1. Introduction
This paper contains two main results. The following theorem is the first main result. Theorem 2 below is the second main result, along with the associated technique of consistency proofs by class forcing over the power-less set theory , or, equivalently, the second-order Peano arithmetic .
Studies of the relationship between Gödel’s constructibility and the analytic definability of the reals (here: points of the Cantor discontinuum 
 or the Baire space 
) began with a profound study by Shoenfield [
1], in which it was established that all 
 reals are constructible. With the development of the forcing method in the 1960s, various models of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory 
ZFC were proposed, in which there exists a non-constructible real analytically definable above the Shoenfield level 
; see a survey [
2] by Mathias. Of those, the strongest result was obtained by Jensen [
3], and it corresponds to the case 
 of Theorem 1. A similar result for 
, but in the absence of (ii) and (iii), was obtained by Jensen and Solovay [
4] using a different technique. Further research in this direction included, in particular, studies of Solovay [
5] on 
 reals under large cardinal assumptions, Abraham [
6] on definable reals coding minimal collapse functions 
, Harrington [
7] on definable well-orderings of the reals in the absence of the continuum hypothesis, David [
8] on non-constructible 
 reals, Jensen and Johnsbraten [
9] on 
 reals, any pair of which entails a collapse function 
, and  many more.
Theorem 1. If , then there exists a generic extension of the universe  in which it holds that:
- (i)
- There is a nonconstructible  real , such that: 
- (ii)
-  holds; 
- (iii)
- a is minimal over , in the sense that  but any real  either belongs to  or satisfies  
- (iv)
- But all  sets  are constructible and  in  
 We have recently succeeded in proving a weaker version of Theorem 1, again without (ii) and (iii), but for all 
, in [
10], using essentially the same technique of forcing by almost disjoined sets as in [
4], but modified by the method of the definable generic construction of the notion of forcing. This led us to the problem of incorporating (ii) and (iii) into this general result, and Theorem 1 solves this problem. The first part of this paper (
Section 2, 
Section 3, 
Section 4, 
Section 5, 
Section 6, 
Section 7, 
Section 8, 
Section 9, 
Section 10, 
Section 11, 
Section 12 and 
Section 13) contains the full proof of Theorem 1, using a similar definable generic modification of the forcing notion originally developed in [
3], so that the level of definability is determined by the value of the parameter 
 in Theorem 1. This innovation, on top of Jensen’s forcing, is the sine qua non of our proof of Theorem 1. See 
Section 9 for a sketch of the construction.
The second main result of the paper concerns an important aspect of the result above in the context somewhat similar to the “reverse mathematics” approach. Indeed, Theorem 1 essentially asserts, for any given 
, the consistency of the conjunction
	  
with the axioms of 
ZFC. We may note here that the conjunction 
 can be adequately and rather straightforwardly represented by means of a suitable formula of the language 
 of 
, second-order Peano arithmetic.
We recall that, following [
11,
12,
13], second-order Peano arithmetic 
 is a theory in the language 
 with two sorts of variables: for natural numbers and for sets of them. We use 
 for variables over 
 and 
 for variables over 
, reserving capital letters for subsets of 
 and other sets. The axioms are as follows in (1)–(5):
- (1)
- Peano’s axioms for numbers. 
- (2)
- Induction as one sentence: . 
- (3)
- Extensionality for sets of natural numbers. 
- (4)
- The Comprehension schema CA: , for every formula  in which x does not occur, and, in , we allow for parameter-free variables other than k. 
- (5)
- The schema  of Countable Choice: , for every formula  with parameters allowed, where . 
The theory 
 is also known as 
 (see, e.g., an early survey [
11]), az 
 (in [
14] or elsewhere). See also [
15].
The analytical representation of Gödel’s constructibility is well known since the 1950s; see, e.g., Addison [
16], Apt and Marek [
11], and Simpson’s book [
13]. This raises 
the problem of the consistency of (the analytical form of) 
 under the assumption that only the consistency of 
 as a premise is available, rather than the (much stronger) consistency of 
ZFC. This is why we consider and solve this problem in our paper.
The working technique of such a transformation of the consistency results related to 
ZFC to the basis of 
 is also rather well known since some time ago. (See, e.g., Guzicki [
17].) It makes use of 
 as a proxy theory.
We recall that the power-less set theory  is a subtheory of ZFC obtained so that:
- (a)
- The power set axiom PS is excluded; 
- (b)
- The well-orderability axiom WA, which claims that every set can be well ordered, is substituted for the usual set-theoretic axiom of choice AC of ZFC; 
- (c)
- the separation schema is preserved, but the replacement schema (which is not sufficiently strong in the absence of PS) is substituted with the collection schema: . 
A comprehensive account of main features of 
 is given in, e.g., [
18,
19,
20].
Theories 
 and 
 are known to be equiconsistent (Kreisel [
12], Apt and Marek [
11]; see 
Section 18 for more details on this equiconsistency claim), so we can make use of 
 as the background theory instead of 
. If now we have established the consistency of a 
-sentence 
S by means of a generic extension of 
, the constructible universe, via a forcing notion 
, then we check if 
P can be defined in 
 as a set or class in 
 and whether 
 is strong enough to prove that 
P-generic extensions of 
 model 
S. And, if yes, then we have a proof of the consistency of 
S with 
 on the basis of the consistency of 
 alone.
