Managing Innovation for a Sustainable Transport System: A Comparative Study of the EU and Ukraine

Abstract

This paper is dedicated to analysing sustainability and digitalisation in the transport systems of the European Union (EU) and Ukraine, with a particular focus on three representative subsectors: freight rail, urban public transport and last-mile postal logistics. It explores how technological innovation, operational efficiency and environmental responsibility interact within these sectors under distinct institutional and economic conditions: mature, market-based systems in the EU and resilience-driven systems in wartime Ukraine. This study applies a comparative, descriptive–analytical methodology using secondary data drawn from corporate sustainability reports, official statistics and sectoral databases for 2022. Quantitative KPls were complemented with a qualitative assessment of digitalisation maturity to ensure cross-country comparability. Through a comparative analysis of KPIs, such as freight volumes, emissions intensity, revenue efficiency and digital maturity, this study identifies structural and policy gaps that hinder progress toward sustainable mobility. This study develops a multi-dimensional framework combining operational, financial, environmental and digital indicators. In this paper, digital integration refers to the degree to which transport operators embed digital tools such as tracking, data management and automation into their core processes, while environmental efficiency denotes the ability to deliver transport services with minimal resource consumption and carbon emissions per operational unit. Institutional resilience is understood here as the capacity of transport organisations and governing institutions to maintain functionality, adapt and recover under crisis or systemic stress, which is particularly relevant for Ukraine’s wartime context. The findings demonstrate that while EU operators lead in transparency, digital integration and environmental performance, Ukrainian actors exhibit rapid adaptive innovation and significant potential for technological leapfrogging during reconstruction. This paper concludes that the EU must overcome regulatory inertia and infrastructure fatigue, while Ukraine should institutionalise resilience and transparency.

1. Introduction

Transport can be considered as one of the key drivers of economic development, but is also one of the largest contributors to environmental problems and climate change. Globally, the transport sector accounts for almost a quarter of total CO₂ emissions, making it a focal point in the sustainability agenda [1]. The European Green Deal (2019) sets ambitious targets for reducing transport-related greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50% by 2030, requiring a fundamental transformation of mobility systems across the continent [2]. At the same time, technological advancements in digitalisation are opening new pathways for optimising logistics, reducing inefficiencies and integrating sustainable modes of transport. In this article, the term “digitalisation” mostly refers to the strategic use of digital technologies, such as data analytics, automation or specific platforms, which can allow companies to plan, monitor and optimise transport operations. Scholars argue that the transportation of the future will be driven by two main trends: sustainability and digitalization [3,4,5,6]. Based on this we can define this kind of intersection as a critical research field.

The potential of digitalisation to support sustainability in transport lies in its ability to generate efficiency gains and enable systemic innovations. Digital platforms for ride-hailing, freight management and postal logistics allow the real-time optimisation of routes, a reduction in empty runs and predictive maintenance, all of which directly contribute to lowering carbon intensity. For instance, Deutsche Bahn integrates digital control systems to enhance capacity utilisation [7], while PostNL deploys digital parcel tracking alongside electric delivery fleets [8]. In public transport, Berlin’s BVG and Paris’s RATP combine digital ticketing platforms with low-emission vehicles, demonstrating the dual benefits of passenger convenience and environmental performance [9,10].

Ukraine, however, faces a more complex situation. Decades of underinvestment, compounded by the destruction caused by the full-scale Russian invasion, have left the country’s transport system in urgent need of modernisation. The International Transport Forum highlights the lack of prior investment in sustainability and digitalisation as a key bottleneck for Ukraine’s freight transport [11]. Nonetheless, Ukraine has made notable progress in digital governance overall, with initiatives such as “Prozorro” for digital procurement and the “Diia” mobile application, which provide a strong institutional base for expanding digital solutions into transport [12,13]. In fact, the post-war reconstruction of Ukrainian transport systems must be laid on modern digital solutions, making the alignment of digital and green transitions both urgent and strategic [14].

The contrast between the European Union’s (EU) and Ukrainian cases thus provides fertile ground for comparative analysis. In the EU, cohesive regulatory frameworks, large-scale funding instruments and established sustainability goals have accelerated the deployment of the digitalisation of transport systems and the implementation of low-carbon practices. For example, Deutsche Bahn Cargo (DB Cargo) as a part of DB Group reported a 17.9% reduction in absolute emissions in 2024, largely due to the use of renewable electricity for traction [7]. PostNL achieved a 25% improvement in CO₂ efficiency during 2021 and 2022 by investing in renewable fuels and electrified delivery vehicles [8]. Both companies are actively investing in the digitalization of their services, which is proven by their recent reports. Meanwhile, Ukrainian state companies such as Ukrzaliznytsia (rail transport) or Nova Poshta (post service) still operate primarily with diesel traction or conventional delivery fleets, with limited environmental reporting.

At the same time, Ukraine exhibits unique forms of resilience-driven innovation. The wartime environment has necessitated rapid adaptation, such as rerouting freight through alternative corridors [15], modernising rolling stock under constrained budgets and introducing mobile-based services in urban transport [16]. These practices may provide lessons for EU actors in crisis management and system flexibility. Scholars studying post-war reconstruction note that Ukraine’s alignment with EU standards is likely to accelerate the adoption of digital and green technologies [17]. For instance, the integration of Ukrainian freight flows into the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) requires digital interoperability and environmental compliance, creating a natural convergence of goals [18].

The principal aim of this article is to analyse how sustainability and digitalisation intersect within transport systems of the European Union and Ukraine, identifying operational, environmental and institutional differences that can inform post-war reconstruction and EU integration and give valuable lessons for the EU as well. In this research, a transport system is considered as a combination of three transport subsectors: freight rail, urban public transport and last-mile logistics. By focusing on financial and environmental key performance indicators, this study identified both gaps and opportunities. Data is collected from open sources such as annual reports, sustainability disclosures and government statistics. This study builds on these strands of the literature by combining comparative KPI analysis with sector-specific insights. Unlike prior works that focus either on EU trends or Ukraine’s reconstruction challenges in isolation, it seeks to identify cross-sectoral and cross-national lessons. By comparing EU leaders with Ukrainian counterparts in freight, public transport and last-mile logistics, it aims to empirically demonstrate where gaps persist. A distinctive contribution of this study lies in its KPI-based comparative framework that integrates operational, financial, environmental and digital indicators across these transport subsectors.

The comparative framework serves two main purposes. First, it highlights the magnitude of disparity between EU and Ukrainian transport companies in terms of sustainability outcomes, revealing areas where Ukraine needs targeted investment and policy support. Second, it identifies mutual learning opportunities, where EU actors may adopt Ukraine’s agile digital solutions developed under crisis conditions, while Ukraine can leverage EU experience in large-scale sustainable transport transformation. Ultimately, the paper contributes to the growing body of knowledge on how digitalisation can be harnessed to achieve sustainable mobility and provides actionable insights for post-war reconstruction in Ukraine within the broader European context.

The paper is structured as follows: the Section 1 reviews the existing literature and identifies research gaps; the Section 2 describes the materials and methods; the Section 3 presents the comparative results across freight rail, urban transport and last-mile logistics; the Section 4 discusses the findings in relation to existing scholarship; and the Section 5 concludes with policy implications and recommendations.

2. Materials and Methods

In this paper, the transport systems of the EU and Ukraine are conceptualised as comprising three interrelated subsectors: freight rail, urban public transport and last-mile postal logistics. These subsectors were selected to ensure representativeness across the main dimensions of sustainable mobility, including goods transport, passenger mobility and last-mile connectivity, while allowing direct comparison through available and standardised performance indicators, depending on data availability. Together they capture both freight and passenger flows, as well as the growing intersection between sustainability and digitalisation that defines the modern transport system. While individual indicator frameworks addressing digitalization or environmental performance in transport systems are well established, their systematic integration with institutional resilience into a single comparative KPI-based framework, applicable across both stable and crisis-affected governance context, remains limited.

Although institutional resilience is conceptually central to the analysis, it is not operationalized through synthetic scores or ordinal indices in this study. This decision reflects substantial cross-case heterogeneity in governance structures, crisis exposure, reporting practices and data availability, which would render composite resilience scoring methodologically fragile and potentially misleading. Constructing synthetic or ordinal resilience measures would require strong assumptions regarding indicator selection, weighting and functional equivalence across EU and Ukrainian operators. These assumptions cannot be robustly validated under wartime and post-crisis conditions. Instead, institutional resilience is employed as a qualitative analytical lens that contextualises observed digitalization and environmental performance outcomes in terms of operational continuity, adaptive responses and institutional capacity under stress. This approach prioritises analytical validity and transparency over artificial quantification and reduces the risk that cross-case differences reflect modelling artefacts rather than substantive structural characteristics.

The freight rail subsector was chosen for its structural comparability and policy relevance. Rail freight in both contexts represents the backbone of long-distance cargo movement and a key instrument for decarbonisation. In the EU, the sector combines liberalised private operators and public incumbents under a harmonised regulatory framework (e.g., the Fourth Railway Package). In Ukraine, it is dominated by a single state enterprise, Ukrzaliznytsia, whose operational scale makes it representative of national logistics performance. Rail freight’s high energy efficiency and its role in the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) integration process make it essential to both sustainability and digitalisation agendas.

