Understanding Security Vulnerabilities in Private 5G Networks: Insights from a Literature Review
Abstract
1. Introduction
- (i)
- To identify and categorize the main security vulnerabilities in private 5G networks;
- (ii)
- To analyze risks affecting data confidentiality, integrity, and availability;
- (iii)
- To examine mitigation strategies proposed in the literature;
- (iv)
- To highlight gaps and opportunities for future research.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Background
2.2. Architecture of Private 5G Networks
2.3. Security in 5G Networks
2.4. Summary of the Literature Review
3. Methodology
3.1. Review Approach
3.1.1. Rationale for Using a Review
3.1.2. Overview of the Review Process
3.2. Defining the Research Question
- What specific vulnerabilities exist within private 5G networks?
- How do these vulnerabilities affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability?
- What mitigation strategies have been proposed in the literature?
3.3. Selecting Databases and Research Sources
3.4. Defining Search Terms, Keywords, and Scope
3.5. Merging Results from Multiple Databases
3.6. Screening, Study Selection, and Eligibility Criteria
- Relevance: Studies addressing vulnerabilities, risks, or threats in private 5G networks.
- Recency: Publications between 2014 and 2024 to capture recent developments.
- Quality: Peer-reviewed sources or credible technical reports.
3.7. Review and Data Extraction Process
- Identified vulnerabilities such as jamming, spoofing, and edge-based threats.
- Proposed mitigation strategies including blockchain frameworks, quantum-safe cryptography, and zero-trust architectures.
- Implementation challenges like scalability and interoperability constraints.
3.8. Synthesizing the Results
4. Results and Findings
4.1. Comparison of Security Vulnerabilities in Public and Private 5G Networks
4.2. Analysis of Findings
4.2.1. Identified Security Vulnerabilities
4.2.2. Themes and Patterns
Similarities
- Network slicing security: Ensuring complete isolation between slices.
- Zero-trust architectures: Continuous verification for all users and devices [23].
- Advanced cryptography: Implementing quantum-resistant encryption.
Differences
- Regulatory and Deployment Challenges: Private 5G deployment is often constrained by regulatory barriers, including prolonged spectrum allocation processes and limited access to affordable spectrum. These obstacles create logistical and financial burdens, hindering widespread adoption. Streamlined regulatory frameworks and improved spectrum accessibility are essential to enable timely and secure deployment of private 5G technologies.
- Authentication and Access Control: Robust authentication mechanisms are crucial for protecting private 5G networks. Vulnerabilities in existing systems—particularly those managing sensitive or mission-critical data—pose significant security risks. Proposed solutions, such as Software-Defined Perimeter (SDP) architectures, enforce secure, identity-based access and strengthen overall network resilience.
- Network Slicing and Isolation Risks: Network slicing offers essential benefits for resource allocation and traffic management; however, inadequate isolation between slices can introduce severe security risks, including cross-slice contamination and unauthorized data manipulation. Effective mitigation requires advanced encryption, strict isolation protocols, and continuous monitoring to ensure slice integrity and safeguard sensitive resources.
- Diverse Attack Vectors: Private 5G networks face a broad array of threats, including spoofing, fake base station attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and eavesdropping. These vulnerabilities jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data. The diversity and complexity of these attack vectors highlight the need for adaptive, multi-layered security strategies capable of addressing both known and emerging threats.
- Proposed Solutions: The literature presents multiple mitigation approaches, ranging from comprehensive architectural frameworks, such as SDP, to targeted interventions like real-time detection algorithms for fake base stations. Additional strategies include enhanced authentication frameworks, zero-trust architectures, and sector-specific countermeasures. The variety of proposed solutions underscores the importance of integrated, layered security measures customized to the operational context of private 5G deployments.
- Sector-Specific Security Concerns: Certain sectors, such as smart healthcare, exhibit unique security requirements where data confidentiality and real-time communication are critical. While some studies advocate generalizable security frameworks, the evidence emphasizes the need for solutions tailored to sector-specific operational and regulatory constraints.
