4.1. Physical Framework Supporting Data Interpretation
Comparing
Figure 3 and
Figure 6, it is possible to see that, from one side, the global physical efficiency, depending on extraction from primary sources, final consumption, with the exclusion of imports, exports, power losses, non-energy use and energy-own use, power losses, is declining. On the other side, the unitary cost, in USD, of energy, is declining, showing that the economic cost of the system is becoming cheaper. Historically, energy needs increase, as global economies develop and become more complex [
53]. While energy system components grow together with its complexity, supported by lower costs, the physical efficiency, driven by power losses, is also increasing. This tendency is also stimulated by the growing weight of virtual financial operations. However, financial trading doesn’t compensate the state and communities with respect to external resources depletion and external environmental damage or loss of livelihood. Meanwhile, some global currency policies, such as ‘quantitative easing’, could lead to a further growth in energy use.
Looking at efficiency data from different perspectives (i.e., physical and economic ones) might lead to different system interpretations and policy options. Considering the decline of global system physical efficiency, the positive statement [
54], affirming that “Global energy savings from efficiency improvements since 2000 led to a reduction in greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions of just over 4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Gt CO
2-eq) in 2016” might become weak or, at least, too simplistic. The driver of such a tendency is the growth in materials processing, which leads to higher use of energy and to higher GHG emissions [
55]. These savings, ultimately conceived in economic terms, avoid to include the existence of growing power losses. Instead, economic efficiency and environmental considerations should not be disentangled in the future. In fact, a study proved the existence of a long-term positive correlation between physical efficiency and environmental performance, considering the energy use of 129 world Countries [
56]. Thus, a decline in overall energy system physical efficiency implies a decline in environmental performance, making the above positive statement too optimistic.
Actions are required to counterbalance this trend. In this respect, considering 13 world regions and coupling materials and energy use with carbon emissions, a research showed that OECD economies, as well as developing economies, could significantly reduce their materials use and emissions with little negative impacts on their economic growth [
57]. This process should be supported by a wider use of several technologies to extract renewable energy from organic matter, to substitute fossil with renewable fuel and to optimize hybrid energy networks [
58].
The metabolism of energy resources, in terms of material flows analyzed under a physical perspective, constitutes a constraint to the evolving complexity of social-ecological systems [
59]. In fact, the evolution of societal complexity depends critically on energy availability [
60,
61]. In particular, SES complexification leads to higher energy costs and dispersion, which is used by SES to maintain the existing thermodynamic disequilibrium and structure [
62]. This co-evolutionary pattern is indirectly confirmed by trends reported in
Figure 2,
Figure 4 and
Figure 5.
World sectoral final consumption, power losses and remaining differences (i.e., energy own-use, exports, non-energy use and stocks) can be grouped, according to the given representation.
Figure 7 details such a partition on yearly base at a global scale, expressing the numbers as percentage of TPES. Available data cover the period from 1973 to 2019. Original data are reported as
Supplementary Material.
It is, then, addressed that: (1) energy use for industry, agriculture and fisheries, as percentage of TPES, declined, until year 2014, when the total energy use for these sectors increased; (2) residential sector energy use, corresponding to individual energy appropriation, is also declining; (3) energy consumption for common services is almost stable, besides the decline displayed in the last three years analyzed; (4) power plant losses grew until 2007, then displaying a little decline; (5) differences associated to energy industry own use, stocks, exports and non-energy use are growing.
Even if traditional energy-intensive industries still play a key role in energy consumption, other factors are becoming important. The first one is the growth of real power losses along societal energy metabolism processes. This loss, as shown before, mainly depends on the complexification of socio-economical system. The second is related to a small increase of exports (this factor depends on global markets), stocks (depending on energy security issues) and development of non-energy final products, derived from accounted energy sources. This difficulty in performing a correct account of material flows depends on the fact that intermediate products of complex supply chains are often depending on activities labeled under different and apparently uncorrelated economic sectors in Input-Output tables [
63].
