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Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games

School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP, UK
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2014, 5(4), 234-256;
Received: 13 August 2014 / Revised: 25 October 2014 / Accepted: 31 October 2014 / Published: 14 November 2014
PDF [318 KB, uploaded 14 November 2014]


We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game. View Full-Text
Keywords: public good; conditional cooperation; reciprocity; leadership public good; conditional cooperation; reciprocity; leadership

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Cartwright, E.J.; Lovett, D. Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games. Games 2014, 5, 234-256.

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