5. Security Challenges in Private 5G Networks
5.1. Threats to Data and Services in Private 5G Networks
5.1.1. Risks to Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of Data
5.1.2. Risks of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of Services
5.2. Use Case
6. Mitigations
7. Discussion and Future Directions
7.1. Implications and Future Research Directions
7.1.1. Implications for Practice
- Advanced Encryption Techniques: End-to-end encryption and cryptographic key pair mechanisms protect sensitive user and network data. Safeguarding identifiers such as IMSI and UE IDs prevents exploitation if intercepted. Integration with established libraries, such as OpenSSL, strengthens encryption, key management, and overall network security [4].
- Regular Security Audits and Continuous Monitoring: Frequent audits of physical and digital components—including UEs, base stations, and core networks—enable early vulnerability detection. Real-time monitoring tools allow rapid responses to potential breaches [22].
- Robust Access Control Mechanisms: Multi-factor authentication for devices, role-based access for administrators, and network slice segmentation minimize exposure to attacks. Ensuring UE security prevents unauthorized access or manipulation [35].
- Collaboration Across Stakeholders: Effective network security relies on cooperation among equipment manufacturers, service providers, and regulators. Manufacturers must embed security in design, providers enforce policies consistently, and regulators establish clear standards [4].
- User Education and Awareness: Human error remains a critical risk. Training programs that raise awareness of identity spoofing, manipulated behaviour, and other threats reduce vulnerability [22].
7.1.2. Future Research Directions
- Specific Vulnerabilities in Private Deployments: Case studies are necessary to evaluate encryption, IDPS, and MFA performance in private 5G contexts. Industrial deployments may face attacks targeting network slicing or jamming, while campus networks are vulnerable to internal threats or misconfigurations.
- Standardized Security Protocols: Private networks operate under diverse regulatory and sector-specific constraints. Developing frameworks that incorporate dynamic access control, edge monitoring, and secure IoT integration is essential to improve resilience and align with operational objectives.
- Emerging Technologies: AI and ML provide real-time threat detection and adaptive responses but also introduce risks such as adversarial attacks. Future studies should explore AI-driven anomaly detection and secure ML model deployment for private 5G networks.
- Additional Research Opportunities:
- o
- Threat Modelling: Limited use of attack graphs exists for private 5G networks. Expanding this approach can enhance vulnerability assessment and mitigation.
- o
- Moving Target Defence (MTD): Dynamic network configurations could increase attack complexity; feasibility studies are needed.
- o
- Automation of Security Models: Automating attack graph generation can accelerate vulnerability identification and response.
- o
- Comparative Security Insights: Studies comparing private 5G, legacy networks, Wi-Fi, public 5G, and SNPNs can inform best practices.
8. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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| Industry/Organisation | Purpose of Private 5G Network | Key Applications |
|---|---|---|
| Manufacturing Plants | Enhance automation and IoT | Smart factories, real-time monitoring, robotics |
| Ports | Improve logistics and operations | Shipment tracking, automation |
| Smart Cities | Manage infrastructure, public services | Autonomous vehicles, traffic control, smart grids |
| Healthcare | Support telemedicine and data security | Remote monitoring, telemedicine, secure data transmission |
| Educational Campuses | Provide secure, high-speed internet | VR/AR applications, remote learning |
| Energy and Utility | Monitor and control infrastructure | Smart grids, predictive maintenance |
| Logistics and Supply Chain | Improve tracking and automation | Asset tracking, warehouse automation |
| Financial Institutions | Ensure secure and fast transactions | Real-time data analysis, compliance with data protection |
| Airports | Optimize operations and communications | Baggage handling, real-time data for security |
| Retail | Enhance customer experience and operations | Smart stores, contactless payments, inventory management |
| Category | Vulnerability | Challenges | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spectrum and Authorization | Delays in spectrum allocation | Hinders timely network deployment | Slows innovation and market readiness |
| Limited affordable spectrum | Barriers for small enterprises | Reduces competitiveness | |
| Lengthy authorization processes | Increases costs and delays | Reduces ROI and scalability. | |
| Authentication and Access Control | Authentication issues | Risk of unauthorized access | Compromises security and user trust |
| Weak access controls | Exploitation by attackers | Data breaches and disruptions | |
| Fake user equipment | Malicious device infiltration | Service disruptions and financial losses. | |
| Confidentiality and Privacy | Inadequate data encryption | Privacy and data leaks | Financial and reputational damage |
| Eavesdropping on communication | Interception of sensitive information | Regulatory penalties and data exposure | |
| Misconfigured security settings | Leaves exploitable gaps | Undermines reliability | |
| Integrity and Availability | Service availability loss | Network disruptions | Affects business continuity |
| Loss of data integrity | Corruption of critical data | Reduces trust and decision-making reliability | |
| Denial-of-Service attacks | Overloaded resources | Operational inefficiencies | |
| Signalling storms | Infrastructure overload | Network degradation or collapse. | |
| Network Slicing and Orchestration | Slice isolation bypass | Risks to performance and data security | Compromised network integrity |
| Orchestration challenges | Resource allocation inefficiencies | Reduces reliability. | |
| Physical Security | Insider attacks | Risk of sabotage | Operational damage and data leaks |
| Physical theft or vandalism | Loss of infrastructure | Downtime and repair costs | |
| Specific Attack Types | Man-in-the-middle attacks | Data interception | Breaches and loss of trust |
| Rogue base station attacks | Traffic manipulation | Data theft and service disruptions | |
| Device malware injection | Remote control of devices | Facilitates further attacks | |
| Jamming and channel interference | Disrupted communication | Affects service reliability | |
| DNS cache poisoning | Misdirected traffic | Phishing and service disruption | |
| Machine Learning and AI | Vulnerable ML algorithms | Exploitation risks | Reduces optimization and reliability. |
| Radio Access Network (RAN) and Open Interfaces | Resource exhaustion | Overloaded resources | Reduces performance and quality |
| Vulnerabilities in O-RAN | Increased security risks | Opens avenues for breaches | |
| Legacy Systems | Vulnerable legacy devices | Exploitation of outdated protocols | Reduces overall security. |
| Difficulty with updates | Exposure to known vulnerabilities | Increases attack risks | |
| Encryption and Cryptography | Weak cryptographic protection | Unauthorized data modification | Compromises data authenticity |
| Insecure encryption key transmission | Risk of interception | Enables decryption of sensitive data | |
| Specific Messaging Attacks | Exploitation of system messages | Network manipulation | Affects integrity and performance |
| Fake base station attacks | Misguided user equipment | Data theft and service manipulation | |
| Integration and Deployment | RAN sharing challenges | Complex infrastructure management | Affects efficiency and security |
| Integration issues | Security gaps and deployment delays | Reduces reliability and scalability. | |
| Expertise and Regulation | Limited 5G expertise | Improper configurations | Increased vulnerabilities |
| Inconsistent regulations | Compliance gaps | Delays and security complications |