4.2. Risks Connected to the Evolutionary Dynamics of Global Energy Metabolism
Existing risks for the future of human SES must be assessed, in order to implement appropriate policies. Global power appropriation grew up together with ecological civilization. The costs of such appropriation of environmental resources are increasing, together with energy production. The depletion of non-renewable resources is the first factor of risk. In fact, energy withdrawal from ecosystems–in particular, the one due to biomass harvest–cause a loss of biodiversity [
64]. Biodiversity protection is of major importance for several reasons: (1) its influence on the efficiency, by which ecological communities capture biologically essential resources, produce biomass; (2) its ability to decompose and recycle nutrients; (3) its stabilizing function.
Complexity has energy costs, with gradually diminishing return on investment, which can be assessed in terms of “energy return on investment” (EROI) [
65]. Until now, humans have benefited from easily accessible, abundant and inexpensive energy of fossil fuels. However, energy production, innovation, and societal complexification have gradual diminishing returns [
6]. The energy costs to maintain the societal structure, embedded in the terms E and μN (i.e., service sector, referred to Equation (1)), grow with societal complexification. The same trend is observed for power losses (i.e., TS in Equation (1)), as well as for the generation of multiple intermediate outputs in the societal metabolic processes. Thus, the energy consumed to perform a given ‘work’ (i.e., pV, represented by industry, as well as by all the activities related to food production) tends to decline. Moreover, also the resilience, as the “capacity to recover from a setback” will decrease [
66].
With civilization development, global energy demand is getting closer to the Net Primary Productivity (NPP), which is related to photosynthesis [
67,
68]. The risk of regime shifts under such conditions are becoming higher. Preliminary esteems of future Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES), expressed in watts, are based on World Energy Council forecasts [
69] and total appropriation of NPP [
68]. In particular, the World Energy Council (WEC hereafter) generated two different scenarios for the year 2050: Jazz and Symphony. The former is based on economic growth and secure individual access. The second, instead, is based on environmental sustainability, in turn based on coordinated policies and practices. Derived data are reported on
Table 7.
Presently, it is not possible to foresee the effects of approaching to NPP total appropriation. However, it is clear that, crossing that limit, the depletion of energy resources seriously impacts on the biosphere in several aspects. This is why, fixing the lower additive power to 31.7 TW and the upper limit to 50.0 TW, it is possible to define a system of boundaries also for energy, in parallel to the other planetary boundaries [
3]. The increasing risk of regime shifts can be broadly associated to factors contained in Equation (1). The decline in the system efficiency is first observed through a declining value of pV (i.e., a decline in the component which powers the transformative dynamics of the system–see
Figure 2). The second step is the reduction of services, either attributable to E (collective services) or μN (i.e., individual appropriation and use of energy resources). Globally,
Table 7 indicates that a slight decline of μN is already occurring. It is important to remark here that common services (E) keep together the components and function of any social system. Thus, they should be preserved. Instead, μN is referred to the individual appropriation and use of energy resources. In fact, the potential μ refers to an energy amount per unit mass or number, such as the number of individuals within a community or a Country. An interesting parallel arises with food webs, for which increasing energy requirements are dependent on μN [
70]. Population size, N, is also relevant. In fact, population growth rates influence the competition for energy resources, as well as the ability to extract them [
71,
72].
There is, finally, a risk connected to the lack of adaptation to the pulsing trend of energy availability. Since the publication of “The limits to growth” [
73], scholars are stressing the fact that resources are limited and a major transition will occur sooner or later. Signs that nations are entering into a mature-stage of capitalism, characterized by a declining energy density throughput, were again confirmed in several works (see, for example [
74]). However, society and policies exhibit a significant inertia in shifting away from the comforting paradigm of continuous growth, whereas cyclic dynamics, such as that described by the pulsing paradigm [
27], are a reality.
Figure 4 and associated data show that some Countries have a better performance than others. However, while worst performing Countries should, first, improve their status, all the nations should also consider, for the near future, that energy savings is anyway required, due to the declining supply connected with lower availability of fossil energy resources.
4.4. Geopolitical and Social Dimensions
Presently, the most ecologically-sound economic paradigm is the circular one. However, we are still far from reaching tangible assessments and results. The most updated work, analyzing global resources dynamics, even if referred to year 2005 data, showed that only 4 Gt/year of waste are recycled. On the other side, 62 Gt/year of raw materials were processed to produce 41 Gt/year of manufactured materials [
81]. Moreover, 44% of globally-processed materials are used to provide energy, thus being excluded from recycling option. In parallel, between 1950 and 2010, global average per capita material use increased from 5.0 to 10.3 tons per year [
82].
