An Empirical Study on the Incentive Mechanism for Public Active Involvement in Grass-Roots Social Governance Based on Stimulus-Organism-Response Theory

Abstract

In the period of the normalization of COVID-19 prevention and control, Chinese grass-roots social governance, under the guidance of the dynamic zero-COVID policy, was unique, and the experience of actively mobilizing the public to be actively involved in grass-roots social governance, represented by epidemic prevention and control, has a profound internal logic. The Chinese government has long been committed to building a social governance community, and further empirical studies are needed to motivate the public to participate in grass-roots social governance in a sustainable manner. This study uses 428 members of the public who have experience in grass-roots social governance in 20 street offices in 11 cities, including Nanjing, Wuhan and Chengdu, as a valid sample to empirically test the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, from the perspective of Stimulus-Organism-Response Theory. The empirical results show that exogenously driven organizational institutional factors will eventually positively influence the incentive effect on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance through the mediating effect of the individual’s endogenous drive. By adjusting organizational institutional factors to meet the public’s inner drive for acquisition, bond, comprehension, and defense, public motivation can be mobilized and the public can be motivated to be involved in grass-roots social governance in a sustainable manner. The results of the study reveal the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, analyze the internal logic of Chinese characteristics in motivating the public’s active involvement in grass-roots governance, and expand the scope of the application of Stimulus-Organism-Response Theory in studying the incentives for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, which is important for revealing the characteristic laws in a Chinese context with empirical research.

1. Introduction

The governance of the country and the state lies at the grass-roots level. With the rapid development of urbanization and information in China, the situation and environment of grass-roots social governance has changed, facing challenges such as the massification of communities, atomization of residents, diversification of interest groups and demands, and the public’s ability to self-manage. In December 2019, the unexpected COVID-19 (Corona Virus Disease 2019) outbreak posed a severe test on, and exposed the problems within, grass-roots social governance. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), all regions took on strict precautions and the entire population cooperated with the epidemic prevention and control policy, and a “nationwide chessboard” was quickly formed [1]. Under the general policy of “dynamic zero-COVID policy”, 650,000 urban and rural communities in China have held their ground. Although localized epidemics still fluctuate occasionally, China’s epidemic situation has stabilized and the economy is improving. According to the data of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China’s GDP growth of 2.24% in 2020 increased to 8.11% in 2021. Kraemer et al., mentioned in an article that, although the impact of preventive measures cannot be determined, the control measures implemented in China have significantly reduced the spread of the COVID-19 [2]. China’s unique grass-roots social governance has ensured that the post-epidemic era is increasingly effective, as stated by Stephen S. Roach, a senior research fellow at Yale University, who praised China’s public health measures in controlling the spread of the Corona Virus Disease [3]. So why can China control the COVID-19 epidemic in a short time? Mei believes that the participation of civil society forces has played a great role, and the participation of volunteers further makes the community’s public services more adequate [4]. As Juliet Bedford suggests, one of the priorities of epidemic prevention in the 21st century is to establish a coordinated region through the strength of countries or health institutions [5]. This is exactly the case with the Chinese government: the practice of attaching importance to community strength, cultivating the awareness of public participation, and making the public actively participate in grass-roots social governance is worthy of reference. It is therefore important to analyze the internal logic of China’s grass-roots social governance experience.

In October 2019, the Chinese government put forward the new goal of building a social governance community in the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Party Congress [6]; the building of a social governance community implies that the government, the public, enterprises, social organizations and other subjects will jointly participate in grass-roots social governance [7]. Social pluralism has become a new feature of the present moment, and the era when a single government entity shouldered the responsibility of social governance is fading away. China’s proposal to build a “social governance community” requires a more open and inclusive institutional design for grass-roots social governance, which empowers the market and society with vitality and energy, allowing social forces to fully participate in the governance system and jointly solve various problems. Therefore, in order to solve the above-mentioned problems during grass-roots social governance development, it is necessary to maximize the vitality of grass-roots society, mobilize the public to participate in grass-roots social governance, and form a positive interaction between government governance and public self-management, as well as self-service. Facing COVID-19, the mobilization of public involvement in grass-roots social governance in China has been greatly challenged. Against the backdrop of the normalization of the epidemic, China has overcome difficulties in establishing a social governance community as a system, and the effectiveness of China’s grass-roots social governance has been noticed by the world.

When analyzing the “Chinese experience” in fighting the epidemic, the community governance mechanism of joint prevention and control is the highlight, in which the community-wide fight against the epidemic is the main line of the community governance mechanism of the whole society [8]. It relies on the mass power formed by public involvement to win the battle of epidemic prevention and control [9], which shows the important role of active public involvement. However, if we want to build a social governance community in which everyone is responsible and does their part, and everyone enjoys the benefits, the first key issue to be addressed is incentive [6]. In this regard, scholars at home and abroad have conducted a series of studies on incentivizing public involvement in grass-roots social governance, which are mainly divided into two types. One is oriented towards the public and explores the factors that incentivize the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance by means of empirical tests. The conclusions reached by scholars can be divided into three main categories: (1) public factors, such as age, income, education level [10], individual cognitive level and emotional attitude [11], self-efficacy [12], and ability to participate [13]; (2) institutional factors, such as the institutional environment created [14], participation channels and opportunities provided [15]; (3) social factors, such as social network coverage, participation rate of people, and the degree of information technology [16]. Secondly, the forms and systems of public involvement in social governance such as healthcare [17], environmental protection [18], legal construction [19] and epidemic prevention and control are analyzed in the form of evaluation for the government and grass-roots autonomous organizations in order to identify problems and make suggestions to improve the public involvement mechanism.

Although a large number of studies have explored the issue of incentives for public involvement in grass-roots social governance from different perspectives and in different ways, there are few studies that examine institutional and motivational factors in the motivatation for the public’s active involvement from the perspectives of government and the public at the same time. This study provides a theoretical basis for clarifying the complex incentive mechanism involved, further extending the study of the relationship between drivers and the incentive effect, and providing a new theoretical explanatory framework for the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. Therefore, this study uses Stimulus-Organism-Response theory (S-O-R Theory) [20] and Four-Drive theory [21] to conduct an empirical study on the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, using members of the public who have had experience in grass-roots social governance as the target population. The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the incentive effect of the institutional factors of the government and grass-roots self-government organizations, as well as the public’s own incentives for active involvement in grass-roots social governance, from the perspective of both the subject and the object of the incentive, and to make a new contribution to the study of public involvement incentives. The objective of this study is to construct a path-fitting model of the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance and to propose policy recommendations to support and encourage the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance in the new era.

