Environmental Effects of City–County Mergers in China: Strengthening Governance or Aggravating Pollution?
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Institutional Background and Theoretical Analysis
2.1. Institutional Background
2.2. Theoretical Analysis
3. Measurement Model and Index Description
3.1. Measurement Model Setting
3.2. Variable Selection and Data Source
3.2.1. Explanatory Variable: PM2.5 (PM)
3.2.2. Core Explanatory Variable: City–County Merger Policy (Merger)
3.2.3. Control Variables
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Baseline Regression Results
4.2. Parallel Trend Hypothesis Testing and Dynamic Analysis
4.3. Robustness Checks
4.3.1. Excluding Other Policy Influences
4.3.2. Excluding the Impact of Administration Hierarchy
4.3.3. PSM-DID Test
5. Heterogeneity Analysis
5.1. Differences in the Influence by Geographical Distance on the Environment
5.2. Differences in the Influence of Economic Strength on the Environment
5.3. Differences in Influence of Regional Heterogeneity on the Environment
6. Analysis of Impact Mechanisms
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
- (1)
- China’s city–county merger policy can significantly reduce environmental pollution while promoting the development of urbanization, indicating that the policy can strengthen environmental governance and improve urban environmental quality. The robustness test supports this conclusion, but there is a one-year lag in the policy effect.
- (2)
- The heterogeneity analysis showed that the closer the geographical distance of the merged cities and counties and the smaller the difference in economic strength between them, the better the coordinated governance of environmental pollution. The eastern cities are under intense pressure for pollution control due to their faster economic development and urbanization, and the environmental control effects after mergers are not as good as those in the central and western regions.
- (3)
- In addition, we further tested the environmental governance mechanism of city–county mergers and found that the policy promotes regional integration by breaking the administrative boundaries between merged cities and counties and that it strengthens the administrative power of prefecture-level cities, thereby enhancing the environmental governance capacity of prefecture-level cities, specifically by intensifying the vertical management of urban environmental protection agencies, unified urban planning, and fiscal centralization, thereby reducing the negative effects of urbanization and improving the environmental quality of the city.
- (1)
- On the issue of environmental governance, centralization is more effective than decentralization. It is conducive to improving the overall environmental governance capacity of prefecture-level governments and avoiding the coordination difficulties caused by differences in objectives and information asymmetry between different local governments under decentralization. This provides an empirical basis for vertical management reform of central environmental protection Institutions.
- (2)
- The sustainable development of the ecological environment should become one of the goals of urbanization development. Therefore, China should raise the threshold of city–county mergers and add the preconditions of environmental protection to the conditions of application. Most cities applied for merger adjustments in accordance with the 2003 “Criteria for the Establishment of Municipal Districts”, which set conditions for mergers in terms of economic development level, population size, population density, urbanization level, and public services. Although more content was added in 2014, environmental protection has yet to be included. Therefore, in order to improve the environmental quality of the merged cities, existing merger standards should be adjusted with the addition of the environmental protection requirements.
- (3)
- Promoting regional integration is the key to realizing coordinated environmental governance, and the effective integration of merged cities and counties is the guarantee to promoting regional integration. The city–county mergers involve the reorganization of power and the reconstruction of interests. The complexity of mergers leads to a certain degree of lag in the effect of the policy. Therefore, it is necessary to strictly examine and approve the merger application and supervise the merger process to reduce the integration costs and prevent the adverse impact of false urbanization on the environment.