Some economic sectors directly produce or induce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions along the supply chain [
83]. Market effects are often masked, since direct exposures of financial actors to fossil fuel sector are small (3–12%) [
84]. However, the same study demonstrated that the exposures to climate-policy relevant sectors in Europe are large (40–54%), heterogeneous, and possibly amplified by indirect exposures via financial counterparties (30–40%). Similar studies should be extended, in order to understand the global weight of appropriate integrated energy and climate policies.
Economy is just one component of the “socio-economic dimension”. Disparities should be fought to minimize energy poverty. For such a reason, energy justice is meant “to provide all individuals, across all areas, with safe, affordable and sustainable energy” [
85,
86]. With respect to climate and environmental justice, this discipline is more targeted, being not originated from anti-establishment social movements and rooted on a strong academic tradition with many policy-relevant implications [
87]. In order to develop a deeper understanding of this subject, several works suggest to approach to this topic through energy geographies [
88], as well as to the spatialization of energy justice, which depends on “landscapes of material deprivation, geographic underpinnings of energy affordability, vicious cycles of vulnerability, and spaces of misrecognition” [
89]. That is why the geopolitical dimension becomes relevant.
A variety of different approaches may be defined when talking about energy efficiency or sustainability. This plurality derives first of all from the complexity of the very topic, linked to the different levels at which energy planning can be located. For instance, dealing with an energy plant, it may be technically modelled: (1) as an enterprise, focused on its economic sustainability and profit-making performance; (2) as a piece of engineering, focused on technical efficiency; (3) as a part of a public energy network, focused on its role of local energy provider; (4) as a perturbator of environmental equilibrium, focused on environmental impacts; (5) as an element for the transition to fossil-free energy, focused on short-term performance.
Moreover, different policy narratives are possible for the energy sector [
90]: (1) sustainability; (2) middle-of-the-road (i.e., no remarkable shifts); (3) regional rivalry; inequality (i.e., maintaining the divide between rich and poor countries); (4) baseline (no new policies at all). These narratives need to be framed within the changing ‘global energy order’. In fact, the present geopolitical framework is showing clear signs of crisis, being contrasted by national re-appropriations of the extractive industry and the expansion of emerging National Oil Companies beyond their national borders [
91]. In particular, the ‘global energy order’ is becoming multi-polar and hybridized under some constraints: (1) the tendency of energy resources national re-appropriation, as written before; (2) the cooperation among international oil companies; (3) the development of energy service companies; (4) the definition of legal services, which contribute to international rules sophistication.
In parallel, more uncertainty depends on different strategies, which could be adopted by oil-exporting countries as a consequence of climate policies [
92]. Moreover, the effects of the so-called “shale revolution” should be taken into account, especially for Countries highly dependent on oil and gas imports and where the negative economic consequences of oil prices drop are not rebalanced by sufficient buffers, like sovereign wealth funds [
93]. Roadmaps toward de-oilification and de-coalification should be supported through geopolitical instruments, such as performance standards, cap and trade, and carbon tax. A performance standard is commonly viewed as a regulatory tool, in which the government sets pollution limits at the plant or unit level. An emissions trading mechanism establishes an emissions cap or limit and allows the trading of rights to emit. The carbon tax is viewed as a more efficient instrument in comparison to other mechanisms, sending similar price signals across sectors and over time and allowing for a predictable capital stock turnover.
Social acceptance plays a fundamental role in the transition toward a sustainable global energy system. Social acceptance can be supported by stakeholder engagement practices which improve communication and widen the legitimacy of sustainable oriented choices [
94,
95]. Moreover, narratives are important both to develop the social acceptance of sustainability policies and to deploy innovative technologies [
96]. Tacit knowledge, shared narratives, user relations and learning in inter-organizational networks are key enabling factors in this process [
97]. However, the support of arts as instruments of aesthetic meditation on sustainability issues can be effective to support the process of social acceptance [
98].