2. Theory and Hypotheses Development

2.1. S-O-R Theory

Stimulus-Organism-Response theory (also known as “behavioral learning theory”) is the main theoretical cornerstone for explaining individuals’ willingness to behave, and was first proposed by John B. Watson [22], the founder of behavioral psychology. He held the view that the basis behavior is stimulus and response, and proposed the basic S-R (stimulus-response) formula. Mehrabian and Russell (1974) [20] expanded on the S-R theory to include the study of the “organism”, and thus developed the “Stimulus-Organism-Response theory” (as shown in Figure 1). The “S” refers to the stimulus, which is the stimulus from the internal and external environment that causes the individual to respond; the “O” refers to the organism, which is the endogenous processing between the internal and external stimulus and the individual’s final response, including factors such as perception, thinking and emotion; and the “R” refers to the response, which is the endogenous processing between the endogenous and exogenous stimulus and the individual’s final response. “R” is the response, which is the result of this process and is formed by the object of the stimulus. According to the S-O-R model, when an organism is subjected to an internal or external stimulus, it affects the individual’s emotions and cognition, which in turn leads to a tendency towards, or avoidance of, behavior. Accordingly, we believe that the organizational factors that motivate the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance have an impact on the public’s behavior and their willingness to be involved in grass-roots social governance by satisfying individual drivers; for example, the more the organizational incentive system can satisfy the public’s needs and motivations, the higher the incentive effect will be on the public.

2.2. Conceptual Models

Whilst studying the incentive mechanism for Chinese employees, Zhang et al. (2001) stated that the incentive strategies for today’s knowledge-based employees can be summarized into four aspects: compensation, culture, organization and work [23]. In addition to exploring the external factors that have an incentive effect on employees, an increasing number of scholars have begun to consider employees’ incentive issues from the psychological perspective. When analyzing the incentive mechanism of the new, post-1990s generation of employees, Shi et al., from the perspective of the psychological contract, proposed that attaching importance to the subjective psychological expectations of the psychological contract could stimulate employees’ internal motivation [24]. Following this study, the research on analyzing employee motivation from internal and external factors has been gradually enriched. Nitin Nohria et al. [25] have proposed a powerful new model in their study of employee motivation. The model centers on the four employee drives (acquire, bond, comprehend and defend) and requires organizations to motivate their employees in a holistic manner by establishing appropriate incentive systems (reward systems, culture, work design, performance management and resource allocation processes) to satisfy employee motivation. They tested the validity of the model through a number of case studies, confirming that an organization’s incentive system can improve the incentive effect on employees by satisfying one of their motivations, and that the incentive effect is optimal when all four systems work together and the four endogenous motivators of employees are fully stimulated. This conclusion presents a new perspective and theoretical framework for solving the problem of employee motivation, as well as new insights into the study of motivating the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. However, their study is only based on theoretical analysis and the results of individual cases, and has not been tested within a large sample, and the generalizability of their conclusions have not yet been verified. High-quality empirical research based on Chinese society can help advance the deepening of governance theory [26]. Therefore, this study introduces the incentive model to the field of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, and uses empirical analysis to test the validity and universality of the model by conducting a questionnaire survey in a large public sample to obtain the required data. This study will contribute to the study of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, as well as to the strengthening and innovation of grass-roots social governance.

In addition, we introduce S-O-R theory to provide a more in-depth theoretical analysis of Nitin Nohria et al.’s [25] incentive model, which also provides a theoretical basis for the proposed research hypothesis. Previously, scholars have introduced the S-O-R theory into research in the field of human resource management. For example, Liang et al., used the S-O-R theory to analyze the impact of organizational learning on employee performance innovation through the mediation of organizational emotions [27]. Xie et al., also used the S-O-R theoretical framework to review the related research on employee grievances [28]. Referring to their research ideas, based on the logic of S-O-R theory, we argue that if we want the public to respond to grass-roots social governance, we need to analyze which of the public’s demands are not being met, or that could be further met, or what incentives the public has to be involved in grass-roots social governance. The question of what motivates the public to become involved in grass-roots social governance can be clarified. It is therefore important to explore the incentives for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. When analyzing the incentive problem of core employees, Guan et al., proposed to design an incentive mechanism based on the hierarchy of needs theory. He encouraged employees from five levels of needs: physiological, safety, social, respect, and self realization, so as to achieve effective incentivizing [29]. When Yang et al., studied the satisfaction of psychological needs to improve employees’ psychological performance, they proposed that it can be satisfied from three aspects: independent needs, ability needs and relationship needs [30].

Combined with Nitin Nohria et al.’s [25] study, we argue that to incentivize the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, the organizational institutional factors refer to the strategies and organizational climate developed by the government and grass-roots self-governance organizations, including the four aspects of reward system, organizational climate, work design and organizational justice. The individual driven factors refer to the four drives of the public, including acquire, bond, comprehend and defend. The theoretical framework of the study is shown in Figure 2. We define “organization”, in this context, as the organization through which the public is involved in grass-roots social governance, which is divided into government and grass-roots self-governance organizations; these are represented by villagers’ committees, villagers’ representative committees, community residents’ committees, neighborhood committees, residents’ representative committees, women’s representative committees, etc. The factors and indicators of the incentive effect are explained in detail below, and the research hypotheses of this paper are formulated accordingly.

2.2.1. Organizational Institutional Factors

Reward System defines the forms and rules by which organizations provide rewards to individuals. Generally, rewards take the form of material and non-material rewards. Material rewards include prizes, awards and services, while non-material rewards generally refer to intangible rewards of a spiritual nature, including the empowerment of the public, recognition of their behaviors, etc.

Organizational Climate originates from the subjective perceptions of individuals in the same organization about the organizational environment, and the content of the perceptions are the values and behaviors that the organization encourages and supports. When there is some degree of consistency in the perceptions of individuals in the same organization, these common perceptions gradually develop into the organizational climate [31]. In the case of public involvement, the values and behaviors supported by government and grass-roots self-government organizations may be expressed in terms of respect, understanding, collaboration and friendliness.

Work Design is the study and analysis of how the work is conducted to facilitate the achievement of goals and how individuals can be satisfied in their work to motivate them, based on information from work analysis. Work design for public involvement focuses on improving the practical and cognitive level of public involvement through various forms to enable the public to perform governance behaviors more smoothly and better.

Organizational Justice refers to the public’s perception of the fairness of the way organizations treat them [32] and is generally divided into three types: distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. Distributive justice refers to the public’s perception of the fairness of the benefits received and the resources allocated; procedural justice refers to the public’s perception of the fairness of the opportunities for involvement and the procedures and methods for receiving benefits; interactional justice is divided into two types, interpersonal justice reflects the extent to which the public is treated with courtesy and respect by those in power in the organization, and information justice mainly refers to the openness of the information conveyed to the public by those in power [33].

2.2.2. Individual Driven Factors

Four-Drive Theory suggests that human behavior is determined by four basic emotional needs or drives: Acquire, Bond, Comprehend, and Defend [21]. Acquisition is the attainment of something that is scarce. Members of the public will strive to acquire the things they want in order to enhance their well-being. Such desired things include not only tangible goods such as money and gifts, but also intangible rewards such as status, credit and value realization. ‘Bond’ refers to making connections with others. Positive emotions such as love and care arise after the public has established harmonious connections with others, and even the government, in communities, such as WeChat groups and clubs. ‘Comprehension’ refers to satisfying curiosity and individuals understanding the world around them, manifested in the public’s deeper knowledge of grass-roots social governance, as well as their increased ability to participate in governance, or in other aspects of growth. ‘Defense’ refers to protecting oneself in the face of exogenous threats, which manifests itself not only in aggressive and defensive behavior by the public as a result of violations of their rights, but also in the public actively seeking to establish a range of institutions to promote justice.

