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Games 2018, 9(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010004

Incentive Magnitude Effects in Experimental Games: Bigger is not Necessarily Better

1
Department of Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK
2
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 10 November 2017 / Revised: 29 December 2017 / Accepted: 11 January 2018 / Published: 18 January 2018
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Abstract

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices in eight 3 × 3 and four 4 × 4 normal-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost indistinguishable between the two conditions. These results are in line with earlier findings on individual decision making and with a parametric model, in which the incentive elasticity of effort is very small when compared with other factors, such as the complexity of the decision problem. View Full-Text
Keywords: capital-labor-production framework; crowding out; experimental games; incentives; incentive elasticity of effort; reasons for choices capital-labor-production framework; crowding out; experimental games; incentives; incentive elasticity of effort; reasons for choices
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Pulford, B.D.; Colman, A.M.; Loomes, G. Incentive Magnitude Effects in Experimental Games: Bigger is not Necessarily Better. Games 2018, 9, 4.

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