4.5. Potential Strategies and Research Needs
How can these dimensions meet the requirement of social-ecological stability from an energy perspective? Which are the most probable changes or possible strategies? First, the present level of power production, consumption and losses depends on the societal structure and functions. It is difficult to think of a reduction of resources use without any societal impact. A study highlighted several alternative options to cope with energy problems [
99]: (1) Resource consumption reduction, which is constrained by the relation between complexity, requiring energy and societal problem-solving abilities; (2) Consumption control through price mechanisms, which still doesn’t touch the need of increasing consumptions for problem-solving; (3) Resources rationing, which is socially unacceptable, if not during short-period and under critical; (4) Population reduction; (5) Technological solutions. Furthermore, another lever in this direction may be the exploitation of potential energy savings, driven by consumer behavioral changes [
100], which the European Environmental Agency (EEA) itself identified as a key strategy for energy efficiency [
101].
None of these seem to easily pursuable, but–most of all–none of these would provide (if taken alone) the necessary leveraging action towards a multi-level, multi-dimension and hugely complex sector like that of energy, which by definition encompasses all the three traditional sustainability dimensions, namely, environment, society, economy.
Different operational options might be investigated under the light of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In particular: goal 7: ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; goal 8: promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all; goal 9: build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; goal 12: ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. Solutions and implications, shortly listed in
Table 9, are indicated on the basis of Equation (1),
Figure 4 and
Figure 7. In particular,
Figure 7 shows that pV (industry, agriculture, fisheries) is declining, together with residential sector μN expenditure. In parallel, common services (E) and power losses (TS) are growing.
Figure 5 shows that some Countries are more performing than others, considering their efficient power consumption with respect to their power supply.
Considering sectoral subdivision of global energy consumption (
Figure 7), the most urgent interventions pertain power plant losses and household sectors. These actions mainly relate to efficiency improvements. A different share among sectors should be planned, considering also the need of focusing on high-value added and labor-intensive sectors (SDG goal 8). In order to enable a higher consumption for technological development and upgrade, as well as for food production, the future growth of terawatt consumption by some sectors needs to be limited. Many experts believe that global efficiency improvements and reduced demand would be the best solutions to cope with the existing “physical dimension” [
102]. Efficiency improvements should start from reducing power plant losses. Their global amount is almost stable, representing a 20% of the final energy consumption. However, it would be desirable to reduce them at least of 2–3%, fixing a target to 17–18%. Technological solutions are available [
103] and they can be integrated into energy production and consumption systems [
104]. The technological upgrade of distribution networks would be also relevant with respect to this target. Better results could be gained by re-designing the societal energy processes, reducing the number of the number of intermediate product outputs and non-energy use consumption, which do not contribute to the overall final system efficiency. Several factors should be considered in planning this action: (1) the need of increasing the electricity generation infrastructure, which might not be enough to meet the global demand of energy, under a business-as-usual scenario, for year 2050 [
105]; (2) the efficiency of technological alternatives [
106]; (3) the quantification of eco-efficiency indicators with respect to selected alternatives, which allow the evaluation of impacts related to undesirable outputs [
107,
108]; (4) the costs for different solutions [
109].
It is important, however, to stress that multiple rebound effects might lead to a different result from the expected one [
110]. The need of increasing pV, associated both to industrial and to food productions, will be a natural consequence of the increasing world population trend. Thus, the present allocation percentage will likely become higher than the present 21%. Also, the allocation percentage related to common services (E) should be, at least, preserved. Digitalization, ICT and world connectivity might limit this growth, if their role and potential applications are better understood. For example, material flows and workers’ transfers could be reduced and substituted by a better coordination of logistics and by an information exchange system to support a lower mobility for working purposes. Considering the necessity of transition toward a low-carbon future, a dispersed production of low-gain energy by small communities or even individual households would be a desirable option [
111]. In this respect, some elements of discussion were introduced [
6]: (1) an information-centered economy and society, where material flows are reduced; (2) a gradual delocalization of power generation and distribution systems, together with dispersed settlements and smaller production chains, which would be enabled by ICT support. This might imply a potential reduction of energy consumptions for the transport sector, which was accounted here as common services (E). In fact, human and resources movements would diminish, if an optimization compromise is reached. Urban centers would also benefit from a decongestion.