Such a method (sketched, e.g., in [
17]), however, does not seem to immediately work even for the result in [
3] (
 of Theorem 1). Indeed, the construction of Jensen’s forcing notion 
 (either using Jensen’s [
3] original method or via the diamond principle 
 as in ([
21] 28.A) in 
 does not directly work in 
 because the proof of the key CCC property (the countable chain condition) and some other involved properties of 
, using either method, heavily depends on countable elementary submodels of 
, hence transitive models of 
 itself, which is way beyond 
. In the second part of this paper (
Section 14, 
Section 15, 
Section 16, 
Section 17 and 
Section 18), we circumvent this difficulty by means of the method of killing only antichains that belong to a certain transitive model of the bounded separation axiom instead of the full separation as in 
, in the course of a Jensen-like transfinite construction of the forcing notion. This innovation is not a trivial and easily seen modification, and we may observe that not all mathematically meaningful results about hereditarily countable sets, and countable ordinals in particular, can be rendered on the 
 basis; see, e.g., [
22]. The relevant changes are concentrated in Definition 10 and Condition 4
+ in 
Section 15.
Thereby, the following theorem is the second main result of this paper.
Theorem 2. If , then the conjunction  of items of Theorem 1 is consistent with  provided that  itself is consistent.
   2. Preliminaries
Let  be the set of all strings (finite sequences) of natural numbers. Accordingly,  is the set of all dyadic strings.If  and , then  is the extension of t by k as the rightmost term. If , then  means that t extends s, while  means a proper extension of strings.
If , then  is the length of s, and  (strings of length n), and, accordingly, .
A set  is a tree iff, for any strings  in , if  then . Thus, every non-empty tree  contains the empty string . If  is a tree and , then put ; this is a tree as well.
Let PT be the set of all perfect trees .Thus, a non-empty tree  belongs to  iff it has no endpoints and no isolated branches. In this case, there is a largest string  such that ; it is denoted by (the root of a perfect tree T). If , then s is a branching node of T; that is, and .
Each perfect tree 
 defines a perfect set 
 of all paths through 
T; then, accordingly, 
, where
      
If  are trees in  and there is a finite set  such that , then we say that S is clopen in T; then,  is a relatively clopen subset of . Trees clopen in  itself will be called simply clopen; thus, clopen trees are those of the form , where  is a finite set and  for each .
A set  is a true antichain iff  (or, equivalently,  is finite) for all  in A. If , then a set  is:
- -
- Dense in X, iff, for every tree , there is a subtree ; 
- -
- Open dense in X, iffit is dense in X and  holds whenever , , and ; 
- -
- Pre-dense in X, iffthe set  is dense in X. 
As usual, if , , and there is a finite set  such that  (or, equivalently, ) then we write ,and if, in addition, A is a true antichain, then we write .
Thus, perfect sets in the Cantor space  are straightforwardly coded by perfect trees in . It takes more effort to introduce a reasonable coding system for continuous functions . Let FPT (functional perfect trees) be the set of all sets  such that
- (a)
- If , then ; 
- (b)
- c is a tree; that is, if  and , then ; 
- (c)
- ; that is, ; 
- (d)
- c has no endpoints; that is, if  and , then there is  such that ; 
- (e)
- For every m, there exists  such that if , then there is a string  satisfying . 
If 
 is continuous, then the set 
, where
      
      belongs to 
FPT (condition (e) represents the uniform continuity of 
F defined on a compact space), and 
, where
      
(a function coded by 
c). Conversely, if 
, then 
.
Lemma 1 (well known). If  and , then either there is a string  such that the restriction  is a constant, or there is a subtree , such that the restriction  is an injection.
   3. Splitting Systems of Trees
If  and , then let , where ; obviously,  are trees in  as well. Define  for  by induction on  so that  and .
A splitting system is any indexed set  of trees  satisfying
- (A)
- If  and , then . 
It easily follows from (A) that
- (B)
- ; and 
- (C)
- If  and strings  belong to , then . 
Lemma 2 (routine). If  is a splitting system, then  is a perfect subtree of , and . In addition,  for all s.
 We proceed to several slightly more complicated applications.
Lemma 3. If , then there exists a sequence of trees  such that  for all n and  whenever .
 Proof.  If , then there are perfect trees  and  such that . This allows us to easily define a system  of trees  such that
- (1)
- If , then  is a splitting system consisting of subtrees of ; 
- (2)
- If  and , then . 
(The inductive construction is arranged so that, at each step n, we define all trees  with  and  and also all trees  with .) Now, we simply put  for all k.    □
 Lemma 4. If  and  is continuous, then there exist perfect trees  such that either  for all  or  for all .
 Proof.  Suppose that  for some . By continuity of F, there are a clopen subtree  and a clopen neighborhood A of  such that  and . Hence,  for all . The compact set  is either countable or has a perfect subset. If X is countable, then let  and, for every,  let  be an arbitrary perfect tree such that .