| Category | Security Vulnerability | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Network Attacks | Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks | Overwhelm network resources, disrupting critical services by exploiting increased connectivity and bandwidth. |
| Identity and Authentication Threats | Spoofing Attacks | Attackers impersonate legitimate network entities; fake base stations can intercept communications, steal data, or manipulate network traffic. |
| Authentication and Access Control Vulnerabilities | Weak authentication frameworks make networks susceptible to breaches; secure and scalable authentication is required. | |
| Data Security Risks | Eavesdropping and Data Tampering | Weak encryption protocols allow attackers to intercept sensitive data or alter transmissions, compromising network integrity. |
| Network Slicing Threats | Slice Isolation Bypass and Traffic Manipulation | Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in one slice to affect others, undermining overall network security. |
| Radio-Layer Vulnerabilities | Active Threats: Radio Jamming and Signal Overshadowing | Degrade network performance by interfering with wireless signals. |
| Passive Threats: IMSI Leaks | Compromise user privacy by exposing unique subscriber identifiers. |
| Security Best Practice | Description | Implementation Considerations | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) | Requires strict identity verification for every user and device accessing the network. | Involves continuous authentication and least-privilege access controls. | Highly effective in preventing unauthorized access. |
| Network Slicing Security Protocols | Implements isolation and strict security policies for each network slice. | Requires careful resource allocation and segmentation. | Prevents cross-slice attacks and lateral movement of threats. |
| End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) | Encrypts data throughout transmission to prevent unauthorized interception. | Requires strong key management policies. | Essential for maintaining confidentiality and data integrity. |
| Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) | Uses multiple verification factors to authenticate users and devices. | May impact usability and require additional infrastructure. | Strengthens access control and reduces credential theft risks. |
| Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) | Monitors network traffic for anomalies and mitigate potential threats. | Needs proper tuning to reduce false positives. | Crucial for identifying and blocking security breaches. |
| Access Control Policies | Defines and enforces restrictions on who can access network resources. | Requires continuous policy updates and role-based access control (RBAC). | Helps mitigate insider threats and unauthorized access. |
| Physical Security Measures | Protects network infrastructure from theft, tampering, or sabotage. | Includes secure facility access and monitoring. | Essential for preventing hardware-based attack. |
| Security in Third-Party Integrations | Ensures security compliance for external vendors and service providers. | Requires continuous assessment of third-party risk exposure. | Reduces vulnerabilities introduced by external components. |
| Category | Key Concerns |
|---|---|
| Expanded Attack Surface | The high number of connected devices and IoT endpoints increases potential entry points for cyber threats. |
| Network Slicing Complexity | Ensuring effective slice isolation, managing inter-slice communication security, and preventing unauthorized access to network slices. |
| Edge Computing Security | Protecting edge nodes from physical tampering, cyber threats, and data breaches while ensuring secure processing and transmission. |
| Integrating Legacy Systems | Older infrastructure may lack modern encryption, have unpatched vulnerabilities, and be incompatible with secure authentication protocols. |
| Insider Threats | Employees or contractors with legitimate access could unintentionally or intentionally compromise security. |
| Evolving Threat Landscape | Defending against advanced persistent threats (APTs), ransomware, and large-scale DDoS attacks targeting 5G networks |
| Security Monitoring and Response | The challenge of real-time threat detection, automated response, and forensic analysis in a highly distributed private 5G environment. |
| Authentication and Access Control | Enforcing robust identity verification for users, devices, and services to prevent unauthorized access |
| Regulatory and Compliance Risks | Ensuring compliance with GDPR, PCI DSS, and industry-specific security regulations, which may introduce additional constraints. |
| Data Confidentiality and Integrity | Protecting sensitive data in transit and at rest from unauthorized access, modification, or leakage, particularly in mission-critical applications |
| Regulatory and Compliance Challenges | Dependencies on vendors, cloud providers, and third-party software/hardware components introduce supply chain vulnerabilities. |
| Third-Party Security Risks | Safeguarding physical network components such as base stations, edge nodes, and core network infrastructure from tampering, destruction, or theft |