2.2.3. Incentive Effect

We still draw on Nohria et al.’s [25] study for the selection of incentive effect indicators, using: Participation, Satisfaction, Engagement and Willingness to Participate as indicators of the incentive effect on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. Engagement reflects the extent to which the public takes responsibility for social governance; Satisfaction refers to the extent to which the public believes that the organization has met their expectations for participation and effectiveness in governance; Engagement represents the energy, effort and initiative that the public brings to grass-roots social governance; and Willingness to Participate reflects the extent to which the public is willing to involve in governance on a proactive and long-term basis.

2.3. Incentive Mechanism: A Hypothetical Model

2.3.1. Reward System, Acquisition Drive, and Incentive Effect

Organizational reward systems can provide not only exogenous rewards such as bonuses, gifts, services, etc., but also implicit rewards such as social status and social credit. If these rewards are exactly what the public needs or lacks in their lives, then they can satisfy the public’s need for “acquisition”. If the “acquisition” needs are met, the public will be satisfied and motivated to become involved in grass-roots social governance so that they can move towards their intended governance goals. Studies have shown that reward systems have a significant impact on individual attitudes towards work [34] and that generous and fair rewards have a significant positive impact on work performance, organizational commitment and work satisfaction [35]. Accordingly, the hypothesizes were formulated as:

Hypothesis 1a (H1a).

Reward system has a positive effect on incentive effect.

Hypothesis 1b (H1b).

Reward system has a positive effect on acquisition drive.

Hypothesis 1c (H1c).

Acquisition drive has a positive effect on the incentive effect.

Hypothesis 1d (H1d).

Acquisition drive mediates between reward system and incentive effect.

2.3.2. Organizational Climate, Bond Drive, and Incentive Effect

The effectiveness of the organizational climate lies in the constant display of “many people and many things”, so that individuals have frequent, real and significant information about the organization [36]. According to the social information processing theory, through this information, members are able to familiarize themselves with the organization’s values and procedures, adjust their attitudes and behaviors [31] and gradually becoming part of the organization. Thus, a harmonious and consistent organizational climate helps to meet the public’s need to form a “bond”. According to social exchange theory, when the public perceives the organizational climate to be negative, the public will reduce their investment in grass-roots social governance activities in order to maintain a relative balance between the organization and their own inputs and outputs; conversely, when the public perceives a positive organizational climate, such as harmonious interpersonal relationships and good teamwork, their “bond” needs will be fully satisfied and their demand for grass-roots social governance activities will be fully satisfied. In this regard, a lot of research has been conducted by previous authors confirming that ‘organizational climate’ has a positive impact on individual attitudes such as engagement [37]; work satisfaction [38]; behavioral levels, such as constructive behavior [39] and counterproductive behavior [40]; and employee work performance [41] have a significant positive effect. Accordingly, the hypothesizes were formulated as:

Hypothesis 2a (H2a).

Organizational climate has a positive effect on incentive effect.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b).

Organizational climate has a positive effect on bond drive.

Hypothesis 2c (H2c).

Bond drive has a positive effect on the incentive effect.

Hypothesis 2d (H2d).

Bond drive mediates between organizational climate and incentive effect.

2.3.3. Work Design, Comprehension Drive, and Incentive Effect

Well-designed work enables the public to be competent in their work and makes governance activities attractive, interesting and challenging by meeting the technical, competency and personality requirements of the employing public. In the process of becoming competent in their work, the public’s abilities are enhanced in various areas, and they become aware of the meaning and importance of governance practices, develop a strong sense of responsibility for grass-roots social governance and ultimately realize their self-worth, thus enabling the need for “comprehension” to be satisfied. The increased capacity for public involvement and sense of responsibility for grass-roots social governance help to stimulate the initiative and creativity of public involvement in governance, i.e., it helps to increase the incentive effect of public involvement [42]. On the other hand, according to the work demand-resource model, a reasonable work design can also provide the public with resources from physical, social and organizational aspects. According to S-O-R theory, these resources can create incentives for the public and attract employees to be actively involved in grass-roots social governance. Accordingly, the hypothesizes were formulated as:

Hypothesis 3a (H3a).

Work design has a positive effect on the incentive effect.

Hypothesis 3b (H3b).

Work design has a positive effect on comprehension drive.

Hypothesis 3c (H3c).

Comprehension drive has a positive effect on the incentive effect.

Hypothesis 3d (H3d).

Comprehension drive mediates between work design and incentive effect.

2.3.4. Organizational Justice, Defense Drive, and Incentive Effect

Organizational justice can signal that the organization values, respects and supports its members, and convince them that the organization is distributing according to established principles of fairness [43], which will reassure members of the normative nature of the organization and spare them the fear of having their legitimate interests infringed upon. In an environment of organizational fairness, the public can determine the benefits they receive from their involvement in governance according to the established distribution principles, which allows the public to gain a sense of control over performance outcomes and anticipate that the distribution will be favorable to them, which contributes to a sense of psychological security [44]. Therefore, organizational justice can, to a certain extent, satisfy the public’s “defense” needs. If the “defense” needs are not met, the public will lack security and self-confidence and focus more on whether the organization is fair and how to protect themselves, neglecting the governance activities themselves, thus reducing their commitment to grass-roots social governance and even withdrawing from it [45,46]. On the other hand, according to social exchange and S-O-R theory, the benefits that the public receives from the fairness of the organization’s resource distribution, dispute resolution or day-to-day processing compel the public to reciprocate [47]; When the public’s “defense” needs are satisfied, i.e., they have a high level of psychological security, the intangible resources such as consistency, respect and legitimacy that the organization brings to the public will also re-enforce the public’s trust in the organization [48], and therefore increase satisfaction with the organization [49]. Accordingly, the hypothesizes were formulated as:

Hypothesis 4a (H4a).

Organizational justice has a positive effect on incentive effect.

Hypothesis 4b (H4b).

Organizational justice has a positive effect on defense drive.

Hypothesis 4c (H4c).

Defense drive has a positive effect on the incentive effect.

Hypothesis 4d (H4d).

Defense drive mediates between organizational justice and motivational effect.

In summary, the hypothetical theoretical model for constructing this paper is shown in Figure 3.

3. Methods

3.1. Sample and Procedures

We commissioned 20 street offices from Gulou, Qinhuai and Pukou districts of Nanjing, Gusu and Wuzhong districts of Suzhou, Yunlong and Tongshan districts of Xuzhou, Binhu and Jiangyin districts of Wuxi, Jingkou and Jurong districts of Zhenjiang, Hai’an city of Nantong, Fengtai district of Beijing, Jing’an district of Shanghai, Hanjiang district of Wuhan, Wenjiang district of Chengdu, and Guandu district of Kunming, a total of 11 municipalities, each drawing 30 members of the public who had experience in grass-roots social governance, and collected data in three stages.

In the first stage (July to August 2019), questionnaires on basic personal information and organizational institutional factors were distributed to 600 members of the public, 572 questionnaires were returned (95.33% response rate), and 533 valid questionnaires were returned (88.83% valid return rate). In the second stage (September to October 2019), individual driven factors questionnaires continued to be distributed to the 533 valid samples from the first stage factor questionnaire, 515 questionnaires were returned (response rate 96.62%) and 480 valid questionnaires (valid recovery rate 90.06%). In the third stage (November to December 2019), the incentive effect questionnaire was distributed to the 480 valid samples in the second stage, 455 questionnaires were returned (response rate 94.79%) and 428 valid questionnaires (valid recovery rate 89.17%). After comprehensive matching of the social public identifiers provided by each street office and eliminating invalid questionnaires from the three surveys, we obtained a total of 428 valid data, with a valid recovery rate of 71.33%.