The urban public transport subsector represents collective passenger mobility in cities and serves as a primary interface between citizens and public infrastructure. It includes bus, tram and trolleybus systems operated by municipal or contracted entities. This segment was selected because of its strong link to urban decarbonisation and digital transition through smart ticketing, real-time data integration and fleet electrification. The comparison between Lvivelectrotrans in Ukraine and RATP Dev Angers in France illustrates two distinct yet converging paths: a resilient system under wartime constraints and a digitally mature network aligned with EU Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs).

The last-mile postal logistics subsector captures the consumer-facing frontier of transport, connecting e-commerce, logistics and mobility. It focuses here on postal and parcel delivery rather than private courier or taxi services, ensuring data transparency and cross-country comparability. Operators such as PostNL (Netherlands) and Nova Poshta (Ukraine) reflect contrasting institutional contexts: PostNL’s regulated sustainability model versus Nova’s market-driven digital innovation.

Together, these three subsectors form an analytically coherent representation of the transport ecosystem: freight rail reflects large-scale cargo efficiency, urban public transport demonstrates collective mobility and environmental policy integration and postal logistics embodies digitalisation and consumer proximity. Although the EU and Ukraine differ in governance and market maturity, both employ similar measurement frameworks and increasingly converge through shared policy directions, including the European Green Deal and the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement. Analysing them jointly provides a systemic perspective on how digital and sustainable transitions unfold across multiple transport layers, offering a comparative basis for identifying structural and policy gaps relevant to post-war reconstruction and green integration.

This research employs a comparative, descriptive–analytical analysis design relying on secondary, publicly available data from the 2022 reporting year. This year was chosen since it is the latest period covered by the full info for all companies chosen for this research, ensuring maximum consistency for the KPIs and data. Transport companies from the EU and Ukraine were selected to enable cross-country and cross-sectoral comparison while illustrating transferable lessons. The companies analysed include the following: DB Cargo (Germany) and Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukraine) for freight rail; RATP Group (France) and Lvivelectrotrans (Ukraine) for urban public transport; and PostNL (Netherlands) and Nova Poshta (Ukraine) for last-mile postal logistics. Selection criteria prioritised institutional relevance, the representation of public and private operators and the availability of audited or official 2022 data. The selected companies are representative because they are market leaders or dominant national operators in their respective subsectors, providing the most complete datasets and exemplifying prevailing institutional models.

The analysis draws on official corporate reports and publicly available info for DB Cargo, RATP Group, PostNL, Ukrzaliznytsia, Lvivelectrotrans and Nova Poshta. Data collection involved extracting quantitative and qualitative metrics from annual reports, sustainability reports, municipal case studies and sectoral databases. Where operator-level data were not directly accessible, authoritative institutional summaries or consolidated figures were used. Each data point includes a direct source reference, ensuring transparency and traceability. Key sources encompass annual development reports, accompanying spreadsheets and local authorities’ press releases. Data reliability was ensured by cross-checking indicators from the multiple independent sources mentioned above.

The analysis considers three primary groups of metrics:

• Operational KPIs—freight tons, tons-kilometres, amount of passenger journeys, vehicle- or passenger-kilometres and parcel volumes.
• Financial KPIs—annual revenue and revenue normalised per operational unit, which can be freight ton, passenger or journey or parcel.
• Environmental KPIs—total CO₂ emissions, CO₂ intensity metrics (e.g., CO₂ per tons-kilometer or per passengers-kilometers) and emission-free kilometres or fleet shares.
• Digitalization is listed mostly as a descriptive status, then a numerical indicator.

When only aggregate totals were reported, per-unit KPIs were derived by dividing totals by activity volumes. Financial figures reported in Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) were converted to Euros (EUR) using the official 2022 exchange rate (1 UAH = 0.02942 EUR or 38.981 UAH = 1 EUR). For multi-business organisations such as DB Group, unit-level revenue was estimated using documented business unit shares, with all estimates clearly flagged. Digitalisation indicators were captured qualitatively and mostly answering availability questions as “yes/no”, e.g., for the availability of mobile application, e-commerce, tracking platform or IT modernisation initiatives. Several KPIs rely on first-order approximations due to data limitations; however, alternative parameter values were tested within plausible ranges, and the resulting variations do not affect the qualitative patterns or comparative conclusions reported in this study. This approach was adopted due to the lack of standardised, publicly available quantitative metrics and to ensure cross-case comparability.

There are also data limitations, which should be highlighted. The analysis is subject to notable constraints arising from differences in reporting transparency, granularity and wartime operational disruptions. EU companies typically report standardised sustainability and CO₂ metrics, whereas some Ukrainian companies do not consistently provide CO₂ emissions or passenger-kilometre breakdowns. Wartime operational instability further complicates comparisons, particularly for Ukrzaliznytsia, Lvivelectrotrans and Nova Poshta. Additionally, certain KPIs were only available at consolidated group level or in differing reporting scopes. To mitigate these issues, we focused on per-unit KPIs to normalise scale differences and avoided mixing reporting years, restricting primary comparisons to 2022. Despite these limitations, the methodology ensures the comparability, reliability and reproducibility of findings while providing a basis for meaningful EU–Ukraine cross-sectoral insights.

Given the operators’ context-specific business models and regulatory environments, the findings should be interpreted as illustrative and exploratory, providing analytical insights rather than statistically representative generalisations across transport systems.

By combining quantitative KPIs and qualitative digitalisation indicators across freight rail, urban public transport and last-mile postal logistics, this study provides a comprehensive comparative framework. It identifies measurable disparities between EU and Ukrainian transportation companies and highlights opportunities for adopting EU best practices in Ukraine and Ukrainian wartime experience for resilience-driven innovations in the EU.

3. Results

The results are structured sequentially: quantitative indicators first, then qualitative digitalisation evidence. This flow is chosen, taking into account the data limitations mentioned in the previous section, to maintain analytical clarity and to separate findings from interpretation.

3.1. Freight Rail Analysis

Freight rail plays a pivotal role in the logistics and transport infrastructure of both European Union (EU) countries and Ukraine, supporting industrial supply chains, international trade and regional connectivity. This analysis compares two leading freight rail operators: Deutsche Bahn’s DB Cargo, Europe’s largest freight rail provider by tons-km, and the state-owned Ukrzaliznytsia (UZ), which operates almost the entire rail network of Ukraine [19]. In

Table 1. Freight rail: EU and Ukrainian companies comparison (2022).

KPI Type	KPI Name	DB Cargo	Ukrzaliznytsia (UZ)	Comment
Operational	Freight carried, Mt (million tons)	222.3 Mt	150.6 Mt	Estimated amounts based on available reports and press releases.
Operational	Freight performance, ton-km	84.5 billion ton-km	86.5 billion ton-km	UZ: estimated value based on available information of freight carried in 2022.
Financial	Annual revenue, mil. EUR	5005 mil. EUR	2227 mil. EUR	DB Cargo revenue is an estimate of reported DB group EUR 56.3 bn based on DB freight share ~8.9%. UZ revenue has been reported in UAH and converted to EUR using 2022 average exchange rate 1 UAH = 0.02942 EUR.
Financial	Revenue per ton (EUR/t)	22.5 EUR/t	14.7 EUR/t	UZ revenue might include other activities, not only cargo.
Environmental	CO2 intensity (g CO2/t/km)	~25–45 g CO2/t/km	No info	DB indicative value derived from rail-mode emissions and t·km, so not a precise company-only figure. UZ does not provide such info.
Digitalisation	IT and online platforms availability	Yes	Limited	DB: Advanced scheduling, digital traffic management pilots. DB invests in digital freight solutions. UZ: Has some IT upgrades but lacks mature e-freight platform.

, the main operational, financial and environmental KPIs are presented for both companies, as well as a short digitalisation status.

DB Cargo is an international rail freight subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn, with operations in seventeen European countries. Its operational network spans approximately 40,000 km, offering block trains, intermodal services and extensive cross-border freight connections. As of 2022, DB Cargo transported 222.3 million tons of freight, generating an estimated revenue of 5.005 billion EUR, reflecting its scale, diverse customer base and value-added services. Despite this volume, the company remained loss-making in 2022, with an adjusted EBITDA of −257 million EUR compared with the previous year. In contrast, Ukrzaliznytsia administers a 19,787 km network, encompassing both standard and broad-gauge lines. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, UZ carried over 300 million tons annually. However, in 2022, freight volumes dropped by 52.1% to 150.6 million tons due to wartime disruptions, including damaged infrastructure, blocked ports and reduced industrial output. This operational contraction has directly impacted UZ’s financial performance, as the organisation relies heavily on freight revenues to subsidise passenger operations. The company reported revenues of approximately 2.227 billion EUR in 2022, translating into a revenue-per-ton rate of 14.7 EUR, which is significantly lower than DB Cargo’s 22.5 EUR per ton [20,21].

These figures indicate fundamental differences in scale, efficiency, financial structure and technological adoption. Operational efficiency is critical for freight rail competitiveness. DB Cargo’s performance, measured in ton-km, reflects its large-scale network integration across Europe.

According to the report published by Deutsche Bahn, DB Cargo transported a total of 222.3 million tons of freight during 2022, representing a modest year-on-year decline of 1.2% compared with 2021. The company simultaneously generated 84.5 billion ton-km of freight performance, a measure that reflects not only the amount of goods carried but also the distance those goods were moved. The relationship between these two indicators provides an average haul distance of approximately 380 kilometres per ton (freight performance divided by freight carried).