Assume that there is a perfect tree T such that . By Lemma 3, there are trees  such that , , and [ whenever . Choose  such that  and let .    □
   4. Jensen’s Construction: Overview
Beginning the proof of case  of Theorem 1, we list essential properties of Jensen’s forcing :
(1)  consists of perfect trees  (a subset of the Sacks forcing);
(2)  forces that there is a unique -generic real;
(3) “being a -generic real” is a  property;
(4)  forces that the generic real is (nonconstructible and) minimal.
Thus,  forces a nonconstructible  real singleton  over , whose only element is, therefore, a  real in .
Jensen [
3] defined a forcing 
 in 
 in the form 
, where each 
 is a countable collection of perfect trees 
. The construction of the 
-sequence of sets 
 is arranged so that each 
 is generic, in a certain sense, over the least transitive model of a suitable fragment of 
ZFC, containing the subsequence 
. A striking corollary of such a genericity is that 
 forces that there is only one 
-generic real. Another corollary consists in the fact that, for a real 
, being 
-generic is equivalent to 
. The construction can be managed so that the whole sequence 
 is 
, or, more exactly, 
 in 
. (We recall that HC = all 
hereditarily countable sets. A set 
x is hereditarily countable iff its transitive closure is at most countable.) Altogether, it follows that if 
 is a 
-generic real, then 
 in 
; that is, 
 in 
, which is obviously the lowest possible level for a nonconstructible real. The minimality of 
-generic reals follows from another property of 
: given a tree 
 and a continuous 
, there is a tree 
 (a stronger condition) such that 
 is either a bijection or a constant.
Now, we consider this construction in detail.
  5. Jensen’s Sequences
In this section, we argue in .
See 
Section 1 regarding matters of the power-less set theory 
. Let 
 be the theory: 
 + “the set 
 exists” (then 
 exists as well) + “
”. Note that 
 (all sets constructible up to 
) is a natural model of 
.
Definition 1 (in ). Suppose that  and  is a sequence of hereditarily countable sets. We let  be the least CTM , necessarily of the form , containing  and such that  strictly and still all sets , , are, at most, countable in M.
 Definition 2 (in ). If , then let  be the αth element of the set  in the sense of the Gödel canonical well-ordering of .
 Thus, for any  and , there exist uncountably many indices  such that  and .
For any ordinal , we let  (Jensen’s sequences of length ) be the set of all sequences , of  countable sets , satisfying the following conditions 1°–6°.
      
- 1°.
-  consists of all clopen trees , including the full tree  itself. 
- 2°.
- If , , and  is a perfect tree clopen in T, then . 
- 3°.
- If  and , then there is a tree . 
- 4°.
- If , , ,  is open dense in , then  
- 5°.
- If , , and , then there is  such that  and: - either 
              
- we have  for all , 
-     or
-  we have  for all . 
 
- 6°.
- If , , and , then there exists  such that  and the restricted function  is either a bijection or a constant. 
Let . (Jensen’s sequences of any countable length).  
Lemma 5 (in ). Suppose that  and . Then,  is pre-dense in the set .
 Proof.  First,  is dense in  by . Now, by induction on , suppose that  is pre-dense in . To check that  remains pre-dense in , consider any tree . By definition, , and hence we have  by . (Note that the set  belongs to  and is open dense.) It follows that there exist a tree  and a string  such that . Finally,  by , so T is compatible with , as required.    □
 Lemma 6 (in ). Assume that . Then, the forcing  satisfies CCC in . Therefore the cardinals are preserved in -generic extensions of .
 We recall that CCC, or the countable chain condition, is the claim that every antichain in a given partially ordered set is at most countable.
Proof.  Arguing in , suppose that  is a maximal -antichain, that is, a pre-dense set, and, if  belongs to A, then there is no tree , . Consider a countable elementary submodel  containing A. Let  be the Mostowski collapse; . Let . Thus,  and . The set  satisfies  and is pre-dense in . It remains to prove that 
Suppose toward the contrary that . Then, T is compatible with some  by Lemma 5; that is, there is a tree , .
On the other hand, ; hence, we have  and . It easily follows from  that . Then,  as well, and hence there exist  and  such that the tree  satisfies ; therefore, . However,  by , and  but , contrary to A being a -antichain.    □
 The following rather obvious lemma demonstrates that the top level of a Jensen sequence of successor length can be freely enlarged by adding smaller trees, with only care of the property .
Lemma 7 (in ). Suppose that  and , so that  is the last term in this sequence. Let  be trees in  and . Let  consist of all trees in  and all trees , clopen in S. Then, the sequence  belongs to , too.
   6. Extension of Jensen’s Sequences
Now, we prove a theorem that shows that Jensen’s sequences of any countable length are extendable to longer sequences in .
Theorem 3 (in ). Suppose that . Then, any sequence  has an extension .
 Proof.  We argue in . Basically, we have to appropriately define the top level  () of the extended sequence. The definition goes on in four steps.
Step 1: we define a provisional set  satisfying only requirements , . Put . Fix an arbitrary enumeration  of all sets , , open dense in , and any enumeration . For any k, there is a system  of trees  satisfying the following conditions (i)–(iii):
- (i)
- If , then ; 
- (ii)
- For each  k- ,  -  is a splitting system in the sense of  Section 3- ; 
- (iii)
- If  and , then . 
