Next Article in Journal / Special Issue
Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Public Goods Games: How Preferences and Beliefs Affect Contribution Levels
Previous Article in Journal
Including Blood Vasculature into a Game-Theoretic Model of Cancer Dynamics
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2019, 10(1), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010014

Agency Equilibrium

Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
I thank Françoise Forges, Atsushi Kajii and Toru Suzuki for comments on earlier drafts, and Rajiv Vohra for suggesting some relevant reading.
Received: 13 February 2019 / Accepted: 10 March 2019 / Published: 14 March 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norm and Risk Attitudes)
  |  
PDF [288 KB, uploaded 14 March 2019]
  |  

Abstract

Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of incomplete information to model such situations. View Full-Text
Keywords: agency; equilibrium; individualism; collectivism agency; equilibrium; individualism; collectivism
Figures

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
SciFeed

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Newton, J. Agency Equilibrium. Games 2019, 10, 14.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top