This indicator has remained relatively stable for DB Cargo over the past five years, typically fluctuating between 370 and 390 km per ton, which reflects both the geographic density of industrial production across Germany and the country’s strategic position within the EU’s integrated logistics corridors. The 2022 operational figures indicate that DB Cargo maintained its position as the largest rail freight operator in Europe, responsible for roughly one-fifth of total EU freight work. Although its total tonnage slightly declined, this reduction mirrors broader cyclical trends in the European industrial sector linked to post-pandemic supply chain adjustments and the energy crisis that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Notably, DB Cargo’s operational stability amid these conditions reflects strong network resilience, underpinned by advanced digital scheduling systems, the high electrification of traction (about 95%) and sustained investment in energy efficiency measures aligned with the European Green Deal objectives.

The Ukrainian case presents a starkly different context. The full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 led to the near-complete blockade of maritime ports and the destruction or occupation of several major industrial regions, particularly those responsible for high-volume bulk goods such as coal, steel and grain. As a result, Ukrzaliznytsia’s total freight output fell by more than half. According to available operational data, the company transported 150.6 million tons of cargo in 2022, with a decline of 52.1% percent compared with 2021 (approximately 314 million tons). Unlike DB Cargo, Ukrzaliznytsia does not publicly report ton-km indicators in its available financial or operational documentation. Therefore, to provide a comparable measure of freight work, this study relies on ratio-based extrapolation derived from historical data. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [22] reported that in 2019, UZ transported 314 million tons of freight and produced approximately 195 billion ton-km. This relationship defines an average haul length as about 621 km per ton.

This long average haul distance reflects the extensive east–west structure of Ukrainian freight corridors, with bulk commodities such as iron ore, coal and agricultural goods typically travelling several hundred kilometres from extraction or production sites in the east and centre of the country to ports or western border crossings. Given the wartime disruption of 2022, however, these logistics chains were fundamentally altered. Export corridors through Odesa and Mykolaiv became largely unavailable, forcing rerouting toward Polish, Slovak, Hungarian and Romanian border crossings. These alternative routes are typically shorter, averaging 600–700 km per shipment rather than the pre-war average of 800–900 km. To reflect this structural change, it is reasonable to assume a reduction of approximately 15% in the average haul distance during 2022. Applying this adjusted ratio to the 2022 freight volume yields a credible estimate of Ukrzaliznytsia’s total freight work. In the end we have two possible scenarios: the pre-war scenario, which is taking into account 621 km per ton haul which results in 93.5 billion ton-km, and a haul reduced by 15% (528 km per ton) which results in 79.3 billion ton-km. From these two estimates, the realistic range for Ukrzaliznytsia’s 2022 transport work is between 79 and 94 billion ton-kilometres, depending on the precise distribution of freight flows and distances. We roughly estimate it to be an average of these two values of 86.5 billion ton-km for a proper comparison with DB Cargo for 2022.

Financial indicators reveal a marked divergence between a competitive market-based operator and a state-owned entity in crisis conditions. DB Cargo’s revenue of EUR5.005 billion in 2022 represented a modest increase from pre-pandemic levels. However, the company faced continued losses, emphasising the pressure of European competition, the need for ongoing investment and rising operational costs. Cost control measures and digital automation strategies under new management aim to restore profitability, highlighting the importance of efficiency optimisation in mature freight markets. Ukrzaliznytsia’s financial situation is far more precarious. Freight volumes halved during the 2022 war, while operating costs escalated sharply: diesel prices increased by 57%, electricity by 216% and wages by 65%. These pressures created substantial losses, with the company seeking significant state subsidies to maintain operations. The projected deficit for 2026 exceeds USD 728 million and proposed freight tariff hikes face political resistance. Revenue-per-ton metrics further highlight the disparity: UZ earns 14.7 EUR per ton compared with DB Cargo’s 22.5 EUR, reflecting lower tariffs, subsidised operations and limited value-added services. This gap underscores the difference between competitive European freight markets and wartime-impaired state monopolies [23].

Sustainability has become a central dimension of freight rail competitiveness. Rail transport inherently offers low-carbon alternatives to road haulage; however, the adoption of formal environmental strategies diverges sharply between Europe and Ukraine. DB Cargo has committed to detailed carbon accounting, reporting a CO₂ intensity of 25–45 g per ton-kilometer, and invests in electrified traction, renewable energy sourcing and automated freight stations. Its operations align with EU decarbonization frameworks and science-based targets, emphasising both operational efficiency and environmental responsibility. It is important to distinguish between the pre-war and wartime environmental performance of Ukrainian rail transport. Prior to 2022, Ukraine’s electricity mix consisted predominantly of low-carbon sources, with approximately 55% nuclear, 6% hydropower and 2% solar and wind energy, resulting in around 63% low-carbon electricity generation. In the same period, Germany’s share of low-carbon electricity was lower and reached a comparable level only after 2023. Moreover, in 2019, approximately 84% of Ukrainian locomotives were electric, compared with about 81% in Germany. Ukrainian railways also benefited from domestically produced nuclear electricity, reducing the dependence on imported fossil fuels. Consequently, before the outbreak of the war, Ukrainian rail transport likely achieved a lower or at least comparable carbon footprint per ton-km than German rail transport. During the war, the destruction of energy infrastructure and the increased reliance on diesel traction may have worsened this performance; however, due to the absence of verified data, this effect cannot be quantified and is discussed only qualitatively. Ukrzaliznytsia benefits from network electrification, yet wartime infrastructure damage and diesel reliance for backup traction likely increased carbon intensity, although formal emissions reporting remains unavailable. Unlike DB Cargo, UZ lacks a comprehensive decarbonization programme and does not publicly disclose climate targets. The environmental gap reflects broader policy disparities: EU operators are incentivized to adopt low-carbon practices under regulatory frameworks such as the Green Deal, whereas Ukraine prioritises continuity and reconstruction over sustainability initiatives. Despite electrification of approximately 87% of its network, UZ’s reliance on diesel traction during power shortages likely decreased overall efficiency. Operational resilience also differs: DB Cargo has invested in digital marshalling yards, automated couplers and predictive maintenance tools, enhancing network throughput, whereas UZ, while implementing some IT upgrades and digital scheduling software, prioritises infrastructure restoration over operational innovation, reflecting a dual need for continuity and eventual modernization [24,25].

Digitalization is a critical enabler of freight efficiency and resilience. DB Cargo demonstrates advanced digital maturity, deploying automated marshalling yards, digital traffic management and predictive maintenance systems. Initiatives such as the Digital Automatic Coupler and digital load-matching platforms enhance throughput, reduce turnaround times and provide real-time tracking. These initiatives align with broader EU policies promoting digital rail interoperability and innovation under programmes like Shift2Rail. Ukrzaliznytsia’s digital investments are comparatively limited, constrained by infrastructure damage and operational priorities. Existing upgrades include online station accessibility maps and partial ERP integration, yet the network lacks a unified digital freight marketplace. Digital tracking, telematics adoption and automated scheduling remain underdeveloped. While UZ’s modernization roadmap, “Ukraine in Motion,” targets EU standard compliance and digitalization, progress is impeded by war-related reconstruction needs. The contrast between DB Cargo and UZ underscores the importance of digitalization in enhancing reliability, transparency and market responsiveness in freight operations [26].

Both DB Cargo and Ukrzaliznytsia face structural and policy-driven constraints. DB Cargo contends with underinvestment in wagons, partial network electrification and stagnation in modal shift from road to rail. Policy gaps include the harmonisation of cross-border regulations within the Single European Railway Area and support for the accelerated adoption of digital automation technologies. Despite these challenges, DB Cargo operates within a mature regulatory and funding ecosystem, benefiting from EU freight corridors, decarbonization incentives and competitive market pressures that drive efficiency improvements. Ukrzaliznytsia’s gaps are more acute. Wartime infrastructure damage necessitates a focus on emergency repairs, limiting capacity for efficiency improvements. Operational constraints include broad-gauge lines that hinder cross-border flows, politically sensitive tariff setting and the absence of private sector competition, reducing incentives for innovation. Strategic modernization plans, including EU-standard gauge integration, digitalization and electrification, require substantial foreign investment and supportive policy frameworks. To align with EU technical and green standards, Ukraine must secure funding, adopt international interoperability norms and implement governance structures that balance resilience with modernization [27,28].

The comparison of DB Cargo and Ukrzaliznytsia highlights three primary dimensions: operational scale, financial performance and technological maturity. DB Cargo benefits from a diversified network across seventeen countries, advanced digital infrastructure and higher-value cargo services. Its performance metrics indicate the efficient utilisation of network capacity and stronger revenue per ton, despite losses linked to market pressures. Environmental reporting and sustainability initiatives reinforce DB Cargo’s competitive positioning in the EU freight market. Ukrzaliznytsia, by contrast, illustrates the vulnerabilities of state-owned freight monopolies under crisis conditions. Operational performance has contracted due to war-related disruptions, with freight volumes halved and network efficiency challenged by infrastructure damage. Financially, UZ struggles with rising costs, politically constrained tariffs and dependency on state support. Digitalization and sustainability are secondary priorities, reflecting the dual need to maintain continuity and gradually modernise infrastructure. While UZ possesses significant potential due to network electrification and strategic location, its modernization trajectory depends heavily on post-war reconstruction and EU integration support.