In the final social public sample, 199 (46.50%) were male and 229 (53.5%) were female; 32 (7.48%) were aged 25 and below, 117 (27.34%) were aged 26–30, 120 (28.04%) were aged 31–35, 50 (11.68%) were aged 36–40, 86 (20.09%) were aged 41–50, 23 people (5.37%) aged 51 and above; 171 people (39.95%) with postgraduate education, 213 people (49.77%) with bachelor’s degree, 28 people (6.54%) with specialist education, 12 people (2.80%) with high school/junior high school/technical school education, 4 people (0.94%) with junior high school education or below; 144 people (33.64%) with work units belonging to state organs, 102 people (23.83%) belong to institutions, 65 people (15.19%) belong to state-owned enterprises, 66 people (15.42%) belong to private enterprises, 23 people (5.37%) are freelancers; 59 people (13.79%) have an annual income level of 200 thousand Yuan or more, 149 people (34.81%)) have an annual income level of 100–200 thousand Yuan, 168 people (39.25%) with 50–100 thousand Yuan, 34 people (7.94%) with 30–50 thousand Yuan and 18 people (4.21%) with less than 30 thousand Yuan.

3.2. Measures

The empirical study of the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance focuses on three main variables: organizational institutional factors, individual driven factor, and incentive effect. Among them, the organizational institutional factors and individual driven factors were measured by the scales developed by Huang Qin (2022) [50], while the incentive effects were measured in four aspects of participation, satisfaction, engagement and willingness to participate, respectively, and the measurement questions were derived from the relevant mature scales, and the scales of incentive effect indicators were selected from the mature scales. All scales were translated into Chinese according to the back-translation procedures recommended by Brislin (1980) [51] before being measured. All study variables were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), except for the demographic variables, a 7-point Likert-type scale helps us to distinguish between subtle differences in the opinions of the subjects. The scales are detailed in Appendix A.

3.2.1. Measurement of Organizational Institutional Factors

In order to avoid the confusion of the definition of “organization”, this study has limited the organization of public involvement to community residents’ committees when issuing the organizational institutional factors scale. The community is the basic unit of urban governance, and it is also the concentration of social problems and the accumulation of conflicts, so the community residents’ committee has good representation among the grass-roots self-governance organizations.

The reward system dimension consists of three items, which assess the extent and fairness of the organization’s rewards for involvement in grass-roots social governance behaviors, using the example item: “Your community rewards involvement in grass-roots social governance behaviors well”.

The organization climate dimension consists of four items, which assess the atmosphere of communication and cooperation created for the public, using the example item: “Mutual trust between the residents of your community”.

The work design dimension consists of three items that assess the extent to which the organization enhances the capacity and values of public involvement in governance, with the example item: “Your community focuses on making residents who participate in governance feel that they are contributing to the community”.

The organizational justice dimension consists of the items that assess the extent to which the organization is open and fair in the public involvement process, with the example item: “Your community focuses on fairness in the public resource allocation process”.

3.2.2. Measurement of Individual Driven Factors

The acquisition drive dimension consists of four items that assess the extent to which the public wants to obtain certain values through involvement in grass-roots social governance, with the example item: “Your involvement will help you gain social respect”.

The Bond drive dimension consists of six items and assesses the extent to which the public would like to establish good social relationships with the outside world through involvement in grass-roots social governance, with the example item: “Interpersonal relationships are easy and relaxed during involvement”.

The comprehension drive dimension consists of four items, which assess the extent to which people want to enhance their knowledge and ability related to grass-roots social governance, with the sample item: “You can understand the goals and tasks of governance during the process of involvement”.

The defense driven dimension consists of seven items, which assesses the extent to which the public wants their rights to be effectively protected in grass-roots social governance, with the sample item: “Information on involvement is open and transparent, and can be accessed in a timely and convenient manner”.

3.2.3. Measurement of Incentive Effect

The participation dimension, adapted from Kanungo and Rabindra (1982) [52], consists of four items that assess the extent to which the public takes responsibility for social governance, with the sample item: “You are keen to take responsibility for your community”.

The satisfaction dimension, adapted from Weiss et al. (1967) [53], consists of four items that assess the degree of public satisfaction with the effectiveness of social governance at the grass-roots level, with the sample item: “You are satisfied with the outcome of the governance event you participated in”.

The engagement dimension, adapted from Schaufeli et al. (2006) [54], consists of three items and assesses the extent to which the public brings energy, effort, and initiative to grassroots social governance efforts, with the sample item: “You are emotionally and enthusiastically involved in the process”.

The willingness to participate dimension, adapted from Chen et al. [55], consists of three items that assess the degree of willingness of the public to participate in grass-roots social governance and to motivate others to involve in grass-roots social governance, with the sample item: “You are willing to mobilize more people around you to involve in grass-roots social governance”.

3.3. Reliability and Validity Analysis

We first assessed the reliability of the scales for the three main variables: organizational institutional factors, individual driven factors, and incentive effect respectively; secondly, we conducted a validity assessment, which included the assessment of the structural validity of the main variables, as well as the convergent and discriminant validity among the dimensions.

3.3.1. Reliability and Validity Analysis of Organizational Institutional Factors

To assess the reliability of the four dimensions of the organizational institutional factors, the structural reliability of the reward system, organizational climate, work design, and organizational justice factors needs to be calculated. The internal consistency reliability coefficients of the organizational policy factor scales are shown in

Table 1. Internal consistency reliability of the organizational institutional factors scale.

Item	Reward System	Organizational Climate	Work Design	Organizational Justice	Total Scale
Chronbach’s α	0.858	0.924	0.926	0.953	0.954
Number	3	4	3	3	13

. The reliability coefficients of the four factor subscales of the organizational institutional factors, in this study, were all greater than 0.80, and the reliability coefficient of the total scale was greater than 0.90, which proved that the organizational institutional factors scale used in this study had a high reliability.

The AMOS 20.0 statistical software was used for parameter estimation using the great likelihood method, and 428 valid samples were fitted accordingly. A four-dimensional hypothetical model of organizational institutional drivers with reward system, organizational climate, work design, and organizational justice was established with a fit index ${\chi }^2/df$ = 3.213, RMSEA = 0.072, NFI = 0.966, TLI = 0.968, CFI = 0.976, assuming that the model fit was relatively satisfactory. The C.R. values of each measure were greater than 1.96, which passed the significance test; the loading coefficients of each item were greater than 0.5. The details are shown in Figure 4.

Therefore, this study concluded that the organizational institutional factor can be measured by four dimensions: reward system, organizational climate, work design, and organizational justice. The standardized factor loading of the 13 measurement items on all four dimensions were greater than 0.71, indicating that the explanatory power of each latent variable corresponding to the measurement items was relatively strong.

In terms of convergent validity, as shown in Figure 4, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis showed that the policy drivers consisted of four dimensions, with a clear structure and clear content. As shown in

Table 2. Table of discriminant validity judgment coefficients of the organizational institutional factors measure scale.

