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Public Information: Relevance or Salience?
Open AccessEditorial

Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning

1
UNSW Business School, UNSW Sydney, Sydney, NSW 20152, Australia
2
TU Dortmund University, D-44227 Dortmund, Germany
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2020, 11(1), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010010
Received: 26 January 2020 / Accepted: 1 February 2020 / Published: 7 February 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning)
Note: In lieu of an abstract, this is an excerpt from the first page.

All political actors, from world leaders to common citizens, make choices based on information that is noisy, perhaps biased, and sometimes fake [...] View Full-Text
MDPI and ACS Style

Gratton, G.; Zudenkova, G. Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning. Games 2020, 11, 10. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010010

AMA Style

Gratton G, Zudenkova G. Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning. Games. 2020; 11(1):10. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010010

Chicago/Turabian Style

Gratton, Gabriele; Zudenkova, Galina. 2020. "Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning" Games 11, no. 1: 10. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010010

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Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

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