Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Regeneration Projects: The Brazilian Context and the Case of “Porto Maravilha” in Rio de Janeiro

Abstract

Urban regeneration projects have been part of urban planning in different cities to recover strategic areas and combat new land consumption. Often, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) agreements are signed to meet the demands of these projects. In the Brazilian context, the general PPP law classifies concessions into two types: sponsored concessions or administrative concessions. Urban regeneration projects in the Brazilian context can be carried out through different policies and instruments, such as those in the City Statute. Despite this, there are several obstacles in how these practices are developed, which require greater attention to the enabling environment and the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that can improve the performance of these public procurement practices. Based on this, this study aims to analyze the Brazilian context of PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects and the specific case of the “Porto Maravilha” in Rio de Janeiro. To this scope, the study adopts a previously established CSF framework. The data analyzed are derived from secondary sources obtained through documentation collection and primary sources obtained through interviews. Regarding the PPP process, the results indicate financial and execution problems. Concerning the project, which remains unfinished, the results point to a transformation of the port area, but with significant social impacts.

1. Introduction

In different urban contexts, the intense urbanization currently being experienced is exerting strong pressure on cities. Today, more than half of the world’s population lives in cities. The highest urban growth rates are found in developing countries, leading to extensive suburbanization of peripheral areas or agglomeration in slums [1].

In the face of growing and intense urbanization, measures must be considered to achieve greater sustainability in urban contexts, which is one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) proposed by the United Nations—SDG 11, Sustainable Cities and Communities.

Urban regeneration practices are presented as a path to sustainability. They respond to decline urban degradation and decline scenarios, giving new functions to obsolete areas and offering an alternative to the urbanization of new areas [2].

Nevertheless, urban regeneration practices are often complex, involving different risks and requiring high investments. In addition, the public sector, as the provider of various types of infrastructure and public services, often does not have the resources to meet all the current urban demands. In this sense, private sector action through Public-Private Partnership (PPP) agreements can be strategic in urban regeneration and developing urban regeneration projects.

Urban regeneration projects carried out through PPP agreements are used to develop projects in different urban contexts. Among the project typologies, waterfront projects stand out. In many cases, former ports and central areas in the city are considered strategic for the city from an urban point of view and, therefore, interesting to regenerate. The regeneration of these areas through PPP arrangements is often related to spaces for culture, leisure, and recreation, seeking to give the city a new image. In some cases, the regeneration processes of these areas may also be motivated by mega-events such as the World Cups, the Olympic Games, or World Exhibitions. Within neoliberalist logic, they can be associated with processes of exclusion and gentrification [2].

On the other hand, the use of PPP arrangements presents both positive and negative points. The advantages of using PPP arrangements include incorporating private sector capacity, knowledge, and innovation, sharing risk with the private sector, reducing the overall cost of the project through greater private sector efficiency, and increasing the probability of meeting project deadlines [3,4].

Some critical points can also be observed in the use of PPP arrangements. Some of the essential points are additional costs that, if not managed properly, can compromise economic viability; loss of responsibility; mitigation of unexpected risks that are eventually assumed by the public sector; and management difficulties over long periods of time [3,4].

Therefore, urban regeneration practices carried out through PPP arrangements can be controversial. They fail to achieve the initial objectives proposed and result in negative consequences from an urban, social, and financial point of view.

In Brazil, PPP arrangements are carried out through two modalities: concessionary PPP or sponsored PPP [5]. On the other hand, urban regeneration practices are carried out mainly in large and medium-sized cities seeking to recover their central areas. Urban regeneration practices can be carried out through different policies and instruments, such as those found in the City Statute [6].

The urban regeneration of Rio de Janeiro’s port area through the “Porto Maravilha” project is an interesting and complex example of a Public-Private Partnership. The ambitious project, whose PPP arrangement was formalized in 2009, envisioned the urban regeneration of 500 ha of the central and port area [7]. Despite developing important parts of the project, such as museums and open spaces, the project was not completed due to problems that compromised the PPP arrangement.

Considering this scenario, this study aims to analyze the Brazilian context regarding PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects and the specific case of “Porto Maravilha”. The study focuses on PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects from a perspective that is not restricted to urban planning and includes important contractual and management aspects of these practices.

The study identifies best practices through Critical Success Factors (CSFs). CSFs refer to elements, conditions, events, and activities that must be considered for an organization or a project to achieve its goals and ensure its success [8,9].

The analysis aims to identify which critical success factors are observed in the Brazilian context and in the specific case study, and which factors can be better worked on. Meeting the proposed objective, the study also aims to answer the following research questions:

• How are PPP arrangements understood and applied in urban regeneration projects in the Brazilian context?
• Which CSFs are most relevant in the Brazilian context? Which factors could be better addressed?
• Which CFSs are most relevant in the “Porto Maravilha” case study? Which factors could be better addressed?

To this scope, the study uses a previously established framework, which considers clusters related to the external environment related to the PPP projects—a country’s enabling environment that facilitates or does not facilitate the implementation of partnerships and exogenous factors found in that country—and the internal environment of the PPP projects—referring to the partnership itself and its different phases [10].

The study consists of five sections: this brief introduction, a second section on the research methodology, a third section analyzing the Brazilian context and presenting the case study, a fourth section discussing the results obtained, and a final section drawing conclusions.

2. Materials and Methods

The study aims to analyze the Brazilian context of PPP agreements in urban regeneration projects, also delving into a specific case of a PPP agreement for urban regeneration of a waterfront area—the case of the Port of Rio de Janeiro and the Porto Maravilha partnership. The analysis focuses on the CSFs observed in the Brazilian context and the PPP analyzed, and the issues that could be improved.

To this scope, the study uses a previously established framework of CSFs in PPP agreements for urban regeneration projects [10]. The framework considers five distinct clusters, two relate to the external environment, and three to the internal environment of the partnership. The external environment includes the enabling environment and exogenous factors. The internal environment includes the three phases of the partnership: the preparation phase, the procurement phase, and the contract management phase (Figure 1).

The enabling environment consists of the entire environment external to the PPP projects, which can be controlled in such a way as to facilitate the development of partnerships. Concerning the enabling environment, six factors were identified:

• Favorable legal and regulatory framework: laws and regulations that follow the country’s legislation at its different levels and that facilitate the development of partnerships, protecting the rights and interests of all parties.
• Government support and guarantees: Government support in the form of guarantees ensures the project’s financial viability and creditworthiness.
• Leadership focus: the capacity of the public sector to exercise its leadership role in implementing the partnership.
• Political support and stability: political stability at different levels beyond the period of a political mandate that can guarantee the continuity of the partnership.
• Standardization procedure for PPP projects: standardization of the process to assure the public sector that the partnership is carried out in accordance with governmental and local objectives and to facilitate the private sector to prepare for the partnership.
• Well-organized and committed public agency: organized and committed public body, with technical capacity and experience in partnerships.

