Next Article in Journal
Relationship Modeling of Critical Success Factors for Enhancing Sustainability and Performance in E-Learning
Next Article in Special Issue
Assessment of Public–Private Partnership in Municipal Solid Waste Management in Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Previous Article in Journal
Relationship between Vegetation and Environment in an Arid-Hot Valley in Southwestern China
Previous Article in Special Issue
Resource Harvesting through a Systematic Deconstruction of the Residential House: A Case Study of the ‘Whole House Reuse’ Project in Christchurch, New Zealand
Article

Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services

1
Department of Economics and Business, University of Piemonte Orientale, 28100 Novara, Italy
2
HERMES (Higher Education and Research on Mobility regulation and the Economics of local Services), 10122 Torino, Italy
3
School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, 39100 Bolzano, Italy
4
Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, University of Torino, 10134 Torino, Italy
5
Collegio Carlo Alberto, 10122 Torino, Italy
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2018, 10(12), 4775; https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124775
Received: 7 November 2018 / Revised: 7 December 2018 / Accepted: 11 December 2018 / Published: 14 December 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Environmental, Social and Economic Sustainability of Waste Management)
This paper explores the link between voters’ information, corruption, and efficiency in the context of a career concern model, where politically connected local monopolies are in charge of the provision of a local public service. We find that both a corrupt environment and a low level of voters’ information on managerial actions induce managers to reduce effort levels, thereby contributing to drive down efficiency. We test our predictions using data on solid waste management services provided by a large sample of Italian municipalities. We estimate a stochastic cost frontier model that provides robust evidence that services produced in more corrupted regions with low voters’ information are substantially less cost-efficient. View Full-Text
Keywords: fight against corruption; economic vote; inefficiency of the public sector; new models of public management; Governance 4.0 fight against corruption; economic vote; inefficiency of the public sector; new models of public management; Governance 4.0
MDPI and ACS Style

Abrate, G.; Boffa, F.; Erbetta, F.; Vannoni, D. Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services. Sustainability 2018, 10, 4775. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124775

AMA Style

Abrate G, Boffa F, Erbetta F, Vannoni D. Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services. Sustainability. 2018; 10(12):4775. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124775

Chicago/Turabian Style

Abrate, Graziano, Federico Boffa, Fabrizio Erbetta, and Davide Vannoni. 2018. "Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services" Sustainability 10, no. 12: 4775. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124775

Find Other Styles
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Access Map by Country/Region

1
Back to TopTop