Dispersion of Family Ownership and Innovation Input in Family Firms
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Different Types of Technological Innovation—Product and Process Innovation
2.2. Family Ownership Dispersion and Innovation Input Decisions
2.3. The Moderating Role of Proportion of Family Directors and Collective Decision Making
2.3.1. The Proportion of Family Directors
2.3.2. Collective Decision Making
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Data and Sample
3.2. Variables
3.3. Data Processing
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
4.2. Hypotheses Testing
5. Robustness Test
6. Discussion and Conclusions
7. Limitations and Future Research Directions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Features | Sample Size | Percentage | Features | Sample Size | Percentage |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Entrepreneurial characteristics | |||||
Age | Education level | ||||
30 years old and below | 25 | 2.8 | High School and below | 190 | 21.5 |
31~40 years old | 49 | 5.5 | College | 325 | 36.8 |
41~50 years old | 408 | 46.2 | Undergraduate | 292 | 33.1 |
51~60 years old | 207 | 23.5 | Graduate | 75 | 8.5 |
Over 60 years old | 193 | 21.9 | |||
Gender | |||||
Male | 784 | 89.0 | |||
Female | 98 | 11.0 | |||
Firm Characteristics | |||||
Size | Industry | ||||
Less than 100 people | 387 | 43.8 | Manufacturing | 394 | 44.6 |
100~500 people | 392 | 44.4 | Wholesale and retail trade | 118 | 13.3 |
501~1000 people | 48 | 5.4 | Agriculture, forestry and fisheries | 48 | 5.4 |
1001~2000 people | 37 | 4.2 | Real estate | 46 | 5.2 |
More than 2000 people | 18 | 2.0 | Other | 276 | 31.2 |
Firm Age | Location | ||||
5 years and below | 118 | 13.3 | Zhejiang | 245 | 27.7 |
6~10 years | 174 | 19.7 | Guangdong | 170 | 19.2 |
11~15 years | 274 | 31.0 | Fujian | 72 | 8.1 |
16~20 years | 179 | 20.2 | Anhui | 98 | 11.1 |
More than 20 years | 137 | 15.5 | Other | 297 | 33.6 |
Variable Type | Variable | Variable Code | Measurement Instructions |
---|---|---|---|
Dependent variable | Product innovation | PI1 | The amount of product investment divided by the sales |
Process innovation | PI2 | The amount of process investment divided by the sales | |
Independent variable | Family ownership Dispersion | PD | The difference between the shareholding of the first shareholder and the average shareholding of other family members |
Moderating variables | Percentage of family directors | FB | Proportion of family-member directors to the total number of board members |
Collective decision making | GD | Who makes the major decisions in the firm | |
Control variables | Entrepreneur gender | Gender | Dummy variable, male = 1, female = 0. |
Entrepreneur age | Age | Business owners’ age in 2015. | |
Entrepreneurial education level | Edu | 1 = high school and below, 2 = college, 3 = bachelor’s degree, 4 = master’s degree. | |
Leadership turnover | Turnover | Set to 1 if there has been a previous change of leadership in the company, otherwise 0. | |
Firm age | Firm age | Number of years of business existence as of 2015. | |
Firm size | Firm size | Total enterprise assets (CNY million), taking the natural logarithm. | |
Board size | Bodsize | The total number of board of directors. | |
Family voting rights | FV | Total family ownership. | |
Percentage of family executives | FT | The number of family executives as a percentage of the total number of executives. | |
Duality | Dual | Set to 1 if the chairman is also the CEO, otherwise 0. | |
Past performance | Roa | Return on assets (ROA) of the company in 2014. | |
Industry | Industry | The financial sector was used as the control group, and agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, mining, and manufacturing were set up. 18 dummy variables, such as manufacturing industry. |
Variable | Mean | Standard Deviation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1. PI1 | 0.036 | 0.027 | 1.000 | ||||||
2. PI2 | 0.023 | 0.011 | −0.095 ** | 1.00 | |||||
3. PD | 0.678 | 7.541 | 0.122 *** | 0.091 ** | 1.000 | ||||
4. FB | 0.362 | 9.742 | 0.041 * | 0.027 | 0.235 * | 1.000 | |||
5. GD | 0.382 | 1.092 | 0.152 *** | 0.113 *** | 0.084 ** | −0.012 | 1.000 | ||
6. Gender | 0.891 | 0.323 | 0.052 | −0.012 | 0.061 | −0.037 | 0.076 + | 1.000 | |
7. Age | 47.621 | 8.112 | 0.021 | −0.034 | 0.548 | −0.038 | 0.036 | 0.175 ** | 1.000 |
8. Edu | 2.350 | 0.896 | 0.055 | 0.033 | 0.101 ** | 0.032 | −0.051 | −0.032 | −0.191 *** |