- (4)
- Cities should choose the urbanization path to suit local conditions to prevent the disorderly expansion. In the past two decades, many prefecture-level cities in China hoped to rapidly advance urbanization through city–county mergers. However, the results of this paper show that not all cities are suitable for the merger policy. For example, when the geographical distance between merging cities and counties is great or the difference in economic strength is large, the effect of environmental governance is not ideal. Blind expansion does not necessarily bring about the green development of the city but constrains sustainable urban development. Careful consideration should be given as to which counties the prefecture-level city chooses to merge and to whether those at a distance from the central city should choose a city–county mergers adjustment, county to city upgrading, or expanding towns and villages through industrial development.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Major Differences | County | Municipal District |
---|---|---|
Function focus | Agriculture development | Urban planning and construction |
Functional institutions Independence | Independent | Prefecture-level city government vertical management |
Socio-economic management authority | Independent | Unified management of prefecture-level city government |
Financial authority | Independent | Unified management of prefecture-level city government |
Urbanization level | low | high |
Difference | |||
---|---|---|---|
= 1 | |||
= 0 | |||
Difference |
Index | Description | Source |
---|---|---|
Merger | Dummy variables of the city–county merger policy | http://www.xzqh.org/html/ (accessed on 8 June 2021) http://www.mca.gov.cn/ (accessed on 8 June 2021) |
PM | Annual average concentration of PM2.5 (μg/m³) | https://beta.sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/ (accessed on 1 March 2021) |
VC | Ventilation coefficient | https://www.ecmwf.int/en/forecasts/datasets/reanalysis-datasets/era-interim (accessed on 8 March 2021) |
Pop | Population/regional administrative area | China City Statistical Yearbook (2001–2017) |
Ind | Added value of the secondary industry/GDP | |
Pgdp | GDP/population | |
Fis | Fiscal revenue/GDP | |
Urb | Non-agricultural population/total population | |
SO2 | Industrial sulfur dioxide emissions per unit of GDP (t /104 yuan) | |
Sci | Amount of scientific research and number of technical personnel (person) | |
Fauto | Financial revenue/financial expenditure | |
Gas | Natural gas penetration rate | China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook (2001–2017) |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Merger | −1.229 *** | −1.424 *** | −1.389 *** |
(0.39) | (0.397) | (0.391) | |
lnPop | 1.039 ** | 2.294 ** | |
(0.022) | (1.036) | ||
Ind | 0.098 *** | 0.098 *** | |
(0.023) | (0.023) | ||
lnPgdp | −4.449 *** | −4.791 *** | |
(0.792) | (0.791) | ||
Fis | −23.476 *** | −23.328 *** | |
(5.254) | (5.254) | ||
Urb | 6.376 *** | 6.463 *** | |
(2.170) | (2.167) | ||
lnVC | −7.083 *** | ||
(1.125) | |||
City fixed effects | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 4436 | 4436 | 4436 |
R-squared | 0.951 | 0.91 | 0.952 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Merger | −1.789 *** | −1.316 *** | −1.276 *** |
(0.507) | (0.406) | (0.399) | |
Control variables | YES | YES | YES |
City fixed effects | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 2816 | 4079 | 4346 |
R-squared | 0.945 | 0.942 | 0.951 |
Variables | 0–10 km | 10–30 km | 30–50 km | Over 50 km |
---|---|---|---|---|
Merger | −2.581 *** | −1.300 ** | −1.433 | 3.652 ** |
(0.654) | (0.543) | (0.888) | (1.608) | |
Control variables | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Ctiy fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 3450 | 3790 | 3297 | 3229 |
R-squared | 0.950 | 0.951 | 0.949 | 0.948 |
Variables | SS | SW | WS | WW |
---|---|---|---|---|
Merger | −1.590 ** | −1.311 | −0.677 | −1.523 ** |
(0.675) | (1.073) | (0.735) | (0.724) | |
Control variables | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Ctiy fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 2922 | 2477 | 3017 | 2686 |
R-squared | 0.953 | 0.948 | 0.945 | 0.951 |
Variables | Eastern | Central | Western |
---|---|---|---|
Merger | −0.807 * | −2.501 ** | −2.862 *** |
(0.472) | (1.136) | (0.657) | |
Control variables | YES | YES | YES |
Ctiy fixed effects | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 1496 | 1645 | 1295 |
R-squared | 0.965 | 0.935 | 0.909 |
Variables | SO2 | lnSci | Gas | Fauto |
---|---|---|---|---|
Merger | −0.015 ** | 0.092 *** | 2.419 ** | 0.017 *** |
(0.007) | (0.032) | (0.945) | (0.005) | |
Control variables | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Ctiy fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 4436 | 4436 | 4436 | 4436 |
R-squared | 0.592 | 0.928 | 0.807 | 0.933 |
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Cao, Z.; Wang, L.; Zhang, Y. Environmental Effects of City–County Mergers in China: Strengthening Governance or Aggravating Pollution? Sustainability 2022, 14, 5522. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095522
Cao Z, Wang L, Zhang Y. Environmental Effects of City–County Mergers in China: Strengthening Governance or Aggravating Pollution? Sustainability. 2022; 14(9):5522. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095522
Chicago/Turabian StyleCao, Zhiying, Liangjian Wang, and Yang Zhang. 2022. "Environmental Effects of City–County Mergers in China: Strengthening Governance or Aggravating Pollution?" Sustainability 14, no. 9: 5522. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095522