Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- What are the conditions for the MHW separation strategy between government and residents to evolve into the maximization of environmental benefits?
- (2)
- What stimulus mechanisms can the government choose to drive residents to separate MHW? Which mechanism works best?
2. Literature Review
3. Problem Description and Assumption
3.1. Problem Description
3.2. Model Assumption
4. Evolutionary Game Model
4.1. Game Model
4.2. Model Analysis
5. Simulation Analysis
5.1. Environmental Fee Rate
5.2. Subsidy Intensity
5.3. Penalty Intensity
5.4. Government Effort
6. Discussion
6.1. Condition of “Ideal State”
6.2. Environmental Fee Rate
6.3. Subsidy Intensity
6.4. Penalty Intensity
6.5. Government Effort
6.6. Limitation and Future Work
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
- (1)
- In the game between the government and residents, due to the high opportunity cost of residents and lack of motivation to separate MHW, in the absence of government regulation, residents often choose not to separate;
- (2)
- The increase in environmental fee rates has a significant impact on residents’ decision-making behavior;
- (3)
- The increase in subsidy intensity has a weak impact on residents’ decision-making behavior, and its incentive effect is not obvious;
- (4)
- The increase in government regulation efforts has a greater impact on residents, but it is interesting that the increase in government regulation efforts will significantly reduce the enthusiasm of government regulation;
- (5)
- Surprisingly, residents are most sensitive to the increase in the penalty coefficient. The increase in the penalty coefficient can significantly promote residents to separate MHW;
- (6)
- Among the three reward and punishment mechanisms, the punishment mechanism can stimulate residents to separate MHW more than the reward mechanism.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Parameters | Descriptions |
---|---|
The residents’ cost for MHW separation (e.g., time cost, economic cost) | |
The government’ cost for regulation | |
The rewards of residents without MHW separation | |
The rewards of residents with MHW separation | |
The environmental values of MHW separation | |
The subsidies for residents with MHW separation | |
The penalties for residents without MHW separation | |
The loss of government credibility without regulation | |
The environmental loss of MHW non-separation | |
The amount of MHW | |
The effort coefficient of residents to separate MHW | |
The environmental fee rate for residents without MHW separation | |
The environmental fee rate for residents with MHW separation | |
The effort coefficient of government to implement regulations | |
The penalty coefficient of the government | |
The subsidy coefficient of the government | |
Variables | Descriptions |
The probability that residents separate MHW | |
The probability that government implement the regulation |
Government | Regulate | Not Regulate | |
---|---|---|---|
Residents | |||
Separate | |||
Not separate |
Equilibrium Point | det.J | tr.J |
---|---|---|
O(0,0) | MN | M + N |
A(0,1) | −N(M + K) | M − V − D |
B(1,0) | −MV | V − M |
C(1,1) | V(M + K) | −(M + N + D) |
D(x*,y*) | −[MNV(M + K)]/[K(K + D)] | 0 |
Scenario | Assumption | Equilibrium Point | Symbol of det.J | Symbol of tr.J | Local Stability |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Scenario 1 | M < 0 | O(0,0) | + | − | ESS |
M + K < 0 | A(0,1) | − | − | Saddle point | |
N < 0 | B(1,0) | + | + | Instability point | |
V > 0 | C(1,1) | − | N | Saddle point | |
D(x*,y*) | − | 0 | Saddle point | ||
Scenario 2 | M < 0 | O(0,0) | + | − | ESS |
M + K < 0 | A(0,1) | − | N | Saddle point | |
N < 0 | B(1,0) | − | N | Saddle point | |
V < 0 | C(1,1) | + | N | Saddle point | |
D(x*,y*) | + | 0 | Saddle point | ||
Scenario 3 | M < 0 | O(0,0) | − | N | Saddle point |
M + K < 0 | A(0,1) | + | − | ESS | |
N > 0 | B(1,0) | + | + | Instability point | |
V > 0 | C(1,1) | − | N | Saddle point | |
D(x*,y*) | + | 0 | Saddle point | ||
Scenario 4 | O(0,0) | + | + | Instability point | |
M > 0 | A(0,1) | − | N | Saddle point | |
N > 0 | B(1,0) | + | − | ESS | |
V < 0 | C(1,1) | − | − | Saddle point | |
D(x*,y*) | − | 0 | Saddle point | ||
Scenario 5 | O(0,0) | − | − | Saddle point | |
M > 0 | A(0,1) | + | N | Saddle point | |
N < 0 | B(1,0) | + | − | ESS | |
V < 0 | C(1,1) | − | N | Saddle point | |
D(x*,y*) | + | 0 | Saddle point | ||
Scenario 6 | M > 0 | O(0,0) | + | + | Instability point |
M + K > 0 | A(0,1) | − | N | Saddle point | |
N > 0 | B(1,0) | − | N | Saddle point | |
V > 0 | C(1,1) | + | − | ESS | |
D(x*,y*) | + | 0 | Saddle point | ||
Scenario 7 | M < 0 | O(0,0) | − | N | Saddle point |
M + K > 0 | A(0,1) | − | − | Saddle point | |
N > 0 | B(1,0) | + | + | Instability point | |
V > 0 | C(1,1) | + | N | Saddle point | |
D(x*,y*) | − | 0 | Saddle point |
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Wu, X.; Zhang, L.; Huang, J.; Li, W.; Chen, Y.; Qiu, W. Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation. Sustainability 2021, 13, 11421. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011421
Wu X, Zhang L, Huang J, Li W, Chen Y, Qiu W. Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation. Sustainability. 2021; 13(20):11421. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011421
Chicago/Turabian StyleWu, Xueping, Liping Zhang, Jianhua Huang, Wei Li, Yanhua Chen, and Wenhai Qiu. 2021. "Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation" Sustainability 13, no. 20: 11421. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011421