This comparative analysis reveals significant disparities between DB Cargo and Ukrzaliznytsia across operational, financial, environmental and digitalization dimensions. DB Cargo operates as a mature, market-driven European freight rail provider, leveraging scale, advanced technology and environmental compliance to optimise performance. Ukrzaliznytsia, in contrast, faces extraordinary challenges due to wartime conditions, financial constraints and legacy infrastructure. The strategic gap encompasses operational resilience, financial stability, technological adoption and environmental transparency. For Ukraine, the primary priorities are restoring network capacity, ensuring financial sustainability and progressively implementing digital and green initiatives aligned with EU standards. Policy interventions, foreign investment and targeted modernization programmes will be critical in closing performance gaps. For DB Cargo, continuous efficiency improvements, digital expansion and modal shift incentives remain essential to maintain market leadership and align with EU sustainability objectives. Overall, the comparison highlights the impact of external shocks, regulatory environments and digital transformation on freight rail performance. It underscores the importance of a multifaceted strategy combining operational efficiency, financial prudence, sustainability and technological innovation to strengthen resilience and competitiveness in the global freight rail sector.

3.2. Urban Public Transport Analysis

Urban public transport systems are vital components of sustainable city development, shaping accessibility, inclusion and economic performance. In this research we consider urban public transport as a subsector of a transport system, either regional or across the country. Although urban public transport usually depends on local authorities, this component might be different from city to city even in terms of one region or country; therefore, we tend to review this in terms of a comparison between different transport branches of the EU and Ukraine. For urban public transport analysis, it was important not just to pick companies for comparison, but also more or less comparable EU and Ukrainian cities. We chose Angers (France), where the RATP company runs public transport, and Lviv (Ukraine), where public transport is mostly operated by Lvivelectrotrans. This analysis reveals significant insights into the interplay between financial capacity, institutional design, environmental strategy and digital maturity in medium-sized European cities. Though embedded in different political and economic contexts, both systems share comparable operational scales yet diverge in governance stability and technological advancement. In

Table 2. Urban public transport: EU and Ukrainian companies comparison (2022).

KPI Type	KPI Name	Angers, France (RATP)	Lviv, Ukraine (Lvivelectrotrans)	Comment
Operational	Passenger journeys, mil.	29 mil.	24.68 mil.	For Lviv, only late-2021 municipal data is available. Taking into account that the amount of residents reduced in 2022 by internally displaced people due to full-scale war, we can assume that the difference with Angers should be approx. less than 15%.
Operational	Vehicle-kilometers, mil.	7.5 mil.	7.08 mil.	Angers’ value includes buses and trams, while Lviv’s value includes trams and trolleybuses.
Financial	Annual revenue, mil. EUR	60 mil. EUR	5 mil. EUR (approx.)	Angers value based on Agglomération financial statements 2022, while Lviv’s value is estimated based on fares info.
Financial	Revenue per journey, EUR	2.07 EUR	0.2 EUR	Amount of revenue in EUR per 1 journey.
Environmental	CO2 intensity (g CO2/t/km)	70 g CO2/passenger-km	0 g CO2/passenger-km	Lvivelectrotrans operates only electric transport.
Digitalisation	IT and online platforms availability	Yes	Yes	Both companies have basic mobile ticketing, also Angers uses open GTFS data feeds.

we have collected operational, financial, environmental and digitalisation indicators, similarly to freight rail subsector, but related to urban public transport.

Both Angers and Lviv represent mid-sized European cities with long-standing tram traditions and evolving integrated transport systems. Angers Loire Métropole, managed by RATP Dev Irigo, serves approximately 310,000 inhabitants through a network of two tram lines and 65 bus routes [29]. Lviv’s municipal enterprise, Lvivelectrotrans, operates 10 tram and 11 trolleybus routes, serving roughly 720,000 residents within the broader metropolitan area [29]. Many residents have been internally displaced and moved to Lviv due to the full-scale war. Despite differing urban densities and fleet compositions, both systems demonstrate similar operational volumes of around 7–7.5 million vehicle-kilometres per year, underlining comparable network intensity and service coverage.

Passenger demand further reflects parity: Angers recorded roughly 29 million passenger journeys in 2022, while Lviv registered about 24.7 million [29]. Adjusting for the population displacements caused by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the two systems remain within a 15–20% range of each other. However, beneath this operational resemblance lies a profound financial asymmetry. Angers’ annual transport budget of approximately 60 million EUR translates to about 2.07 EUR per passenger journey, whereas Lviv’s estimated 4–5 million EUR yields only 0.20 EUR per journey, which is a tenfold difference [30]. This disparity constrains Lviv’s ability to modernise vehicles, implement digital technologies and sustain infrastructure.

France’s employer-based payroll tax earmarked for public transport ensures predictable revenue streams, supplemented by a balanced mix of fare income around 25%, employer contributions around 40% and regional or municipal subsidies around 35% [29]. In contrast, Ukraine’s municipal transport operators depend heavily on local budgets and irregular international loans from institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This structural imbalance limits Lviv’s planning horizon, forcing the reactive rather than strategic management of assets and services.

From an environmental perspective, the comparison produces an intriguing paradox. Lviv, despite its limited finances, achieves near-zero direct carbon emissions due to its fully electric tram and trolleybus fleet, making its direct CO₂ intensity approximately 0 g CO₂ per passenger-km. Angers, by contrast, records an estimated 70 g CO₂ per passenger-km, largely due to the continued use of diesel buses. Nonetheless, the French network is rapidly decarbonizing through hybrid and electric battery bus deployment and renewable energy procurement agreements [31]. While Angers follows an incremental Green Deal-aligned pathway toward electrification, Lviv exemplifies a path-dependent model where legacy electric infrastructure has become a de facto low-carbon asset. However, the sustainability advantage in Lviv is tempered by indirect emissions from Ukraine’s electricity mix, approximately half of which still derives from thermal sources [29].

Both systems broadly align with the Avoid–Shift–Improve paradigm underpinning the EU Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan (SUMP) framework [2]. They seek to avoid excessive car dependency through integrated fares and dense route coverage, shift travel towards low-carbon modes such as trams and trolleybuses and improve operational efficiency via technological upgrades like regenerative braking and optimised scheduling. Yet, while Angers implements these policies under stable institutional arrangements, Lviv faces persistent wartime challenges, like disrupted power supply or constrained budgets, that threaten service continuity and hinder long-term decarbonisation planning.

Digitalisation represents another domain of both convergence and asymmetry. Each system provides mobile ticketing, but Angers demonstrates a higher degree of technological integration. The Irigo platform supports account-based ticketing, open GTFS data feeds and Google Transit integration, whereas Lviv’s LeoKart system remains limited in coverage [30,31]. The open-data ecosystem in Angers promotes innovation by enabling third-party developers to build mobility tools and supports greater public transparency. Empirical studies by the European Commission suggest that open-data cities achieve up to 15% higher user satisfaction, underscoring the governance value of digital openness [2]. Lviv’s reliance on closed, manual data systems constrains its potential to enhance efficiency and accountability, though donor-funded Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) initiatives provide a basis for progress.

Institutional structures fundamentally explain these differences. Angers Loire Métropole manages its network through a public service delegation contract with RATP, combining public ownership with private management under key performance indicators. This hybrid model encourages innovation and operational efficiency while maintaining democratic oversight [29]. Conversely, Lvivelectrotrans operates as a fully municipal enterprise with limited autonomy and high political dependency, resulting in procedural rigidity and delayed procurements. This governance centralisation also restricts access to external finance: Angers can issue municipal bonds and attract EU Green Deal funds, whereas Lviv depends on central government approvals for external borrowing.

Social inclusion and resilience further differentiate the two systems. Angers prioritises universal accessibility through barrier-free infrastructure, achieving 95% accessible stops in 2022 [31]. Lviv, meanwhile, pursues gradual accessibility improvements via the national Barrier-Free Ukraine initiative, yet wartime disruptions, including power outages and damaged rolling stock, impede consistent progress. In this context, resilience acquires different meanings: in France it denotes climate adaptation and redundancy, while in Ukraine it signifies survival and continuity under conflict. Lviv’s rapid post-attack service restorations illustrate an emergent model of resilience-driven innovation, reflecting adaptive capacity to European post-disaster recoveries.

Comparatively, several insights emerge. Firstly, both systems exhibit operational parity despite vast financial disparity, revealing Lviv’s resource efficiency but also its developmental constraints. Secondly, Lviv’s historical electrification grants it environmental leadership, while Angers invests heavily to converge on similar performance metrics. Thirdly, the digital gap underscores how open-data policies enhance innovation and user trust. Fourthly, governance differences demonstrate the importance of contractual autonomy and diversified funding. Finally, Lviv’s wartime resilience experience offers valuable lessons to EU cities preparing for crises such as energy shortages or cyberattacks.

In policy terms, the comparison identifies multiple gaps and opportunities. Ukraine faces a critical funding deficit, having 0.20 EUR per journey versus 2.00 EUR in France, suggesting the need for stable revenue mechanisms. Institutional reforms introducing performance-based contracts could enhance efficiency and transparency. Both cities would benefit from deeper renewable energy integration and from harmonising digital systems under the EU’s Intelligent Transport Systems Directive. Moreover, cross-city cooperation on crisis mobility planning and inclusive design could strengthen resilience.

Theoretically, applying the SUMP framework and Avoid–Shift–Improve model positions Angers as a mature example of integrated sustainable mobility, whereas Lviv represents an early-stage transition, propelled by necessity and external aid rather than stable institutional frameworks. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian case demonstrates potential for leapfrogging: even under crisis, digitalisation and electrification can catalyse convergence with EU sustainability norms when supported by governance and funding reform.