Exogenous factors include factors that cannot be controlled, but which also influence the development of PPP projects. The following factors were identified:

• Available financial and capital market: available financial and capital markets allow for low financing costs and offer a diversified range of financial products.
• Community support: The community’s acceptance, understanding, and participation are important to ensure the smooth running of the PPP, avoid delays, facilitate the hiring of local labor, provide projects valued by citizens, manage expectations, and mitigate disagreements.
• Favorable socio-economic factors: a favorable socio-economic scenario in which the public sector and the population have a robust payment capacity, creating an environment that encourages partnerships.
• Stable macroeconomic conditions and sound economic policy: sound economic policy capable of creating a stable and growing economic environment, allowing for a low cost of capital and greater certainty in the market, thus reducing risks.

For the preparation phase, the following factors were identified:

• Availability of resources and a skilled and dedicated team of professionals: because these are long processes, it is necessary to guarantee resources for the PPP during the transition; furthermore, it is essential to have a dedicated and competent team of professionals to accompany the entire PPP.
• Clearly defined responsibilities and roles: the different roles and functions of the actors involved have been clearly defined already in the preparation phase.
• Clear project scope definition and documentation: clear definition, already in the preparation phase, of the project documentation, including objective, scope, geographical area, technical project, functional responsibilities, and previous experience in similar projects.
• Comprehensive and business viability of project feasibility study: a comprehensive business feasibility study of the project, including technical feasibility studies, financial and socio-economic analyses, and realistic assessments of costs and benefits.
• Good governance: managing the relationships between the actors involved is essential at all stages of the PPP, including the preparatory phase.

For the procurement phase, the following factors were identified:

• Availability of resources and a skilled and dedicated team of professionals: just as in the preparatory phase, the availability of resources and a team to accompany the PPP is fundamental during the contracting phase.
• Competitive and standardized bidding process: a standardized process must define the rules a priori and present them to bidders, facilitating the preparation of bids and allowing them to be fairly compared; the competitive process, in turn, guarantees the best cost-benefit ratios.
• Transparent procurement process: a transparent procurement process that reduces transaction costs and shortens negotiation and contracting times.
• Trust and openness: openness between the parties to create trust and a solid relationship, increasing their willingness to cooperate.

Finally, regarding the contract management phase, the following factors were identified:

• Commitment and responsibility of public and private sectors: the commitment of both parties to the objectives of the partnership and the project, including allocating their best resources.
• Effective conflict management: effective and efficient conflict management, as early as possible, and involving those responsible in both sectors, to avoid aggravating the conflict and compromising the partnership.
• Effective contract management: effective and efficient contract management by controlling costs, time, security, materials, techniques, and skills to avoid renegotiations and compromising the partnership.
• Good governance: managing the relationships between the different players involved is important at all stages of the PPP arrangements, including the contract management phase.
• Open and constant communication among stakeholders: openness and communication between all the actors involved—not just the public and private sectors—ensures that the interests and concerns of all parties are managed, increasing trust and commitment to project management.

The external environment will be used to analyze the Brazilian context in general, while the PPP’s internal environment will guide the analysis of the specific case study.

The study was carried out through desk-based research on the Brazilian context and the specific case study. The document analysis includes secondary data referring to laws, regulations, official documents, reports, scientific articles, and promotional information about the Porto Maravilha project.

To complement the case study analysis, primary data were extracted from interviews conducted with stakeholders involved in the case study. The use of interviews as a primary data collection method was extremely important since it allowed us to hear different stakeholders involved in the process, with different points of view that can often be contradictory.

In this sense, five interviews were conducted with stakeholders or experts in the Porto Maravilha partnership and project in March and April 2025 (

Table 1. Interviews—interviewee profile.

Interviewee 1	Former president of the public company responsible for Porto Maravilha
Interviewee 2	Former employee of the Private Consortium
Interviewee 3	Employee of the Port Authority of Rio de Janeiro
Interviewee 4	Representative of the local community (Morro da Providencia)
Interviewee 5	Academic and researcher on the Porto Maravilha project

). The interviews were conducted online in a semi-structured format based on open-ended questions (

Table A1. Interviews—open-ended questions.

How was Rio de Janeiro’s port area before the project?

What was the context of the Porto Maravilha OUC and PPP?

Which external entities were involved?

How do you evaluate the urban results obtained through the area’s regeneration? What aspects do you see as positive, and what could be addressed better?

How do you evaluate the partnership between the public sector and the Porto Novo Consortium? What aspects do you see as positive, and what could be addressed better?

Were there any conflicts observed during the development of the Porto Maravilha partnership and project? How were these conflicts managed?

How did the local population receive the Porto Maravilha partnership and project? Was there support or opposition?

If the process was done again, what could be done differently?

—Appendix A).

3. Results

3.1. Brazilian Context

To analyze the Brazilian context based on the clusters identified previously, the study focused first on the enabling environment and, subsequently, on the exogenous factors that influence the Brazilian scenario on PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects.

3.1.1. Enabling Environment in Brazil

In Brazil, the legal framework for PPP projects is based mainly on Law No. 11,079/2004—“Normas gerais para licitação e contratação de parceria público-privada no âmbito da administração pública” (General rules for bidding and contracting public-private partnerships within the public administration). This law establishes general rules for bidding and contracting PPP projects within the sphere of powers of the Federal Government, the States, the Federal District, and the Municipalities. The law defines the PPP arrangement as “the administrative concession contract, in the sponsored or administrative modality” [5].

The sponsored concession corresponds to the concession of public services and goods when it “involves, in addition to the tariff charged to users, pecuniary consideration from the public partner to the private partner” [5]. In addition to Law No. 11,079/2004, the sponsored concession is also governed by Law No. 8987/1995, which provides for the concession and permission regime for the provision of public services provided for in art. 175 of the Federal Constitution and makes other provisions [11].

The administrative concession, in turn, corresponds to “a contract for the provision of services of which the Public Administration is the direct or indirect user, even if it involves the execution of infrastructure or the supply and installation of goods” [5]. In addition to Law No. 11,079/2004, the administrative concession is also governed by Law No. 8987/1995 and Law No. 9074/1995, which establish rules for granting and extending concessions and permissions for public services and make other provisions [12].

Law No. 11,097/2004 also refers to important issues related to PPP arrangements. The document defines that it is forbidden to enter into partnerships in the following circumstances: where the value of the contract is less than BRL 10,000,000.00 (ten million reais—1.6 million USD); where the period for providing the service is less than five years; or where the sole purpose is to supply labor, supply and install equipment, or carry out public works [5].

The document also defines some guidelines to be observed when signing PPP projects, namely: efficiency in fulfilling state missions and in the use of society’s resources; respect for the interests and rights of the recipients of the services and the private entities entrusted with their execution; non-excludability of regulatory and jurisdictional functions, the exercise of police power and other activities exclusive to the state; fiscal responsibility when signing and executing partnerships; transparency of procedures and decisions; objective distribution of risks between the parties; financial sustainability and socio-economic advantages of partnership projects [5].

