Research on Behavioral Decision-Making of Subjects on Cultivated Land Conservation under the Goal of Carbon Neutrality

Protecting cultivated land is an urgent mitigation measure for China to reconcile the contradiction between food safety and carbon neutrality. In the context of carbon neutrality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model among local governments, agricultural technology service organizations (ATSOs), and farmers based on China’s cultivated black land, and discusses the factors influencing the strategy choice of each stakeholder group and the final form of evolutionary stabilization strategies adopted by each stakeholder from the perspective of agricultural extension. Through numerical simulations, we reveal that two stable situations exist in the current state of protection of cultivated black land in China: full subject participation and government subject participation only. In order to achieve the optimal realization of the dynamic equilibrium of the three parties, we identify the key issues of cultivated land protection (CLP) and put forward reasonable suggestions, which are summarized as follows: (1) prohibit the excessive subsidies to farmers, and keep the appropriate subsidies at 100~140 CNY/mu to help the protection of cultivated land, if more than 140 CNY/mu is not conducive to the participation of local governments in CLP (mu, a Chinese unit of land measurement that equals to 1/15 a hectare); (2) an increase in the farmers’ fines has a dampening effect on farmers digging black soil, and the game model achieves the ideal equilibrium when it reaches 10 billion CNY, which can be implemented as a long-term cultivated land protection policy; (3) maintaining the incentive fund at 5 billion CNY provides the greatest incentive for ATSOs to promote low-carbon agricultural technologies (LCAT), while the production trusteeship subsidies has no beneficial impact on ATSOs; (4) reducing production trusteeship costs and not increasing service charges is the most effective way of incentivizing ATSOs to promote LCAT. This means the service fee is maintained at 400 CNY/mu and the service cost is reduced to 308 CNY/mu. This study reveals the inner mechanism of CLP, provides a theoretical basis for the promotion of CLP technology, and proposes effective cultivated land protection suggestions, aiming to improve the overall implementation effect of CLP in China and help carbon neutrality.