Indeed, if some  is already defined and , then the trees  and  belong to  as well, and hence there are trees  and  in , which belong to .
It remains to define , where .
Step 2. We are going to shrink the trees  obtained at Step 1 in order to satisfy requirement . Suppose that  and , as in . (If , then we skip this step.) We may assume that the enumeration  is chosen so that . Let  (a continuous map ). By Lemma 4, there exist perfect trees  such that either  for all  or  for all . The new set  still satisfies  and , of course.
Step 3. We shrink the trees  obtained at Step 2 in order to satisfy 6°. This is similar to Step 2, with the only difference being that we apply Lemma 1 instead of Lemma 4.
Step 4. If  is one of the trees in  obtained at Step 3, then we adjoin all trees  clopen in  to  in order to satisfy 2°.    □
   7. Definable Jensen’s Sequence
Each of the conditions 
, 
, 
 (
Section 5) will have its own role. Namely, 
 implies CCC and continuous reading of names (Lemma 10) and 5° is responsible for the generic uniqueness of 
 as in Lemma 11, while 
 yields the minimality of 
. However, to obtain the required type of definability of 
-generic reals in the extensions, we need to take care of the appropriate definability of a Jensen’s sequence in 
.
Definition 3. Recall that HC is the collection of all hereditarily countable sets.
- = all sets , definable in HC by a parameter-free  formula. 
- = all  definable in HC by a  formula with sets in HC as parameters. 
Collections , etc.are defined similarly. Something like  means that only x is admitted as a parameter. It is known that  under , and that  is the same as  for reals and sets of reals, modulo any appropriate coding, and the same with parameters.
 Lemma 8 (in ). The set  is .
 Proof.  Suppose that  is a sequence (of any kind) of length , , the set  contains J and is a model of , and, for every , the model  (defined in Definition 1) also belongs to . Then, the property of J being a Jensen sequence is absolute for . This yields a  definition for the statement “J is a Jensen sequence” in the form: there is such-and-such ordinal  such that  and “J is a Jensen sequence” holds in .    □
 Corollary 1 (in ). There exists a  sequence .
 Proof.  For every  we define, by transfinite induction,  to be the least set, in the sense of the Gödel  well-ordering of , such that . To establish the definability type  of the sequence obtained, use Lemma 8.    □
   8. Adding One Jensen Real: Theorem 1, Case 
Here, we prove the case  of Theorem 1.
Definition 4. By Corollary 1, fix a sequence  such that it is true in  that
- (1) 
- —will be used in Lemmas 9, 10, 11 and Corollary 2; and 
- (2) 
-  is a  sequence—will be used only in Corollary 2. 
 Put .
 Consider such a set 
 as a forcing notion over 
, the ground universe. It is ordered so that 
 means that 
S is stronger as a forcing condition. Thus, 
, 
Jensen’s forcing of [
3] (see also [
21], 28.A), consists of (some, not all) perfect trees by construction.
Lemma 9. If  is a -generic set over , then the intersection  is a singleton , and ; hence, .
 Reals ,  being a -generic set over , are called -generic over. The next lemma provides a useful tool of representation for reals in -generic extensions.
Lemma 10 (continuous reading of names). Suppose that  is -generic over . Let . There exists  such that .
 Proof.  Let 
. Let 
 be a name for 
x in the forcing language; then, every 
 forces
		
We argue in . Let . Each set  is dense in  Let  be a maximal -antichain. Then, every  is countable by Lemma 6; hence, there is an ordinal  such that , and, for each k, , and the set  belongs to . Note that  is dense in  by the maximality of .
By 
 of 
Section 5, there exists 
. By 
, we have 
 for every 
k, so that there are finite sets 
 such that 
 and, if 
 belongs to the same set 
, then 
.
Put . For any k, there is a finite set of values l such that . Thus, a continuous function  can be defined in  as follows:  iff  for some . Let  be a continuous extension of ;  for some . Then, T forces , where  is the canonical name for .    □
 Lemma 11. If  is a -generic set over , then  is the only element of the set  in . Moreover,  is minimal over .
 Proof.  If , then the real  belongs to  since all sets  are pre-dense by Lemma 5. To prove the opposite direction, consider any  and . By Lemma 10, there exists  such that . There is an ordinal  in  such that  and . Let  witness . In the “either” case of , T obviously forces that , while, in the “or” case, T forces .
To prove the minimality, consider any real . By Lemma 10, we have , where . It follows from 6° that there exists  such that  is either a bijection or a constant. If  is a bijection, then  by means of the inverse map. If  is a constant z, say  for all  in , then obviously .    □
 Corollary 2 (= Theorem 1, case ). Assume that  is -generic over . Then,  satisfies Theorem 1 for .
 Proof.  Lemma 11 implies that ; hence,  in . Thus  in , as required by (i) of Theorem 1. The minimality claim (iii) follows from Lemma 11, whereas the equality  of (ii) of Theorem 1 in  is implied by Lemma 9. Finally, (iv) holds since all  sets  are constructible by Shoenfield’s absoluteness.    □
   9. Warmup: Definable Generic Forcing Construction
To solve the general case of Theorem 1, we employ one more idea. Jensen’s -sequence  as in 4 can be seen as an -branch of type  through the set  of all countable (transfinite) sequences satisfying conditions 1°–6° above.
