# Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network

## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

## 2. Model

**Remark**

**1.**

## 3. Results

#### 3.1. Separate GSP Auctions

**Lemma**

**1.**

**Proposition**

**1.**

**Proposition**

**2.**

**Proposition**

**3.**

**Corollary**

**1.**

**Corollary**

**2.**

**Remark**

**2.**

**Example**

**1.**

#### 3.2. Integrated Auction with Pauses

**Proposition**

**4.**

**Proposition**

**5.**

**Example**

**2.**

**Remark**

**3.**

## 4. Conclusions

## Funding

## Acknowledgments

## Conflicts of Interest

## Appendix A

#### Appendix A.1. Proof of Lemma 1

**Proof.**

#### Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 1

**Proof.**

#### Appendix A.3. Proof of Proposition 2

**Proof.**

#### Appendix A.4. Proof of Proposition 3

**Proof.**

#### Appendix A.5. Proof of Proposition 4

**Proof.**

#### Appendix A.6. Proof of Proposition 5

**Proof.**

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**MDPI and ACS Style**

Watts, A. Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network. *Games* **2018**, *9*, 67.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030067

**AMA Style**

Watts A. Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network. *Games*. 2018; 9(3):67.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030067

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Watts, Alison. 2018. "Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network" *Games* 9, no. 3: 67.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030067