Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in Environmental Information Disclosure in Sustainability Reports of Listed Forestry Companies in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Environmental Information Disclosure
2.2. Evolutionary Games
2.3. Environmental Information Disclosure and the Evolutionary Game
3. Game Model
3.1. The Logical Connection between the Subjects of Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed Forestry Companies
3.2. Model Assumptions
3.3. Model Construction
4. Model Analysis
4.1. Evolutionary Game Model Stability Analysis
4.1.1. Stabilization Strategies for the Probability of Choosing “High Quality” Environmental Information Disclosure Strategies for Listed Forestry Companies
- ①
- When , M(z) < 0, , and , then x = 0 has stability, so the stability strategy of forestry listed companies is to choose low-quality environmental information disclosure.
- ②
- When , , and , then has stability, so the stability strategy of listed forestry companies is to choose high-quality environmental information disclosure.
- ③
- When , , and . Then are in a stable state, so it is not possible to determine their stable strategies where the threshold value is
4.1.2. Stabilization Strategy for the Probability of the Government Choosing a “Mandatory” Environmental Information Disclosure Strategy for Listed Forestry Companies
- ①
- When , , and , then y = 1 has stability, so the government’s stability strategy is to force environmental accounting information disclosure.
- ②
- When , , and , then y = 0 has stability, so the government’s stability strategy is voluntary environmental accounting disclosure.
- ③
- When , , , and , then are in a stable state, so it is not possible to determine their stable strategies where the threshold is
4.1.3. Stabilization Strategy for the Probability of the Public Choosing the “Monitoring” Environmental Information Disclosure Strategy
- ①
- When , , and , then has stability, so the stable strategy of the social public is not to supervise the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies.
- ②
- When , , and , then has stability, so the stable strategy of the social public is to supervise the environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies.
- ③
- When , , and , then are in a stable state, so their stable strategies cannot be determined where the threshold is
4.1.4. Three-Party Subject Stabilization Strategy
4.2. Evolutionary Game Simulation Analysis
4.2.1. Simulation of a Three-Group Evolutionary Game with Parameter Changes
4.2.2. The Evolutionary Influence of Different Factors on the Behavioral Strategies of Tripartite Subjects
5. Mechanism Optimization
5.1. Optimize Environmental Information Disclosure Mechanism
5.2. Reward and Punishment Mechanism
5.3. Environmental Information Sharing Mechanism
5.4. Benefit Coordination Mechanism
6. Discussion
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Research Direction | Main Points |
---|---|
Theory | Legitimacy theory [30], |
Stakeholder theory [31], | |
Information asymmetry [32], | |
Voluntary disclosure [33], | |
Institutional theory [34], etc. | |
Environmental Information Sources | Integrated reporting [35,36], |
Sustainability reporting [37], | |
CSR report [38], | |
ESG report [39], | |
Factors influencing environmental information disclosure | Company Scale, etc. |
Internal factors: Industry sensitivity [31,40,41], financial performance [42], environmental performance [43], quality of environmental information disclosure [41], etc. | |
External Factors: Political and corporate system [36,44], public opinion monitoring, media coverage [16], public environmental awareness [45], etc. |
Parameters | Significance |
---|---|
x | The proportion of listed forestry companies choosing high-quality environmental information disclosure |
y | The proportion of governments choosing to mandate environmental accounting disclosure |
z | The proportion of society choosing to monitor environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies |
Ch | Costs of forestry listed companies in selecting high-quality environmental information disclosure |