Concerning the contracts to be established, they must follow the elements identified in art. 23 of Law No. 8987/1995 and art. 5 of Law No. 11,097/2004. The contracts must refer to the object, area, and term of the concession; the manner, form, and conditions of providing the service; the criteria, indicators, formulas, and parameters defining the quality of the service; the price of the service and the criteria and procedures for adjusting and reviewing tariffs; the rights, guarantees, and obligations of the granting authority and the concession holder, including those related to the foreseeable need for future alteration and expansion of the service and consequent modernization, improvement and expansion of equipment and facilities; the rights and duties of users to obtain and use the service; the form of supervision of the installations, equipment, methods, and practices of execution of the service, as well as the indication of the competent bodies to exercise it; the contractual and administrative penalties to which the concession holder is subject and their form of application; the cases of termination of the concession; the reversible assets; the criteria for calculating and paying the indemnities due to the concession holder, when applicable; the conditions for extending the contract; the obligation, form, and frequency of the concession holder’s rendering of accounts to the granting authority; the requirement to publish the concession holder’s periodic financial statements; and the forum and amicable way of resolving contractual differences [11].

Concerning guarantees, the pecuniary obligations contracted by the Public Administration in a PPP contract may be guaranteed by: earmarking revenues, in compliance with the provisions of item IV of article 167 of the Federal Constitution; establishing or using special funds provided for by law; contracting insurance guarantees with insurance companies that the Public Administration does not control; guarantees provided by international organizations or financial institutions; guarantees provided by a guarantee fund or state-owned company created for this purpose; other mechanisms allowed by law [5].

Finally, Law No. 11,079/2004 also deals with bidding processes, defining that contracting in PPP processes will be preceded by bidding in the form of a tender or competitive dialogue [5]. The document also refers to other laws that, in part, regulate the bidding process: Law No. 8666, of 21 June 1993 [13], currently repealed by Law No. 14,133 of 1 April 2021—the Administrative Bidding and Contracts Law [14]; Law No. 8987, of 13 February 1995, which provides for the concession and permission regime for the provision of public services provided for in art. 175 of the Federal Constitution [11]; and Law No. 9307, of 23 September 1996, which provides for arbitration [15].

Another important aspect of the Brazilian scenario regarding PPP arrangements is the presence of PPP Units, which are responsible for assisting PPP processes. These units, however, are present on a state level in some states such as Bahia, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Espirito Santo, Porto Alegre, and Piauí.

Urban regeneration practices, on the other hand, are mainly carried out in the central areas of large and medium-sized cities. In this context, some documents stand out: the Política de Desenvolvimento Urbano (Urban Development Policy) defined in articles 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution, the Estatuto da Cidade (City Statute), the Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento Urbano (National Urban Development Policy), the Política Nacional de Habitação (National Housing Policy), the Plano Nacional de Habitação (National Housing Plan), and the Programa de Reabilitação de Áreas Urbanas Centrais (Rehabilitation Program for Central Urban Areas).

The City Statute, approved in 2001 through Law No. 10,257, is the ordinary law that regulates Brazilian urban policy, and articles 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution [6]. The Statute provides a series of instruments that municipalities can incorporate into their Municipal Master Plans and subsequently apply. The instruments provided by the City Statute can be of three types [16]: instruments to induce urban development, instruments to democratize urban management, and instruments to regularize land ownership.

Among the instruments for inducing urban development, the City Statute provides for an instrument called Operação Urbana Consorciada—OUC (Consortium Urban Operation). An OUC is defined as “the set of interventions and measures coordinated by the municipal authority, with the participation of property owners, residents, permanent users, and private investors, to achieve structural urban transformations, social improvements, and environmental enhancement in an area” [6]. Therefore, it is an instrument aimed at the structural transformation of an urban area through a combination of public and private investment [17].

Among the incentives, the City Statute defines that an OUC can provide for: the modification of indices and characteristics of subdivision, use, and occupation of land and subsoil, and changes to building regulations, considering the environmental impact resulting from them; and the regularization of constructions, renovations or extensions carried out in disagreement with current legislation [6].

The approval of an OUC should be carried out at the municipal level, and the coordination of the OUC is the responsibility of the City Council. The City Statute states that a “specific municipal law, based on the master plan, may delimit an area for the application of consortium operations” [6]. In other words, a specific municipal law should be adopted for each OUC.

This law must include a definition of the area to be affected; a basic program for occupying the area; an economic and social assistance program for the population directly affected by the operation; the purposes of the operation; a preliminary neighborhood impact study; the compensation to be demanded from owners, permanent users, and private investors; and the form of control over the operation, which must be shared with representatives of civil society [6].

Furthermore, the City Statute also states that “the specific law approving the consortium urban operation may provide for the municipality to emit a certain number of additional construction potential certificates, which will be sold at auction or used directly to pay for the work necessary for the operation itself” [6].

As stated in the City Statute, the municipality is responsible for controlling partnerships, assuming leadership of operations, and ensuring that partnerships are aligned with the municipal master plan and, therefore, with the city’s urban planning and collective interest. The specific law also guarantees a standardization of the information provided about the partnership and clearly defines the objectives of each of the parties and the incentives.

3.1.2. Exogenous Factors in Brazil

The exogenous factors analyzed include the availability of a financial and capital market, community support, favorable socio-economic factors, and a stable macroeconomic condition and sound economic policy.

The Brazilian capital market has developed and expanded considerably since the early 2000s regarding the availability of financial and capital markets. This development and expansion were the result of constant and significant reforms in the regulatory framework, modernization of the financial infrastructure, and increased participation of national and international investors [18,19].

The Brazilian equity capital markets are mainly regulated by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), which is jointly regulated by the National Monetary Council (CMN), the Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Market Entities (ANBIMA), and B3 S.A.—Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3), the Brazilian stock exchange [19].

Brazil’s capital markets are the largest and most dynamic in Latin America, known for their robust trading volumes and diverse investment options. Investors in Brazil have access to a wide range of financial products, from traditional stocks and bonds to sophisticated instruments such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), structured products, and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) focused opportunities. This diversity allows investors to adapt their strategies to different risk profiles and market conditions [18].

Regarding community support, there is a strong polarization between those who defend a strong State with greater power of intervention and those who defend greater decentralization of the State and free action of private agents [20], thus reflecting a polarization regarding support for PPPs. In general, opposition to PPP arrangements is related to the transparency of these processes [21] and corruption issues [22].