Overall, the comparative analysis underscores that operational efficiency is insufficient without institutional resilience. Financial diversification, digital openness and decentralised governance emerge as decisive enablers of sustainable urban mobility. Angers exemplifies how structured policy frameworks translate into balanced development, while Lviv illustrates adaptive innovation under duress, revealing that resilience, when institutionalised, can bridge the gap between constraint and sustainability.

3.3. Last-Mile Postal Logistics Analysis

Last-mile delivery, the final and most consumer-facing stage of parcel logistics, has emerged as one of the fastest-evolving domains of transport systems worldwide. It represents both an economic lifeline for e-commerce ecosystems and a major sustainability challenge, as urban deliveries account for a disproportionate share of emissions, congestion and resource use. In the EU, the decarbonisation of last-mile logistics has been closely integrated into the European Green Deal [32], while in Ukraine, the sector has developed largely through entrepreneurial initiative and rapid technological adoption under wartime constraints. This section presents a comparative analysis of PostNL, the Netherlands’ national postal and parcel operator, and Nova Poshta, Ukraine’s dominant private courier network. The focus is on 2022, when both companies faced acute external challenges, and the discussion examines operational, financial, environmental and digital performance, concluding with an integrated assessment of efficiency, policy alignment and sustainability gaps. Similarly to the previous subsections, the main indicators for both companies are presented in

Table 3. Last-mile postal logistics: EU and Ukrainian companies comparison (2022) [31,33,34].

KPI Type	KPI Name	PostML (Netherlands)	Nova Poshta (Ukraine)	Comment
Operational	Parcels handled, mil.	344 mil.	317 mil.	Nova Poshta: 2022 estimated using growth rate and 2023 stats.
Financial	Annual revenue, mil. EUR	3144 mil. EUR	607.7 mil. EUR	Nova Poshta: estimated revenues from non-official sources (Odesa Journal).
Financial	Revenue per parcel, EUR	9.14 EUR	1.91 EUR	Amount of revenue in EUR per 1 parcel.
Environmental	Emission-free share, % km	22% km	1% km	Nova Poshta: pilot projects; large-scale EV adoption not yet reported for 2022.
Environmental	CO2 intensity (g CO2/fleet-km)	152 g CO2/fleet-km	No info	Nova Poshta: there is no information in official reporting or from non-official sources.
Digitalisation	IT and online platforms availability	Yes	Yes	PostNL: full track and trace, app, e-logistics products. Nova Poshta: app, NP Shopping, tracking available; e-commerce integration strong.

.

The global pandemic triggered an unprecedented expansion in parcel logistics, but by 2022 the European market had entered a phase of normalisation. PostNL reported the delivery of 344 million parcels that year, a decline of 10.2%. The company’s mail segment also continued to contract, with 1.884 billion addressed mail items (–8% year on year) [33]. Despite reduced volumes, service reliability remained strong: 98% of parcels and 91% of letters met on-time delivery standards. PostNL’s operations, deeply embedded in a mature digital infrastructure and supported by extensive regulatory oversight, reflect the characteristics of a stable, post-growth market environment.

In contrast, Nova Poshta represents a dynamic case of expansion under crisis. Although direct 2022 figures are not publicly disclosed, the credible triangulation of available data allows estimation. According to industry statistics, Nova Poshta delivered 412 million parcels in 2023, a 30% increase over 2022 [34]. Thus, its 2022 parcel volume is inferred at approximately 317 million shipments, comparable to PostNL’s output, despite Ukraine’s wartime disruptions. This operational resilience is remarkable: during a period of systemic economic contraction, fuel shortages and damaged infrastructure, the company maintained near-full national coverage through more than 8800 service points and branches. Moreover, Nova Poshta expanded internationally, establishing offices and sorting centres in Poland’s major urban hubs, including Warsaw [35]. Such expansion underscores the flexibility and adaptability of Ukraine’s private logistics sector, which has evolved into one of the most digitally advanced in Eastern Europe, even without the institutional stability or regulatory frameworks available to EU operators [36].

Financially, the contrast between the two companies illustrates divergent developmental logics. PostNL’s total revenue in 2022 was 3144 million EUR, a 9.3% decline compared with the previous year, mainly due to lower parcel volumes and the fading of pandemic-related surges [33]. Normalised EBIT fell to 84 million EUR (down from 308 million EUR in 2021), corresponding to a modest operating margin of 2.7%. Net profit turned negative (−11 million EUR), influenced by a one-time tax settlement. These figures exemplify the challenges facing EU postal incumbents in a market characterised by price competition, inflationary pressures and high fixed costs. Nonetheless, PostNL retained financial stability, maintaining a conservative leverage ratio of 1.9 net debt to EBITDA and continued to operate under robust corporate governance standards, reflecting the institutional maturity of EU-listed postal enterprises.

Nova Poshta, on the other hand, continued to exhibit high growth and strong profitability. According to independent financial reporting, its turnover reached approximately 607.7 million EUR, with a net profit near 55 million EUR [37]. These dynamics reflect not only rapid recovery from crisis conditions but also the elasticity of Ukrainian consumer demand for reliable delivery services. When revenue is normalised per parcel, the difference in cost structure becomes evident: PostNL generated approximately 9.14 EUR per parcel, while Nova Poshta’s figure was roughly 1.91 EUR per parcel. This fivefold disparity illustrates broader contrasts in purchasing power, wage levels and service integration. PostNL’s higher revenue per parcel reflects its diverse portfolio, whereas Nova Poshta operates mainly in the domestic and regional segment. Despite these differences, Nova’s trajectory demonstrates that even in an unstable economy, private logistics can remain profitable when supported by technological innovation and strong brand trust [38].

In 2022, its total CO₂ intensity across scope 1 and 2 emissions was 152 g of CO₂ per fleet kilometre, improving by nearly 8% from the previous year [32]. The company achieved 22% of all delivery kilometres using emission-free vehicles, like electric vans and cargo bikes, making it one of Europe’s leaders in urban green delivery. PostNL’s long-term strategy commits to achieving zero-emission urban distribution by 2030, a goal fully consistent with the EU’s “Fit for 55” package and the Dutch national “Climate Agreement”. By comparison, Nova Poshta lacks publicly available carbon data or sustainability targets. Its 2022 operations relied predominantly on diesel-fuelled vans and motorcycles. Nonetheless, incremental progress has begun. The company launched pilot projects introducing electric minivans and cargo bicycles in major cities such as Kyiv and Lviv, partly supported by the EU-funded “Without Barriers” initiative [39]. Nova’s 2023 corporate communications referenced sustainability as a new strategic focus, with planned investments in fleet electrification and renewable-powered sorting centres. However, without verified emissions data or performance indicators, it is impossible to quantify its carbon intensity per parcel. Qualitatively, the reported Nova Poshta’s CO₂ per parcel value is likely several times higher than PostNL’s, primarily due to vehicle efficiency gaps and longer delivery routes in areas with weak infrastructure. This absence of standardised environmental reporting illustrates the broader regulatory and capacity gap in Ukraine’s logistics sector, where climate policy remains secondary to operational survival during wartime.

Digitalisation represents another axis of differentiation. PostNL’s digital ecosystem is one of the most sophisticated in Europe. By 2022, 98% of its parcels were tracked in real time, supported by route optimisation and advanced customer interfaces [32]. Around 61% of its total revenue derived from e-commerce-related logistics, reflecting deep integration between digital and physical networks. PostNL’s automated sorting centres employ Lean and Industry 4.0 technologies, while its nationwide network of parcel lockers is expected to reach 3600 units by 2028 [40]. Nova Poshta has also positioned digitalisation at the core of its competitive strategy. Through its IT subsidiary, Nova Digital, the company has developed an integrated platform encompassing online payments, real-time parcel tracking and back-office automation. In 2024, Nova Digital announced the creation of an artificial intelligence department to integrate predictive analytics and image recognition into logistics operations [41]. Nova’s digital offerings, including the NovaPay wallet and NP Shopping e-commerce service, position it as a regional pioneer of consumer-oriented logistics technology. Yet its digitalisation remains uneven, with high progress in customer interfaces but limited back-end optimisation compared with PostNL. For instance, Nova’s network includes only around two hundred parcel lockers nationwide, compared with PostNL’s multi-thousand network, indicating a lower level of automation and convenience. Moreover, while PostNL’s data management practices comply with GDPR, Nova operates under a less stringent regulatory regime, which limits the international interoperability of their digital systems.

Comparing these findings, it becomes evident that PostNL and Nova Poshta represent two complementary extremes of the digital–sustainability spectrum. PostNL shows institutional maturity, compliance and incremental innovation within a highly regulated EU environment, whereas Nova Poshta embodies agility, rapid scaling and crisis resilience within a deregulated, entrepreneurial ecosystem. PostNL integrates environmental and digital strategies coherently: its data analytics serve not only operational optimisation but also emissions management, aligning digital transformation with climate objectives. Nova Poshta’s technological progress, while remarkable, is largely directed toward speed, convenience and market expansion rather than decarbonisation. This asymmetry illustrates a fundamental policy insight: technological modernisation does not automatically produce environmental gains unless guided by coherent sustainability frameworks. The comparative analysis of efficiency and policy readiness reinforces this conclusion. Nova Poshta’s operational output rivals that of PostNL, but with approximately five times lower revenue, limited emission controls and restricted public transparency. At the same time, its responsiveness to consumer demand and investment agility are significantly higher. PostNL, conversely, demonstrates strong institutional capacity and climate accountability but faces structural constraints such as high labour costs, market saturation and universal service obligations that limit strategic flexibility. These contrasting characteristics reflect different positions on the innovation–regulation continuum. Ukraine’s logistics sector operates with entrepreneurial freedom but limited oversight; the EU sector operates under advanced governance but constrained market dynamics.

