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Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

Division of Mathematical Science for Social Systems, Graduate School of Engineering Science, Osaka University, 1-3 Machikaneyama-Cho, Toyonaka City 560-8531, Japan
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Sustainability 2019, 11(18), 5030; https://doi.org/10.3390/su11185030
Received: 31 July 2019 / Revised: 31 August 2019 / Accepted: 11 September 2019 / Published: 14 September 2019
(This article belongs to the Section Economic and Business Aspects of Sustainability)
The government plays a critical role in the promotion of recycling strategy among supply chain members. The purpose of this study is to investigate the optimal government policies on closed-loop supply chains and how these policies impact the market demand and the returning strategies of manufacturers and retailers. This paper presents a design of closed-loop supply chains under government regulation by considering a novel three-stage game theoretic model. Firstly, Stackelberg models are adopted to describe the one-shot game between the manufacturer and the retailer in a local market. Secondly, based on the Stackelberg equilibriums, a repeated and dynamic population game is developed. Thirdly, the government analyzes the population game to find the optimal tax and subsidy policies in the whole market. To solve the proposed model, the idea of backward induction is adopted. The results suggest that, by collecting tax and allocating subsidy, the government can influence the market demands and return rates. The centralized supply chain structure is always preferred for the government and the market. The government prefers to allocate subsidy to low-pollution, low-profit remanufactured products. The environmental attention of the government affects the subsidy policy. View Full-Text
Keywords: closed-loop supply chain; Stackelberg competition; evolutionary game; government regulation closed-loop supply chain; Stackelberg competition; evolutionary game; government regulation
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MDPI and ACS Style

Liu, Z.; Nishi, T. Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. Sustainability 2019, 11, 5030. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11185030

AMA Style

Liu Z, Nishi T. Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. Sustainability. 2019; 11(18):5030. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11185030

Chicago/Turabian Style

Liu, Ziang, and Tatsushi Nishi. 2019. "Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy" Sustainability 11, no. 18: 5030. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11185030

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