1. Introduction
Operational safety has always been pursued by the air transport industry as one of its primary goals towards development and sustainability. Although the air traffic control (ATC) system guides aircrafts’ daily operation, it also accompanies the safety of the air transport industry [
1]. Moreover, it has been found that skill-based errors (e.g., memory lapses and attention failures) made by air traffic controllers lead to incidents and accidents in the air transport industry [
2].
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) claims that the global air traffic demand will continue to grow in the long run. Therefore, the ever-increasing number of flights will impose more pressure on air traffic flow, which will further congest the airspace and lead to an ultra-high-density operational status. Meanwhile, the workloads of air traffic controllers would increase simultaneously following the growing demand for air traffic [
3]. Since the daily operation of air traffic will be more complicated than ever, the ATC system is required to take the initiative and deal with the upcoming pressure on the safety risks. To this end, the ICAO stresses the cruciality of implementing a safety management system (SMS) in the units that provide ATC services [
4]. Furthermore, the ICAO has released Annex 19 Safety Management to improve the safety management level worldwide [
5]. Although those ICAO publications provide a roadmap for member states to enhance their air traffic control systematically, they also raise the question of how to measure and assess the safety risk level properly in a constantly changing industry.
The safety risk level assessment identifies the weaknesses in the ATC system, reflects the operational status of the system, and highlights future work for improvement. Subsequently, it has become an essential part of the safety management system.
Attention has been found to improve the safety risk level of the ATC system toward the sustainable and safe development of air transportation [
6]. Precisely, Friedman and Carterette proposed the concept of the SHELL model, using software, hardware, environment, and liveware to clarify the scope of human factors in the aviation industry [
7]. In accordance with the SHELL model, Hawkins analyzed the human factors in the air transport field to gain insights into the relationships between the aviation system and the human component [
8]. Ternov and Akselsson conducted disturbance effect barrier (DEB) analysis to identify weaknesses that could lead to insufficient protection in the ATC system [
9]. Leveson proposed an accident cause model based on the System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), which analyzed the risk in the ATC system and expanded the current accident causality [
10]. Subotie et al. primarily investigated the performance of controllers and assessed the interaction between equipment failure and human reliability in the system [
11]. By identifying and analyzing different types of errors made by air traffic controllers, Shorrock suggested that the decision-making of a controller is dependent on whether operational safety can be achieved [
12]. Kirwan et al. collected human error data in the ATC system and assessed human reliability before giving suggestions about how to improve the safety level systematically [
13]. Chang illustrated the air traffic safety situation in Taiwan with statistical measurements [
14].
Regarding assessment approaches, Saaty proposed the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in the 1970s, which is a multi-criteria decision-making method combining qualitative and quantitative methods [
15]. Since then, AHP has been applied to many decision-making areas. For instance, Ding and Wang established a safety early-warning indicator system for the ATC system using the AHP method [
16]. Shyur applied the proportional hazard model for the first time to analyze the accidents and safety indicators in the aviation field. It was concluded that human error is the major cause of safety risk accidents in the ATC system [
17].
Other methods have been introduced into the air transport industry as well. For example, Du et al. and Zhang et al. assessed the safety risks in ATC systems with the fuzzy comprehensive assessment method [
18,
19]. Vismari and Camargo measured the safety level of the ATC system through a random Perti network [
20]. Wen built a gray multi-level model for an air traffic safety risk assessment [
21]. Yang simulated the possible scenarios and predicted the safety risks of the ATC system, taking the system dynamics into consideration [
22]. Liu et al. and Zhang et al. applied the matter element extension theory to evaluate the safety status of the ATC system [
23,
24]. Yuan et al. assessed the operational safety level of the ATC system based on the evidence synthesis theory [
25]. Zhao and Wan analyzed the operational risks of the ATC system by introducing the set pair method [
26]. Wang et al. proposed a trajectory-based landing risk assessment method using Bayesian update, and they claimed that their model can predict the occurrence of landing accidents [
27]. Hu et al. proposed a risk-based operational safety bound for unmanned air traffic to enhance operational safety [
28,
29].
