Performance Analysis of LSTM, GRU and Hybrid LSTM–GRU Model for Detecting GPS Spoofing Attacks
Abstract
1. Introduction
1.1. Related Work
1.1.1. Traditional Methods and Signal-Based Approaches
1.1.2. Machine Learning-Based Approaches
1.1.3. Deep Learning and Hybrid Models
1.1.4. Other Related Studies
- Sedjelmaci et al. [25] introduced a hierarchical attack detection and response framework and reported a high detection rate accompanied by a low false positive rate.
- Gaspar et al. [26] developed a portable GPS spoofing system based on Software Defined Radio (SDR), demonstrating the vulnerability of commercial receivers.
- Arteaga et al. [27] demonstrated the exploitability of GPS vulnerability in a commercial UAV and highlighted the security advantages of military GPS.
- Nayfeh et al. [28] achieved a detection rate better than 92% with a detection time under a millisecond, demonstrating the real-time applicability of ML-based modeling.
- Eshmawi et al. [29] reported an accuracy of 99.74% by employing a stacking ensemble model that integrates support vector machines and convolutional neural networks.
- İşleyen and Bahtiyar [30] demonstrated that the XGBoost model is effective in accurately detecting fraud incidents.
1.1.5. The Gap in the Literature and the Position of This Study
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Dataset and Preprocessing
2.2. Method and Models Applied
Model Training and Application Details
3. Results
4. Discussion
- Examination of different feature selection methods: In this study, 11 features were selected using the mutual information method. The effect of different feature selection or dimension reduction techniques (e.g., PCA, LDA, model-based importance scores) on performance can be investigated.
- Deepening hyperparameter optimization: To further improve model performance, more comprehensive hyperparameter optimization (e.g., Bayesian optimization) can be performed and parameters (e.g., optimal configuration of layers, cell counts and learning rate) can be investigated in greater detail.
- Validation with larger and more diverse datasets: To test the model’s generalization ability more robustly, work can be done on training and evaluating it on larger and more diverse datasets from different UAV platforms and containing different attack scenarios.
- Validation Strategy Limitations: It is important to acknowledge that the 5-fold cross-validation employed in this study was performed at the sample level rather than using a time-aware or flight-wise split. While sample-level splitting provides statistical robustness regarding feature space distribution, it may result in high performance due to the temporal correlation between adjacent samples in time-series data. In real-world operational scenarios, detecting attacks on completely unseen flight trajectories (flight-wise validation) represents a stricter generalization challenge. Future studies should prioritize flight-wise splitting strategies to rigorously evaluate the model’s performance on unseen trajectories and minimize potential data leakage arising from temporal proximity.
- Real-time application and deployment: Work can be done on optimizing the developed model to run in real time and integrating it as an embedded system on a UAV flight controller or ground station. In this context, model pruning, quantization, and latency analysis are critical.
- Research on different deep learning architectures: In future work, the performance of other advanced architectures, such as Transformer-based models or Convolutional Neural Networks for Long-Term Patterns (CNN-LSTM), can be investigated.
- Extension to other attack types: In addition to the GPS spoofing attack focused on this study, the development of similar deep-learning-based methods for detecting other cyber-attacks, such as communication channel eavesdropping, DoS and command injection, could be investigated.
5. Conclusions
- Hybrid model demonstrated superior performance: Our findings confirm that the hybrid architecture provides an optimal balance for UAV security, with an F1-score of 97.47%. Specifically, it minimizes missed detections (False Negatives) by reaching a recall of 96.98%, a significant improvement over single-layer recurrent models.
- LSTM provided high precision: The LSTM model demonstrated the highest positive predictive consistency, achieving a precision value of 98.49%. This indicates that the LSTM model exhibits superior reliability in its positive class predictions.
- All models achieved high success: ROC curves and 1.00 AUC values confirmed that all three models performed near-perfectly in distinguishing GPS spoofing attacks from normal conditions. This result proves that deep learning models are effective tools in the field of UAV cybersecurity.
- The hybrid model converged faster: During the training process, the hybrid model was observed to reach high accuracy values at earlier epochs (Figure 4). This indicates that the hybrid model also offers advantages in terms of learning efficiency.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
| UAV | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| GNSS | Global Navigation Satellite System |
| IMU | Inertial Measurement Unit |
| uORB | Micro Object Request Broker |
| SDR | Software Defined Radio |
| ANN | Artificial Neural Network |
| RNN | Recurrent Neural Network |
| LSTM | Long Short-Term Memory |
| GRU | Gated Recurrent Unit |
| ROC | Receiver Operating Characteristic |
| AUC | Area Under the Curve |
| PVT | Position–Velocity–Time |
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| Feature Name | Description | Unit | MI Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| alt_ellipsoid_x | Fused altitude relative to the ellipsoidal reference surface | meter (m) | 0.315998 |
| epv_x | Primary standard deviation of estimated vertical position error | meter (m) | 0.274125 |
| alt_y | Raw GPS altitude above Mean Sea Level (MSL) | meter (m) | 0.284894 |
| alt_ellipsoid_y | Raw GPS altitude relative to the ellipsoidal reference surface | meter (m) | 0.284961 |
| s_variance_m_s | GPS speed accuracy estimate (speed variance) | meter/second (m/s) | 0.349014 |
| epv_y | Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP) representing geometric quality | meter (m) | 0.293474 |
| vdop | Vertical Dilution of Precision (unitless geometric multiplier) | - | 0.269708 |
| vel_m_s | GPS ground speed | meter/second (m/s) | 0.284417 |
| vel_d_m_s | GPS downward velocity component (vertical speed) | meter/second (m/s) | 0.264995 |
| cog_rad | Course Over Ground | radian (rad) | 0.281952 |
| epv | System-wide vertical position error estimate (redundant check) | meter (m) | 0.256721 |
| Parameter | Value/Detail |
|---|---|
| Input Sequence Length | 1 |
| Batch Size | 64 |
| Optimizer | Adam |
| Initial Learning Rate | 0.001 |
| Loss Function | Binary Cross-Entropy |
| Callbacks | Early Stopping (patience 3), ReduceLROnPlateau |
| Maximum Epochs | 20 |
| Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F1 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LSTM | 0.9867 | 0.9849 | 0.9176 | 0.9501 |
| GRU | 0.9870 | 0.9829 | 0.9217 | 0.9513 |
| LSTM-GRU | 0.9931 | 0.9798 | 0.9698 | 0.9747 |
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Kuriş, U.; Turna, Ö.C. Performance Analysis of LSTM, GRU and Hybrid LSTM–GRU Model for Detecting GPS Spoofing Attacks. Sensors 2026, 26, 1111. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26041111
Kuriş U, Turna ÖC. Performance Analysis of LSTM, GRU and Hybrid LSTM–GRU Model for Detecting GPS Spoofing Attacks. Sensors. 2026; 26(4):1111. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26041111
Chicago/Turabian StyleKuriş, Umur, and Özgür Can Turna. 2026. "Performance Analysis of LSTM, GRU and Hybrid LSTM–GRU Model for Detecting GPS Spoofing Attacks" Sensors 26, no. 4: 1111. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26041111
APA StyleKuriş, U., & Turna, Ö. C. (2026). Performance Analysis of LSTM, GRU and Hybrid LSTM–GRU Model for Detecting GPS Spoofing Attacks. Sensors, 26(4), 1111. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26041111

