Next Article in Journal
Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences
Next Article in Special Issue
Two Pricing Mechanisms in Sponsored Search Advertising
Previous Article in Journal
Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle

An Equilibrium Analysis of Knaster’s Fair Division Procedure

Department of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, USA
Games 2013, 4(1), 21-37;
Received: 19 October 2012 / Revised: 8 January 2013 / Accepted: 8 January 2013 / Published: 18 January 2013
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Mechanism Design)
PDF [319 KB, uploaded 18 January 2013]


In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not follow truthful bidding strategies. We find that, ex-post, the equilibrium allocation is still efficient but may not be fair. However, on average, participants receive the same outcome they would have received if everyone had reported truthfully—i.e., the mechanism is ex-ante fair. View Full-Text
Keywords: fair division; auction fair division; auction

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Van Essen, M. An Equilibrium Analysis of Knaster’s Fair Division Procedure. Games 2013, 4, 21-37.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics



[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top