Household energy consumption, displaying a declining consumption trend, still has margins of action. Then, it is easily foreseeable that a reduction of a further 2% is not impossible. Several solutions, like more efficient illumination and passive thermal regulation, are already widely applied in many Countries. Widening this action would allow to reallocate 4% of the present global consumption share, derived from household consumption and power plant losses decline, on other critical sectors. Measures related to households should be implemented, considering that: (1) consumers psychology and behaviors strongly influence the willing to implement private energy savings and efficiency actions [
112,
113]; (2) behavioral shifts, which are more easily modifiable should be promoted first, introducing simplifications aimed at promoting desirable decisions, while implementing money-saving alternatives [
100]; (3) the implementation of education and communication campaigns seems to be among the most efficient means for promoting the adoption of sustainable household’s resources consumption patterns [
114]; (4) actions directed toward low-income areas could play a significant role within this target [
115,
116]; (5) ICT solution can support behavioral changes in relation to inefficiency removals and energy saving [
117,
118]; (6) direct and indirect factors should be carefully analyzed when determining the carbon footprint of different options in search of eco-efficient solutions [
119].
Further analyses are necessary to determine and quantify the potential solutions, since complete and reliable data are presently missing. Behind these points, the concept of energy efficiency, presenting the contrasting physical and economic perspectives require to be clearly defined, considering the necessity of decoupling economic growth from environmental degradation. Moreover, it should be considered that we adopted a simplified and incomplete version of thermodynamic equations, implying a simplified epistemology necessary to develop an easier phenomenological conceptualization for the empirical laws, verified in the literature, that can be applied social-ecological systems. This is true, for example, in the case of the product pV, that we used as a simplified indicator for work. This version, however, would be valid only in the in the absence of nuclear, magnetic, electrical, and surface tension effects [
120]. Otherwise, other forms of work should appear in the equation, like the shaft work, which could be determined for the system. In our case, the use of the simple products pV and TS for representing work and power loss, respectively, is not always accurate from an engineering point of view, since the computation of the quantities actually depend on the change on volume and entropy, respectively. Moreover, the form assumed by a certain amount of produced work may not be representable as the product of a pressure times a volume, and the entropy (intended as change of net entropy) may depend in turn on the details of the transformation in terms of heat transfers. Despite this apparent inappropriateness, we chose to use this language since it may directly refer to the symbolism used in the discipline of econophysics, where a set of isomorphic relations are built up between economic and thermodynamic and statistical mechanics laws [
121,
122]. The application of such an approach allowed to develop a phenomenological conceptualization for the empirical laws of economics. Therefore, the epistemology we used to connect socio-economic or environmental narratives to thermodynamics should not be intended as a strict identification of the single quantities, but rather as a convenient conceptualization of the overall body of knowledge concerning the global energy systems.
The role of cities, as most densely populated areas in the world, should be rethought [
123]. Meanwhile, rural areas could benefit from a ‘renaissance’, which would enhance the natural, social, cultural and economic potential of rural areas. The European Union already promoted a research area on this topic through HORIZON 2020 programme. In particular, it will be interesting to observe the outcomes of the projects aimed at designing innovative policy instruments, approaches and governance models, through which socio-economic and environmental conditions should be improved. However, any option should be supported by further research, aimed at modelling different scenarios, their likelihood, as well as impacts. Energy sectorial accounting should start to disentangle shared and individual energy consumptions. Moreover, the impacts of ICT require to be assessed at different scales.
Further researches are also needed, in order to better understand the energy dynamics of human SES and for reducing the potential risk of a future societal collapse. In fact, such dynamic modes are still at embryonal level due to their complexity. However, with this respect, nexus modelling might offer some hints. In this field, a huge number of works was published in the last years [
124,
125,
126]. Energy pressures on the environment should be determined at different spatial scales. An improved integration of data, derived from human SES energy structure and its footprint, would support better planning tools development, which would become available for policy-makers and public managers. The development of big data management and a more efficient ICT-based integration might be useful in such a direction.
Finally, studies are necessary to better integrate the energy sector in the broader economic and financial landscape. In particular, the shape of this network structure, the interconnectedness among producers, the financial interdependence of electricity markets players, as well as the consequences of the existing structures and dynamics, should be considered [
127]. The outputs of these inquiries should become effective inputs for future policies, managed by an international energy governance structure, whose existence is of paramount importance to drive the transition toward a sustainable civilization and human lifestyles dynamics.