Concerning socio-economic factors, the country presents a controversial scenario. Despite being the 10th largest economy in the world and the largest economy in Latin America, Brazil has historically been one of the most unequal countries in the world [23]. With 216 million inhabitants living in different realities across 8.5 million km², the differences are found to manifest in many “Brazils” [24]. The country’s regions present relevant socio-economic disparities: even before COVID-19, some regions in the north and northeast of the country had a Human Capital Index (HCI) of around 40%, while some regions in the richer southeast of Brazil had HCI levels of around 70% [24].

In 2020, with the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the country was about to face historic socio-economic disruptions. The pandemic took a huge human toll, causing the deaths of thousands of people (194,949 people just in 2020 and 714,736 people so far); the country’s economy suffered its worst contraction in recorded history; the closure of businesses led to an unprecedented exit of workers [25]. The crisis generated by COVID-19 was the second in the country’s recent history. After the global financial crisis of 2008 and the response to macroeconomic stimulus, the country entered a technical recession in 2014. The economic recession was also accompanied by a political crisis, marked by intense polarization. The crisis that began in 2014 and the COVID pandemic have increased already serious socio-economic disparities [25].

Finally, to understand the country’s macroeconomic scenario, some indicators relating to annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth in percentual and inflation were analyzed, based on the data obtained from the World Bank over the last twenty years.

Concerning annual GDP per capita, the World Bank data shows negative peaks in four years—2009 (−1.1%), 2015 (−4.4%), 2016 (−4.1%), and 2020 (−3.9%). Despite the growth in 2021 (+4.2%), the growth in 2023 was only 2.4%. In terms of GDP per capita growth, the macroeconomic scenario does not indicate a robust economy, but rather an economic slowdown.

Regarding inflation, the country has had considerable inflation peaks in recent years, particularly in 2022, with a 9.3% inflation rate. In 2023, inflation stood at 4.6%, representing a high and unfavorable inflation rate for the country’s macroeconomic scenario.

3.2. “Porto Maravilha” Case Study

After a general overview of the Brazilian context, the study focused on the case of “Porto Maravilha”. It begins with an initial contextualization of Rio de Janeiro and its port. It then presents the proposed urban regeneration project. Finally, it focuses on the PPP responsible for developing the project.

3.2.1. Context of Rio de Janeiro and the Port

Rio de Janeiro is the capital of the state with the same name, located in the southeastern region of Brazil (Figure 2). The city of Rio de Janeiro has a population of 6.2 million inhabitants, while its metropolitan area has 13.4 million inhabitants. In economic terms, Rio de Janeiro is the second-largest metropolitan area and one of the country’s most important centers for services, culture, and tourism [26]. As Brazil’s main gateway, Rio de Janeiro has good accessibility at regional, national, and international levels, whether in terms of airports or the road network [26]. Despite this, the city is also characterized by enormous contrasts, with differences in the quality of life of different groups of citizens, poverty, and inequality. It is also well known for its favelas.

In the context of Rio de Janeiro, the port area is also strategically located, close to Santos Dumont Airport, Tom Jobim International Airport, and important areas and points of interest in the city, such as Maracanã Stadium, Corcovado, Copacabana, and Pão de Açucar (Figure 3).

The Port of Rio de Janeiro emerged in the 18th century, in an area close to the first Portuguese settlement. Still, in the middle of the 18th century, the port expanded considerably due to the coffee boom in Brazil. For a long time, the Port of Rio de Janeiro was closely linked to Brazil’s economic, social, and cultural development [26].

However, with the changes in the Brazilian economy and in maritime transport technologies, the Port of Rio de Janeiro went through a phase of decline and abandonment. Although part of the port infrastructure has been maintained, with the modernization of port activities, logistical difficulties related to the city’s growth, and changes in the city’s economic activities, the extension of the port region that was originally present has lost its primary function [27].

In this sense, since the 1970s, the port area has been continuously degraded, and proposals for renovation have failed. The lack of alignment between the different players—the state, the municipality, private entities, and federal agencies—was pointed out as one of the main barriers that explain the failure of projects [27]. The port area of Rio de Janeiro is complex, large, and has land features. It is close to the metropolis’s historical and financial center.

3.2.2. Porto Maravilha Proposed Project

The Porto Maravilha project seeks to regenerate Rio de Janeiro’s port area through recreation, tourism, cultural complexes, and housing, like what can be seen in other port cities. The project is part of the context of the major mega-events that took place in Rio de Janeiro: the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. The mega-events were thus essential motivations for the urban regeneration of the port area [28].

The project covers an area of approximately 500 ha and foresees the construction of around 4.5 million square meters over a period of 30 years. The delimited perimeter contains three integral neighborhoods—Saúde, Gamboa, and Santo Cristo, four partial neighborhoods—Centro da Cidade, Cidade Nova, São Cristóvão, and Caju, and historic favelas in the region—Morro da Providência, Moreira Pinto, São Diogo, Pedra Lisa, Livramento, and Conceição (Figure 4) [29].

As a point of arrival for the enslaved population and later home to freed slaves, the area is rich in cultural aspects related to the African population. Part of the port area, known as Pequena África (Small Africa), is the historical home of the Afro-Brazilian population in Rio de Janeiro [30].

Figure 4. Delimitation of the intervention area with the subdivision of neighborhoods. Source: Prepared by the authors based on [31].

Figure 4. Delimitation of the intervention area with the subdivision of neighborhoods. Source: Prepared by the authors based on [31].

Before the project started, the Porto Maravilha area had a population of around 28,000 inhabitants, mainly located on the hills in precarious settlements. The area was also crossed by a large viaduct, called the Elevado da Perimetral (Perimetral Elevated), with an intense flow of vehicles. Because of this, the area was considered a transit zone, with many abandoned and degraded buildings.

The project was designed to restore urban infrastructure, transport, the environment, and historical and cultural heritage. It was also intended to improve housing conditions and attract new residents to the area. In addition to improving housing, the project also expected the arrival of large companies, new tax incentives, and the provision of public services [32].

Regarding mobility, the project aims to completely change the concept of urban mobility in the port and central area, creating a system that favors public transport, values the idea of living close to work, creates new spaces for pedestrians, creates new cycle paths, and integrates means of transport [32].

The project includes major works and the provision of various services. Among the works are: the demolition of the Elevado da Perimetral (Perimetral Elevated), the construction of the Museu de Arte do Rio—MAR (Rio Art Museum) and the Museu do Amanhã (Museum of Tomorrow), the construction of the Via Binário do Porto e Túnel Rio 450 (Port Binary Road and Rio 450 Tunnel), the construction of the Via Expressa e Túnel Prefeito Marcello Alencar (Express road and Mayor Marcello Alencar Tunnel), the Nova Orla Conde (New Conde waterfront), the Veículo Leve Sobre Trilhos (Light Rail Vehicles), 70 km of roads re-urbanized and 650,000 m² of sidewalks renovated, 700 km of urban infrastructure networks rebuilt (water, sewage, drainage), 17 km of new cycle paths, 15,000 trees [32].

