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Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets

Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, 31000 Toulouse, France
Department of Mathematics, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Paul Weirich and Ulrich Berger
Games 2016, 7(4), 37;
Received: 31 August 2016 / Revised: 16 November 2016 / Accepted: 17 November 2016 / Published: 25 November 2016
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
PDF [300 KB, uploaded 25 November 2016]


We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Y i contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability. View Full-Text
Keywords: epistemic game theory; epistemic robustness; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief epistemic game theory; epistemic robustness; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

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Asheim, G.B.; Voorneveld, M.; Weibull, J.W. Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets. Games 2016, 7, 37.

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