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Sustainability
Volume 14
Issue 19
10.3390/su141912647
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Article
Peer-Review Record

Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy Selection and Simulation Research of Carbon Emission Reduction of Government and Enterprises under the “Dual Carbon” Goal

Sustainability 2022, 14(19), 12647; https://doi.org/10.3390/su141912647
by Sufeng Li 1,2,3, Chenxin Dong 1, Lei Yang 1, Xinpeng Gao 1, Wei Wei 4, Ming Zhao 1 and Weiqi Xia 5,*
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Reviewer 3:
Jingci Xie
Sustainability 2022, 14(19), 12647; https://doi.org/10.3390/su141912647
Submission received: 24 August 2022 / Revised: 27 September 2022 / Accepted: 28 September 2022 / Published: 5 October 2022
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Natural Resource Institution Change and Policy Reform in Transitional Economies)

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Please see the attached file.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Author Response File: Author Response.docx

Reviewer 2 Report

Please find the report from the attachment.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Author Response File: Author Response.docx

Reviewer 3 Report

This paper uses evolutionary game model to dynamically analyze the strategic choices of the government and enterprises in the context of carbon trading, and proposes to scientifically adjust the carbon quota, subsidy, penalty and carbon emission right price to achieve the dual carbon goal. It complies with the current green and low-carbon development requirements, and is of practical significance. I have several concerns regarding this paper as follows:

1. What are the differences in model construction and result analysis between high-polluting enterprises and ordinary polluting enterprises? The significance of studying this group should be further highlighted.

2. The introduction can briefly explain the game between the government and high-polluting enterprises and the influence of public supervision.

3. The literature review may need to further clarify the logic and hierarchy.

4. There are some detailed errors in the paper which need to be corrected, such as the beginning statement of 4.2.1 and the solution result of x.

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Author Response File: Author Response.docx

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report

All comments are well responded.

Author Response

Thank you very much for your recognition of our manuscript. And thank you for your suggestion last time, which makes our manuscript more perfect！

Reviewer 3 Report

All of my concerns have been solved, so I think the work could be accepted now.

Author Response

Thank you for your recognition of our manuscript, and thank you for your last comment which was very useful and helpful to our manuscript.

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