Company Reputation, Implied Cost of Capital and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Korea
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
2.1. Literature
2.2. Hypothesis Development
3. Research Design
3.1. Measuring Variables
3.1.1. Company Reputation
3.1.2. Implied Cost of Capital
3.1.3. Tax Avoidance
3.2. Research Model
COCPEG | Measure of cost of capital, based on Easton (2004). |
COCMPEG | Measure of cost of capital based on Easton (2004). |
COCGM | Measure of cost of capital, based on Gode and Mohanram (2003). |
COCAVG | The average of cost of capital measured according to the method used by Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004). |
REPUTATION | Measured as the company’s score on Korea BSTI list in the year and set to 0 for non-BSTI companies. |
SIZE | Natural log of total assets. |
LEV | Total debts for year t scaled by total assets at the end of the year. |
ROA | Return on assets, measured by net income scaled by total assets. |
MTB | Market to book ratio for the end of year t, measured as market value of equity divided by book value of equity. |
BETA | Beta estimated from CAPM model over the fiscal year. |
DA | Jones model discretionary accruals. |
FORN | The proportion of common shares held by foreigners. |
OWN | The proportion of common shares held by controlling holders. |
3.3. Sample Selection
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Empirical Results
4.2.1. Main Results
4.2.2. Additional Analyses
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Year | Reputation = 0 | Reputation = 1 | Total |
---|---|---|---|
2003 | 91 | 11 | 102 |
2004 | 95 | 17 | 112 |
2005 | 85 | 17 | 102 |
2006 | 97 | 14 | 111 |
2007 | 126 | 14 | 140 |
2008 | 97 | 16 | 113 |
2009 | 127 | 18 | 145 |
2010 | 125 | 17 | 142 |
2011 | 127 | 19 | 146 |
2012 | 81 | 16 | 97 |
2013 | 107 | 15 | 122 |
2014 | 122 | 16 | 138 |
2015 | 123 | 19 | 142 |
2016 | 119 | 22 | 141 |
Total | 1522 | 231 | 1753 |
Variables | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Q1 | Median | Q3 | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
COCPEG | 0.132 | 0.062 | 0.038 | 0.090 | 0.118 | 0.160 | 0.370 |
COCMPEG | 0.142 | 0.064 | 0.044 | 0.098 | 0.127 | 0.170 | 0.383 |
COCGM | 0.141 | 0.063 | 0.043 | 0.098 | 0.127 | 0.170 | 0.382 |
COCAVG | 0.138 | 0.063 | 0.043 | 0.096 | 0.125 | 0.166 | 0.377 |
REPUTATION | 0.132 | 0.338 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
CASH ETR | 0.239 | 0.199 | 0.000 | 0.121 | 0.224 | 0.298 | 1.000 |
SIZE | 21.067 | 1.510 | 18.301 | 19.949 | 20.942 | 22.110 | 24.840 |
LEV | 0.429 | 0.175 | 0.084 | 0.288 | 0.438 | 0.565 | 0.805 |
ROA | 0.071 | 0.052 | 0.001 | 0.032 | 0.060 | 0.098 | 0.255 |
MTB | 1.662 | 1.437 | 0.264 | 0.791 | 1.221 | 1.950 | 8.575 |
BETA | 0.849 | 0.382 | 0.093 | 0.568 | 0.826 | 1.120 | 1.735 |
DA | 0.000 | 0.063 | −0.186 | −0.037 | −0.003 | 0.035 | 0.187 |
FORN | 0.205 | 0.163 | 0.000 | 0.069 | 0.164 | 0.313 | 0.689 |
OWN | 0.403 | 0.153 | 0.086 | 0.302 | 0.388 | 0.509 | 0.750 |
COCPEG | COCMPEG | COCGM | COCAVG | REPUTATION | CASH ETR | SIZE | LEV | ROA | MTB | BETA | DA | FORN | OWN | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
COCPEG | 0.991 | 0.989 | 0.996 | −0.175 | 0.005 | −0.228 | 0.254 | −0.170 | −0.259 | 0.068 | 0.071 | −0.224 | 0.022 | |
COCMPEG | 0.985 | 0.997 | 0.999 | −0.181 | 0.004 | −0.244 | 0.241 | −0.158 | −0.286 | 0.038 | 0.066 | −0.215 | 0.039 | |
