social-Cultural Context: Confucianism and Socialist Harmonious Society

Traditional Confucian ethics, Marxist–Leninist socialism, and the state-promoted vision of a “harmonious society” (和谐社会, hexie shehui) jointly form the moral-political terrain in which Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in China has evolved. As the imported business discourses, CSR must be ethically compatible with both Chinese normative cultural tradition and what the state calls the “socialist harmonious society”.

At its core, Chinese CSR reflects a Confucian moral universe that privileges social harmony, ethical cultivation, and role-based duties. As Wang and Juslin argue, Confucianism provides a distinct, culturally grounded philosophical basis for CSR in China, which they term the “harmony approach.” This perspective is not merely an ethical add-on but is central to understanding the motivations and manifestations of CSR in a Chinese context [23]. While Western stakeholder theory often involves managing and balancing competing interests, the Confucian approach seeks to harmonize these interests, emphasizing mutual benefit and collective well-being over individual rights or adversarial negotiation [24,25]. The harmony approach fundamentally rejects the notion that a company’s sole responsibility is to its shareholders. Its responsibilities are diffused across a network of relationships, with a primary duty to maintain social stability and harmony.

Core virtues such as ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), and li (propriety) constitute this normative framework. The junzi (exemplary person)—a moral archetype of leadership—anchors corporate conduct in ethical authority rather than procedural rules. The junzi virtues therefore provide a leadership model that emphasizes CSR as an inner moral cultivation and self-regulation over external accountability, legal compliance [26]. Under such a model, Confucian ethics does not reject profit-seeking per se; rather, it seeks to moralize profit making by aligning it with collective good and social legitimacy. Empirical work by Low and Ang and Wang, Li, and Sun suggests that corporate leaders and especially that of family-owned enterprises often engage Confucianism to enhance stakeholder loyalty and organizational legitimacy [24,25]. Firms operate within a dense field of ethical expectation and state surveillance. Consequently, CSR in China frequently concentrates on areas such as education funding, disaster relief, and rural assistance—domains where moral obligation intersects with political utility. Huang et al. demonstrate that firms headquartered in Confucian-influenced regions are significantly more active in poverty alleviation initiatives, suggesting regional moral cultures still shape corporate priorities [27]. Meanwhile, Li et al. argue that Confucian norms operate as informal governance tools: in the absence of rigorous enforcement, firms adhere to moral expectations to preserve guanxi-based legitimacy and avoid reputational sanctions [28]. The concept of guanxi—relational networks encompassing trust, obligation, and reciprocal ties—further deepens CSR’s embeddedness in affective accountability rather than rule-based compliance [29].

Confucianism is adopted not only as a corporate governance value but also a broader ideological matrix. Since the early 2000s, the Chinese state has strategically reanimated traditional ethics alongside socialist doctrine under the banner of the “harmonious society.” Originally articulated by Hu Jintao and later reframed within Xi Jinping’s “common prosperity” campaign, this ideology attempts to reconcile economic dynamism with social cohesion and normative governance. As See notes, hexie shehui is not mere political rhetoric; it provides a guiding logic for CSR policy, linking corporate legitimacy to national developmental goals [30]. In this context, firms are expected to fulfill roles as “social stabilizers”. In other words, enterprises are required not only to properly manage labor relations and prevent consequent social conflicts but also to actively align with national strategic priorities by supporting poverty alleviation, rural revitalization, and environmental sustainability. It is not just for reputational benefits but as an expression of political alignment and moral-political responsibility.

The socialist and communist ideologies in China further politicize Confucianism-based CSR as not only collective well-being and egalitarian ethics but also state-defined priorities and governance imperatives. This politicization is particularly evident in regulatory expectations and incentive structures, where CSR reporting, philanthropic initiatives, and rural support programs often align with state campaigns. For example, tax incentives and public recognition systems selectively reward firms that support national development objectives. This alignment constitutes a soft regulatory environment that blends coercion with moral encouragement [31].

Yet, this Confucian-socialist model is not without friction. The non-confrontational, harmony-oriented ethos may conflict with global CSR norms that stress stakeholder voice, transparency, and independent auditability. The drive for harmonious consensus can inhibit dissent, suppress critical oversight, and produce performative compliance. As See argues, such orientations risk masking systemic risks and discouraging organizational learning [30]. Ip also critically notes that Confucianism’s inherent hierarchy can render this model paternalistic and opaque. Without modern governance safeguards—transparent systems, legal accountability, and stakeholder participation—the top-down authority it reinforces may suppress dissent and prioritize political compliance over genuine social good [32]. Moreover, CSR’s fusion with ideological alignment raises questions about its voluntariness. State-linked CSR initiatives may function more as political signaling—evidencing regime loyalty—than as authentic commitments to ethical business.

3.2. The Economic Context: Between State-Led Capitalism and Neoliberalism

China’s model of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is shaped by a distinctive configuration of state-led capitalism and selective neoliberal governance, producing a political-economic logic in which CSR is not the outcome of civil society pressure or corporate moral awakening but a state-institutionalized mechanism aligned with developmental and ideological objectives [7]. Unlike in liberal capitalist systems—where CSR is often premised on stakeholder autonomy and voluntary engagement—in China, CSR operates as a tool of regime-preserving governance, simultaneously serving political signaling, performance management, and market-facing legitimacy.

At the heart of this model lies China’s form of state-led capitalism, characterized by extensive government ownership, strategic policy steering, and Party penetration into corporate governance. As Lin and Milhaupt explain, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not merely commercial actors but function as administrative extensions of the state [33,34]. Their CSR performance is thus embedded within political mandates and legitimacy goals. The state leverages CSR to direct resources toward national campaigns—such as poverty alleviation, rural revitalization, and ecological civilization—transforming CSR into a soft governance mechanism to guide firm behavior in line with state-defined priorities.