	AVE	Reward System	Organizational Climate	Work Design	Organizational Justice
Reward system	0.815 *	0.903	/	/	/
Organizational climate	0.870 *	0.748	0.933	/	/
Work design	0.898 *	0.681	0.730	0.948	/
Organizational justice	0.935 *	0.761	0.812	0.720	0.967

Note: Diagonal numbers marked with “*” are the AVE coefficients of the corresponding factors; bold numbers are the square roots of the corresponding AVE coefficients; unmarked numbers are the correlation coefficients of the corresponding factors.

, the correlation coefficients among the four constituent variables in the four-dimensional fitted model of organizational institutional factors are, at maximum, 0.812, which is smaller than the standard value of 0.85. The AVE coefficients among the four factors of organizational institutional factors of reward system, organizational climate, work design, and organizational justice are all greater than the correlation coefficients among the factors, and the AVE coefficients of the other factors are all greater than 0.5, so it can be considered that the organizational institutional factors scale has sufficient discriminant validity. In conclusion, the scale of organizational institutional factors of public involvement in grass-roots social governance used in this study has good construct validity.

3.3.2. Reliability and Validity Analysis of Individual Driven Factors

In order to assess the reliability of the 4 dimensions of individual driven factors, the structural reliability of the acquisition, defense, comprehension, and bond factors needed to be calculated. The internal consistency reliability coefficients of the individual driven factor scales are shown in

Table 3. Internal consistency reliability of individual driven factors.

Item		Number	Chronbach’s α
Acquisition	Acquisition1	2	0.811	0.852
	Acquisition 2	2	0.895
Bond		6		0.901
Comprehension	Comprehension 1	2	0.803	0.828
	Comprehension 1	2	0.895
Defense		7		0.953
Total Scale		25		0.945

. The reliability coefficients of the four first-order factor subscales of the organizational drivers in this study were all greater than 0.80, the reliability coefficients of the three second-order factor subscales of the acquisition factor were all greater than 0.75, and the reliability coefficients of the total scale were greater than 0.90, which proved that the individual driver scale used in this study had high reliability.

The AMOS 20.0 statistical software was used for parameter estimation using the great likelihood method, and the corresponding fit was performed on 428 valid samples. A four-dimensional hypothesis model of individual driven factors with acquisition, defense, comprehension, and bond was established with a fit index ${\chi }^2/df$ = 3.658, RMSEA = 0.079, NFI = 0.912, TLI = 0.923, CFI = 0.934, assuming that the model fit was relatively satisfactory. The C.R. values of each measure were greater than 1.96, which passed the significance test; the loading coefficients of each item were greater than 0.5. The details are shown in Figure 5.

Therefore, this study concluded that individual driven factors can be measured by four dimensions: acquisition, defense, comprehension, and bond. 21 measure items had standardized factor loadings greater than 0.71 on the first- and second-order sub-dimensions of the four dimensions, indicating that the explanatory power of each latent variable corresponded to the measured items is relatively strong.

In terms of convergent validity, as shown in Figure 5, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis showed that the individual driven factors consisted of four dimensions, the acquisition dimension consisted of two second-order sub-dimensions, and the comprehension dimension consisted of two second-order sub-dimensions, with a clear structure and clear content. As shown in

Table 4. Table of discriminant validity judgment coefficients of individual driven factors measure scales.

	AVE	Acquisition			Bond	Comprehension			Defense
		AVE	Acquisition 1	Acquisition 2		AVE	Comprehension 1	Comprehension 2
Acquisition	0.830 *	0.823 *	0.907	/	/	0.831 *	0.912	/	/
		0.817 *	0.686	0.904		0.891 *	0.609	0.944
		0.911				/
Bond	0.814 *	0.799			0.902	/			/
Comprehension	0.833 *	0.820			0.704	0.913			/
Defense	0.866 *	0.563			0.555	0.729			0.931

Note: Diagonal numbers marked with “*” are the AVE coefficients of the corresponding factors; bold numbers are the square roots of the corresponding AVE coefficients; unmarked numbers are the correlation coefficients of the corresponding factors.

, the correlation coefficients between the four component variables in the four-dimensional second-order fitted model of individual driven factors were the maximum of 0.820, the correlation coefficients between the two second-order component variables of the two acquisition dimensions were 0.686, and the correlation coefficients between the two second-order component variables of the two comprehension dimensions were 0.609, all of which were less than the standard value of 0.85. The AVE coefficients among the four factors (acquisition, defense, comprehension, and bond) were all greater than the correlation coefficients among the factors, the AVE coefficients among the two second-order factors of the acquisition factor were all greater than the correlation coefficients among the factors, the AVE coefficients among the two second-order factors of the comprehension factor were all greater than the correlation coefficients among the factors, and the AVE coefficients of the other factors (including the second-order factor of acquisition) were all greater than 0.5, so it can be concluded that the individual driver factors scales have sufficient discriminant validity. In conclusion, the individual driver factors scale used in this study has good construct validity.

3.3.3. Reliability and Validity Analysis of Incentive Effect

In order to assess the reliability of the four dimensions of incentive effect, it is necessary to calculate the structural reliability of the four dimensions of participation, satisfaction, engagement, and willingness to participate. The internal consistency reliability coefficients of the four dimensional measures of incentive effect scales are shown in

Table 5. Incentive effect and reliability coefficients of each dimensional scale.

Item	Participation	Satisfaction	Engagement	Willingness to Participate	Total Scale
Chronbach’s α	0.951	0.927	0.899	0.940	0.938
Number of items	4	4	3	3	14

. The reliability coefficients of the four dimensions of the incentive effect scale are all greater than 0.80, and the reliability coefficient of the total scale is greater than 0.90, which proves that the incentive effect scale used in this study has a high reliability.

The AMOS 20.0 statistical software was used for parameter estimation using the great likelihood method, and 428 valid samples were fitted accordingly. A four-dimensional hypothetical model of incentive effect participation, satisfaction, engagement and willingness to participate was established with a fit index ${\chi }^2/df$ = 2.495, RMSEA = 0.059, NFI = 0.971, TLI = 0.977, CFI = 0.982, assuming that the model fit was ideal. The C.R. values of each measure were greater than 1.96, which passed the significance test; the loading coefficients of each item were greater than 0.5. The details are shown in Figure 6.

Therefore, this study concluded that the incentive effect can be measured by four dimensions: participation, satisfaction, engagement, and willingness to participate. The standardized factor loadings of the 14 measured items on all four dimensions were greater than 0.71, indicating that the explanatory power of each latent variable corresponding to the measured items was relatively strong.

In terms of convergent validity, as shown in Figure 6, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis showed that the incentive effect consisted of four dimensions with a clear structure and clear content. As shown in

Table 6. Table of discriminant validity judgment coefficients of the incentive effect scale.

	AVE	Participation	Satisfaction	Engagement	Willingness to Participate
Participation	0.911 *	0.954
Satisfaction	0.879 *	0.470	0.938
Engagement	0.865 *	0.498	0.529	0.930
Willingness to Participate	0.917 *	0.730	0.603	0.634	0.958

Note: Diagonal numbers marked with “*” are the AVE coefficients of the corresponding factors; bold numbers are the square roots of the corresponding AVE coefficients; unmarked numbers are the correlation coefficients of the corresponding factors.