COCGM | 0.985 | 0.997 | 0.998 | −0.181 | 0.000 | −0.236 | 0.247 | −0.161 | −0.281 | 0.046 | 0.064 | −0.214 | 0.036 | |
COCAVG | 0.993 | 0.998 | 0.998 | −0.180 | 0.003 | −0.237 | 0.248 | −0.163 | −0.276 | 0.051 | 0.067 | −0.218 | 0.032 | |
REPUTATION | −0.179 | −0.188 | −0.187 | −0.185 | −0.011 | 0.349 | −0.004 | 0.127 | 0.130 | −0.062 | −0.113 | 0.395 | −0.154 | |
CASH ETR | −0.049 | −0.040 | −0.046 | −0.045 | 0.001 | −0.019 | 0.027 | −0.184 | 0.017 | −0.014 | −0.036 | 0.011 | 0.015 | |
SIZE | −0.208 | −0.231 | −0.223 | −0.221 | 0.333 | −0.060 | 0.292 | −0.121 | 0.023 | 0.287 | −0.080 | 0.403 | −0.203 | |
LEV | 0.265 | 0.255 | 0.258 | 0.261 | −0.006 | −0.026 | 0.324 | −0.362 | 0.037 | 0.252 | 0.015 | −0.165 | −0.043 | |
ROA | −0.189 | −0.171 | −0.172 | −0.178 | 0.108 | −0.082 | −0.169 | −0.390 | 0.419 | −0.046 | 0.081 | 0.271 | −0.036 | |
MTB | −0.307 | −0.353 | −0.339 | −0.334 | 0.133 | 0.043 | 0.080 | 0.006 | 0.415 | 0.024 | −0.030 | 0.266 | −0.103 | |
BETA | 0.083 | 0.051 | 0.057 | 0.063 | −0.062 | −0.072 | 0.294 | 0.251 | −0.079 | 0.056 | 0.055 | −0.021 | −0.201 | |
DA | 0.064 | 0.056 | 0.052 | 0.057 | −0.137 | −0.056 | −0.071 | 0.023 | 0.034 | −0.062 | 0.060 | −0.100 | 0.055 | |
FORN | −0.265 | −0.265 | −0.257 | −0.263 | 0.366 | 0.085 | 0.436 | −0.139 | 0.267 | 0.284 | −0.016 | −0.094 | −0.289 | |
OWN | 0.031 | 0.046 | 0.038 | 0.038 | −0.154 | 0.017 | −0.187 | −0.046 | −0.020 | −0.151 | −0.216 | 0.045 | −0.317 |
Variables | COCPEG | COCMPEG | COCGM | COCAVG | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | |||||
Intercept | 0.332 | 12.69 | *** | 0.353 | 13.35 | *** | 0.345 | 13.05 | *** | 0.343 | 13.07 | *** |
REPUTATION | −0.008 | −1.76 | * | −0.010 | −2.13 | ** | −0.010 | −2.20 | ** | −0.009 | −2.04 | ** |
SIZE | −0.013 | −10.99 | *** | −0.014 | −11.26 | *** | −0.013 | −11.04 | *** | −0.013 | −11.13 | *** |
LEV | 0.113 | 11.71 | *** | 0.118 | 12.01 | *** | 0.118 | 12.09 | *** | 0.116 | 11.97 | *** |
ROA | −0.027 | −0.84 | −0.004 | −0.12 | −0.009 | −0.26 | −0.013 | −0.40 | ||||
MTB | −0.010 | −9.18 | *** | −0.012 | −10.63 | *** | −0.012 | −10.39 | *** | −0.011 | −10.10 | *** |
BETA | 0.007 | 1.73 | * | 0.003 | 0.80 | 0.004 | 0.91 | 0.005 | 1.16 | |||
DA | 0.021 | 1.00 | 0.016 | 0.75 | 0.014 | 0.67 | 0.017 | 0.79 | ||||
FORN | 0.010 | 0.94 | 0.017 | 1.64 | 0.017 | 1.63 | 0.016 | 1.43 | ||||
OWN | −0.007 | −0.72 | 0.001 | 0.07 | 0.000 | 0.02 | −0.002 | −0.21 | ||||
Fixed effect | Industry and Year | |||||||||||
Adj R2 | 0.273 | 0.294 | 0.290 | 0.287 | ||||||||
N | 1753 | 1753 | 1753 | 1753 |
Panel A: Aggressive Tax Avoidance Groups | ||||||||||||
Variables | COCPEG | COCMPEG | COCGM | COCAVG | ||||||||
Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | |||||
Intercept | 0.450 | 6.83 | *** | 0.485 | 7.32 | *** | 0.475 | 7.21 | *** | 0.470 | 7.14 | *** |
REPUTATION | −0.004 | −0.30 | −0.003 | −0.25 | −0.004 | −0.36 | −0.004 | −0.30 | ||||
SIZE | −0.018 | −6.20 | *** | −0.019 | −6.56 | *** | −0.019 | −6.50 | *** | −0.019 | −6.43 | *** |
LEV | 0.116 | 4.74 | *** | 0.119 | 4.82 | *** | 0.120 | 4.88 | *** | 0.118 | 4.82 | *** |
ROA | −0.055 | −0.80 | −0.035 | −0.51 | −0.044 | −0.65 | −0.044 | −0.65 | ||||
MTB | −0.019 | −4.84 | *** | −0.022 | −5.45 | *** | −0.021 | −5.22 | *** | −0.021 | −5.18 | *** |
BETA | 0.010 | 0.95 | 0.006 | 0.58 | 0.007 | 0.60 | 0.008 | 0.71 | ||||
DA | 0.018 | 0.39 | 0.010 | 0.21 | 0.011 | 0.24 | 0.013 | 0.27 | ||||
FORN | 0.027 | 0.91 | 0.037 | 1.24 | 0.040 | 1.34 | 0.035 | 1.17 | ||||
OWN | −0.051 | −2.16 | ** | −0.045 | −1.91 | * | −0.043 | −1.84 | * | −0.047 | −1.98 | ** |