9. Firm age | 14.050 | 8.112 | 0.027 | 0.003 | −0.031 | −0.032 | 0.053 | 0.071 * | 0.352 *** |
10. Firm size | 8.471 | 1.902 | 0.153 *** | 0.062 + | 0.083 ** | 0.077 * | 0.029 | 0.137 *** | 0.192 *** |
11. Dual | 0.423 | 0.495 | −0.065 + | −0.024 | −0.057 | −0.038 | 0.055 | 0.043 | 0.042 |
12. Bodsize | 3.411 | 3.110 | 0.075 * | −0.021 | 0.053 | −0.043 | 0.021 | 0.062 + | 0.164 *** |
13. FT | 0.236 | 8.722 | 0.061 * | 0.027 | 0.235 * | 0.042 | 0.023 | 0.033 | 0.032 |
14. FV | 0.724 | 4.234 | 0.244 ** | −0.051 | 0.063 | −0.323 | 0.1231 | 0.162 | 0.574 |
15. Roa | 0.078 | 0.124 | −0.01 | 0.033 | 0.073 * | −0.112 ** | 0.061 | −0.072 * | −0.043 |
16. Turnover | 0.115 | 0.352 | 0.026 + | −0.021 | 0.089 ** | 0.048 * | 0.032 | −0.011 | −0.025 |
Variable | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
8. Edu | 1.000 | ||||||||
9. Firm age | −0.011 | 1.000 | |||||||
10. Firm size | 0.029 ** | 0.216 *** | 1.000 | ||||||
11. Dual | −0.027 * | 0.081 * | −0.023 | 1.000 | |||||
12. Bodsize | 0.130 *** | 0.128 *** | 0.252 *** | 0.121 *** | 1.000 | ||||
13. FT | 0.038 * | 0.031 | 0.059 ** | 0.072 | 0.237 *** | 1.000 | |||
14. FV | 0.037 | 0.295 * | 0.072 | 0.033 | 0.321 | 0.044 | 1.000 | ||
15. Roa | −0.041 | −0.024 | −0.132 *** | 0.021 | 0.012 | 0.024 | −0.025 | 1.000 | |
16. Turnover | 0.061 + | 0.117 ** | 0.019 ** | −0.037 * | 0.056 + | 0.034 | −0.045 | −0.245 | 1.000 |
High Ownership-Concentration Degree of Family Business | Low Ownership-Concentration Degree of Family Business | |
---|---|---|
Product-innovation intensity | 0.037 | 0.032 |
Process-innovation intensity | 0.020 | 0.026 |
Difference | 0.017 ** | 0.006 |
T-value | t = 1.842 | t = 2.150 |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
PD | 0.117 ** (0.037) | 0.118 ** (0.037) | 0.112 ** (0.037) | 0.111 ** (0.037) | |
PD × FB | 0.055 * (0.026) | 0.048 + (0.027) | |||
PD × GD | −0.066 * (0.032) | 0.067 * (0.032) | |||
Gender | 0.035 (0.089) | 0.038 (0.088) | 0.039 (0.088) | 0.037 (0.088) | 0.027 (0.088) |
Age | −0.003 (0.005) | −0.002 (0.005) | −0.004 (0.005) | −0.002 (0.005) | −0.005 (0.005) |
Edu | 0.025 * (0.032) | 0.023 * (0.031) | 0.025 * (0.031) | 0.024 * (0.031) | 0.027 * (0.031) |
Firm age | −0.003 (0.006) | −0.001 (0.002) | −0.004 (0.003) | −0.003 (0.003) | −0.002 (0.003) |
Firm size | 0.048 ** (0.016) | 0.046 ** (0.016) | 0.047 ** (0.016) | 0.047 ** (0.016) | 0.047 ** (0.016) |
Dual | −0.093 + (0.056) | −0.089 (0.055) | −0.090 (0.055) | −0.083 (0.055) | −0.085 (0.055) |
Bodsize | 0.009 (0.010) | 0.010 (0.009) | 0.011 (0.009) | 0.010 (0.009) | 0.011 (0.009) |
FT | −0.131 (0.321) | −0.127 (0.319) | −0.128 (0.319) | −0.104 (0.319) | −0.131 (0.318) |
FV | 0.112 (0.421) | 0.117 (0.417) | 0.118 (0.419) | 0.114 (0.412) | 0.111 (0.419) |
Roa | 0.023 ** (0.229) | 0.004 ** (0.228) | 0.011 ** (0.228) | 0.000 ** (0.228) | 0.007 ** (0.227) |
Turnover | 0.069 (0.078) | 0.078 (0.077) | 0.080 (0.077) | 0.074 (0.077) | 0.080 (0.077) |
Industry | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
FB | 0.043 * (0.017) | 0.039 * (0.017) | 0.032 + (0.017) | 0.038 * (0.017) | 0.030 + (0.017) |
GD | 0.105 ** (0.025) | 0.095 ** (0.025) | 0.092 ** (0.025) | 0.093 ** (0.025) | 0.089 ** (0.025) |
Constant | 1.898 *** (0.260) | 1.532 *** (0.283) | 1.541 *** (0.282) | 1.538 *** (0.282) | 1.569 *** (0.282) |
AdjustedR2 | 0.051 | 0.060 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.068 |
N | 882 | 882 | 882 | 882 | 882 |
Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Control variables | Control | Control | Control | Control |
PD | 0.115 ** (0.061) | 0.114 ** (0.067) | 0.113 ** (0.065) | 0.112 ** (0.069) |
PD × FB | 0.032 * (0.019) | 0.030 * (0.018) | ||
PD × GD | −0.061 * (0.030) | −0.061 * (0.030) | ||
Constant | 1.535 *** (0.232) | 1.549 *** (0.232) | 1.542 *** (0.232) | 1.553 *** (0.232) |
AdjustedR2 | 0.047 | 0.051 | 0.053 | 0.056 |
N | 882 | 882 | 882 | 882 |
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Wei, X.; Chen, L. Dispersion of Family Ownership and Innovation Input in Family Firms. Sustainability 2022, 14, 8418. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14148418
Wei X, Chen L. Dispersion of Family Ownership and Innovation Input in Family Firms. Sustainability. 2022; 14(14):8418. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14148418
Chicago/Turabian StyleWei, Xiao, and Ling Chen. 2022. "Dispersion of Family Ownership and Innovation Input in Family Firms" Sustainability 14, no. 14: 8418. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14148418