In the context of sustainability theory, both cases can be analysed through the “Avoid–Shift–Improve” framework. PostNL actively pursues avoidance through route optimisation and dense locker networks, shifting to low-emission vehicles and improving efficiency through AI-driven logistics. Nova Poshta has achieved improvements mainly in operational reliability and digital user experience but has yet to undertake a systematic shift toward low-emission mobility. In theoretical terms, PostNL represents an “institutional sustainability transition,” while Nova Poshta reflects a “resilience-driven innovation path.” These trajectories are distinct but potentially complementary: Ukraine’s digital agility could inform EU models of adaptability, while EU environmental standards could accelerate Ukraine’s green convergence.

The performance and policy gaps identified across both cases highlight opportunities for mutual learning and strategic alignment. On the Ukrainian side, the most critical gaps concern environmental governance, data transparency and infrastructure modernisation. Nova Poshta lacks verified CO₂ reporting, comprehensive fleet decarbonisation and audited financial disclosure comparable to EU standards. The company also operates a less dense network of parcel lockers and consolidation hubs, which increases redundant delivery trips and associated emissions. Moreover, while Nova’s digital investments enhance efficiency, they are not yet systematically integrated with environmental goals, leaving a disconnect between innovation and sustainability outcomes. On the EU side, gaps persist in scaling up fleet electrification and harmonising cross-border e-commerce regulation. Despite PostNL’s strong progress, its rural operations remain dependent on combustion engines and the fragmentation of European parcel markets continues to reduce efficiency. Additionally, rigid labour relations and universal service mandates create institutional inertia, slowing adaptation to digital and sustainability imperatives.

In policy terms, these findings align with the Digital Green Deal vision, which seeks to couple digital innovation with environmental transformation. PostNL’s experience demonstrates that decarbonisation and digitalisation can reinforce one another when embedded within coherent regulatory and reporting frameworks. Nova Poshta’s trajectory, on the other hand, shows how digitalisation can advance independently of sustainability goals, driven by market demand and technological entrepreneurship. Bridging this gap will require targeted policy instruments, such as EU–Ukraine partnership programmes for green logistics, subsidised access to electric vehicle fleets and standardised carbon accounting systems compatible with EU taxonomy rules. Institutionalising such mechanisms during Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction could fast-track its convergence with European sustainability norms.

The path forward requires institutionalising environmental reporting through internationally recognised frameworks such as GRI or SBTi, leveraging EU reconstruction funds to accelerate the electrification of delivery fleets and expanding digital systems to include environmental analytics. In addition, deeper public–private cooperation between EU and Ukrainian postal operators could facilitate knowledge transfer in sustainable fleet management, emissions accounting and data governance. Such integration would enable Ukraine not only to rebuild its logistics infrastructure but also to align it with the EU’s climate neutrality and digital transition goals. PostNL represents the EU’s sustainability-driven postal model, rooted in regulatory consistency and transparency, whereas Nova Poshta exemplifies Ukraine’s resilience-driven innovation and digital entrepreneurship. Their comparison reveals both divergence and synergy: PostNL demonstrates how governance can embed sustainability into operations, while Nova Poshta illustrates how innovation can sustain efficiency under extreme conditions. The intersection of these experiences offers a powerful framework for sustainable digitalisation, which can be considered as the strategic integration of technological modernisation and environmental responsibility as twin pillars of resilient transport development in Europe’s evolving logistics landscape.

3.4. Synthesis Across Subsectors and Regions

The comparative analysis of the three transport subsectors reveals both convergent and divergent trends shaping the digital and sustainable transformation of the European and Ukrainian transport systems. Across all modes, the EU cases represent mature, competitive and policy-driven frameworks characterised by integrated planning, institutional stability and transparent performance reporting. Ukrainian counterparts, while facing wartime disruption and financial constraints, exhibit striking operational resilience and growing engagement with digitalisation and sustainability agendas, albeit from a lower baseline and within a reconstruction-oriented policy environment.

Across sectors, a shared structural asymmetry is evident. EU operators function in competitive, regulated markets with established governance mechanisms and diversified funding sources. DB Cargo, RATP Angers and PostNL operate within multilevel governance architectures combining market incentives, EU regulations and local or national subsidies. Their financial models blend market revenues with targeted public support, for instance, EU rail infrastructure funding, local mobility contracts and green bond schemes for fleet electrification. In contrast, Ukrainian companies rely on user fees and state or donor support, operating in crisis conditions where financial planning prioritises continuity and reconstruction over long-term sustainability.

Based on the analysis performed in the previous subsections, we formulated recommendations for stakeholders for each of the transport system subsectors for closing the identified gaps on both the EU and Ukrainian sides (

Table 4. Recommendations for improving transport systems of the EU and Ukraine.

Dimension	Freight Rail	Urban Public Transport	Last-Mile Postal Logistics
Operational Efficiency	EU: Modernise rail freight terminals through the Digital Automatic Coupler (DAC) and expand intermodal corridors to eliminate bottlenecks (L/O). Ukraine: Reconstruct damaged infrastructure; prioritise gauge conversion on western lines to enable TEN-T integration and increase cross-border throughput (L/C).	EU: Improve multimodal coordination within regional SUMPs; expand electrified priority lanes in medium cities (Angers model) (L/O). Ukraine: Modernise depots, replace outdated rolling stock with EU-standard vehicles; prioritise operational reliability and real-time dispatch under crisis conditions (L/C).	EU: Streamline parcel flows through national micro-hubs to avoid redundant van trips; automate sorting centres (L/O). Ukraine: Build network of parcel lockers and micro-depots; optimise route planning via AI to reduce empty km (S/C).
Financial Sustainability	EU: Continue PPP funding and green bonds to finance zero-emission locomotives; reform track-access charging to reward low-carbon operators (L/C). Ukraine: Introduce transparent freight tariff indexation; reduce cross-subsidisation of passenger services; mobilise EU and international reconstruction grants for rolling-stock renewal (L/C).	EU: Maintain diversified funding (e.g., farebox, regional subsidies). Ukraine: Introduce local mobility tax; develop performance-based public service contracts similar to RATP model (S/C); strengthen municipal creditworthiness for EBRD projects (L/C).	EU: Align universal-service regulation with e-commerce realities to ensure profitability; deploy dynamic pricing models based on demand analytics (L/O). Ukraine: Improve access to capital markets; encourage ESG-linked loans for fleet electrification; formalise financial reporting for private carriers, like Nova Poshta or Meest (S/C).
Environmental Impact	EU: Accelerate modal shift from road to rail; expand renewable traction power (L/C). Ukraine: Electrify remaining 13% of UZ lines; adopt EU CO2-reporting methodology; integrate climate-resilient reconstruction standards in rail bridges and corridors (L/C).	EU: Achieve 100% zero-emission urban fleets by 2035; invest in renewable-based depot energy (L/O). Ukraine: Preserve existing electric tram/trolley networks; rebuild substations with high-efficiency converters; adopt green-energy PPAs for traction power (L/O).	EU: Increase EV share in last-mile deliveries beyond 22%; expand use of bio-LNG and cargo bikes in urban cores (L/O). Ukraine: Pilot e-vans and cargo e-bikes; incentivise low-emission zones in cities like Kyiv or Lviv; create national clean fleet roadmap aligned with EU Fit-for-55 package (L/C).
Digitalisation and Innovation	EU: Scale up real-time logistics data sharing via EU Freight Data Space; deploy predictive maintenance using IoT sensors (L/O). Ukraine: Develop digital freight platform integrating customs and rail scheduling; introduce ERP and telematics for wagons and traction units (S/C).	EU: Integrate open mobility data (GTFS + NeTEx) across metropolitan networks; advance Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) pilots in mid-sized cities (L/O). Ukraine: Mandate open data publication; complete e-ticketing roll-out (LeoKart 2.0); link real-time information to EU ITS Directive standards (L/C).	EU: Strengthen AI-driven route optimisation and smart locker management; share anonymised delivery data with city planners (L/O). Ukraine: Expand R&D on automation; adopt secure cloud-based CRM and tracking systems; harmonise data-protection rules with GDPR to enable cross-border e-logistics (L/C).
Institutional and Policy Alignment	EU: Enhance coherence between Green Deal and TEN-T freight corridor funding; promote single-window permitting for rail investments (L/O). Ukraine: Create inter-ministerial Transport Sustainability Taskforce to align rail, logistics and digital policies; prepare legislative harmonisation for EU accession (e.g., rail liberalisation, climate law) (L/C).	EU: Continue integration of mobility and land-use planning in SUMPs; benchmark digital access indicators (L/O). Ukraine: Formalise city-level SUMPs with donor assistance; institutionalise resilience planning and KPI-based monitoring of service performance (L/C).	EU: Coordinate postal sustainability targets under EU Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) (L/O). Ukraine: Establish national sustainability framework for logistics operators; integrate postal and courier data into national emissions inventory (L/C).

). The recommendations are labelled in the following way: “Short-term” (S), “Long-term” (L), “Critical” (C), and “Optional” (O).