Fixed effect | Industry and Year | |||||||||||
Adj R2 | 0.293 | 0.305 | 0.306 | 0.301 | ||||||||
N | 350 | 350 | 350 | 350 | ||||||||
Panel B: Non-Aggressive Tax Avoidance Groups | ||||||||||||
Variables | COCPEG | COCMPEG | COCGM | COCAVG | ||||||||
Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | |||||
Intercept | 0.309 | 10.78 | *** | 0.326 | 11.22 | *** | 0.318 | 10.95 | *** | 0.318 | 11.02 | *** |
REPUTATION | −0.008 | −1.72 | * | −0.010 | −2.15 | ** | −0.010 | −2.20 | ** | −0.010 | −2.04 | ** |
SIZE | −0.012 | −9.10 | *** | −0.012 | −9.19 | *** | −0.012 | −8.99 | *** | −0.012 | −9.13 | *** |
LEV | 0.109 | 10.19 | *** | 0.115 | 10.57 | *** | 0.115 | 10.62 | *** | 0.113 | 10.49 | *** |
ROA | −0.026 | −0.67 | 0.000 | 0.00 | −0.002 | −0.05 | −0.009 | −0.24 | ||||
MTB | −0.009 | −7.89 | *** | −0.011 | −9.23 | *** | −0.011 | −9.06 | *** | −0.011 | −8.76 | *** |
BETA | 0.005 | 1.03 | 0.001 | 0.25 | 0.001 | 0.30 | 0.002 | 0.54 | ||||
DA | 0.022 | 0.95 | 0.018 | 0.77 | 0.015 | 0.63 | 0.018 | 0.78 | ||||
FORN | 0.010 | 0.83 | 0.016 | 1.39 | 0.016 | 1.38 | 0.014 | 1.20 | ||||
OWN | 0.004 | 0.40 | 0.011 | 1.09 | 0.011 | 1.04 | 0.009 | 0.85 | ||||
Fixed effect | Industry and Year | |||||||||||
Adj R2 | 0.258 | 0.285 | 0.278 | 0.274 | ||||||||
N | 1403 | 1403 | 1403 | 1403 |
Variables | COCPEG | COCMPEG | COCGM | COCAVG | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | Estimate | t-Stat | |||||
Intercept | 0.219 | 4.17 | *** | 0.226 | 4.20 | *** | 0.224 | 4.14 | *** | 0.223 | 4.18 | *** |
REPUTATION | −0.009 | −1.94 | * | −0.011 | −2.46 | ** | −0.012 | −2.62 | *** | −0.011 | −2.35 | ** |
SIZE | −0.007 | −3.17 | *** | −0.007 | −3.17 | *** | −0.007 | −3.12 | *** | −0.007 | −3.16 | *** |
LEV | 0.075 | 4.76 | *** | 0.089 | 5.54 | *** | 0.090 | 5.57 | *** | 0.084 | 5.31 | *** |
ROA | −0.039 | −0.76 | −0.013 | −0.24 | −0.016 | −0.31 | −0.023 | −0.44 | ||||
MTB | −0.005 | −2.95 | *** | −0.006 | −3.95 | *** | −0.006 | −3.84 | *** | −0.006 | −3.59 | *** |
BETA | 0.015 | 2.19 | ** | 0.010 | 1.47 | 0.009 | 1.27 | 0.011 | 1.65 | * | ||
DA | 0.014 | 0.43 | 0.012 | 0.36 | 0.014 | 0.40 | 0.013 | 0.40 | ||||
FORN | −0.010 | −0.60 | 0.005 | 0.29 | 0.006 | 0.33 | 0.000 | 0.01 | ||||
OWN | −0.008 | −0.52 | 0.005 | 0.31 | 0.003 | 0.21 | 0.000 | 0.00 | ||||
Fixed effect | Industry and Year | |||||||||||
Adj R2 | 0.291 | 0.293 | 0.290 | 0.291 | ||||||||
N | 462 | 462 | 462 | 462 |
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Kim, I.; Kim, J.; Kang, J. Company Reputation, Implied Cost of Capital and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Korea. Sustainability 2020, 12, 9997. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12239997
Kim I, Kim J, Kang J. Company Reputation, Implied Cost of Capital and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Korea. Sustainability. 2020; 12(23):9997. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12239997
Chicago/Turabian StyleKim, Imhyeon, Jinsoo Kim, and Jeongyeon Kang. 2020. "Company Reputation, Implied Cost of Capital and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Korea" Sustainability 12, no. 23: 9997. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12239997
APA StyleKim, I., Kim, J., & Kang, J. (2020). Company Reputation, Implied Cost of Capital and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Korea. Sustainability, 12(23), 9997. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12239997