When Is Green Too Rosy? Evidence from a Laboratory Market Experiment on Green Goods and Externalities
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Framing within Economic Experiments
3. Experimental Framework and Procedures
4. Results
4.1. Market Outcomes
4.2. Supply Side Behaviour
4.3. Demand Side Behaviour
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Instructions for Treatment NEUTRAL FRAME
- If a Producer does not sell anything, his earnings for that period are Zero.
- If a Producer sells something, he receives the unit price minus the production cost per unit sold.
- If buyer buys one unit:
- If buyer does not buy one unit:
Appendix B. Instructions for Treatment ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME
- If a Producer does not sell anything, his earnings for that period are Zero.
- If a Producer sells something, he receives the unit price minus the production cost per unit sold.
- If buyer buys one unit:
- If buyer does not buy one unit:
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Neutral Frame |
In each market, in each period, fictitious goods will be traded. There are two types of goods available to be produced, Type A and Type B. Each producer will choose one type, propose a price and will be able to sell up to three units. Each buyer decides from whom to buy one unit. There are two types of goods which differ in their production costs and the fact that during production they may cause negative impacts on the earnings of buyers in the group:
|
Environmental Frame |
In each market, in each period, fictitious goods will be traded. There are two types of goods available to be produced, Green Goods and Brown Goods. Each producer will choose one type, propose a price and will be able to sell up to three units. Each buyer decides from whom to buy one unit. The two types of goods in this market have identical characteristics, in terms of quality and performance, therefore, are worth the same for consumers. However, the two goods differ in their production costs because of the technology used: either cleaner and more expensive technologies or polluting and cheaper techniques. Brown Goods are cheaper to produce but impact negatively on the environment through pollution and waste generation, which in turn has a negative effect on other individuals in society (due to health problems caused by pollution, for instance, or the adverse effects caused by the loss of environmental quality). For that reason, in this experiment, when a Brown Good is purchased, the earnings of the other buyers in a group are negatively affected. Green goods have higher production costs, but since they do not harm the environment, there is no negative impact on the other buyers in the group.
|
Parameters | Green (A) | Brown (B) |
---|---|---|
(−) production cost | 50 | 40 |
(−) externalities | 0 | 20 |
(+) benefit | 100 | 100 |
(=) net social benefit | 50 | 40 |
Treatments | # Groups or Markets | # Subjects | # Sellers | # Buyers |
---|---|---|---|---|
neutral frame | 2 sessions × 4 groups | 48 | 24 | 24 |
environmental frame | 2 sessions × 3 groups | 36 | 18 | 18 |
Total | 14 | 84 | 42 | 42 |
Treatment | Proposals | Market Share |
---|---|---|
neutral frame | 31.9% | 18.1% |
environmental frame | 68.9% | 70.0% |
Price green goods | N | Mean | sd | Min. | Max. |
neutral frame | 87 | 53.3 | 4.3867 | 45 | 70 |
environmental frame | 252 | 55.7 | 5.7568 | 44 | 80 |
Price Brown goods | N | Mean | sd | Min. | Max. |
neutral frame | 390 | 44.2 | 5.6504 | 20 | 65 |
environmental frame | 106 | 44.3 | 4.9810 | 15 | 70 |
VARIABLES | |
---|---|
Proposed price | −0.334 *** |
(0.0371) | |
Proposed Price * Environmental Frame | 0.221 *** |
(0.0416) | |
Lowest competitors’ price | 0.331 *** |
(0.0368) | |
Lowest Competitors’ Price * Environmental Frame | −0.292 *** |
(0.0404) | |
Green good proposed (1: yes 0: no) | 0.965 *** |
(0.358) | |
Green good proposed * Environmental Frame | 0.168 |
(0.491) | |
Relative green reputation | 0.175 *** |
(0.0470) | |
Relative Green Reputation * Environmental Frame | −0.0903 |
(0.0642) | |
Environmental Frame (1: yes 0: no) | 2.828 * |
(1.578) | |
Constant | 1.003 |
(1.209) | |
Observations | 840 |
Number of subjects | 42 |
VARIABLES | Green Announcements |
---|---|
Environmental Consciousness (1: yes 0: no) | 0.577 |
(0.505) | |
Environmental Consciousness * Environmental Frame | 0.142 |
(1.195) | |
Environmental Frame (1: yes 0: no) | 1.792 * |
(1.041) | |
Constant | −1.201 *** |
(0.357) | |
Observations | 840 |
Number of subjects | 42 |
VARIABLES | |
---|---|
Number of sellers announcing green | 0.470 |
(0.352) | |
Green units bought by other consumers (lagged) | 0.236 |
(0.219) | |
Lowest price for green good | −0.216 *** |
(0.0593) | |
Lowest price for brown good | 0.239 *** |
(0.0581) | |
Environmental consciousness | 1.228 |
(0.928) | |
Environmental Frame | 2.898 *** |
(1.115) | |
Constant | −2.460 |
(2.452) | |
Observations | 435 |
Number of subjects | 42 |
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Fernandes, M.E.; Valente, M. When Is Green Too Rosy? Evidence from a Laboratory Market Experiment on Green Goods and Externalities. Games 2018, 9, 70. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030070
Fernandes ME, Valente M. When Is Green Too Rosy? Evidence from a Laboratory Market Experiment on Green Goods and Externalities. Games. 2018; 9(3):70. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030070
Chicago/Turabian StyleFernandes, Maria Eduarda, and Marieta Valente. 2018. "When Is Green Too Rosy? Evidence from a Laboratory Market Experiment on Green Goods and Externalities" Games 9, no. 3: 70. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030070
APA StyleFernandes, M. E., & Valente, M. (2018). When Is Green Too Rosy? Evidence from a Laboratory Market Experiment on Green Goods and Externalities. Games, 9(3), 70. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030070