This logic is further reinforced by the institutionalization of CSR through top-down policy instruments. Documents like the Guidelines for Central Enterprises’ Social Responsibility (2016) embed CSR into the formal apparatus of cadre evaluation and performance review, particularly for SOEs. As Hofman, Moon, and Wu observe, this model subordinates CSR responsiveness to stakeholder pluralism in favor of compliance with state-defined metrics [7]. Conceptually, CSR is tethered to ideological visions such as “Common Prosperity” and “Ecological Civilization,” which function as both normative frameworks and governance scripts [12,35].

Alongside these political imperatives, elements of neoliberal governance—particularly those linked to capital markets and global competitiveness—have introduced performance-based incentives for CSR. Firms, especially those operating across borders or listed in liberalized exchanges (e.g., Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect), face increasing pressure to manage their reputations and disclosure practices. Mechanisms such as ESG ratings and investor expectations encourage CSR engagement, but this engagement remains narratively aligned with state priorities. As Marquis and Qian and Yang, Wang, and Luo note, even where CSR disclosures increase under market reform, the substance of these disclosures often mirrors official discourse rather than independent accountability to civil society [14,36]. This results in a strategically selective neoliberalism: market logics are tolerated and even encouraged but only to the extent that they reinforce or do not conflict with politically acceptable narratives. Firms that actively promote state-endorsed initiatives—such as the Belt and Road Initiative, targeted poverty relief, or green development—are rewarded with preferential access to land, loans, subsidies, and regulatory flexibility. As Li and Belal show, this alignment becomes an informal currency of favor, particularly for Chinese multinationals seeking both global legitimacy and domestic political security [37].

Another neoliberal logic manifests in the state’s practice of enlisting enterprises to take on roles in providing social services and welfare, filling gaps left by the public sector in the absence of a strong civil society. This is particularly evident in the firms operating within the county scale, where local government has limited financial capacity in social services. For example, Jingbo and Natalie’s study of local enterprises’ engagement in the Anhui rural education reveals how corporations are mobilized to address educational resource gaps amid local fiscal constraints. This CSR mechanism effectively transforms enterprises into surrogate public goods providers, demonstrating the neoliberal rationalization of social service delivery within China’s distinctive state-corporate governance framework [38]. These localized CSR activities are also often facilitated by clan associations and their core cultural values of glorifying ancestors. Wang, Tang and Wang’s research indicates that clan values reinforce this mechanism by fostering CEOs’ long-term orientation for legacy building and strengthening collectivist ethics for broader stakeholder consideration [39]. This dual governance model—combining state-led mobilization with cultural drivers—demonstrates China’s distinctive corporate governance path, where neoliberal rationalization coexists with persistent traditional values in shaping CSR practices.

Within this hybrid structure, CSR often takes on a performative character—valued not for its ethical substance, but for its function as symbolic compliance with state ideology. CSR becomes a formal metric within the cadre evaluation system and a political signal, rather than an arena of ethical deliberation. Even in sectors where privatization and global integration are pronounced, firms must continuously calibrate between market competitiveness and political loyalty. This performance is enabled and regulated by the state’s control over public discourse. While public awareness of CSR has increased, especially among urban consumers, such awareness is filtered through state-framed narratives and censored media environments. Some research suggests that Chinese consumer evaluations of CSR can be significantly influenced by factors such as nationalism (particularly in contexts of international tensions), trust in SOEs, and state-framed reputational cues [40,41,42]. Independent civil society actors—such as NGOs, watchdogs, or investigative media—face structural constraints, limiting their ability to pressure firms into substantive CSR reform. As Tian, Wang, and Yang show, public CSR expectations are mediated through state-managed channels, including government-endorsed rankings, televised CSR awards, and official coverage of philanthropic acts [16].

3.3. The Political Context: Political Legitimacy and Party-State Embeddedness

For firms under direct Party-state influence (notably SOEs and private enterprises with political ties), CSR is not a neutral expression of corporate ethics or stakeholder responsiveness but a deeply politicized tool embedded in the logic of authoritarian governance. CSR serves as a mechanism for regime legitimation, elite coordination, and policy implementation, rather than a vehicle for transparency or accountability. It reflects a distinctive institutional configuration in which the boundaries between state, enterprise, and market are porous. Political incentives and ideological imperatives increasingly shape corporate behavior, especially under Xi Jinping’s consolidation of centralized Party control [43]. The following analysis of political embeddedness applies most directly to firms where the Party state’s presence and leverage are strongest: namely, SOEs and private enterprises with formal Party organizations or deep political connections. The mechanisms of signaling and bargaining described here are most visible in this segment.

The Communist Party’s penetration into corporate governance is central to this system. Through Party committees, cadre appointments, and joint initiatives, the state exercises direct influence over enterprise decisions—most visibly in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but increasingly in private firms as well. SOEs are mobilized to fulfill politically defined goals like poverty alleviation, rural revitalization, and regional stability [15], functioning less as market actors than as administrative arms of the Party state. Private firms, meanwhile, are brought into the fold through a mix of incentives, surveillance, and ideological alignment. Xu and Liu show that politically connected firms—especially those led by Party-affiliated executives—are significantly more likely to engage in CSR projects aligned with central priorities, including donations to government foundations or participation in policy-themed campaigns [44]. These activities are not neutral gestures of goodwill but symbolic acts of compliance exchanged for regulatory leniency, market access, and protection from political risk.

CSR in this context is highly performative and temporally calibrated. Firms strategically time their philanthropic disclosures and public responsibility initiatives around key political events, such as Party Congresses or leadership transitions. Empirical evidence confirms a distinct political cycle in Chinese CSR disclosure, where reporting is strategically timed to key political and bureaucratic calendars. Song et al. find that non-state-owned enterprises significantly increase CSR reporting around National Party Congresses, a pattern interpreted as proactive signaling of loyalty to the Party state during politically salient moments [45]. Extending this insight, Zhang et al. trace a similar disclosure rhythm to the promotion cycles of local officials. Their analysis reveals that firms amplify reporting to help local cadres meet social governance targets, a practice that cultivates political goodwill and facilitates economic rent-seeking [46].