The services provided include: conservation and maintenance of the road system; conservation and maintenance of green areas and squares; maintenance and repair of public lighting and sidewalks; execution of urban cleaning services; selective garbage collection; maintenance of the drainage network and collective galleries; maintenance of traffic signs; installation and maintenance of bicycle parks; maintenance and conservation of tourist, historical, and geographical points and monuments; and citizen service [32].

The planned works and services are expected to have a significant impact on the area: an increase in population from 32,000 to 100,000 inhabitants in 10 years; an increase in the green area; a 50% increase in traffic flow capacity in the region; a reduction in air and noise pollution, with the removal of the Perimetral and a reduction in heavy transport in the region; an increase in soil permeability; an increase and improvement in the quality of public services provided; the transformation of the region into a reference point for the city [32].

In terms of social commitments, the project was based on the assumption that the residents of the area should remain there and proposed a series of measures: the creation of housing of social interest; installation of nurseries, emergency care units, and schools to meet the expected population density; integration between the various modes of public transport, facilitating accessibility and communication with other areas; restoration of the area’s environmental quality; generation of direct and permanent employment in the region; regularization and formalization of economic activities; professional training; creation of the Porto Maravilha Cultural and Porto Maravilha Citizen Programmes; support for community development initiatives [32].

3.2.3. OUC Porto Maravilha

The OUC Porto Maravilha was established in 2009 through Complementary Law No. 101/2009 [33]. However, the procedures that led to the implementation of the OUC began in 2006, through Decree No. 26,852, of 8 August 2006, which creates and delimits the Área de Especial Interesse Urbanistico (AEIU) da Região Portuária do Rio de Janeiro—Area of Special Urban Interest of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro for the purposes it indicates, declares real estate to be of public utility, establishes conditions for partnerships with the private sector, and authorizes the creation of a Working Group [34].

After the creation and delimitation of the Area of Special Interest, a series of other documents related to the area were published, such as the different decrees to constitute and create the Working Group responsible for analyzing the studies for modeling a concession or PPP agreement for the implementation of the Recovery and Revitalization Plan for the Port Region, as well as decrees to create and alter the Working Group to supervise the implementation of the Porto Maravilha Project [35,36,37,38,39,40,41].

Complementary Law No. 101/2009 modified the Master Plan and authorized the Executive Power to institute the OUC Porto Maravilha. It is important to highlight that Law No. 101/2009 presents the OUC and its basic program in a very generic way, basically referring to a few major urban interventions and massive building densification—mainly because of the increase in density that would be allowed with the sale of Certificado de Potencial Adicional de Construção—CEPACs (Certificates of Additional Construction Potential).

Concerning the definition of the intervention plan in Law No. 101/2009, the basic program for the occupation of the area does not clearly define objectives or provide a clear idea of the type of occupation intended. Without any more detailed explanation, the program refers to a “new occupation pattern” to be implemented in the area and the subdivision into sectors, but without relating them to the different types of urban spaces within the perimeter of the operation [42]. The lack of clarity in the basic program and the occupation plan, the enormous dimension of the area, and the possibility of intense densification make the project very complex and make it difficult to understand its development over time.

Complementary Law No. 101/2009 was followed by Complementary Law No. 102/2009, which created the Companhia de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Região do Porto do Rio de Janeiro—CDURP (Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro), responsible for the development of the AEIU of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro [43], and Complementary Law No. 105/2009, which instituted the Municipal Program of Public-Private Partnerships—Propar-Rio [44]. Also, in 2009, Decree No. 31,620 established the CDURP and approved its statutes [45].

CDURP is a mixed-capital company, independent financially and administratively from the municipality. It is responsible for promoting the development of the Port through concessions and managing the assets transferred to it [46]. In the first months of 2010, CDURP granted a 24-month preliminary license for the AEIU Neighborhood Impact Study and a preliminary license for the OUC.

Two decrees were published in July 2010. The first is Decree No. 32,575, of 28 July 2010, which includes the Port of Rio Revitalization Project in the Municipal Plan for Public-Private Partnerships [47]. The second is Decree No. 32,576, of 28 July 2010, which provides for the delegation of the management of services of local interest and public services of municipal competence to be provided within the boundaries of the AEIU of the Port of Rio Region [48].

Also, in July 2010, Public Tender No. 001 was opened [49]. The public tender notice defined that the bidding process would be carried out and judged in two phases, with the first phase referring to the analysis of the qualification documents and the second phase referring to the analysis of the technical proposal and the economic proposal. The tender document stipulated that the execution of the contract would be divided into fifteen successive phases, following the general terms of the General Urbanization Plan for the Port AEIU [49].

The public tender notice also defines the terms relating to the counterpart and guarantee of payment by the public authority, the amount of which would be the subject of dispute in the competition. In general terms, the maximum estimated value of the contract was eight billion reais (4.5 billion USD) [49]. The notice defined the conditions for participation and included models for the documents to be submitted by bidders, including documents relating to qualification, legal standing, tax regularity, technical qualification, economic-financial qualification, technical proposal, and economic-financial proposal [49].

In the following month, Decree No. 32,666, of 11 August 2010, determined the issuance of CEPAC [50]. The Municipality of Rio de Janeiro has issued 6,436,722 CEPACs, in book-entry form, for BRL 545.00 (five hundred and forty-five reais—310.00 USD) each, to be used as additional construction potential in the Rio de Janeiro Port Region AEIU.

The amounts obtained from the sale of these CEPACs, as well as other assets transferred to CDURP, such as 408,000 m² of land in the Porto region, capitalize this state-owned company to promote the Porto Maravilha PPP [46].

In October 2010, the Qualification Trial, the Technical Proposal Trial, and the Final Score were carried out. The winner was the Porto Novo Consortium, made up of Construction companies OAS Ltd.a, Norberto Odebrecht Brasil S/A, and Carioca Christiani-Nielsen Engenharia S/A. In November 2010, the announcement of the signing of the administrative concession contract was published. Figure 5 shows the main steps that led to the implementation of the PPP arrangement.

After the contract was signed, the Public Tender No. 002/2010 was also opened to hire specialized technical services for the management and supervision of the Administrative Concession Contract for the revitalization, operation, and maintenance of the AEIU in the Port region of Rio de Janeiro. Qualification was judged in February 2011, and the result was announced in April 2012, with the Ecoplan/JHP Consortium winning. Approval and award took place in May 2012 [51].

In June 2011, the Real Estate Investment Fund Porto Maravilha, owned by Caixa Econômica Federal, bought a single lot of CEPACs in Rio de Janeiro’s Port Zone for BRL 3.5 billion (2.2 billion USD), during an auction organized by the Rio de Janeiro Municipal Government [51].

The PPP Porto Maravilha contract was managed through the service orders that mark the start of the project phases. The order for the first phase was placed in June 2011. In addition, several amendments to the contract were published [52], modifying the original agreement.