The idea behind the general case  is to maintain the choice of  in such a way that the final -long sequence of (countable sets of trees)  intersects all suitably definable (depends on !) “dense” sets. In this way, we will obtain a version of Jensen’s forcing that allows us to prove Theorem 1. The main cog in this construction is that, because of the “definable genericity”, the resulting set  resolves every boldface  set D of perfect trees, in the sense that either it contains a tree in D or it contains a tree non-extendable to a tree in D. This makes  similar to the Sacks forcing up to level , leading to claim (iv) of Theorem 1 because of the homogeneity of the Sacks forcing.
Such a 
definably generic forcing construction was applied to great effect by Harrington [
23] with the almost disjoint forcing. We will overview some new results in this direction in the 
Section 19.
Now, let us present the definably generic forcing construction in detail.
  10. Complete Sequences and Forcing Notions
Approaching the general case of Theorem 1, we begin with a few definitions.
Definition 5. Let  be a partially ordered set. For any , let  be the set of all  that solve D in the sensethat either  or there are no elements .
 Recall Definition 3 on the definability types like  and .
Definition 6 (in ). Suppose that . A sequence  is -complete if, for any  set , there is  such that —meaning that either  or there is no sequence in D extending .
A set  of perfect trees is -complete if, for any  set , the set  is dense in P.
 Thus, n-completeness is a property of “generic” nature, where genericity is related to a family of sets distinguished by a definability property.
Lemma 12 (in ). If a sequence  is -complete, then  is -complete.
 Proof.  Suppose that  is a  set, and  ; that is,  for some . We prove that there is  such that . The set D of all sequences , such that there exists , is . It follows that  for some , i.e., either , or there is no sequence in D that extends .
If , then, by definition, there is a tree  with , as required.
Suppose that  is not extendable to a sequence in D, and denote . Then, the extended sequence  is not extendable to a sequence in D because  is not extendable. By 3°, there is a tree , . We claim that .
Suppose, to the contrary, that  and there is  such that . Then, by Lemma 7, there is a set  containing  and such that  is still a sequence in  extending , and   by the choice of . But, this contradicts the non-extendability of , and therefore .    □
 Lemma 13 (in ). If , then there exists an -complete  sequence 
 Proof.  Let  be a universal  set. That is, U itself is , and if  is a (boldface)  set, then there is a parameter  such that . As we argue in , for any , let  be the th element of  in the sense of Gödel’s  well-ordering of . Then,  and the sequence  is .
To prove the lemma, we define a strictly -increasing sequence  of sequences  as follows. Let  be the empty sequence.
Let  whenever  is a limit.
For every , if  is defined, then let  be the Gödel-least sequence  such that  and .
The limit sequence  is n-complete by construction, and, by an easy estimation, based on the assumption that U is , it belongs to .    □
 The next theorem is the conclusive step in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 (in ). Assume that ,  is an - complete  sequence (Lemma 13), and . Then, -generic extensions of  prove Theorem 1.
 Its proof will be accomplished in 
Section 13. A few remarks follow before the proof starts.
Lemma 11 implies that if  is -generic over , then the corresponding real  is minimal. It also follows from the same lemma and the fact that the sequence  is  in  that the singleton  is  and hence  is  in . It is a more difficult problem to prove the remaining claim of Theorem 1, that is, that any  set  in  is constructible. We will establish this fact in the remainder; the result will be based on the -completeness property and on some intermediate claims.
  11. Digression: Definability of the Sacks Forcing
Our next goal is to estimate the definability of the Sacks forcing relation, restricted to formulas of a certain ramified version of the second-order Peano language.
Definition 7. Let  be the ordinary language of the second-order Peano arithmetic, with variables of type 1 for functions in . Extend this language so that some type 1 variables can be substituted by symbols of the form , and each  is viewed as a name for , where a means a generic real of any kind. (Recall that  is a continuous map coded by .) Let  be the extended language; the index s is from Sacks.Accordingly,  and  will denote the standard types of formulas of .
If  and φ is a formula of , then  is the result of the substitution of  for any name  in φ;  is a formula of  with real parameters.
 Definition 8. Let  be the Sacks forcing relation (that is,  is the forcing notion). Define an auxiliary relation of “strong” forcing , restricted to  formulas, , generally, to all existential formulas of , as follows:
- (*)
- If  is a formula of  with the only free variable x (over ), and , then  if there exists  such that . 
But, if φ is a  formula, then we define:  iff .
 It is a known property of the Sacks forcing that any real 
x in the 
- generic extension 
 of the universe 
 has the form 
, where 
; see, e.g.,  [
24]. Therefore, the forcing relation 
 as in Definition 8 is still adequate. In particular, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 14. Suppose that φ is a closed formula in , , and . Then,  iff there is no , such that .
 Here,  is the result of the canonical transformation of  to a  form.
Now, let us address the descriptive complexity of .
Lemma 15. The relation  restricted to  formulas is . If , then the relation  restricted to  formulas is  while  restricted to  formulas is .
