Alliance Decision of Supply Chain Considering Product Greenness and Recycling Competition
School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi 214122, China
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Sustainability 2019, 11(24), 6900; https://doi.org/10.3390/su11246900
Received: 19 October 2019 / Revised: 29 November 2019 / Accepted: 30 November 2019 / Published: 4 December 2019
In a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), the right alliance can help manufacturers better manufacture green products and make more profits. Choosing the most suitable alliance partner is also critical for manufacturers. In regard to product greenness and recycling competition, this paper considers the CLSC comprised of a dominant manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. Based on the Stackelberg game and equilibrium analysis, we discuss the optimal supply chain decision-making under four different models. Then, in order to ensure supply chain (SC) members’ enthusiasm to participate in the alliance, we design a profit distribution method to distribute the total profit to SC members. The results show that manufacturer’s optimal alliance decision is related to the degree of recycling competition. When less than the threshold, C alliance(the manufacturer make an alliance with the retailer and the third-party recycler at the same time) is optimal, otherwise, MR alliance(the manufacturer and the retailer make an alliance ) is more beneficial for the manufacturer.
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MDPI and ACS Style
Liu, Y.; Shi, Q.-Q.; Xu, Q. Alliance Decision of Supply Chain Considering Product Greenness and Recycling Competition. Sustainability 2019, 11, 6900.
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