New decrees and laws were also published during contract management. Municipal Decree No. 36,665 of 1 January 2013, provides for the review of the economic and financial balance of administrative contracts [53]. Complementary Law No. 147/2014 amends the wording of art. 24 of Complementary Law No. 105/2009 to change the percentage limit for contracting PPP agreements from 3% (three percent) to 5% (five percent) of the net current revenue for the year and the projected net current revenue [53]. Municipal Decree No. 46,787 of 7 November 2019, creates a Working Group to analyze documentation and determine possible distortions in executing the Administrative Concession Contract PPP-01 [54].

In June 2018, it was reported that Caixa Econômica Federal declared the illiquidity of the Real Estate Investment Fund Porto Maravilha, responsible for OUC payments, leaving CDURP to maintain the flow of transfers under the PPP contract. In January 2023, CDURP announced that the project had been halted due to the illiquidity of the Real Estate Investment Fund.

To date, approximately 85% of the project has been completed. The main works include the demolition of the Elevado da Perimetral, the construction of tunnels, urban infrastructure such as water supply and wastewater collection and treatment, and cultural buildings such as museums.

3.2.4. OUC and Project Porto Maravilha

Despite the interruption of the partnership responsible for the Porto Maravilha project, some aspects should be highlighted, both in a positive and negative view.

In terms of urban aspects, the project brought improvements to the infrastructure. The demolition of the Elevado da Perimetral, a viaduct that cut through the area, was a crucial element in the greater integration of the area with the rest of the city (Figure 6). The construction of the tunnels, as an alternative to the viaduct, was also positive for the area. In addition, infrastructure works such as new roads, sidewalks, street lighting, and wastewater collection and treatment sewage have benefited the area (Figure 7). The expansion of the Light Rail Vehicle has also improved transportation, increasing the area’s connectivity.

Regarding the urban planning aspects, interviewee 1 states that “the region had an extremely poor and inefficient urban infrastructure. It has all been redone—I’m talking about water, wastewater, drainage, energy, telecommunications, gas… All of this has been redone in this region. In fact, 85% of the planned construction program has already been carried out. All this was done in the period 2011–2016. Not to mention the urban aspects: there has been an increase in the number of trees and improvements to the sidewalks. This area was often subject to flooding because the drainage system was unable to drain the water. In addition to considering the usual technical parameters for making a drainage network—which is rainfall recurrence and, in the case of the vicinity of the Port, tidal recurrence—the new drainage network also took into account studies by the city council estimating the impact of rising sea levels in that region” (translated from Portuguese).

He complements this by saying that “because of this whole process, the VLT was implemented, changing urban mobility patterns in the region. Clean energy has a low impact on noise, air pollution, and all that. The demolition of the Perimetral and the construction of the tunnels—unfortunately, I don’t know if this is being monitored or not—have certainly had a positive impact on reducing air pollution, the impact on traffic itself, and several listed buildings in the region” (translated from Portuguese).

Some anchor architectural projects are worth highlighting. The construction of the Rio Art Museum (MAR) and the Museum of Tomorrow have created new points of interest for the city, motivating tourism and culture (Figure 8 and Figure 9). New public spaces, such as squares, have also made a place for tourism.

Concerning these elements, interviewee 5 states that “the bet that was made on the region becoming part of Rio de Janeiro’s tourist circuit has intensified. At first, there were those anchor projects—the Rio Art Museum, the Museum of Tomorrow, some restoration of buildings of historical importance, with some archaeological discoveries” (translated from Portuguese).

On the other hand, interviewee 4 points out that “the municipality took 114 million reais from the infrastructure of Morro do Pinto and Morro da Providência and reallocated it to more than 300 million reais for the construction, designed by Calatrava, of the Museum of Tomorrow. So, they took the money from a place that needed it to build the Museum of Tomorrow” (translated from Portuguese).

Historical and cultural aspects were reinforced in the area with the discovery of spaces such as Cais do Valongo (Valongo Wharf), an old pier located in the port area related to the arrival of Africans enslaved in America (Figure 10). African history related to the area was further reinforced with the African Heritage Circuit and the Museum of Afro-Brazilian Cultural History—MUHCAB (Figure 11).

Regarding the reinforcement of African heritage in the region, interviewee 4 points out that “if today there is a great deal of visitation in the port area, if today the African heritage circuit has become well established, it’s because of the rediscovery of Cais do Valongo, but it’s worth remembering that they weren’t looking for the pier, they were just doing some work and found it” (translated from Portuguese).

Despite the work and improvements carried out, the project did not achieve its initial vision of real estate development, mainly related to commercial uses. Due to the change in the economic context, the private market reduced its interest in the area, leading to a period of low demand. After the period of crisis, the private market began to return to the area, but commercial use lost its focus, giving way to more high- and middle-income residential use, as well as short-term residential use.

About this change in the project’s vision, interviewee 5 states that “we’re seeing a change in the profile of what was initially envisioned. What was envisioned when the project was conceived? Basically, the area would have a strong demand for corporate spaces… and not only. The area was always thought of as having potential for leisure and entertainment activities. It would also have an incentive for residential use, but the project’s main focus was corporate real estate, especially driven by the gas and oil industry… at the time, it was discovered with pre-salt. Petrobras expanded a lot, so the demand for corporate space in the region was thought to come from that. Then came the economic crisis, a whole series of things… and that bet didn’t materialize. So, what we’re seeing there today is basically a massive construction of small-scale residential real estate… studios, one-bedroom apartments, and at most two-bedroom apartments… and a lot of this new segment is being driven by short-term rentals, Airbnb, and other platforms” (translated from Portuguese).

From a social perspective, despite the improvements to public and cultural spaces, the project has been strongly criticized for its negative impacts on the most vulnerable population who previously lived there. The criticisms refer, above all, to processes of gentrification and expulsion of the most vulnerable population. The idea of presenting the area as an initial urban emptiness reinforces the social criticism since it reduces the importance of the existing residents.

Regarding this idea of the area being an urban emptiness, interviewee 5 states that “we have this discourse of urban emptiness, of characterizing these areas as urban emptiness… It’s partly pertinent. But, in part, it also invisibles a lot of things. The port region of Rio, in fact, is a region that has a series of warehouses that have already been used industrially in ports and are underused. They could have been used for other purposes and for much more intensive use. On the other hand, the region is not exactly a population vacuum. When the project was launched, the area had a significant number of people, almost 30,000 people living in the port area, mainly in the slums of the port area” (translated from Portuguese).

Concerning the displacement of the low-income population, interviewee 4 added that “they invited the poorest residents to leave. They didn’t invite them, they expelled them… some people were bruised, wounded, and psychologically threatened… To obey the order of development and progress” (translated from Portuguese).