Operationally, EU systems benefit from dense, interoperable networks; Ukrainian systems, though extensive, are constrained by infrastructure damage and historical underinvestment. For example, DB Cargo’s 40,000 km European network ensures continental-scale connectivity, whereas Ukrzaliznytsia’s 19,787 km, much of it war-affected, faces physical and technical bottlenecks. Similarly, Angers’ modernised trolleybus and tram infrastructure contrasts with Lviv’s reliance on Soviet-era fleets. In last-mile logistics, PostNL’s mature micro-hub network and automation contrast with Nova Poshta’s rapidly expanding but still diesel-dependent operations.

Environmental and digital performance reveal additional divergences. EU operators report explicit, Paris-aligned targets: DB Cargo’s low CO₂ intensity (25–45 g/tkm), RATP’s zero-emission fleet goals and PostNL’s 22% emission-free kilometres exemplify advanced climate integration. Ukrainian entities, in turn, demonstrate emerging but informal environmental initiatives often supported through EU or international programmes (e.g., EFSD+, “Barrier-Free Ukraine”) rather than statutory obligations. The digital divide is narrowing: Ukrainian carriers increasingly employ digital tools for operational management, but EU firms generally demonstrate higher digitalisation maturity and data-driven innovation.

Several systemic gaps recur across all three modes. Infrastructure and investment remain the foremost challenges. EU networks face congestion and maintenance backlogs, while Ukrainian systems require large-scale reconstruction. DB Cargo reports 20% of German freight delayed due to single-track congestion, whereas UZ contends with destroyed bridges and damaged track sections. Urban transport faces similar divergence: Angers replaced its entire trolleybus fleet by 2020, while Lviv still operates much older vehicles. Last-mile logistics display the same asymmetry: PostNL’s 3000+ parcel lockers epitomise spatial efficiency, whereas Nova Poshta’s locker rollout remains nascent. Another common issue concerns policy and institutional coordination. EU systems function within a layered governance hierarchy: European directives, national strategies and local Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs). Ukraine’s institutional fragmentation, between ministries of infrastructure, energy and environment, impedes integrated planning. The effective implementation of SUMPs, digitalisation roadmaps and freight corridor development requires inter-ministerial coordination.

Data transparency and performance monitoring also differentiate the systems. EU operators routinely publish disaggregated KPIs, allowing independent benchmarking. Ukrainian operators, by contrast, rarely disclose such data, limiting international comparability and evidence-based policymaking. For example, DB Cargo’s public dashboards and PostNL’s parcel-level CO₂ reports contrast sharply with the absence of verified emissions reporting by Ukrzaliznytsia or Nova Poshta. Financing mechanisms further shape the disparity. EU operators leverage diversified instruments, like public–private partnerships, EU Green Deal funds and corporate green bonds, whereas Ukrainian firms depend on limited public funding and international assistance. The absence of stable regulatory frameworks and tariff indexation discourages private investment in Ukraine’s transport sector. Addressing this gap will require predictable policy environments and ESG-linked financing tools to attract international investors.

Lastly, resilience versus efficiency represents a conceptual trade-off. Ukraine’s transport systems prioritise resilience, ensuring supply chain continuity and evacuation logistics, over economic efficiency, given wartime imperatives. EU systems, conversely, prioritise efficiency, but are increasingly embedding resilience into policy frameworks following shocks such as COVID-19 and the energy crisis. Thus, while Ukrainian operators are adapting under extreme conditions, the EU’s experience shows the importance of institutionalising resilience through predictive maintenance, redundancy planning and digital monitoring.

Despite these differences, the analysis demonstrates growing thematic convergence between EU and Ukrainian transport agendas. Both regions embrace frameworks that integrate sustainability and digitalization paradigm. EU cities like Angers implement “Shift” strategies by promoting modal transitions from private cars to public transport and cycling, supported by SUMPs. Lviv’s similar initiatives, tram prioritisation and pilot cycling lanes, reflect the early adoption of the same logic. In freight, both DB Cargo and Ukrzaliznytsia contribute to a modal shift by promoting rail over road; in Ukraine, this shift is further reinforced by the wartime closure of maritime routes. PostNL applies its strategies through extensive locker networks and route optimisation, while Nova Poshta could replicate such measures to minimise redundant trips and emissions. Institutionally, Ukraine’s adoption of SUMPs in cities like Lviv and its rail liberalisation and digital transport reforms echo EU norms, though practical implementation lags. The European Commission’s transport and mobility directorate has channelled funds toward Ukraine’s digital ticketing and accessibility programmes, mirroring the Digital Green Deal’s dual emphasis on inclusivity and environmental performance. Programmes such as the “Without Barriers” initiative and the EIB’s Green Reconstruction Facility illustrate how EU–Ukraine cooperation is evolving from policy alignment to practical integration.

The synthesis of the results across modes identifies several overarching insights.

First, EU companies consistently demonstrate higher levels of data transparency, digital maturity and environmental accountability than their Ukrainian peers. Their reporting structures enable clear benchmarking and stakeholder trust. Second, Ukrainian companies, though less formalised, exhibit strong operational resilience under extreme conditions. Wartime adaptations, such as UZ’s rerouting of freight to western corridors and Nova Poshta’s rapid international expansion, illustrate flexibility and innovation potential. Yet measurable gaps persist in emissions reporting, digital freight interoperability and access to long-term capital for fleet renewal. Quantitatively, KPI comparisons confirm EU advantages in revenue efficiency and environmental transparency. DB Cargo’s revenue per ton (22–24 EUR) significantly exceeds UZ’s (14–15 EUR), reflecting higher-value services and better network utilisation. PostNL reports 22% emission-free kilometres and specific CO₂ efficiency, while Nova Poshta lacks verified metrics. Similarly, RATP’s per-passenger revenue and operational yield surpass those of Lvivelectrotrans, indicating economies of scale and integrated ticketing systems.

From a policy perspective, bridging these gaps requires a multi-dimensional strategy built on four axes. The first is establishing a cross-sectoral “Transport Sustainability Taskforce” in Ukraine to align rail, urban mobility and logistics reforms with EU directives and accession requirements. The second is introducing mandatory KPI and emissions reporting for all major Ukrainian transport operators in alignment with EU “Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive” (CSRD) practices. The third is expanding access to green credit lines, concessional EU loans and blended finance mechanisms for fleet electrification and infrastructure reconstruction. The fourth is accelerating the adoption of freight systems and open mobility data standards to integrate Ukraine into the EU “Freight Data Space” and ITS architecture.

This synthesis suggests that both EU and Ukrainian transport ecosystems possess complementary strengths. The EU’s structured governance and climate-aligned investment frameworks ensure policy continuity and environmental accountability. Ukraine’s transport sector, in turn, offers lessons in adaptive management, agility and rapid problem-solving under extreme uncertainty. EU cities could draw on Ukraine’s “resilience-by-necessity” model to enhance flexibility in crisis response, while Ukrainian entities can emulate EU standards of transparency, interoperability and carbon accounting. The mutual reinforcement of digital and green transitions remains central to this trajectory. The Digital Green Deal’s principle, that digital innovation must serve decarbonisation, applies equally to both contexts. Equipping Ukrainian freight fleets with IoT sensors for predictive maintenance (following the Shift2Rail model) could significantly improve energy efficiency. Similarly, sharing anonymised delivery and mobility data between Nova Poshta and PostNL could inform cross-border congestion management. Collaborative projects, including EU–Ukraine “twinning” initiatives and Horizon Europe partnerships, could serve as catalysts for such cross learning. To move beyond purely narrative comparison, the analysis consolidates key KPIs across all six operators into a unified comparative structure and applies simple normalisation and ratio-based contrasts relative to subsector-specific reference values. While the limited sample size precludes advanced statistical techniques, this modest analytical extension allows relative performance gaps to be expressed in a transparent and comparable manner, thereby supporting a quantified interpretation of cross-operator differences without overstating precision or generalizability.

Overall, the synthesis across modes and regions highlights the transformative potential of EU–Ukraine transport integration under the twin imperatives of sustainability and digitalisation. The comparative evidence demonstrates that while the EU leads in institutional maturity, environmental metrics and data-driven innovation, Ukraine offers a unique perspective on resilience, flexibility and crisis-driven transformation. The convergence of these approaches could yield a more robust, sustainable and interoperable transport ecosystem across Europe. By aligning operational, financial, environmental and digital dimensions within a unified policy framework and by leveraging programmes such as the Digital Green Deal, SUMPs and “Avoid–Shift–Improve”, both the EU and Ukraine can accelerate the transition toward a greener and more resilient transport future.

4. Discussion

The comparative results reflect broader trends in recent scholarship while also uncovering context-specific details. Most of the reviewed studies emphasise that digital transport policies are central to enabling green transitions. For example, Santarius, Schmidt and Grunwald [3] argue that digitalisation must be embedded within cross-sectoral environmental policies to deliver sustainable outcomes. Consistent with this, in the freight rail subsector we observed that DB Cargo’s deployment of digital logistics tools and its fully renewable traction contribute to a markedly lower carbon intensity than Ukraine currently achieves. Cherniavskyi et al. [14] emphasise that Ukraine’s post-war modernisation must rely heavily on digital solutions; our data confirm that Ukraine’s freight recovery remains delayed primarily due to limited capital and fragmented data governance. On the EU side, the WIPO report projects “efficient modes of transportation” as part of technology-driven sustainability: DB Cargo’s green-energy targets and PostNL’s electric vehicle acquisitions represent tangible evidence of those aspirations.