 Proof.  We argue by induction. Suppose that 
 is a closed formula in 
. It follows from the Shoenfield absoluteness and the perfect set theorem for 
 sets that, for any 
, 
 is equivalent to the set 
 being countable, and then to
        
        as any countable 
 set 
 consists of elements of type 
. Yet, the displayed formula is 
, hence 
, as 
 is a 
 relation.
The step : make use of Definition 8(∗).
Now, the step 
. Suppose that 
, 
 is a closed formula in 
, and  
. Then, by Lemma 14, 
 is equivalent to
        
        and hence we obtain 
 using the inductive hypothesis for 
.    □
   12. Back to the -Complete Jensen’s Forcing
Let  and  be the same as in Theorem 4. We begin with the following.
Lemma 16 (in ). For any closed formula φ in , the set of all  such that  or  is dense in .
 Proof.  The set  is  by Lemma 15. Therefore, the set  is dense in  by Lemma 12. However, it follows from Lemma 14 that  is equal to the set of all  such that  or .    □
 It is a basic fact of forcing theory that the truth in generic extensions is, in a certain way, connected with the forcing relation. Thus, the truth in -generic extensions  of  corresponds to the -forcing relation. However—and this is the key moment—the following theorem shows that the truth in -generic extensions is also in tight connection with , the Sacks forcing notion, up to the level . This is a consequence of - completeness, of course: in some sense, the - completeness means that  is an elementary submodel of  with respect to formulas of a certain level of complexity.
Theorem 5. Let and  be the same as in Theorem 4. Suppose that  is a closed formula in , or , and  a set  is -generic over . Then,  holds in  if there is  such that .
 Proof.  We argue by induction on k. Let  be a closed  formula. If  and , then, in ,  is true for all  with, at most, a countable set of exceptions; see the proof of Lemma 15. And, all exceptions are , hence absolutely defined and belong to . Therefore, the generic real  cannot be an exception, thus  holds in . If  is , then  is ,  being , and if , then, by definition,  for some , and so on. On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 16 that there is  such that  or . This easily implies the result for .
Step . Let  be a  formula. Suppose that  fails in . Then,  holds in , and hence, by the inductive hypothesis, there is a condition  satisfying . Then, by Lemma 14, there is no  with . Conversely, suppose that there is no  with . Then, by Lemma 16, there is a condition  satisfying . It follows that  holds in , and, subsequently,  fails, as required.
Step . Thus, let  be a formula , where  is . Assume that  satisfies . This entails, by (∗) of Definition 8, that  for some , a code of the continuous map . Apply the induction hypothesis to the formula : it says that  holds in . But,  is , where . Therefore,  holds in , as required.
In the opposite direction, let  be true in ; that is,  holds for some . By Lemma 10, there is  such that . The formula  coincides with  and hence holds in . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, there is  such that . But, then,  by (∗) of Definition 8, as required.    □
   13. Proof of Theorem 1: General Case
Here, we accomplish the proof of Theorems 4 and 1. We fix .
Let  be the same as in Theorem 4. If a set  is -generic over , then all  sets  in  are constructible by Theorem 5 because, by the homogeneity of the Sacks forcing, for any parameter-free formula  and any trees , we have
Let us present this final argument in more detail.
If 
, then let 
 be the set of all homeomorphisms 
; clearly, 
 is non-empty. Suppose that 
. Recall that continuous functions 
 are coded so that 
 is the function coded by 
. If 
, then write 
 iff 
 for all 
. If 
 and 
 are formulas of 
 (see 
Section 11), and 
 for all 
i, then write 
. In this case, the formulas 
 and 
 coincide for any 
.
Lemma 17. Suppose that , , Φ and Ψ are closed formulas in one and the same type,  or , and . Then,  if and only if .
 Proof.  Routinely argue by induction on the complexity of the formulas.    □
 Corollary 3. If  and
		   is a formula in  or , then  iff .
 Proof.  Pick , note that  (as  contains no symbols of the form ), and apply Lemma 17.    □
 Lemma 18. If  is -generic over , and  is  in , then  and x is  in .
 Proof.  Let 
 be a parameter-free 
 formula such that 
 in 
. Consider the tree 
. Then,
		
by Theorem 5 and Corollary 3. It remains to refer to Lemma 15.    □
 This ends the proof of Theorems 4 and 1.
  14. Theorem 2: Outline
As the proof of Theorem 1, given above, contains a heavy dose of the forcing technique, first of all we have to adequately replace 
 with a more 
ZFC-like, forcing-friendly set theory, dealing with Theorem 2. We will make use of the theory
      
      as such a proxy theory. (The upper minus stands for the absence of the power sets axiom, whereas l and c in the lower index stand for the constructibility (
) and countability.) The following is the according proxy theorem (compared to Theorem 1).
Theorem 6. If , then there exists a generic extension of the universe of , in which all axioms of  hold, along with the following:
- (i)
- There is a nonconstructible  real  such that: 
- (ii)
-  holds; 
- (iii)
- a is minimal over the ground universe of , in the sense similar to (iii) of Theorem 1; 
- (iv)
- But, all  sets  are constructible and  in the ground universe of  
 The universe of  is naturally identified with . It will take some effort to obtain the proof of Theorem 1 relativized to  so that it can be executed in the universe of , denoted by  below for the sake of convenience.