Although the above-mentioned papers provided techniques that have been widely applied in the aviation industry, they have their defects and limitations. To be more specific, references [
6,
7,
8,
9,
10,
11,
12,
13] revealed the safety risk levels qualitatively rather than quantitatively, and the quantitative methods in references [
14,
15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26] have defects and deficiencies. For instance, the applicability of those statistics methods highly depends on the incident and accident data sample. Since the sample should be consistent with the safety management level, it limits the application of the mathematical statistics method in the ATC field. The AHP requires judgment calls from the professionals and experts, implying that the results could be affected by their knowledge and experience in safety and risk assessment. Additionally, the AHP can only assess a limited number of indicators; otherwise, the calculation process would be time-consuming. Additionally, the accuracy of the fuzzy comprehensive assessment method can be easily affected by the reviewer. Besides, the system dynamics methods require accurately predetermined parameters to achieve objective results, which is not easy to achieve in the real world. Regarding the proportional risk model, the indicators are static instead of time-varying. In other words, those indicators can hardly reveal the operational safety trend of the ever-changing ATC system. Although the Perti network theory does not reveal the ambiguity of the ATC safety management level, the determination of the whitening weight function in the grey clustering method lacks certain theoretical bases. The matter element extension model determines the level of the assessment object based on the maximum membership principle. Nonetheless, the assessment matter element information may be lost, which may lead to errors. The lack of theoretical basis makes the evidence synthesis theory controversial, and the possibility of exponential explosion in calculation further questions its rationality and validity. Lastly, the set pair theory continues to develop. The way it determines the difference coefficient between [−1, 1] is simple and rough, and cannot fully demonstrate the evolutionary laws of a system. Regarding references [
27,
28,
29], the Bayesian-based method is not ideal for the civil aviation industry since it requires the prior probability and more data, and the risk-based dynamic tropic operational safety bound has only been tested on unmanned air traffic, which is less complex than civil aviation.
The ATC system is a complex scheme. There are considerable qualitative indicators and ambiguous information that should be carefully evaluated. However, the above-mentioned conventional methods tend to leave some of the critical information behind due to the gray characteristics of the risk assessment of the ATC system. To fill the gap, this study proposes a safety risk assessment model for the ATC system and contributes to the previous literature.
This paper contributes to the sustainable development of air transport by introducing game theory [
30,
31,
32,
33] into the weighing system for the initial indicator assessments. To overcome the ambiguity and randomness of the indicators, the cloud model [
34,
35,
36] is applied to solve the conversion of uncertain knowledge between qualitative and quantitative measurements. Furthermore, this paper introduces the matter element model [
37,
38,
39] to explore the internal characteristics of those indicators and obtain an in-depth understanding of their incompatibility. Lastly, this study replaces the certain value in the conventional matter element theory with the cloud model to build a cloud matter element assessment [
40,
41,
42] for safety risk assessment of the ATC system. Generating the assessment cloud of the indicators, this study presents a comprehensive safety risk assessment using the correlation function of the matter element theory. Consequently, this study expands the research scope to game theory and cloud matter element analysis, which contributes to the previous literature on the sustainable development of interdisciplinarity.
3. The Safety Risk Assessment for the ATC System
Figure 2 reveals the safety risk assessment process for the ATC system. The assessment started with experts conducting field research on the safety risk management status of the ATC units. In this study, eight experts were invited to an ATC unit in China to examine the applicability and the robustness of the proposed method. After scoring each indicator listed in
Table 1, a game theory-based cloud matter element assessment model was introduced for the analysis and evaluation. As discussed in the model specification, this research first combined weights using game theory before multiplying with the cloud matter element matrix to calculate the correlation degree of the respective indicator. The result represents the quantitative outcomes of the safety risk degree, showing the safety risk in the ATC system.
3.1. The Combined Weighting Processes
3.1.1. The AHP-Based Weighting Process
This study invited eight experts to an ATC unit in China and scored each of the indicators listed in
Table 1. Based on the above discussion in
Section 2.2.1, the AHP-based weighting process required the experts to conduct a pairwise comparison and build a matrix for the indicators (see
Table 2).