| Physical Security | Protecting base stations, network infrastructure, and edge devices from tampering, destruction, or unauthorized access. |
| Attack Type | Key Mitigation Strategies | References |
|---|---|---|
| Jamming | Spread Spectrum Techniques (SST); frequency hopping; random key distribution; control channel protection; redundancy mechanisms; power control; IDPS detection and response; regular updates. | [1,4,21,23,24,41] |
| Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) | Network isolation and segmentation; end-to-end encryption (TLS, IPSec); MFA; advanced IDPS; incident response planning; user awareness; blockchain-based key verification; mutual authentication; anomaly detection with ML. | [1,4,21,22,26,42] |
| Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS) | Real-time detection via IDPS; traffic filtering and rate limiting; DNS protection; anti-DDoS appliances; redundant infrastructure; adaptive traffic management; edge anomaly detection; cloud security for slicing and RAN. | [7,13,21] |
| Spoofing | Mutual authentication; PKI and certificates; CSI-based authentication; ML-based anomaly detection; regular software/firmware updates; multi-stakeholder collaboration. | [4] |
| Fake User Equipment (UE) | 5G AKA authentication; edge-based detection; supply chain validation; network isolation; user awareness training to prevent phishing/social engineering. | [7,8,22,43] |
| Fake Base Stations (FBS) | Digital signature-based authentication of system info; PKI-based approaches (3GPP); UE behaviour analysis (registration patterns); enhanced monitoring/logging; MFA or cryptographic keys at UE side. | [4,21,24,44,45] |
| Authentication Issues | Advanced protocols (AKA, EAP); VPN SSC with MFA; dynamic authentication (AGUPF, AGPA); secure key management between MeNB–SgNB; access logging and monitoring. | [8,13,46] |
| Unauthorized Access | MFA, RBAC, least privilege enforcement; network segmentation; physical security of infrastructure; user training and awareness; continuous audits and monitoring. | [4,22] |
| Eavesdropping & Privacy Leaks | Strong encryption (AES, E2EE); network segmentation; strict access control; IDS/IPS monitoring; log analysis; physical security; MFA and digital certificates. | [8,21,22,33,47] |
| Vulnerability | Description/Impact | Future Research Directions |
|---|---|---|
| DDoS attacks | Overload network resources, disrupting mission-critical services. | Develop resilient traffic filtering, AI-driven anomaly detection, and real-world validation of scalable mitigation strategies. |
| Spoofing | Impersonation of devices/users to gain unauthorized access. | Stronger authentication (e.g., SDP, multi-factor), and adaptive identity verification mechanisms. |
| Unauthorized access | Exploits weak authentication and access control, worsened by device density. | Role-based access control, continuous monitoring, and empirical studies on long-term effectiveness. |
| Jamming attacks | Flood communication channels with interference, degrading QoS. | Research on anti-jamming protocols, spectrum agility, and moving target defence. |
| Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) | Interception and manipulation of communications. | End-to-end encryption, secure handover protocols, and lightweight cryptography for IoT. |
| Eavesdropping | Intercepts sensitive communications, compromising confidentiality. | Enhanced encryption, privacy-preserving frameworks, and validation in healthcare/IIoT contexts. |
| Privacy leaks | Unauthorized disclosure of personal or industrial data. | Data governance models, secure data-sharing protocols, and regulatory harmonization. |
| Tampering | Manipulation of devices or data to disrupt services. | Blockchain-based integrity verification and intrusion-tolerant orchestration. |
| Fake base stations | Rogue nodes intercept communications and harvest data. | Secure base station authentication, anomaly detection, and cross-layer defence models. |
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Fue, J.; Gutierrez, J.A.; Donoso, Y. Understanding Security Vulnerabilities in Private 5G Networks: Insights from a Literature Review. Future Internet 2025, 17, 485. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi17110485
Fue J, Gutierrez JA, Donoso Y. Understanding Security Vulnerabilities in Private 5G Networks: Insights from a Literature Review. Future Internet. 2025; 17(11):485. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi17110485
Chicago/Turabian StyleFue, Jacinta, Jairo A. Gutierrez, and Yezid Donoso. 2025. "Understanding Security Vulnerabilities in Private 5G Networks: Insights from a Literature Review" Future Internet 17, no. 11: 485. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi17110485
APA StyleFue, J., Gutierrez, J. A., & Donoso, Y. (2025). Understanding Security Vulnerabilities in Private 5G Networks: Insights from a Literature Review. Future Internet, 17(11), 485. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi17110485