Ce | Costs of environmental management for listed forestry companies |
Cl | Disclosure of the cost of choosing low-quality environmental information disclosure by listed forestry companies |
Ge | Benefits obtained from the disclosure of environmental information by listed forestry companies |
Ah | The credibility of listed forestry companies when high-quality environmental information is disclosed |
Al | The credibility of listed forestry companies when low-quality environmental information is disclosed |
Es | Benefits to the public |
Eg | Government gains benefits |
Cg | Costs of mandatory environmental information disclosure by government departments to listed forestry companies |
Fg | Government fines for listed forestry companies that provide no or low-quality environmental information disclosure |
Bg | Government incentive payments for listed forestry companies that actively engage in high-quality environmental information disclosure |
Cv | The cost that government regulators need to pay to verify the authenticity of social public monitoring |
CS | The cost of social public monitoring |
De | Forestry listed companies need to bear the loss of public supervision of the authenticity of the community |
δ | Probability of truthfulness of social public supervision of environmental information disclosure of listed forestry companies |
Strategy Profile | Forestry Listed Companies, Government Regulators, The Public |
---|---|
(High-quality, Mandatory, Supervision) | (Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah + Bg, Eg − Cg − Bg, Es − Cs) |
(High-quality, Mandatory, No Supervision) | (Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah + Bg, Eg − Cg − Bg, Es) |
(High-quality, Voluntary, Supervision) | (Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah − (1 − δ)De, Eg − (1 − δ)Cv, Es − (1 − δ)Cs) |
(High-quality, voluntary, No supervised) | (Ge − Ch − Ce + Ah, Eg, Es) |
(Low-quality, Mandatory, Supervision) | (Ge − Cl − Ce + Al − Fg, Eg + Fg − Cg, Es − Cs) |
(Low-quality, Mandatory, No Supervision) | (Ge − Cl − Ce + Al − Fg, Eg + Fg − Cg, Es) |
(Low-quality, Voluntary, Supervision) | (Ge − Cl − Ce + Al − δDe, Eg − δCv, Es − δCs) |
(Low-quality, Voluntary, No Supervision) | (Ge − Cl − Ce + Al, Eg, Es) |
Equilibrium Point | Characteristic Root | Stability Condition | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
λ1 | λ2 | λ3 | |||
E1 (0,0,0) | Ah − Al − Ch + Cl | Fg − Cg | −δCs | Ah −
Al <
Ch −
Cl Fg < Cg | Asymptotic stability point |
E2 (0,0,1) | Ah − Al − Ch + Cl + (2δ − 1)De | Fg − Cg + δCv | δCs | Positive characteristic root | Unstable point |
E3 (0,1,1) | Ah − Al − Ch + Cl + Bg + Fg | Cg − Fg − δCv | Cs | Positive characteristic root | Unstable point |
E4 (1,0,0) | −Ah + Al + Ch − Cl | −Cg − Bg | −(1 − δ)Cs | Ch − Cl < Ah − Al | Asymptotic stability point |
E5 (0,1,0) | Ah − Al − Ch + Cl + Bg + Fg | Cg − Fg | −Cs | Positive characteristic root | Unstable point |
E6 (1,0,1) | Al − Ah + Ch − Cl − (2δ − 1)De | (1 − δ)Cv − Cg − Bg | (1 − δ)Cs | Positive characteristic root | Unstable point |
E7 (1,1,0) | Al − Ah + Ch − Cl − Bg − Fg | Cg + Bg | −Cs | Positive characteristic root | Unstable point |
E8 (1,1,1) | Al − Ah + Ch − Cl − Bg − Fg | Cg + Bg − (1 − δ)Cv | Cs | Positive characteristic root | Unstable point |
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Lu, B.; Yue, S. Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in Environmental Information Disclosure in Sustainability Reports of Listed Forestry Companies in China. Sustainability 2022, 14, 2871. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14052871
Lu B, Yue S. Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in Environmental Information Disclosure in Sustainability Reports of Listed Forestry Companies in China. Sustainability. 2022; 14(5):2871. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14052871
Chicago/Turabian StyleLu, Bowen, and Shangzhi Yue. 2022. "Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of Three Parties in Environmental Information Disclosure in Sustainability Reports of Listed Forestry Companies in China" Sustainability 14, no. 5: 2871. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14052871