In the urban public transport domain, the findings echo global research: digital enhancements to transit systems improve efficiency and reduce emissions. Li et al. [5] show that digital infrastructure in transit systems significantly supports city-level green goals. Similarly, our examination of Angers demonstrates that real-time passenger information apps and a largely electrified fleet improve both service quality and per-passenger CO₂ outcomes. In Ukraine, ongoing vehicle modernisation indicates promising steps; yet the overall system remains reliant on diesel buses and suffers from the limited integration of smart-ticketing platforms. Durand et al. [42] similarly found that digital tools “improve transportation efficiency,” and our results support this—showing that e-ticketing and mobile apps in Kyiv are promising but insufficiently widespread. Accelerating implementation would require stronger coordination between local governments and EU partners, particularly in funding and know-how transfer, to meet inclusive accessibility and sustainability targets.

Turning to last-mile postal logistics, the contrasts observed reflect key themes in the contemporary literature. PostNL’s extensive use of electric vans and e-scooters—resulting in 78% emission-free delivery kilometres in the Benelux region—embodies the circular economy logic many analysts advocate. Ukraine offers almost no comparable benchmark, as Nova Poshta does not report environmental metrics publicly. This lack of transparency represents a systemic data gap that constrains policy evaluation. Overall, Ukraine could benefit from adopting EU best practices such as fleet electrification, energy-efficient routing and ESG-aligned disclosure. Conversely, the EU could learn from Ukraine’s rapid digital adoption under crisis conditions: the success of mobile ID and e-governance systems shows how regulatory pressure and necessity can accelerate innovation, offering potential models for agile digital logistics.

A recurring insight across the literature, which is confirmed by the present research, is that policy coherence is decisive for sustainable transformation [43,44,45]. The EU Green Deal’s regulatory framework links funding, monitoring and emission targets in measurable ways: subsidies for electric fleets, mandates for renewable railway energy and emission reporting collectively translate into tangible KPIs. Our case studies affirm that when regulation, finance and accountability align, transport operators deliver measurable sustainability gains. Ukraine, in contrast, still lacks an integrated policy and regulatory environment. Its transport system operates under exceptional wartime and post-war conditions marked by fiscal constraints, disrupted supply chains and shifting donor priorities. These political–economic realities explain why KPI progress remains uneven despite strong policy rhetoric. This context validates Santarius et al.’s argument that only unified digital–environmental strategies unlock digitalisation’s full potential. They further warn that without transparency and explicit goals, digitalisation risks remaining symbolic; indeed, Ukrainian operators’ limited data disclosure compared with detailed EU reporting confirms their concerns.

At the same time, Ukraine’s crisis has produced a unique institutional resilience laboratory. Wartime innovations such as mobile route-rerouting systems, volunteer logistics apps and digital coordination platforms for emergency transport reveal that necessity can catalyse organisational learning. These micro-level digital practices, though born of crisis, could form the basis for scalable post-war digital governance models if embedded into national reconstruction policy.

Taken together, these findings show that digitalisation and sustainability are mutually reinforcing only under coherent institutional and policy conditions. In the EU, mature governance structures and stable financing enable this synergy; in Ukraine, fragmented institutions and limited resources constrain it. Yet both regions illustrate that technological capacity alone is insufficient—what matters is the institutional framework translating innovation into measurable environmental outcomes. In summary, our KPI-driven analysis confirms the consensus in recent scholarship that digitalisation requires supportive governance to achieve sustainability [3,4,5]. The originality of our work lies in quantifying specific performance gaps, such as higher CO₂ per parcel-kilometre or lower revenue per ton-kilometre in Ukraine, that can be directly targeted in policy. These disparities illustrate not only the “negative spillovers” of uneven EU policy diffusion but also clear opportunities for bilateral cooperation. Aligning EU green funds with Ukraine’s reconstruction, particularly for rolling stock electrification, data infrastructure and logistics digitalisation, would transform these observed deficits into drivers of convergence and institutional resilience.

5. Conclusions

The comparative assessment of freight rail, urban public transport and last-mile postal logistics reveals that both the EU and Ukraine are undergoing profound transformations in the pursuit of digitalised and sustainable transport systems. Although the EU operates in a mature institutional environment and Ukraine faces reconstruction pressures, both regions encounter parallel challenges in aligning digital innovation with environmental performance and economic viability. This study achieved its aim by developing and applying a KPI-based comparative framework that quantifies the intersection between digitalisation, environmental efficiency and institutional resilience across transport modes.

The findings suggest that digitalization and environmental sustainability reinforce each other not automatically, but through governance-mediated mechanisms. Specifically, coherent governance structures enable digital tools to translate into measurable performance outcomes by aligning data standards, investment priorities and operational accountability. Where governance frameworks support transparency, interoperability and coordinated decision-making, digitalization facilitates efficiency gains (e.g., reduced empty kilometres, improved asset utilisation) and environmental improvements (e.g., lower CO₂ intensity). Conversely, in fragmented or crisis-constrained governance settings, digital initiatives tend to yield localised or descriptive improvements without fully materialising into systemic sustainability gains.

In the freight rail sector, DB Cargo’s advanced digital logistics, extensive electrification and transparent sustainability reporting represent the current European benchmark. However, EU rail freight still faces structural bottlenecks: fragmented national regulations, underinvestment in intermodal infrastructure and a persistent modal shift deficit from road to rail. Network congestion and lengthy permitting processes impede growth even in highly digitalised contexts. In contrast, Ukrzaliznytsia’s wartime adaptation demonstrates institutional resilience and the early stages of digital integration, though progress remains constrained by limited capital, damaged assets and the absence of unified emissions reporting. The key opportunity for both sides lies in cooperation on interoperable standards and the mutual exchange of digital efficiency technologies within the TEN-T framework.

In urban public transport, RATP Angers and Lvivelectrotrans illustrate opposite ends of the development spectrum. Angers demonstrates the benefits of stable finances, electric fleets and comprehensive passenger data systems, yet many EU cities still struggle with affordability, ageing metro assets and fragmentation between local and regional authorities. The diffusion of advanced Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) solutions remains uneven across Europe. Lviv, conversely, operates mostly an entirely electric fleet under fiscal and wartime constraints but requires sustained investment and stable contracts to modernise vehicles and ticketing infrastructure. EU cities can learn from Ukraine’s low-cost, high-resilience management practices, while Ukraine can benefit from European funding mechanisms and SUMP-based planning standards.

In last-mile postal logistics, PostNL’s large-scale emission-free operations exemplify digital–environmental synergy, though the EU postal market still faces challenges of regulatory heterogeneity and limited cross-border parcel integration. The ambition to reach full decarbonisation requires major investment in grid capacity and electric vehicle supply chains. Nova Poshta, while digitally advanced in customer services, lacks environmental transparency and resources for green fleet conversion. This indicates complementary learning potential: EU firms could emulate Nova’s agile digital culture, while Ukrainian operators could adopt EU-level ESG reporting and clean fleet targets.

Synthesising these findings, this study identifies cross-regional gaps. On the EU side, inertia in regulatory harmonisation, delayed infrastructure modernisation and the uneven implementation of digital freight and mobility data spaces remain significant barriers. On the Ukrainian side, institutional fragmentation, insufficient KPI reporting and limited green financing capacity slow transformation. Both systems, however, converge toward the same strategic direction under the European and Digital Green Deals. Quantitatively, three key KPIs illustrate the differences. These results provide measurable evidence of both performance gaps and potential convergence pathways.

The findings confirm that sustainable transport transformation depends not only on technological advancement but also on governance learning between mature and emerging systems. The EU must overcome regulatory inertia, accelerate intermodal infrastructure renewal and harmonise digital standards. Ukraine, for its part, must institutionalise resilience and transparency through systematic KPI disclosure, the integration of digitalisation with environmental policies and the adoption of EU-aligned reporting practices.

The conclusions of this study should be interpreted within a clearly delimited scope. The analysis is based on a small number of case operators and a single reference year and therefore does not aim to produce statistically representative or sector-wide generalisations. Instead, the results are best understood as indicative patterns that illustrate how digitalization, environmental performance and institutional context interact under both stable and crisis conditions. This framing prioritises analytical insight over predictive inference and underscores the exploratory nature of the comparative assessment.

Joint initiatives, such as EU–Ukraine Green Corridors, cross-border electrification projects and knowledge exchange platforms, could enhance digital and environmental interoperability. Together, these measures would advance a cohesive, low-carbon and digitally intelligent European transport ecosystem.

Future research should extend the KPI database to include additional EU and Ukrainian operators across maritime and aviation logistics; integrate primary data from managerial interviews and field observations to validate KPI outcomes; and employ quantitative modelling (e.g., regression or structural equation approaches) to explore causal relationships between digitalisation indices and sustainability performance. Further inquiry should also examine how EU funding instruments, such as CEF, Horizon Europe and EFSD+, shape institutional learning and policy convergence in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. Longitudinal studies covering multiple years would allow the assessment of dynamic relationships between digitalization, environmental performance and governance evolution, particularly in post-war reconstruction contexts. Expanding the operator sample across additional EU and Eastern European transport systems would strengthen comparative validity. In addition, combining KPI-based analysis with interviews and surveys or the process tracing of digitalization initiatives could provide deeper insight into the organisational and institutional mechanisms that condition observed performance outcomes.

Finally, the results reinforce the theoretical framework of the Digital Green Deal, demonstrating empirically how digital transformation can serve as both a technological and institutional driver of sustainable mobility, thereby addressing the identified research gap in cross-regional transport governance studies.