, the correlation coefficients between the four constituent variables in the four-dimensional fitted model of incentive effect are maximum 0.730, which are all smaller than the standard value 0.85. The discriminant validity judgment coefficients of the incentive effect scale are shown in Table 6, the AVE coefficients between the four factors of incentive effect participation, satisfaction, engagement and willingness to participate are all larger than the correlation coefficients between the factors, and the AVE coefficients of all factors are greater than 0.5, so the incentive effect scale has sufficient discriminant validity. In conclusion, the incentive effect scale used in this study has good construct validity.

The reliability and validity analysis by SPSS 21.0 and AMOS 20.0 software showed that the scales used in this study for the empirical study of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance incentives all had good reliability and validity, and further data analysis could be conducted.

4. Results

Before testing the hypothesis model in Figure 3, we first tested the fitting path of the incentive effect of each driving factor on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. After eliminating the path that failed the significance test, we constructed the hypothesis model of the effect path of the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. Secondly, the maximum likelihood estimation method is used to test the incentive mechanism effect path model. Finally, we analyze the effect path that affects the incentive effect of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, as well as the direct and indirect effects, to test whether the hypothesis is valid.

4.1. SEM of Hypothesis

Based on the research hypothesis in Figure 3, the path fitting hypothesis models corresponding to hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2, hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4, were constructed respectively. AMOS 20.0 software is used for path fitting to test the path fitting of the incentive effect of each driving factor on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance.

4.1.1. Path Fitting of Incentive Effect of Various Factors

The path fitting index value of the incentive effect of reward system on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is shown in

Table 7. Path fitting index table of incentive effect of various factors.

Model	${\mathit{\chi }}^2$	$\mathit{d}\mathit{f}$	${\mathit{\chi }}^2/\mathit{d}\mathit{f}$	RMSEA	NFI	TLI	CFI
Path fitting model: Incentive Effect → Reward System	449.882	179	2.513	0.060	0.945	0.960	0.966
Path fitting model: Incentive Effect → Reward System (modified)	450.094	180	2.501	0.059	0.945	0.960	0.966
Path fitting model: Incentive Effect → Organizational Climate	861.157	243	3.544	0.077	0.912	0.926	0.935
Path fitting model: Incentive Effect → Work Design	492.575	179	2.752	0.064	0.943	0.956	0.963
Path fitting model: Incentive Effect → Work Design (modified)	493.323	180	2.741	0.064	0.943	0.956	0.963
Path fitting model: Incentive Effect → Organizational Justice	998.444	243	4.109	0.085	0.912	0.923	0.932
Path fitting model: Incentive Effect → Organizational Justice (modified)	1005.253	244	4.120	0.085	0.912	0.922	0.931

. The path fitting effect is ideal, but the two paths from reward system to satisfaction and from reward system to engagement fail to pass the significance test of p < 0.001 (β = 0.06, p = 0.607). We deleted the path from reward system to satisfaction, and ran SEM again for the revised model. The data results show that the model fitting effect is still good (as shown in Table 7), and all paths pass the significance test of p < 0.001. Therefore, this modified model is selected as the final model to test our hypothesis.

The path fitting index value of the incentive effect of organizational climate on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is shown in Table 7. The results show that the model fits well, and all paths pass the significance test of p < 0.001. Therefore, the model is directly used to test our hypothesis.

The path fitting index value of the incentive effect of work design on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is shown in Table 7. The path fitting effect is relatively ideal, but the paths from work design to engagement, and from work design to willingness to participate fail to pass the significance test of p < 0.001 (β = −0.05, p = 0.370). The effect path from work design to willingness to participate is deleted, and SEM is run for the revised model. The results show that the fitting effect is still good (as shown in Table 7), and all the paths pass the significance test of p < 0.001. Therefore, the modified model is selected as the final model to test our hypothesis.

The path fitting index value of the incentive effect of organizational justice on the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is shown in Table 7. The path fitting effect is relatively ideal, but the path from organizational justice to participation fails to pass the significance test of p < 0.001 (β = 0.12, p = 0.008), so the effect path from organizational justice to participation is deleted. SEM was run for the revised model. The results show that the fitting effect is still good (as shown in Table 7), and all the paths pass the significance test of. Therefore, the modified model is selected as the final model to test our hypothesis.

4.1.2. SEM of Overall Hypothesis Model

According to the SEM test, we eliminate three effect paths of “from reward system to the satisfaction”, “from work design to willingness to participate” and “from organizational justice to participation”, and select the remaining 33 effect paths to build the initial model of “incentive mechanism for public involvement in grass-roots social governance”. The path fitting index value is shown in

Table 8. Path fitting index table of incentive mechanism for public active involvement in grass-roots social governance.

Model	${\mathit{\chi }}^2$	$\mathit{d}\mathit{f}$	${\mathit{\chi }}^2/\mathit{d}\mathit{f}$	RMSEA	NFI	TLI	CFI
Incentive mechanism hypothesis model	3890.886	1045	3.723	0.080	0.816	0.847	0.858
Incentive mechanism hypothesis model (correction 1)	3894.900	1057	3.685	0.079	0.816	0.849	0.859
Incentive mechanism hypothesis model (correction 2)	3896.493	1058	3.683	0.079	0.816	0.849	0.858
Incentive mechanism hypothesis model (correction 3)	3900.193	1060	3.679	0.079	0.816	0.849	0.859

, path fitting effect is relatively ideal. For the model run SEM, we found that there are 17 path p values greater than 0.05, in turn, remove every fitting biggest path p value, respectively in the first correction in sequence (delete 12 paths), the second correction (delete 1 path), the third correction (delete 2 paths). The fitting index value obtained from path fitting is shown in Table 8. After the third correction, we found that all 18 paths of the current model passed the significance test of p < 0.05, and the model had a good fitting effect (as shown in Table 8). The path coefficient is shown in

Table 9. Path coefficient of incentive mechanism for public active involvement in grass-roots social governance (correction 3, non-standardized).

Path	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	p
Organizational Climate → Bond	0.47	0.048	9.894	***
Work Design → Comprehend	0.267	0.035	7.678	***
Organizational justice → Defend	0.554	0.042	13.315	***
Reword System → Acquire	0.51	0.048	10.686	***
Reword System → Participation	−0.082	0.029	−2.812	0.005
Organizational Climate → Participation	0.17	0.038	4.51	***
Organizational Climate → Satisfaction	0.192	0.042	4.529	***
Organizational Climate → Willingness to Participate	0.11	0.036	3.094	0.002
Bond → Satisfaction	0.105	0.049	2.141	0.032
Work Design → Participation	−0.183	0.038	−4.86	***
Work Design → Engagement	0.178	0.047	3.822	***
Comprehend → Participation	1.269	0.103	12.277	***
Comprehend → Satisfaction	0.384	0.057	6.746	***
Comprehend → Engagement	0.802	0.096	8.329	***
Comprehend → Willingness to Participate	1.107	0.086	12.823	***
Organizational justice → Satisfaction	0.445	0.035	12.732	***
Defend → Engagement	0.108	0.04	2.675	0.007
Defend → Willingness to Participate	0.094	0.028	3.366	***

Note: ***= p < 0.001.

. Therefore, this model (as shown in Figure 7) is selected as the final model to test our hypothesis.