Another relevant criticism from a social perspective concerns the social housing that was initially planned for the area but was never built. Interviewee 4 reinforces this criticism, commenting that “the question is, who are or would be these almost 70,000 new inhabitants? Since the Ministry of the City, at the start of the Porto Maravilha project, demanded 5000 low-income housing units—5000 houses or apartments—for people earning up to 3 minimum salaries, and to this day, not a single house or apartment has been built for people earning up to 3 minimum salaries… quite the opposite, the city has removed the poorest people, giving them no chance to stay and no chance to build new housing for low-income people here in the port region” (translated from Portuguese).

Finally, concerning the PPP arrangement and the process, some points are worth highlighting.

Using a PPP arrangement as an integrated model for building infrastructure and providing services stands out as a differential. Interviewee 1 points out that “there was a complexity to the works that required them to be coordinated, so there had to be a beginning-middle-end to plan. And then, when an urban operation is created, the law approves a program of interventions: I’m going to increase the potential and sell CEPAC to pay for this program of works here. What did the city council do? It included some services such as traffic management, urban cleaning, and maintenance of public lighting, in other words, some urban services, and turned this into a package, an object, for a public concession in the form of a PPP. Why was this done? Because then you contract everything at once, you have a company responsible for everything. This makes it easier for the municipality to manage the whole process. Because even if the concessionaire is going to subcontract the services, it must respond to an intervention strategy that covers everything that needs to happen in the area in the medium term”. He adds that “from the point of view of managing the PPP contract, this direct and unique interaction allowed the municipality to manage the process more efficiently. In the end, for a few years, it served as an experiment in truly integrated management of public works and services” (translated from Portuguese).

On the other hand, doubts were raised about the real necessity of a PPP arrangement to develop the project. Interviewee 5 points out that “when we look at the number of resources that have been mobilized there, from the various levels of government, it’s not true that it wouldn’t be feasible to do a project without relying on the private sector as a last-resort financier. Because deep down, it wasn’t. The volume of public resources mobilized there to get this system up and running was very high. So, there were public resources. The city council was able to carry out this project—when I say the city council, I mean not just the city council, but all the public bodies involved” (translated from Portuguese).

Also, regarding the entities involved, the process received criticism concerning the benefits generated for the entities and how they were balanced. Interviewee 3 believes that the port authority has not benefited as it should from the process, stating that “the port authority had properties, and the municipality used these properties, and they were not fully indemnified” (translated from Portuguese).

The speed at which the process was intended—with 85% of the work carried out in 5 years—is also a factor for discussion. On this issue, interviewee 2 states that “you take a quick shot, as was done—a project of 5 to 6 years of massive investment, intense transformation—but then it lost traction, and there was that immense infrastructure, well built, well made, but without use, without continuity. The other view is, let’s do it step by step, more slowly… make a plot, invest, go slowly, build gradually, get a feel for the market, balance demand with supply” (translated from Portuguese).

The financial dependence related to the sale of CEPACs is another weakness in the process. Interviewee 2 reinforces this point, stating that “firstly, with the issue of the value of CEPACs… the tender that took place, the value that was attributed, the potential, the level of risk that Caixa took on as manager and the scenario it envisioned for capitalizing CEPACs, was a practically impossible scenario… that nothing would happen, that Rio de Janeiro would develop, that the country’s economy would grow constantly, there would be no crisis, income would rise. And economic factors that threatened this scenario were not considered” (translated from Portuguese).

The overly optimistic expectations related to the country’s economic context at the time of the PPP arrangement also demonstrate a fragility, since scenarios that could affect the planning carried out—and which were confirmed—were not considered, generating problems in the financial viability and progress of the project. Interviewee 2 points out that “the assumptions that were adopted for the economic and financial bases of the project were ambitious from the point of view of leverage, that is, how much it was imagined that it would generate in terms of resources and the speed at which it would generate them, the speed of investment at which things would happen, the economic aspects of the country… so no consideration was given to possible economic downturns. The economy of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro collapsed in 2016, so this was a fundamental aspect” (translated from Portuguese).

4. Discussion

The analysis considered the external and internal environments of the PPP project. The clusters and factors related to the external environment—enabling environment and exogenous factors—were used to discuss the Brazilian context concerning PPP arrangements. The clusters and factors related to the internal environment—preparatory, procurement, and contract management phases—were used to analyze the specific urban regeneration project and the OUC Porto Maravilha case.

From the analysis, it was possible to identify the CSFs in the Brazilian context and in the case of the Porto Maravilha PPP project, as well as the critical points that could be better developed to facilitate and improve the implementation and development of PPP arrangements and provide better value for money.

4.1. Brazilian Context

In the Brazilian context, PPP arrangements can be carried out through sponsored concession or administrative concession. Law No. 11,079/2004—General rules for bidding and contracting PPPs within the scope of public administration are the primary document referring to PPP arrangements in the country, followed by other laws—Law No. 8987/1995, Law No. 9074/1995, Law No. 8666/1993, Law No. 14,133/2021, and Law No. 9307/1996. These documents are responsible for defining PPP projects, the bidding process, contract elements, and guarantees.

The existence of PPP units–agencies explicitly created to support the development of PPP arrangements–also reinforces the public sector’s leadership. Despite this, PPP units are defined at the state level, and only a few states have established such units.

Urban regeneration in the Brazilian context is more intense in medium and large urban centers. The City Statute, Law No. 10,257/2001, establishes instruments at the federal level to be implemented at the municipal level. Among the main instruments, the Consortium Urban Operation is responsible for the structural transformation of an urban area through a combination of public and private investment. According to the City Statute, OUC refers to a set of interventions and measures coordinated by the public authorities, but which can involve several other actors—property owners, residents, permanent users, and private investors. The interventions are aimed at structural urban transformations and social and environmental improvements in a specific area.

The law also defines the types of incentives that can be made available and the possibility of issuing additional construction certificates, known as CEPACs. Finally, the City Statute defines the municipality as one that must implement an OUC through a specific municipal law for each operation.

Regarding exogenous factors, the availability of financial and capital markets stands out, with a large trading volume, diverse investment options, and a wide range of financial products. However, other exogenous factors are not favorable to the implementation of PPPs.

Community support is characterized by great polarization: part of the population believes that public power should remain more centralized. In contrast, part of the population defends the greater power of the private sector. Socio-economic factors do not create a favorable environment either, since there are great disparities between the country’s various states, especially between the north/northeast and the south/southeast. Finally, the macroeconomic scenario, analyzed through GDP per capita and inflation, also does not present good conditions for implementing PPPs.

4.2. “Porto Maravilha” Case Study

Some aspects of the OUC Porto Maravilha and its different phases should be highlighted.

During the preparation phase of the contract, some aspects are favorable for the implementation of the PPP project, such as the creation of a specific public company for this purpose. The public tender for the private partner selection also represented a positive aspect, since it clearly defined all the elements to be presented, including models for a standardized process. The well-designed tender notice allowed for a competitive bidding process.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that Complementary Law No. 101/2009, which established the OUC Porto Maravilha, is unclear regarding the intended intervention plan for the area. The lack of clarity in the plan—which only defined sectors and new construction amounts, leaving many aspects to be discussed, a posteriori of the law and the contract itself—combined with the considerable dimension of the area and the possibility of intense densification, increased the complexity of the project. Furthermore, the sale of CEPACs to financially enable the project creates fragility from a financial perspective, since it depends on an external payment for the project to progress.