This performativity is enabled by a weak civil society: with NGOs under strict oversight and independent media curtailed, firms can selectively disclose favorable CSR activities while obscuring failures or harms. Political loyalty is further reinforced through the ideological socialization of corporate elites. In this sense, Party-affiliated managers tend to treat CSR as a political obligation centered on regime stability and policy alignment, while non-affiliated executives often adopt a minimalist, compliance-oriented approach [47,48]. In this way, CSR becomes a tool of bureaucratic capitalism—a means for firms to accumulate symbolic political capital rather than enact genuine social responsibility [48].

Beyond the central state, local governments also appropriate CSR as a governance tool. Municipal officials frequently leverage enterprise CSR contributions to fulfill administrative targets such as employment, infrastructure, or social services—often without direct fiscal input. Fan et al. describe this as “multi-level CSR bargaining,” where firms must navigate a fragmented but potent matrix of political expectations across administrative levels [49]. Symbolic compliance often outweighs substantive engagement, as companies tailor their CSR strategies to the demands of specific officials, regions, or campaigns. The Alibaba case is emblematic: after facing regulatory crackdowns, the company pledged 100 billion RMB to the “Common Prosperity” campaign—ostensibly a philanthropic gesture, but widely understood as a reputational and political recalibration. Similar patterns are observable elsewhere: real estate developers offering discounted housing to cadres, energy firms investing in branded green initiatives, or food companies promoting rural aid during leadership visits. These are not isolated cases but structural features of how CSR operates under Chinese state-led capitalism.

Yet this model is riddled with contradictions. First, it displaces core CSR values by subordinating transparency, equity, and human rights to regime-defined political objectives. Second, it distorts market competition, privileging firms with stronger political connections over those with innovative or efficient business models. Third, it risks hollowing out the legitimacy of CSR itself: as Zhou et al. caution, when CSR becomes symbolic and cyclical compliance, public trust erodes, and corporate responsibility is reduced to opportunistic signaling [50]. Meanwhile, the regime faces growing tension between its performative CSR model and rising domestic and international expectations. Urban consumers and younger workers increasingly demand genuine ethical practices, while global investors and ESG frameworks push for credible disclosures and rights-based accountability. Whether the Party state can adapt CSR to accommodate these pressures without weakening its political control remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that CSR in China cannot be understood as a conventional business practice. It is a node in the architecture of authoritarian governance—linking firms to the state not only through regulation and incentives, but through ideology, performance, and symbolic power.

4. Key Research Agendas of CSR in China

The following key research themes respond to the institutional logics outlined in Section 3. Rather than being universal CSR topics, these agendas bear distinctive Chinese imprints, shaped by the interplay of cultural ethics, state-led capitalism, and political governance. The following sections synthesize five dominant research streams, each of which can be traced back to the institutional embeddedness of CSR in China: the strategic pursuit of political legitimacy (Section 4.1), the symbolic and coercive nature of reporting (Section 4.2), the bifurcated pressures on multinational enterprises (Section 4.3), the contingent relationship between CSR and financial performance (Section 4.4), and the politically charged domain of environmental CSR (Section 4.5). An emergent sixth theme—civil CSR beyond the state paradigm (Section 4.6)—reveals the boundaries and tensions within this dominant model.

4.1. CSR as a Legitimacy Strategy for Private Firms

A substantial body of research shows that CSR functions primarily as a legitimacy strategy for private firms in China, providing the clearest empirical support for the politicized governance logic at the core of China’s CSR model (Section 3.3). Because the Party state holds embedded authority and controls key economic resources within a state-capitalist system (Section 3.2), CSR is transformed from a voluntary ethical activity into a strategic tool for political negotiation and corporate survival. Unlike SOEs, private firms lack formal political protection, making CSR especially important for managing their relationship with the state [51].

First, CSR operates through a signaling and conformity mechanism. In the absence of a strong civil society and independent media (a defining feature of the political context), the primary audience for CSR is the state rather than the public. Private firms therefore adopt highly visible, state-aligned CSR initiatives to signal political loyalty, compliance with ideological campaigns such as “Common Prosperity,” and alignment with official goals of building a “harmonious society” (Section 3.1). Empirical research by Bergman et al. shows that private firms deliberately pursue high-profile CSR to attract favorable attention from political actors, using legitimacy as a strategic resource to offset their weaker formal ties to the state [52]. Similarly, Song et al. demonstrate that non-SOEs significantly increase CSR disclosure when their formal political connections—such as politically connected executives—decline, indicating that CSR functions as a flexible tool for ongoing compliance signaling and reputational repair rather than a static reporting obligation [45].

Second, this performative conformity activates a resource-exchange mechanism, through which CSR is converted into tangible state-controlled benefits [49]. A robust literature review confirms that CSR alignment—particularly in policy-prioritized areas such as poverty alleviation—generates economic and regulatory advantages, effectively operating as political capital. Firms with stronger CSR performance are more likely to receive government subsidies, tax reductions, preferential access to state-backed loans, and public procurement contracts [53,54,55]. Dai et al. directly link higher-quality CSR disclosure to increased government subsidies, framing disclosure as a practical investment in political goodwill [56]. This exchange is as1ymmetrical: failure to meet implicit state expectations may result in regulatory scrutiny, loss of licenses, or exclusion from state-sponsored projects [57]. CSR thus becomes a central medium in an ongoing state–corporate bargain within China’s politically mediated market system.