This study took the criterion layer as an example to demonstrate the AHP calculating process. Based on the experts’ opinions, the judgment matrix of the four criteria could be written as:
Then, the maximum eigen root and eigenvector of the matrix were calculated with Equation (2), where
and
. Equation (3) calculated the weights (
) of the criteria (see the second column in
Table 5). Since the
was less than 0.10, the judgment matrix passed the consistency test. Similarly, the second column in
Table 6 illustrates the AHP-based weighting results for the indicator layers from N1 to N4.
3.1.2. The OWA-Based Weighting Process
Regarding the OWA-based weights, this study still took the criterion layer as an example to demonstrate the calculating process.
Firstly, the eight experts scored the criteria with multiples of 0.5, ranging from 0 to 5, to evaluate their relative importance (see
Table 7). The higher the score, the more important the criterion.
Then, the scores were reorganized in descending order and four new datasets built as follows:
Next, the set of weight vectors were calculated based on Equation (8), where
. Lastly, Equations (9) and (10) calculated the absolute weight value of the four criteria (see the third column in
Table 5). Likewise, the third column in
Table 6 illustrates the OWA-based weighting results for the indicator layers.
3.1.3. The Game Theory-Based Combined Weighting Process
The game theory-based combined weights were obtained with the weight vector from the AHP and OWA operator in the first two steps. Take the criterion layer as an example. First, the weight vectors
and
represent the AHP- and OWA-based weights, respectively (see the second and third columns of
Table 6). According to Equations (13) and (14), the weight coefficient for the AHP method (
) equaled 1.7149, whereas the weight coefficient for the OWA method (
) equaled 0.7893. After normalizing with Equation (15),
and
. The combined weights for the criteria are listed in the last column of
Table 6, based on Equation (16).
Table 7 reveals the combined weights for the indicator layer, which were calculated with an identical process.
3.2. The Safety Risk Level Assessment for the ATC System
The safety risk correlation degrees of each indicator for each safety risk level cloud were determined by Equation (21) (see
Table 8 and
Figure 3). Based on Equation (22), the correlation degrees of four criteria layers to the five safety risk level clouds were calculated. Lastly,
Table 9 and
Figure 4 demonstrate the comprehensive correlation degree of the corresponding safety risk level cloud of the ATC unit calculated based on Equation (23).
As shown in
Table 9, the maximum comprehensive correlation degree of the ATC unit was 0.1824. Although the safety risk assessment level of the ATC unit fell into Level IV, the unit maintained a relatively high level of safety. In other words, the operational safety of ATC can be guaranteed. The results are consistent with the actual safety risk level of the ATC unit, thus verifying the applicability of the proposed method.
Moreover, it is noticeable that the N1 was in Level V, which was the highest level among all indicators and one step away from Level IV. this reveals the vulnerability of manpower and reminds the authority to pay attention to the training of new controllers.
The safety risk level for N2 fell into Level IV. Although the equipment maintained a relatively high level of operational safety, the safety risk level could be further enhanced by improving the operation and management equipment.
The safety risk level for N3 was Level IV, indicating that the superior environment helps the ATC unit to maintain its high level of safety. However, there is still room for improvement.
The comprehensive correlation degree of safety risk level in the management field was the worst compared with other indicators. Therefore, the safety risk level for N4 fell into Level III. Among all the indicators in N4, the execution of the management system (N44) showed the worst result, which sounds the alarm to authorities to maintain constant monitoring of ATC units.
3.3. Model Comparison
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed method, this research conducted a comparative analysis with the fuzzy comprehensive assessment method and the gray multi-level assessment method (see
Table 10). The results of the cloud matter element analysis are consistent with those of the other two methods, verifying the applicability of the proposed method in assessing the safety risk of the ATC system.
However, the fuzzy method only considers the objective weight and leaves the subjective one behind, which reduces the creditability of the results. In contrast, the gray method only considers the subjective weight. By combining the weights based on game theory, the proposed cloud matter element model fills the gap of the previous approaches and provides results with more reliability and rationality.