Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Relationship between Farmland Scale and Irrigation Collective Action
2.1.1. Larger Scale of Farmland Helps Facilitate Irrigation Collective Action
2.1.2. Larger-Scale Farmland Is Not Conducive to Facilitating Irrigation Collective Action
2.1.3. Unclear Relationship between Farmland Scale and Irrigation Collective Action
2.2. Relationship between Farmland Location and Irrigation Collective Action
2.3. Relationship between Farmland Fragmentation and Irrigation Collective Action
3. Framework and Hypotheses
3.1. Framework
3.2. Hypotheses
4. Methods and Materials
4.1. Data
4.2. Variables
4.2.1. Dependent Variable
4.2.2. Independent Variables
- (1)
- Farmland Scale
- (2)
- Rules-in-Use
- (3)
- Biophysical Conditions
- (4)
- Attributes of Community
- (5)
- Attributes of Household
- (6)
- Regional Control Variable
Variables | Definition |
---|---|
Dependent Variables | |
Irrigation collective action | The degree of farmer household participation in the construction and maintenance of irrigation facilities in the village: 1 = never; 2 = seldom; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often; 5 = usually |
Independent Variables | |
Key variable | |
Farmland scale | The average plot size of the farmland in a household (ha) |
Rules-in-use | |
Farmland tenure stability | Whether the village has made farmland tenure adjustments in the past ten years: 1 = no; 0 = yes |
Farmland tenure transfer | Whether the proportion of the farmland transferred in the whole village accounts for more than 36.97% of the total farmland: 1 = yes; 0 = no |
Socialized agricultural services | Whether farmland trusteeship, joint tillage and planting, and farmland entrusted to individuals are adopted in the village: 1 = yes; 0 = no |
Methods of management | Whether collective management is adopted in managing village irrigation facilities: 1 = yes; 0 = no |
Governance failure | Whether water disputes often occur in the village: 1 = yes; 0 = no |
Biophysical Conditions | |
Distance to city | Distance from the village to the nearest city (km) |
Village water resources | Abundance of water resources in the village: 1 = medium; 0 = other |
Farmland location | Whether the farming household’s farmland is located in the middle reaches of the irrigation channel: 1 = yes; 0 = no |
Farmland water scarcity | Whether water shortage is severe for farming: 1 = extremely not severe; 2 = not severe; 3 = general; 4 = severe; 5 = very severe |
Attributes of Community | |
Group size | Number of farming households in the village |
Collective income | Village collective income (USD) |
Attributes of Household | |
Family members | Number of household members |
Agricultural income importance | Whether the agricultural income of the farmer household accounts for more than 50%: 1 = yes; 0 = no |
Education | Education of family head: 1 = no school; 2 = primary school; 3 = junior high school; 4 = senior high school; 5 = college; 6 = graduate |
Age | Age of family head |
Regional Control Variable | Whether the village is in a plain area: 1 = yes; 0 = no |
4.3. Method
P(Yi = 2) = P(μ1 ≤ Yi* < μ2) = Φ(μ2 − xiα) − Φ(μ1 − xiα)
P(Yi = 3) = P(μ2 ≤ Yi* < μ3) = Φ(μ3 − xiα) − Φ(μ2 − xiα)
P(Yi = 4) = P(μ3 ≤ Yi* < μ4) = Φ(μ4 − xiα) − Φ(μ3 − xiα)
P(Yi = 5) = P(μ4 ≤ Yi*) = 1 − Φ(μ4 − xiα)
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Results
5.1.1. Descriptive Analysis
5.1.2. Analysis of Direct Effect
5.1.3. Analysis of Moderating Effect
5.2. Discussion
5.2.1. Farmland Tenure Stability and Irrigation Collective Action
5.2.2. Farmland Tenure Transfer and Irrigation Collective Action
5.2.3. Socialized Agricultural Services and Irrigation Collective Action
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variables | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|
Irrigation collective action | 3.171 | 1.067 | 1.000 | 5.000 |
Farmland scale | 0.086 | 0.188 | 0.001 | 8.533 |
Farmland tenure stability | 0.223 | 0.417 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Farmland tenure transfer | 0.157 | 0.364 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Socialized agricultural services | 0.399 | 0.490 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Methods of management | 0.691 | 0.462 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Governance failure | 0.066 | 0.249 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Distance to city | 22.443 | 15.266 | 1.000 | 105.000 |
Village water resources | 0.164 | 0.371 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Farmland location | 0.212 | 0.409 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Farmland water scarcity | 2.893 | 1.150 | 1.000 | 5.000 |