Third, CSR functions as a risk-hedging and insurance mechanism in a volatile policy environment characterized by periodic top-down campaigns. Proactive investment in state-endorsed CSR—such as large-scale donations following regulatory crackdowns by firms like Alibaba and Tencent—allows companies to accumulate reserves of political goodwill [58]. These reserves can mitigate regulatory severity, secure forbearance, or buffer firms during political realignments [59]. Chowdhury et al.’s concept of CSR as a strategic “real option” under geopolitical and policy uncertainty is especially relevant here, reframing CSR spending as a low-cost investment in political flexibility and social capital rather than a discretionary expense [59].

Finally, these mechanisms are further institutionalized through the expanding presence of CCP branches within private firms, which embeds the Party state directly into corporate governance structures [60]. Yao, Zhang, and Ma find that Party organizations significantly increase firms’ CSR engagement, particularly in philanthropic activities aligned with state campaigns [60]. Acting as internal interpreters of policy signals, these Party branches help firms anticipate and respond proactively to shifting political priorities, thereby operationalizing the deep political embeddedness of corporate strategy in China [61,62].

4.2. CSR Reporting

The literature on Corporate Social Responsibility reporting (CSRR) in China consistently identifies a reporting regime that differs from Western models not only in form but also in its underlying logic, standards of quality, and accountability orientation. While China’s deeper integration into the global economy has increased exposure to international market and stakeholder pressures, CSR reporting remains primarily shaped by state mediation rather than by pluralistic stakeholder accountability. As a result, many scholars observe that leading Chinese firms—especially those listed overseas—have developed a discursive duality: they simultaneously deploy state-aligned political narratives for domestic legitimacy while selectively incorporating globally recognizable managerial rationales such as risk management, operational efficiency, and reputational capital to engage international audiences [63].

A defining feature of Chinese CSRR is the central role of mandatory disclosure and state coordination. Initial reporting requirements were introduced through stock exchange mandates targeting key listed firms, particularly SOEs, thereby institutionalizing CSR disclosure as a bureaucratic and political obligation rather than a voluntary accountability mechanism [64]. This system produces strong coercive isomorphism, as firms conform to state-defined templates to secure legitimacy and avoid regulatory sanctions [65]. For example, companies included in indices such as the SSE 180 and Shenzhen 100 are required to publish sustainability or CSR reports following standardized guidelines issued or endorsed by state authorities. These guidelines explicitly require alignment with national policy agendas such as “Ecological Civilization” and “Common Prosperity,” embedding political priorities directly into disclosure content.

However, the literature also highlights significant limitations in reporting quality and credibility under this model. Marquis and Qian argue that state-led CSRR often results in systematic decoupling, where disclosures prioritize ideological conformity and symbolic alignment over verifiable performance outcomes [14]. Unlike Western systems—where reporting quality is increasingly assessed through standardized metrics, external benchmarks, and independent assurance—Chinese CSR reports rely heavily on narrative statements, policy references, and selective indicators [66]. Independent third-party verification remains limited, and assurance practices are neither widespread nor institutionally robust, reducing the credibility and comparability of disclosed information [67]. Media and reputational signals, framed within state discourse, further substitute for external scrutiny, marginalizing the role of civil society and professional assurance bodies.

In contrast, Western CSR reporting regimes are embedded in multi-stakeholder governance systems, where disclosure quality is shaped by investor scrutiny, civil society monitoring, and standardized frameworks such as GRI, SASB/ISSB, and, more recently, the CSRD [63]. These frameworks emphasize materiality assessment, quantitative indicators, and independent assurance as core components of accountability. As a result, reporting credibility in Western contexts is tied less to political alignment and more to market-based evaluation and stakeholder verification.

Nonetheless, global isomorphic pressures have generated partial convergence at the surface level. Ervits shows that the largest Chinese corporations increasingly produce CSR reports that quantitatively resemble those of U.S. and European firms, particularly in structure, indicator density, and visual presentation [68]. This convergence, however, reflects strategic adaptation rather than normative alignment: global reporting formats are adopted to enhance international legitimacy, while the substantive content remains filtered through domestic political priorities.

A further cleavage in Chinese CSRR emerges between SOEs and private firms. For SOEs, CSR reporting is an institutionalized political duty and an extension of their mandate to implement state development objectives [69]. Their reports function primarily as upward accountability instruments directed at government authorities. By contrast, private firms—especially SMEs—use CSR reporting strategically to compensate for their weaker political standing. Lacking the embedded legitimacy of SOEs, they deploy CSR disclosure to accumulate political capital, signal compliance, and gain access to subsidies, preferential policies, and regulatory forbearance [70,71]. Empirical studies show that private firms often mimic SOE reporting styles and state-preferred narratives as a way to manage regulatory risk and demonstrate political alignment [72].

Taken together, these patterns reflect deeper politico-economic differences in CSR reporting regimes. Liberal market economies rely on CSR disclosure to operationalize a social contract between firms, markets, and society through standardized, externally verified reporting frameworks. By contrast, China’s state-capitalist system uses CSR reporting to formalize a political compact between firms and the Party state, where alignment with national goals and ideological narratives outweigh transparency and independent accountability [63,73]. Consequently, while Western accountability flows outward toward multiple stakeholders, Chinese CSR reporting remains predominantly upward-facing, reinforcing the centrality of political alignment in shaping disclosure quality, credibility, and purpose.

4.3. Globalization, Supply Chain and CSR in Multinational Enterprises

Research on Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) offers a valuable lens for examining the interaction and tension between global CSR norms and the domestic institutional logics of Party state governance and state-led capitalism (Section 3.2 and Section 3.3). This literature shows that Chinese MNEs neither simply converge with international CSR standards nor mechanically export a domestic political model [74,75]. Instead, they engage in strategic hybridization, adapting CSR practices to operate within a dual—and often conflicting—institutional environment. This process is shaped by three interrelated forces: (1) the geopolitical and economic ambitions of the Chinese state, (2) legitimacy pressures in host countries, and (3) the governance structure of global production networks.