To establish Theorem 6, we will make use of a suitable version of the forcing notion  as a definable class in , and a class-forcing notion, CCC, with regard to all definable class-antichains, and then we will show that -generic extensions of  prove Theorem 2.
Yet, there is a serious obstacle: the treatment of 
 involves ordinals and some other objects in 
 (rather than 
) in the proof of the key CCC result by Lemma 6, and this is not admissible in 
. We overcome this difficulty, following the idea of a recent construction of definable-◇ sequences by Enayat and Hamkins [
25].
Definition 9. The ground set universe of  is denoted by . We use  to denote the collection (a proper class) of all ordinals in ; all of them are countable.
 Remark 1. Arguing in , we will often consider (definable) proper classes as they will play a more essential role than is common in ZFC. We will also consider such things as class-size collections of proper classes, e.g., class-long sequences  of proper classes , with the understanding that the real thing considered in this case is some (definable) class  whose slices  are equal to the given classes .
   15. Jensen’s Sequences,  Version
Adapting the proof of Theorem 1 above for the proof of Theorem 6, we are going to introduce  as a definable class forcing under . In this section, we argue in 
Definition 10 (in ). If  and  is a sequence of any sets, then let  be the least CTM M, necessarily of the form , which
- (1)
- Models , i.e.,  with the collection and separation schemata (see Section 1) restricted to bounded ∈-formulas; 
- (2)
- Contains ; and 
- (3)
- Contains the set = all -formulas, with parameters in , true in . 
 Compared to Definition 1, we may note that, arguing in , it is not suitable to refer to models of . This is the reason for passing to  here.
Definition 11 (in ). If , then let  be the αth element of the set  in the sense of the Gödel canonical well-ordering of .
 For any ordinal , we let  (Jensen’s sequences of length ,  version) be the set of all sequences  of length , of  countable sets , satisfying conditions 1°, 2°, 3°, 5°, 6° of Definition 2, and the following condition instead of 4°.
- 4†.
- If , , ,  is open dense in , then . 
Let .
Lemma 19 (in ). Suppose that  and . Then,  is pre-dense in the set —the proof is similar to Lemma 5.
 Lemma 20 (in ). Assume that . Then, the forcing notion  satisfies CCC in  with regard to all antichains  definable in  with parameters.
 In this lemma, CCC is naturally understood in the class form: every class-size definable antichain is a countable set.
Proof.  Suppose that  is a maximal -antichain. As A is definable, assume that , where  is a parameter and  any - formula.
There exists a limit ordinal  such that , the set  satisfies , the set  is a maximal -antichain, and therefore pre-dense in , and, finally,  is elementarily equivalent to  with regard to , so that, overall, we have: .
Let . We assert that . Indeed, by definition, the truth set  belongs to . On the other hand,  by the above. It follows that  since M models .
Now, it suffices to prove that . Suppose, to the contrary, that . Then, T is compatible with some  by Lemma 19; that is, there is a tree , . On the other hand, it follows from  4† that . Then,  as well, and hence there exist  and  such that the tree  satisfies ; therefore, . However,  by 2°, and  but , contrary to the assumption that A is a -antichain.    □
 The following extendability theorem is proved in a similar way to Theorem 3, so we skip the proof.
Theorem 7 (in ). Suppose that . Then, any sequence  has an extension .
   16. Definable Jensen’s Sequence and
the Forcing Engine,  Version
We deal with the issue of the definability of Jensen’s sequences in .
Remark 2. Note that  = all sets, in . The definability types , ,  consist of definable classes  in , of course.
 Lemma 21 (in , note similarities to Corollary 1). There exists a  sequence .
 Definition 12 (in ). By Lemma 21, fix a sequence  of sets , such that it holds in  that (1) , and (2)  is a  sequence.
Put .
 Consider such a set  as a forcing notion (here, a proper class) over .
The forcing engine does not necessarily work in 
 for an arbitrary class-size forcing notion. But, there is a type of forcing notions that admits adequate treatment of forcing similar to the standard 
ZFC case. This is the class forcing theory of S. D. Friedman [
26,
27], further developed by Antos and Gitman [
19] to be applicable over 
.
Definition 13 (S. D. Friedman, see [
19,
26])
.  A forcing notion (a partially ordered definable class) 
 is 
pre-tame if, for every class sequence 
 of dense classes 
, parametrized by elements of a set 
a (so that 
 is a definable class), and every condition 
, there is a condition 
 and a sequence 
 of sets 
 such that each 
 is pre-dense below 
q in 
P.
 Theorem 8 (S. D. Friedman, see [
19,
26])
. In , let P be a pre-tame class-forcing notion. Then, P preserves  and satisfies the main forcing principles, including the truth forcing and forcing definability theorems. Remark 3. The forcing notion , introduced by Definition 12, is a class forcing satisfying CCC by Theorem 20. Therefore,  is pre-tame under , as, obviously, is any CCC forcing. We conclude that Theorem 8 is applicable, and  hence usual forcing theorems are valid for -generic extensions of , the  set universe.
 This justifies all forcing results in 
Section 7 and 
Section 8 above, on the basis of 
.
In particular, we have:
Corollary 4 (in , = Theorem 6, case ). Assume that  is -generic over . Then,  satisfies Theorem 6 for .
 This completes the proof of Theorem 6, case .