4.2. Test of Hypothesis

The effect analysis of the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is mainly to analyze the total effect and indirect effect of the four dimensions of the incentive effect of driving factors. The effect value of the path fitting of the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is shown in

Table 10. Effect analysis table of path fitting of incentive mechanism for public active involvement in grass-roots social governance (standardized).

Variables	Reward System	Organizational Climate	Work Design	Organizational Justice	Acquisition	Bond	Comprehension	Defense
Acquisition	0.615	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bond	/	0.562	/	/	/	/	/	/
Comprehension	/	/	0.456	/	/	/	/	/
Defense	/	/	/	0.603	/	/	/	/
Participation	−0.102	0.178	0.199 (0.419)	/	/	/	0.913	/
Satisfaction	/	0.277 (0.057)	0.138 (0.138)	0.630	/	0.101	0.303	/
Engagement	/	/	0.437 (0.238)	0.072 (0.072)	/	/	0.523	0.116
Willingness to Participate	/	0.120	0.379 (0.379)	0.070 (0.072)	/	/	0.831	0.117

Note: Values not in “()” refer to the total effect value, and values in “()” refer to the indirect effect value.

.

4.2.1. Test of Hypothesis 1

As shown in Figure 7 and Table 10, for the path from reward system to participation, the total effect value is −0.102, indicating that reward system has a negative impact on the incentive effect, and H1a is not supported. The path from the reward system to the acquisition drive has a total effect value of 0.615, and H1b is supported. The four paths from acquisition drive to participation, satisfaction, engagement and willingness to participate fail to pass the significance test of p < 0.05, and H1c is not supported. H1d is not supported because there are no indirect effects from the reward system to participation, and the acquisition drive has no effect on the incentive effect.

4.2.2. Test of Hypothesis 2

As shown in Figure 7 and Table 10, the total effect value of the path from organizational climate to participation is 0.178, the total effect value of the path from organizational climate to satisfaction is 0.277, and the total effect value of the path from organizational climate to willingness to participate is 0.120. However, the path from organizational climate to engagement fails the significance test of p < 0.05. Therefore, H2a is only partially supported. The total effect value of the path from organizational climate to bond drive is 0.562, and H2b is supported. From bond drive to satisfaction, the total effect is 0.101. The three paths from bond drive to participation, engagement and willingness to participate fail to pass the significance test of p < 0.05. H2c is only partially supported. Because the path from organizational climate to bond drive and the path from bond drive to satisfaction are significant, the indirect effect is significant, and the indirect effect value is 0.057. The total effect of the path from organizational climate to bond drive to satisfaction is 0.277, and the direct effect is 0.22. Therefore, the mediation effect is significant, which belongs to incomplete mediation, and H2d is partially supported.

4.2.3. Test of Hypothesis 3

As shown in Figure 7 and Table 10, the total effect value of the path from work design to participation is 0.199, the direct effect is −0.220, and the total effect value of the path from work design to engagement is 0.437. However, the two paths from work design to satisfaction and willingness to participate fail to pass the significance test of p < 0.05, so H3a is only partially supported. The total effect value of the path from work design to comprehension drive is 0.456, and H3b is supported. The total effective value is 0.913 for the path from the comprehension drive to participation, 0.303 for the path from the comprehension drive to satisfaction, 0.523 for the path from the comprehension drive to engagement, and 0.831 for the path from the comprehension drive to willingness to participate. H3c is supported. Because the path from work design to comprehension drive and the path from comprehension drive to participation are both significant, the indirect effect is significant, and the indirect effect value is 0.419. The total effect of the path of work design to comprehension drive to participate is 0.199, and the direct effect is −0.220, so the mediating effect is significant, and there is a masking effect. Since both the path from work design to comprehension drive and the path from comprehension drive to engagement are significant, the indirect effect is significant, and the indirect effect value is 0.238. The total effect of the path from work design to comprehension drive to engagement is 0.437, and the direct effect is 0.198. Therefore, the mediation effect is significant, which is incomplete mediation. However, the direct effect of the two paths from work design to satisfaction and willingness to participate is not significant, and the indirect effect is equal to the total effect, so it belongs to the complete mediation and H3d is supported.

4.2.4. Test of Hypothesis 4

As shown in Figure 7 and Table 10, the total effect of the path of organizational justice to satisfaction is 0.630, while the three paths of organizational justice to participation, engagement and willingness to participate fail to pass the significance test of p < 0.05, so H4a is only partially supported. For the path from organizational justice to defense drive, the total effect is 0.603 and H4b is supported. The total effect of the path from defense drive to engagement is 0.116, and the total effect of the path from defense drive to willingness to participate is 0.117. The two paths from defense drive to participation and satisfaction fail to pass the significance test of p < 0.05, so H4c is only partially supported. Because the direct effect of the path from organizational justice to engagement and willingness participation is not significant, the indirect effect is equal to the total effect, so it belongs to the complete mediation. Therefore, the H4d is partially supported.

4.3. Model Construction of Incentive Mechanism for Public Active Involvement

According to the above empirical analysis, the establishment of the hypothesis is summarized. According to the status of the hypothesis test and the theoretical framework of this paper, the incentive mechanism model of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is built, as shown in Figure 8.

5. Conclusions and Discussion

5.1. Conclusions

This study takes the Stimulus-Organism-Response Theory as the core, combines the Four-Drive Theory to build a theoretical framework, takes organizational institutional factors and individual driven factors as stimulating factors for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, and measures the response degree of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance with incentive effect, and builds a hypothetical model to encourage the public to be involved in grass-roots social governance, and makes an empirical test with 428 members of the public who have worked in grass-roots social governance as samples. According to the empirical results, we draw the incentive mechanism chart of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. The results show that, for the members of public who have worked in grass-roots social governance, exogenous organizational drivers will have incentive effect to their active involvement in grass-roots social governance by acting on endogenous individual driven factors. The specific influence path is shown in Figure 8. Work design has a positive and indirect impact on participation, engagement, satisfaction and willingness to participate through comprehension drive mediation, and will have a negative and direct impact on participation. Reward systems only have a negative direct impact on participation. Organizational climate has a positive and indirect impact on satisfaction through bond drive mediation, and also has a positive and direct impact on participation, satisfaction and willingness to participate. Organizational justice has a positive and indirect impact on engagement through defense drive mediation, and also has a positive and direct impact on satisfaction.

For the members of public with work experience in grass-roots social governance, the influence paths of organizational driven factors on their active involvement in grass-roots social governance through individual driven factors are as follows: first of all, the work design enhances the participation, engagement, satisfaction and willingness to participate in grass-roots social governance by enhancing their comprehending drive. Secondly, the organizational climate enhances the satisfaction of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance by enhancing the bond drive of the public. Finally, organizational justice can enhance the public’s engagement and willingness to participate in grass-roots social governance by strengthening their defense drive. This shows that, for members of the public in the background of the normalization of the COVID-19 epidemic, the uncertainty of the external environment is surging, and the public pays increasing attention to the sense of security and stability that work can bring. The more abstract and difficult to comprehend the work, the more difficult to inspire employees’ confidence and morale; in contrast, the more tangible and easier to comprehend the work, the more clearly the public can see the challenges and growth they can gain in the work, which will make employees more motivated to participate in the grass-roots governance of society. In addition, after the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic, a major public health event, the feeling of sharing weal and woe is easily ignited. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the connection between the units of grass-roots social governance and create a good working atmosphere, so that the public can find a sense of belonging in the work of grass-roots social governance and be more satisfied with their work. Finally, if the fairness within the organization cannot be guaranteed, the individual’s contribution and reward will not be balanced. Especially in the background of the normalization of the COVID-19 epidemic, the public is becoming more and more sensitive to external threats, and the demand for defenses to protect the family’s safety and life stability will rise. Therefore, if you want to motivate the public to be more actively involved in the work of social grass-roots governance, you must try your best to maintain organizational justice from the perspective of defense drive.