First, the geopolitical infrastructure of state capitalism—most notably the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—reshapes the strategic role of CSR. As an extension of China’s state-led developmentalism (Section 3.2), the BRI lowers certain political risks through diplomatic backing, while simultaneously heightening firms’ exposure to social and environmental risks in host societies. CSR thus shifts from a peripheral concern to a core operational issue. Empirical studies support this argument. Using the BRI as a natural experiment, Zhao et al. find that Chinese firms significantly increase CSR disclosure in BRI host countries relative to other overseas investments [76]. This pattern is strongest among SOEs and firms in infrastructure and resource-intensive sectors, suggesting that CSR functions as a pre-emptive risk-management tool to secure a “social license to operate” and to contain reputational or political backlash that could jeopardize both corporate performance and state interests [76]. In this sense, overseas CSR becomes an instrument for managing the social externalities of state-coordinated globalization.

Second, internationalization operates as a mechanism of forced learning and selective adaptation. Exposure to stricter regulations and more demanding stakeholder environments compels Chinese MNEs to adopt more formalized and transparent CSR practices in order to overcome the “liability of emergingness” and gain legitimacy in host markets [77,78]. While this process can generate genuine learning and capability building, it does not result in wholesale convergence with global norms. Instead, CSR practices are filtered through domestic logics of political conformity and geopolitical alignment [79,80]. For example, environmental initiatives abroad may be framed not only as compliance with international standards but also as contributions to China’s “Ecological Civilization” or as evidence of “win–win cooperation” under the BRI. The result is a dual-purpose CSR strategy: operational practices are tailored to external legitimacy demands, while their discursive framing remains aligned with domestic ideological priorities.

Third, within global supply chains, CSR operates as a reputational buffer and form of social capital, but its drivers are largely external and hierarchical. The literature distinguishes between externally driven CSR in global value chains and politically driven CSR in domestic supply chains. For Chinese suppliers serving Western MNEs, CSR is typically imposed as a condition for market access, as lead firms seek to protect themselves from reputational risk. Compliance, while often necessary for securing contracts, frequently takes a ceremonial or decoupled form [81,82]. By contrast, in domestic supply chains dominated by SOEs or state procurement, CSR priorities are shaped by national policy agendas, such as “dual carbon” goals, reflecting the inward-facing political logic discussed in Section 3.3. Importantly, research shows that strong CSR performance by overseas subsidiaries can shield the entire MNE group from reputational damage linked to domestic controversies, effectively functioning as an insurance mechanism [82,83]. For example, Chi’s study of the Chinese textile and apparel industry demonstrates how supplier-level CSR practices—largely driven by pressure from international buyers—are selectively adopted to satisfy external audits and stabilize export relationships, while remaining weakly institutionalized within firms’ broader governance structures. This case illustrates how CSR in global supply chains functions less as an internally embedded ethical commitment than as a strategic response to externally imposed legitimacy requirements, reinforcing the hierarchical and instrumental character of CSR diffusion in export-oriented Chinese industries [84,85].

In sum, research on Chinese MNEs highlights CSR as a site of ongoing institutional negotiation. Firms must continuously balance global market pressures for legitimacy with domestic political and ideological expectations. The outcome is not convergence but hybridization: CSR simultaneously serves as a risk-management tool for state-backed globalization, a legitimacy strategy in host-country markets, and a politically aligned narrative for domestic audiences.

4.4. CSR and Financial Performance

Research on the CSR-financial performance (CFP) link in China provides a critical test case for how the nation’s political-economic context actively shapes, rather than merely backgrounds, the economic value of social responsibility. The central finding is one of radical contingency: the financial return on CSR is not an intrinsic property but is mediated through specific institutional channels derived from China‘s model of state-led capitalism and its pervasive political logic (Section 3.2 and Section 3.3). The literature has evolved from asking if CSR pays to analyzing how political and market structures filter CSR investments into financial outcomes.

First, the existing literature has reached a consensus that the CSR-CFP relationship is not a direct line but a complex pathway shaped by government influence, market forces, and internal firm characteristics. Early work like Chen and Wang and the meta-analysis by Wang, Dou, and Jia establish that a generally positive correlation exists, but it is highly sensitive to contextual factors and especially political power [86,87]. The work of Long et al. explicitly models how government intervention and market competition act as critical levers [88]. Recent research has revealed that the influence of the Chinese government and institutional pressures on dynamics of transforming CSR to CFP is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Chinese government intervention can serve as an amplifier that strengthens the positive impact of CSR on CFP. In this sense, Chinese state operates as a “helping hand,” where the state rewards socially responsible firms with subsidies, preferential policies, and market access, thereby directly translating CSR investments into financial gains [88]. On the contrary, the political ties sometimes also result in a lock-in effect that firms must invest in CSR in the long term without efficient financial returns. Here, Wang, Reimsbach, and Braam’s research is critical. They introduce a crucial caveat with their concept of “political embeddedness” [89]. They argue that deep political connections can lead to a trade-off, where firms are pressured into undertaking CSR activities that are politically motivated but economically inefficient (e.g., over-staffing, non-strategic donations). In this scenario, CSR becomes a cost of doing business that can depress financial performance.

Second, ownership and the firms’ internal state constitute the institutional pressure from within: Some research finds that ownership structure, and in particular the presence of state-owned capital or the concentration of shares, significantly moderates the CSR-CFP link [90,91]. For instance, Ang et al. find that institutional investors, who favor long-term value, can strengthen the CSR-CFP link, while highly concentrated ownership might weaken it [90]. Moreover, the financial value of CSR is also filtered through the firm’s internal state. For example, the positive effects of CSR diminish or disappear for firms in financial trouble [87]. This can be explained by the “slack resources” theory: firms need financial breathing room to make CSR investments that yield long-term returns. Once firms are in crisis, survival outmatches CSR sustainability.