  17. Theorem 6: General Case
Recall Definition 2 on the definability types like .
Definition 14 (in ). Suppose that . Similarly to Definition 6, a sequence  in  is -complete if, for any  set , there is  such that , i.e., either  or no sequence in D extends .
A set  of perfect trees is -complete if, for any  set , the set  is dense in P.
 The two following results are the conclusive steps in the proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma 22 (in , similar to Lemma 13). If , then there exists an -complete  sequence 
 Theorem 9 (in , similar to Theorem 4). Assume that ,  is an - complete  sequence(Lemma 22), and . Then, -generic extensions of  prove Theorem 6.
 This completes the proof of Theorem 6 (general case).
Corollary 5. If , then the conjunction  of items of Theorem 6 is consistent with provided that  is consistent.
 Proof.  This is a usual metamathematical corollary of Theorems 9 and 8 and Remark 3.    □
   18. Reduction to Second-Order Peano Arithmetic
Corollary 5 reduces Theorem 2 to the statement
We recall that the consistency of  is the blanket assumption in Theorem 2. Yet, we can use the following equiconsistency result:
Theorem 10. Theories  and  are equiconsistent.
 Proof.  The theorem has been a well-known fact since some while ago; see, e.g., Theorem 5.25 in [
11]. A rather natural way of proof is as follows.
Step 1. Theory 
 is interpreted in 
 by the tree interpretation described in [
11], § 5, especially Theorem 5.11, or in [
13], Definition VII.3.10 ff. Kreisel [
12], VI(a)(ii), attributed this interpretation to the type of “crude” results.
 Step 2. Arguing in , we define the transitive class  of all constructible sets, which models .
Step 3. We argue in . If every ordinal is countable, then immediately all sets are countable; that is, we have . If there exist uncountable ordinals, then let  be the least of them. Then,  is a transitive set that models .
We conclude from Steps 1,2,3 that  and  are equiconsistent.    □
 Combining Theorem 10 and Corollary 5, we finalize the proof of Theorem 2.
  19. Conclusions and Problems
In this study, the method of definable generic forcing notions was employed to the construction of a model in which, for a given 
, there is a nonconstructible 
 real 
a, minimal over 
 and satisfying 
, but all 
 reals are constructible (Theorem 1). This essentially strengthens and extends our earlier results in [
10] by 
 and the minimality claim. In addition, we established (Theorem 2) the ensuing consistency result on the basis of second-order Peano arithmetic 
, instead of the much stronger theory 
ZFC typically assumed as a premise in independence results obtained by the forcing method. This is a new result and a valuable improvement upon much of known independence results in modern set theory.
The technique developed in this paper may lead to further progress in studies of different aspects of the projective hierarchy. We hope that this study will contribute to the following crucial problem by S. D. Friedman; see [
26] (P. 209) and [
27] (P. 602): find a model of 
ZFC, for a given 
n, in which all 
 sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable and have the Baire and perfect set properties, and, at the same time, there exists a 
 well-ordering of the reals.
From our study, it is concluded that the technique of transitive models of bounded Separation in 
, as in 
Section 15, will lead to similar consistency and independence results, related to second-order Peano arithmetic 
 and similar to our Theorem 2, on the basis of the consistency of 
 itself.
The following problems arise from our study.
Problem 1. Iterations of Jensen’s forcing were developed by Abraham [
28]. Combining this technique with the finite-support Jensen products technique and some earlier forcing constructions used in the theory of generic choiceless models, a model of 
 is presented in [
29] in which the countable 
 holds but the dependent choices scheme 
 fails for some 
 relation (which is the best possible). This leads to two different problems:
- (I)
- Reprove the consistency results in [ 29- ] on the basis of the consistency of theory  - , similar to Theorem 2. 
- (II)
- Generalize the mentioned consistency result of [ 29- ] to higher projective levels by means of a suitable definable generic forcing notion. That is, given  - , define a model of  -  in which the countable  -  holds whereas  -  fails for some  -  relation but holds for  - . A recent paper [ 30- ], containing some consistency results related to different forms of the countable  - , is a step in this direction. 
 Problem 2. The method of definable generic forcing notions has been recently applied for some definability problems in modern set theory, including the following applications:
- -
- A model of  ZFC- , in which the separation principle holds for a given effective projective type  - ,  - , is defined in [ 31- ]; 
- -
- A model of  ZFC- , in which well-orderings of the reals first appear at a given projective level, is defined in [ 32- ]; 
- -
- A model of  ZFC- , in which the full basis theorem holds in the absence of analytically definable well-orderings of the reals, is defined in [ 33- ]. 
It is a common problem related to all these results to establish their -consistency versions similar to Theorem 2.
 Problem 3. A somewhat modified forcing notion, say 
, rather similar to 
 of Theorem 4, is defined in [
34]. It is invariant under some transformations so that, instead of a single generic real by 
, it adjoins a 
-
equivalence class of 
-generic reals. (Recall that reals 
 are 
-equivalent if 
 for all but finite 
n. See some generalizations in [
35].) It turns out that this 
-generic 
-class is a (countable) 
 set containing no OD (ordinal-definable) elements in the extension, and, at the same time, every countable 
 set definitely contains OD elements.