The above conclusions reveal the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, enrich the research in the field of public involvement and incentive, analyze the internal logic of encouraging the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance with Chinese characteristics from a comprehensive perspective of institutional factors and driven factors, and provide a new perspective and tool for the government and grass-roots autonomous organizations to guide and motivate public involvement in the practice of grass-roots social governance.

5.2. Theoretical Implications

Our research has made the following theoretical contributions. Firstly, from the perspective of incentive, we build a theoretical framework based on Stimulus-Organism-Response Theory, and reveal the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. Secondly, by introducing the Four-Drive Theory and referring to the research of Nohria et al. (2008) [25], we have defined the measurement indicators of driven factors and incentive effects, constructed a hypothetical model for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance, enriched the knowledge system concerning the incentive factors of public involvement, revealed the complex motivation and institutional reasons behind public involvement in grass-roots social governance, and expanded the application scope of Stimulus-Organism-Response Theory in studying the incentive problems of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance. Thirdly, our research also carried out in-depth theoretical analysis, and carried out an empirical test on a large range of social public samples who had worked in grass-roots social governance, which verified the effectiveness of the model in China and enhanced its universality. Fourthly, according to the research results, the incentive mechanism diagram of the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is drawn, and the influence paths of the driven factors in the incentive effect of public involvement in grass-roots social governance are summarized. On the basis of empirical research, the internal logic of the incentive mechanism for the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance is excavated, which provides a theoretical basis for constructing a new pattern of grass-roots social governance and multi-subjects participating in grass-roots social governance in collaboration, and is of great significance for revealing the characteristic laws in Chinese situations through empirical research.

5.3. Practical Implications

Grass-roots social governance attaches great importance to the role of “governing the people by the people”, and has developed into the “post-epidemic era”. It has become an important task of the times to explore a more “holistic” method of grass-roots social governance. Political systems differ between regions, and the government structures of various countries have their own characteristics. Therefore, this paper aims to build the incentive mechanism from the perspective of individuals, from the logic that external driven factors affect internal driven and ultimately encourage the public to participate in grass-roots social governance, to analyze the uniqueness of Chinese cases, and this people-oriented management style is what we hope to emphasize through the article. The framework of this incentive mechanism is worthy of further verification in other countries and regions, and it will be of practical significance to explore more appropriate influencing factors and incentive paths under different cultural backgrounds. Our research results provide an effective way for the government and grass-roots self-government organizations around the world to encourage public involvement, and to some extent, reduce the risk that the incentive system introduced by the government and grass-roots self-government organizations is not obvious or ineffective. Against the backdrop of the normalization of COVID-19 epidemic, sorting out the internal logic of grass-roots social governance in China at this time and drawing valuable experience from the effectiveness of epidemic prevention and control in China can provide a theoretical basis for the next optimization of grass-roots social governance and suggestions for encouraging the public’s active involvement in grass-roots social governance.

According to the empirical results, we suggest that the government, community and other grass-roots organizations should adjust the scientific, fair and attractive degree of the work design from the public’s comprehension needs, so as to achieve a mutually agreeable state, and to realize the combination of grass-roots governance goals and individual public goals, so as to encourage the public to involve in grass-roots social governance more actively. Secondly, we should pay attention to the public’s demand for interpersonal communication and sense of belonging, and strive to create a harmonious and friendly organizational climate in grass-roots organizations, so that the public can be more satisfied with their choice of participating in grass-roots governance. Finally, we should fully respect the defense needs of the public, and ensure that the rights of the public are equal and inviolable. From this perspective, we should pay attention to the fairness and openness of the process and resource allocation in the process of public participation, so that more people are willing to take the initiative to involve in the work of social grass-roots governance. Through the above strategies, we can encourage the public to become involved in grass-roots social governance behaviors in an all-round way, stimulate the vitality of grass-roots governance, and promote the realization of “Social governance community” and the modernization of governance capacity.

We also found some interesting results by accident. For example, we expect that the reward system will achieve the incentive effect by meeting the public’s spiritual and material demand for scarcity, but the research results are contrary to this assumption. In addition to showing that this path does not exist, the direct impact of the reward system on the incentive effect is negative, and the impact of acquisition drive on the incentive effect is not significant. This shows that, for the public under the current epidemic normalization background, the reward system itself will not only encourage them to become actively involved in grass-roots social governance, but will inhibit the willingness and behavior of public involvement. This informs the government and grass-roots autonomous organizations that when designing the reward system, they should proceed from the real needs of the current public, and pay attention to stimulating public involvement, rather than adding irrelevant rewards that risk making the public feel “unworthy”. In addition, the direct impact of work design on participation is negative, while the indirect impact of driving on incentive effect is positive through comprehension, and the positive indirect impact is greater than the direct negative impact. This shows that when the public is driven by comprehension, work design can stimulate the public’s participation and willingness to participate. However, when the public has no motivation to understand, or the work design cannot meet the public’s comprehension needs, a series of training activities organized to enhance their cognition and ability will make the public think that participating in grass-roots social governance is a laborious task, thus inhibiting the public’s willingness to participate and reducing the public’s participation from the beginning. This informs us that it is better for organizations to conduct training and exchange meetings around topics that the public is really interested in and wants to learn, such as the methods and processes of grass-roots affairs, rather than topics that the public does not care about at all.

5.4. Limitations and Future Research

This study collects and analyzes data in a rigorous and scientific manner, but there are still some limitations due to the lack of research ability and the influence of objective factors. Firstly, the research object is the public, so it is reasonable to do systematic stratified sampling on the social aspects. However, due to the research conditions, we only entrust the familiar grass-roots governance units to conduct a questionnaire survey on members of the public who have participated in grass-roots social governance, which may limit the universality of our conclusions. Whether this research can be applied and promoted in other cultural contexts remains to be further verified; future research can expand the sample size in the whole country and even in the world. Secondly, although this study adopted a stratified and phased empirical survey, the measurement of individual subjective feelings and behaviors still showed social expectations, and the research was still cross-sectional, which limited our ability to draw causal conclusions. In order to further strengthen the causal inference of our conclusion, future research can be verified by longitudinal research design or experiment. Thirdly, although this study examined the influence of organizational institutional factors and individual driven factors on the incentive effect of public involvement in grass-roots social governance, with the continuous development of the times and the deepening of reform, the incentive model constructed in this paper still needs to undergo a long-term practice test. In addition, the incentive factor scale used in this paper was designed by the author herself in another study, and the content of the scale may also influence the conclusion. In order to enhance the universality of the scale contents and research conclusions, the scale of future incentive factors needs to be used many times in a larger sample range, and the scale contents should be tested, improved and optimized.