Third, research shows that not all CSR is created equal, which means that different CSR strategies can yield diverse effects on CFP. CSR activities that are aligned with the firm’s core competencies and business objectives (e.g., an energy company investing in clean tech) are far more likely to create shared value and improve financial performance than disconnected philanthropic acts. Some scholars argue for a disaggregated view, demonstrating that different dimensions of CSR (environmental, social, governance) have heterogeneous effects on financial outcomes [92,93]. A firm’s performance is not determined by its aggregate CSR score but by the specific mix of its social investments.

4.5. Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR)

Research on Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in China shows how political governance, state-led economic priorities, and market liberalization jointly shape a distinctive responsibility regime. Unlike other CSR domains where symbolic compliance may be sufficient, ECSR is marked by a close alignment between political mandates and technical implementation. This reflects the state’s elevation of environmental protection to a core pillar of national legitimacy and long-term economic planning, making environmental performance both a political and an operational concern for firms.

Since the launch of the “Ecological Civilization” agenda in 2007 and the tightening of environmental regulations, ECSR has shifted from a marginal issue to a central channel for political signaling and resource negotiation. This shift is closely tied to cadre evaluation systems that increasingly incorporate environmental indicators, prompting firms to treat ECSR not simply as regulatory compliance but as a strategic means of aligning with local governments and cultivating political relationships [64,94,95]. In this context, ECSR investments function as political safeguards, enabling firms to secure regulatory flexibility, gain access to subsidies, and demonstrate alignment with national initiatives such as the “Dual Carbon” goals of carbon peaking and neutrality. In sectors such as construction and manufacturing, ECSR is further defined through state-endorsed technological pathways—such as green materials, emissions control, and energy efficiency—so that technological upgrading becomes a concrete expression of political compliance [96,97].

At the same time, top-down environmental mandates activate market-based enforcement mechanisms that further embed ECSR in corporate strategy. Empirical studies show that environmental violations are rapidly penalized by capital markets through stock price declines, as investors interpret such incidents as signals of political and regulatory risk [98,99]. This financialization of environmental performance compels firms to integrate ECSR into core risk management and investment decisions. Consequently, state-led capitalism and market liberalization operate in mutually reinforcing ways: state policies define standardized and measurable environmental benchmarks, while market pressures incentivize firms to undertake substantive, technology-intensive green investments rather than rely on symbolic disclosure alone [94,99]. This dual mechanism of political coercion and market discipline distinguishes ECSR from other CSR domains that remain more reputation-driven.

Although ECSR is rooted in state priorities, it has also created limited but meaningful space for civil accountability. Instruments such as real-time pollution monitoring and mandatory disclosure regimes enhance transparency and expose firms to public and NGO scrutiny [100]. Civil actors frequently leverage state-generated data to pressure firms to exceed minimum standards, particularly in areas such as air pollution and supply-chain governance [101]. However, such influence remains bounded, as NGOs typically operate as technical partners or implementation agents within the political system rather than as independent watchdogs.

It is against this backdrop that research on Chinese ECSR has increasingly adopted an ESG framework, conceptualizing environmental responsibility not merely as a CSR domain but as a core component of a broader governance and accountability architecture [102,103,104]. Shen et al. show that ESG practices in China are primarily organized around disclosure regimes and market-based governance mechanisms, through which environmental indicators function as key signals for regulatory compliance and corporate performance assessment [102]. Zhang, Zhao and He further demonstrate that ESG-oriented investment strategies in China price environmental responsibility as a risk factor, with firms exhibiting stronger environmental performance facing lower downside risk and more favorable market valuation [103]. Nevertheless, this literature predominantly conceptualizes ESG as a market-oriented and firm-level mechanism, thereby under-theorizing ESG in China as a politically reconfigured system of governance and accountability.

4.6. Civil Society and CSR

Beyond the Party state-centered model, a growing body of literature highlights the importance of civil CSR in China, particularly in the domains of labor rights, human rights, and NGO participation. These strands of research suggest that CSR is not solely imposed from above by the state but is also shaped by transnational norms, market mechanisms, and limited forms of civil engagement—albeit within tightly regulated boundaries.

Studies on labor rights and business and human rights (BHR) reveal that civil CSR in China is embedded in a multi-layered governance structure where global standards, state regulation, and corporate incentives intersect. Research on transnational corporate codes of conduct shows that, while global labor standards have been formally introduced into Chinese workplaces, they often result in procedural compliance rather than substantive improvements in workers’ welfare. Factories frequently adapt to audits through managerial strategies that meet formal requirements without empowering workers or significantly increasing labor costs [105,106,107]. This persistent “decoupling” underscores the limited effectiveness of private governance in the absence of independent unions and strong legal enforcement.

At the same time, both labor rights and human rights have been selectively incorporated into state-led CSR and BHR frameworks. Rather than being framed as universal or rights-based entitlements, they are recast as technical and managerial tools to promote social stability, “harmonious labor relations,” and responsible business conduct [108,109]. Firms thus operate within a dual normative environment, navigating between international expectations and domestic political imperatives. In this context, CSR related to workers increasingly serves instrumental purposes. Financial studies show that, particularly among listed firms, employee-related CSR is often motivated by concerns over labor investment efficiency and cost management, treating workers primarily as human capital rather than rights-bearing subjects [110]. Human rights, similarly, are administered as governance instruments rather than upheld as fundamental claims [111].

NGOs constitute another key component of civil CSR, yet their role is similarly constrained and adaptive. Existing research shows that NGOs in China cannot act as independent watchdogs but must operate within a state-corporate nexus, often repositioning themselves as technical experts, intermediaries, or implementation partners in government- or firm-led CSR initiatives [112,113]. Their influence is most visible in less politically sensitive areas such as environmental protection and supply chain sustainability, where they mobilize international norms, professional expertise, and transnational networks to support corporate practices [114]. However, such engagement rarely challenges underlying power relations; instead, it tends to moralize CSR within officially sanctioned narratives, aligning corporate responsibility with state priorities and philanthropic ideals [115].