Group size | 725.739 | 652.461 | 25.000 | 4687.000 |
Collective income | 9.839 | 70.996 | 0.000 | 752.751 |
Family members | 3.213 | 1.359 | 1.000 | 10.000 |
Agricultural income | 0.571 | 0.495 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Education | 2.683 | 0.927 | 1.000 | 6.000 |
Age | 52.174 | 12.851 | 20.000 | 105.000 |
Regional control variable | 0.509 | 0.500 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
---|---|---|---|
Average plot size of the farmland | 0.112 *** (0.020) | 0.119 *** (0.024) | |
Total area of farmland | 0.071 *** (0.024) | ||
Farmland tenure stability | 0.085 * (0.047) | 0.080 * (0.047) | |
Farmland tenure transfer | 0.188 *** (0.052) | 0.155 *** (0.051) | |
Socialized agricultural services | 0.079 * (0.041) | 0.089 ** (0.041) | |
Methods of management | 0.130 *** (0.042) | 0.157 *** (0.041) | |
Governance failure | −0.677 *** (0.080) | −0.676 *** (0.080) | |
Distance to city | 0.094 *** (0.026) | 0.075 *** (0.026) | |
Village water resources | 0.033 (0.05) | 0.027 (0.05) | |
Farmland location | 0.070 (0.044) | 0.060 (0.043) | |
Farmland water scarcity | 0.142 *** (0.016) | 0.142 *** (0.016) | |
Group size | −0.016 (0.025) | −0.033 (0.024) | |
Collective income | 0.006 (0.005) | 0.007 (0.005) | |
Family members | 0.009 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.013) | |
Agricultural income | 0.159 *** (0.037) | 0.158 *** (0.037) | |
Education | 0.018 (0.022) | 0.022 (0.022) | |
Age | −0.005 *** (0.002) | −0.005 *** (0.002) | |
Regional control variable | −0.050 (0.042) | −0.012 (0.041) | |
N | 3,663 | 3,663 | 3,663 |
Log likelihood | −5296.2932 | −5154.7822 | −5162.7237 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.0030 | 0.0296 | 0.0281 |
P | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
Variables | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Farmland scale | 0.078 *** (0.026) | 0.058 ** (0.027) | 0.173 *** (0.029) | 0.062 * (0.034) |
Farmland tenure stability | 0.774 *** (0.184) | 0.067 (0.047) | 0.075 (0.047) | 0.721 *** (0.184) |
Farmland tenure transfer | 0.179 *** (0.052) | 1.198 *** (0.190) | 0.187 *** (0.052) | 1.101 *** (0.193) |
Socialized agricultural services | 0.081 ** (0.041) | 0.100 ** (0.041) | −0.382 *** (0.136) | −0.221 (0.139) |
Methods of management | 0.145 *** (0.042) | 0.144 *** (0.042) | 0.146 *** (0.042) | 0.168 *** (0.043) |
Governance failure | −0.669 *** (0.080) | −0.720 *** (0.080) | −0.696 *** (0.008) | −0.721 *** (0.080) |
Distance to city | 0.102 *** (0.027) | 0.081 *** (0.027) | 0.109 *** (0.027) | 0.100 *** (0.027) |
Village water resources | 0.025 (0.051) | 0.042 (0.051) | 0.022 (0.051) | 0.026 (0.051) |
Farmland location | 0.068 (0.044) | 0.057 (0.044) | 0.058 (0.044) | 0.048 (0.044) |
Farmland water scarcity | 0.147 *** (0.016) | 0.143 *** (0.016) | 0.140 *** (0.016) | 0.147 *** (0.016) |
Group size | −0.022 (0.025) | −0.021 (0.025) | −0.022 (0.025) | −0.030 (0.025) |
Collective income | 0.007 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.003 (0.005) |
Family members | 0.006 (0.013) | 0.008 (0.013) | 0.008 (0.013) | 0.005 (0.013) |
Agricultural income | 0.163 *** (0.037) | 0.166 *** (0.037) | 0.163 *** (0.037) | 0.171 *** (0.037) |
Education | 0.016 (0.022) | 0.013 (0.022) | 0.018 (0.022) | 0.012 (0.022) |
Age | −0.005 *** (0.002) | −0.005 *** (0.002) | −0.005 *** (0.002) | −0.005 *** (0.002) |
Regional control variable | −0.036 (0.042) | −0.040 (0.042) | −0.043 (0.042) | −0.022 (0.043) |
N | 3,663 | 3,663 | 3,663 | 3,663 |
Log likelihood | −5147.2324 | −5139.3905 | −5148.4988 | −5129.1424 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.0310 | 0.0325 | 0.0308 | 0.0344 |
P | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
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Zang, L.; Wang, Y.; Su, Y. Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China. Land 2021, 10, 1263. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10111263
Zang L, Wang Y, Su Y. Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China. Land. 2021; 10(11):1263. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10111263
Chicago/Turabian StyleZang, Liangzhen, Yahua Wang, and Yiqing Su. 2021. "Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China" Land 10, no. 11: 1263. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10111263
APA StyleZang, L., Wang, Y., & Su, Y. (2021). Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China. Land, 10(11), 1263. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10111263