Following the bidding process’s results, CDURP and the Porto Novo Consortium signed a partnership contract. As established by the tender notice, the contract was to be carried out in phases.

Some important events during the contract’s management are important to highlight. The first was the hiring, also through a public tender, of the Ecoplan/JHP Consortium, which would be responsible for managing and supervising the Administrative Concession Contract. Another important element was the purchase of all the CEPACs available by the Real Estate Investment Fund Porto Maravilha, owned by Caixa Econômica Federal, since the amounts obtained from the sale of CEPACs would guarantee the development of the OUC.

The contract management phase was generally marked by a series of additional terms to the original contract, new decrees, and complementary laws. Finally, the illiquidity of the Real Estate Investment Fund Porto Maravilha halted the project’s progress, aggravating the situation. So far, approximately 85% of the work has been completed.

In general, the PPP arrangement and the Porto Maravilha project are complex and ambitious, hindering their full development.

The PPP arrangement was carried out in a very favorable economic context and, as a result, did not take into account different future scenarios that could hinder the project’s progress. The sale of CEPACs to pay for the PPP creates a certain fragility from a financial point of view since it depends on an external agent and the market’s interest in buying CEPACs from that agent.

Furthermore, the idea of making the partnership and the project viable through the sale of additional constructive potential is based, above all, on increasing the value of these titles—which is only possible with a priori improvements and, eventually, with the expulsion of less favored residents, reinforcing a gentrifying character.

As far as the project is concerned, despite the numerous improvements seen in the area—improvements to mobility, the construction of squares, and cultural facilities—there are significant social impacts, especially for the low-income population.

5. Conclusions

Focusing on PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects, this study analyzed the specific Brazilian context on the topic and the specific case of the “Porto Maravilha” partnership in Rio de Janeiro. Finally, the study aimed to understand the CSFs in the Brazilian context and the case study, as well as the issues that could be improved.

To this purpose, the study was based on a pre-established framework of CSFs for PPPs in urban regeneration projects. The framework divides the external environment of the PPP arrangement and the internal environment, considering the different phases of the PPP project. The framework thus facilitates the analysis of the Brazilian context concerning PPP arrangements and the specific case study concerning the Porto Maravilha partnership. To carry out the study, data were collected from official documents, laws, and decrees, available academic literature, and promotional information. In addition, interviews were conducted with actors involved in the Porto Maravilha PPP project.

The analysis of the external environment indicated that Brazil’s enabling environment presents important factors for the development of PPP arrangements. The most relevant factor refers to the legal and regulatory framework, i.e., the legislation that defines the types of partnerships and the means for these partnerships to be carried out. The presence of PPP units, although only in a few states, is also a factor that demonstrates commitment to the development of PPP arrangements.

Concerning exogenous factors, the most relevant factor is the wide availability of financial and capital markets. On the other hand, other critical factors need to be better addressed: socio-economic conditions capable of creating the best scenario for PPP agreements, stable and growing macroeconomic conditions, and the support and acceptance of the local community.

Regarding the Porto Maravilha case study, a few points deserve attention. Firstly, the complexity of the proposed project. This is a large area in a state of considerable disrepair and abandonment. In addition, other aspects should be considered, such as historical aspects—given the historical importance of the area—and especially social aspects—given the presence of the hills and the low-income population. The sale of construction potential would considerably increase the density of the area, and the lack of a priori definition of the basic design elements also made the project more complex.

In terms of the PPP arrangement, flexibility in different aspects stands out. Firstly, it allows for the integration of different urban services, large-scale infrastructures, and interventions in public spaces, providing an integrated approach. From a financial point of view, it allows financial tools to be adapted to local real estate conditions and public finances. Another important flexibility is the possibility of changing important elements of the process according to the socio-economic shifts that are observed, such as the initial vision being altered according to changes in the market.

However, the wide range of works and services made the arrangement quite complex. In addition, the dependence on the sale of CEPACs to make the project financially viable reveals a weakness and jeopardizes the smooth running of the project. Finally, overly optimistic expectations regarding the economic scenario also compromised the project.

In this sense, despite the relevance of some critical factors in the different phases of the PPP arrangement—such as the availability of resources and a team of qualified and dedicated professionals in the preparation phase and procurement phase; and a competitive and standardized process in the procurement phase—the commitment of other factors was crucial for the development of the PPP arrangement and the project—in the preparation phase, a clear definition of the scope of the project; in the contract management phase, effective contract management and conflict management.

Despite this, 85% of the project has been completed to date, completely changing the Porto Maravilha area. Improvements in urban mobility and infrastructure, new public spaces, and important cultural facilities such as museums have been made. On the other hand, social impacts have affected low-income populations.

The case of Porto Maravilha represents a scenario of urban regeneration of port areas and waterfronts that are often present in different urban contexts. Despite creating a new image for the city, mainly based on tourism and leisure, it brings with it social impacts, especially related to gentrification.

The analysis of the Brazilian context and especially of the Porto Maravilha OUC raises important points that should be considered in PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects. The first point concerns the financial sustainability of a PPP agreement, which must be solid enough to complete the partnership and the proposed project. The choice of solid and committed stakeholders is also essential to avoid different types of conflicts.

The public sector’s leadership is crucial, especially as a representative of common interests. The engagement of all the stakeholders affected by the intervention, including the local population, is essential to ensure that the partnership and the project meet their needs and expectations, avoiding conflicts and negative impacts.

Regarding the project to be developed, it is important to clearly define the perimeter and plan for the area, including at a phased level. Defining the project from the beginning avoids major uncertainties and conflicts during implementation. It is important to consider the size of the area, the amount to be built, the specifics of the area, and historical and social aspects. An overly ambitious project can result in unmet expectations and areas falling into disuse again.

PPP arrangements in urban regeneration projects are complex, including urban, architectural, social, contractual, management, and political aspects. Awareness of the different areas related to these practices is necessary for a greater chance of success.

By analyzing a specific context and case, this study contributes to a better understanding of the good practices associated with PPPs in urban regeneration projects, especially in the case of Brazil.

Despite this, the study has limitations. The first limitation concerns the analysis of some factors. Some factors are subjective, such as good governance and openness between parties, which make objective analysis difficult. A second limitation is the analysis of only one urban regeneration operation, which does not represent the whole context of the analyzed country.

In this sense, future studies could apply the proposed framework to explore other operations or contexts. Analyzing other contexts and specific cases will further expand knowledge about the implementation and management of this type of partnership, contributing to better results from both a financial and social point of view.