Overall, this literature suggests that civil CSR in China exists and matters but operates through highly circumscribed mechanisms. Labor rights, human rights, and NGO participation are incorporated into CSR in technical, managerial, and moralized forms that enable limited civil involvement without disrupting state authority or corporate control. As a result, civil CSR expands the repertoire of actors and practices beyond the Party-state paradigm yet remains structurally constrained, consistently marginalizing core rights such as freedom of association and collective bargaining.

5. Discussion: A Comparative Perspective

A core objective of this review is to challenge the presumed universality of Western CSR theories by delineating the distinct configuration of CSR in China. To fully appreciate this distinctiveness and its theoretical implications, a structured comparative analysis is indispensable. Drawing upon our institutional analysis, we propose a comparative framework across six dimensions that highlights contrasting emphases, primary logics, and points of tension between the idealized Western “managerial-stakeholder” models and the observed Chinese “adaptive political technology” model (summarized in

Table 2. Comparative analysis of CSR governance logics: contrasting emphasis in China and Western models.

Analytical Dimension	Primary Emphasis in Chinese CSR Model (“Adaptive Political Technology”)	Primary Emphasis in Western CSR Models (“Managerial-Stakeholder Framework”)
Foundational Imperative	Political alignment and social cohesion: CSR functions as an institutional bridge between corporate behavior and state-defined developmental/ideological objectives.	Pluralist negotiation and market reconciliation: CSR emerges from the interplay of ethical expectations, reputational considerations, and strategic opportunities within market societies.
Governance Architecture	State-orchestrated coordination: The Party state sets the agenda, provides evaluative criteria, and serves as the primary accountability recipient.	Multi-stakeholder dynamics: Governance emerges from the interactions among investors, civil society, media, and regulatory frameworks.
Disclosure Paradigm	Narrative of contribution: Reporting emphasizes alignment with policy discourses; quality is assessed through political consonance and responsiveness to state guidelines.	Metrics of performance: Reporting prioritizes standardized ESG indicators, materiality assessment, and third-party verification for stakeholder decision making.
Corporate Agency	Strategic navigation within political-economic constraints: CSR engagement is optimized for building political capital, securing resources, and managing regulatory relationships.	Strategic discretion and identity formation: Firms exercise relative autonomy in defining their social role, investment levels, and partnership strategies.
Engagement with Globalization	Contextual hybridization: Selective adoption of global CSR forms for external legitimacy, while substantively aligning with domestic political frameworks.	Normative integration: Aspiration toward implementing consistent, principle-based standards across global operations in response to transnational pressures.
Civil Society	Managed participation: Societal actors engage primarily through technical collaboration and implementation within state-corporate defined parameters.	Contested co-creation: Civil society operates through advocacy, litigation, and market activism to challenge and reshape corporate responsibility norms.

). This approach reveals not a clean break but a significant recalibration of priorities and mechanisms shaped by divergent political economies.

At the most fundamental level, CSR in China is anchored in the imperative of political alignment and social stability. Corporate responsibility is mobilized as a mechanism to harmonize firm behavior with national developmental strategies and ideological campaigns, allowing state priorities to be transmitted into the economic sphere [7,12]. By contrast, in liberal democratic contexts, CSR emerges from a more dispersed and contested process involving markets, civil society, and regulatory institutions. There, CSR reflects ongoing negotiation over corporate power, ethical obligation, and reputational risk within pluralist systems where authority is not monopolized by the state [1,2]. While both systems address social and environmental concerns, they differ fundamentally in where coordinating authority resides.

These contrasting imperatives produce distinct governance and accountability structures. In China, CSR is embedded within a state-orchestrated system in which the Party state sets agendas, defines evaluative criteria, and serves as the primary audience for corporate responsibility initiatives. Accountability flows predominantly upward within political hierarchies, often linked to regulatory assessments and cadre evaluation systems [14,66]. In Western settings, accountability is more outward-facing and market-mediated. Firms respond to investors, consumers, NGOs, and media scrutiny within legal frameworks that establish baseline standards but allow significant scope for voluntary and strategic CSR engagement. The state typically functions as a regulator or facilitator rather than the central director of corporate responsibility.

These governance differences are especially visible in CSR reporting practices. In China, disclosure tends to function as a narrative of political and social contribution, with reports emphasizing alignment with state policy discourses such as “Common Prosperity” or “Ecological Civilization.” Reporting quality is frequently assessed through completeness and political consonance with official guidelines, while independent third-party assurance, although expanding, remains secondary to this core political function [66,67]. Western CSR reporting, in contrast, has increasingly consolidated around standardized ESG metrics and formalized frameworks such as GRI and SASB/ISSB. These systems prioritize materiality, comparability, and verification, producing auditable data intended to support risk assessment and value alignment by heterogeneous stakeholders. In this context, assurance is integral to credibility rather than supplementary.

Corporate agency also operates under markedly different constraints. Chinese firms—particularly private enterprises—exercise agency primarily through navigating the political–economic structures of state capitalism. CSR functions as a strategic repertoire for accumulating political capital, securing access to resources, and mitigating regulatory uncertainty. The central strategic question is not whether to engage in CSR aligned with state objectives but how to calibrate such engagement to maximize institutional security and advantage [45,55]. Western firms generally enjoy greater discretion in defining their social roles. Although subject to market and societal pressures, they retain more autonomy in selecting issue areas, determining levels of investment, and shaping partnerships, allowing CSR to be integrated more explicitly into corporate identity and competitive strategy.

Globalization further accentuates these differences. Chinese multinational enterprises typically approach transnational CSR norms with strategic selectivity, adopting internationally recognizable reporting formats and project-level practices to secure legitimacy abroad while filtering their substantive content through domestic political and ideological frameworks. Overseas sustainability initiatives, for instance, are frequently reframed within narratives of “win–win cooperation” or alignment with the Belt and Road Initiative [76,79]. Many Western multinationals, despite engaging in contextual adaptation, tend to pursue a stronger aspiration toward normative integration, implementing relatively consistent group-wide standards based on universal principles such as human rights or anti-corruption in response to coordinated pressure from global investors and advocacy networks.

