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Volume 15
Issue 5
10.3390/g15050032
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Article

Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics

by
Azhar Iqbal
1,*,
Ishan Honhaga
1,
Eyoel Teffera
2,
Anthony Perry
2,
Robin Baker
2,
Glen Pearce
2 and
Claudia Szabo
1
1
School of Computer and Mathematical Sciences, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
2
Defence Science and Technology Group, P.O. Box 1500, Edinburgh, SA 5111, Australia
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2024, 15(5), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15050032
Submission received: 27 July 2024 / Revised: 13 September 2024 / Accepted: 14 September 2024 / Published: 18 September 2024
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Abstract

This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one using advanced drones for attack, and the other defending using tanks. The paper conceptualizes this as a sequential game, illustrating the complex strategic dynamics similar to Stackelberg competition, where moves and countermoves are carefully analyzed and predicted.
Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium; sequential games; backwards-induction outcome Stackelberg equilibrium; sequential games; backwards-induction outcome

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MDPI and ACS Style

Iqbal, A.; Honhaga, I.; Teffera, E.; Perry, A.; Baker, R.; Pearce, G.; Szabo, C. Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics. Games 2024, 15, 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/g15050032

AMA Style

Iqbal A, Honhaga I, Teffera E, Perry A, Baker R, Pearce G, Szabo C. Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics. Games. 2024; 15(5):32. https://doi.org/10.3390/g15050032

Chicago/Turabian Style

Iqbal, Azhar, Ishan Honhaga, Eyoel Teffera, Anthony Perry, Robin Baker, Glen Pearce, and Claudia Szabo. 2024. "Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics" Games 15, no. 5: 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/g15050032

APA Style

Iqbal, A., Honhaga, I., Teffera, E., Perry, A., Baker, R., Pearce, G., & Szabo, C. (2024). Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics. Games, 15(5), 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/g15050032

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