The societal interface of CSR also diverges in important ways. In China, civil society actors—including NGOs, professional associations, and community organizations—typically engage with CSR through channels of managed participation and technical collaboration. Their influence is most pronounced in less politically sensitive domains such as environmental protection or disaster relief, where they contribute expertise within boundaries defined by state and corporate interests [112]. In Western contexts, civil society more often operates as a site of contestation, using advocacy, litigation, shareholder activism, and consumer mobilization to challenge corporate practices and actively shape the evolving norms and standards of responsibility.

Taken together, this synthesis moves beyond a simple “China versus West” dichotomy. Chinese CSR should not be seen as an incomplete variant of Western models, but as a distinct configuration in which state legitimation and political coordination outweigh pluralist stakeholder negotiation. This implies that CSR is not a convergent global template but a contingent practice shaped by specific political settlements and state–capital relations. Framing Chinese CSR as an adaptive political technology highlights how corporate responsibility is institutionally embedded and reconfigured within China’s model of state capitalism.

6. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research

Conclusions: This review synthesizes 112 peer-reviewed studies to delineate how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in China is constituted within its distinct institutional ecosystem. The literature reveals that CSR operates not as a discrete ethical choice or a derivative of global norms but as an institutionally embedded hybrid practice—simultaneously a moral discourse anchored in Confucian and socialist ethics, a governance instrument of state capitalism, a strategic response to developmental mandates, and a mechanism for managing legitimacy across domestic and global arenas. The key finding of this paper is that CSR in China operates as an adaptive political technology through which the Party state produces political guidance, and firms strategically internalize and respond to this guidance. We further identify three mechanisms of translation through which firms operationalize CSR in practice: signaling, risk hedging, and resource conversion. These mechanisms and their interrelations are summarized in Figure 3.

Limitations: (1) This review’s theoretical model is derived from and applies most forcefully to the domain of large, state-influenced corporations that dominate the scholarly literature. The most significant limitation, therefore, is its constrained applicability to China’s vast and heterogeneous SME sector. This is not merely a gap in our review but a fundamental gap in the extant research field. Consequently, our foremost future direction must be a dedicated investigation into SME CSR. (2) The analysis is based on a selective set of international academic databases, which may exclude relevant studies published elsewhere, particularly in Chinese-language journals. As a result, important domestic debates and empirical findings may be underrepresented. This deliberate focus on the English-language literature may bias the review toward perspectives and methodologies favored by international outlets.

Future Research: Future research could proceed in three interrelated directions:

(1)

The embeddedness of CSR in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As Oduro, Bruno and Maccario recently argue, treating SMEs as miniature versions of large corporations leads to a flawed understanding [116]. They therefore highlight the informal, value-driven, and locally embedded nature of SME CSR. Similarly, existing research on CSR in China disproportionately focuses on state-owned and large listed firms, leaving the CSR practices of SMEs largely invisible. Yet SMEs and especially those that are often family-owned and locally rooted are central to China’s regional economies and social governance. Future studies should investigate how local political networks, clan associations, and informal guanxi relations mediate CSR implementation among SMEs. This line of inquiry could illuminate how CSR becomes a tool of moral legitimacy and political exchange at the county and township levels, revealing the everyday embeddedness of CSR in grassroots state–business relations. Unpacking this distinct logic is essential for a complete picture of corporate responsibility in China.

(2)

CSR under geopolitical fragmentation and supply chain decoupling. In the context of rising geopolitical tensions and supply chain reconfiguration, Chinese firms are compelled to rearticulate CSR strategies to navigate global scrutiny, trade barriers, and the politics of decoupling. Chowdhury et al. observe that the current trade war between the US and China has created a future that is not just risky but fundamentally unpredictable and incalculable; therefore, investment in CSR acts as a flexible, low-cost “real option” that allows firms to maintain strategic agility and social capital that can strengthen risk management [114]. Future research should analyze how global production networks and geopolitical realignments reshape CSR’s spatial logic—how firms recalibrate responsibility narratives, risk management, and stakeholder engagement when operating across politically fragmented markets. This direction calls for integrating geoeconomic and political economy perspectives into CSR studies, examining how firms balance national loyalty with global competitiveness.

(3)

Digital technology and the governance of CSR. The emergence of digital CSR—including AI-based sustainability reporting, blockchain-enabled supply chain traceability, and the social credit system—represents a new phase in the governance of corporate responsibility. Digitalization not only enhances transparency but also expands the state’s capacity for surveillance and regulatory control. Future research should thus explore how digital platforms and data infrastructures reconfigure CSR accountability, how algorithmic governance mediates corporate behavior, and how digital CSR simultaneously enables and constrains corporate autonomy under China’s “smart governance” paradigm.

Reference for stakeholders: This review also offers insights relevant to stakeholders. First, for the international business community, a key and often unexpected finding is that alignment with state priorities frequently matters more than the scale of CSR investment. Modest initiatives closely linked to current political agendas (e.g., rural revitalization) can carry greater strategic value than large but generic donations, reshaping how foreign firms assess local partners and design China-specific CSR strategies. Second, for Chinese private entrepreneurs, this review shows that in-house Party organizations can operate as enabling mechanisms rather than merely instruments of control. They help firms anticipate policy shifts, allowing CSR to move from reactive compliance toward proactive strategic positioning. Third, for civil society and NGOs, this review highlights that, despite political constraints, these actors have expanded their influence by positioning themselves as technical experts or implementation partners in areas such as environmental protection and supply-chain governance, demonstrating the adaptive agency of non-state actors within China’s institutional context.