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Sensors 2019, 19(2), 293; https://doi.org/10.3390/s19020293

Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation

1
Institute of Advanced Aerospace Technology, School of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 08826, Korea
2
Datalab, Kakao Mobillity Corp., 13F, Alphadom Tower, 152, Pangyoyeok-ro, Bundang-gu, Seongnam-si, Gyeonggi-do 13529, Korea
3
Agency for Defense Development, Daejeon 34186, Korea
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 30 October 2018 / Revised: 7 January 2019 / Accepted: 8 January 2019 / Published: 12 January 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Sensor Fusion and Novel Technologies in Positioning and Navigation)
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Abstract

When a user receiver is tracking an authentic signal, a spoofing signal can be transmitted to the user antenna. The question is under what conditions does the tracking point of the receiver move from the authentic signal to the spoofing signal? In this study, we develop a spoofing process equation (SPE) that can be used to calculate the tracking point of the delay lock loop (DLL) at regular chip intervals for the entire spoofing process. The condition for a successful spoofing signal is analyzed using the SPE. To derive the SPE, parameters, such as the signal strength, sweep velocity, loop filter order, and DLL bandwidth are considered. The success or failure of a spoofing attack is determined for a specific spoofing signal using the SPE. In addition, a correlation between each parameter for a successful spoofing attack could be obtained through the SPE. The simulation results show that the SPE performance is largely consistent with that of general DLL methods, even though the computational load of SPE is very low. View Full-Text
Keywords: GNSS spoofing; GNSS receiver; delay lock loop GNSS spoofing; GNSS receiver; delay lock loop
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
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Shin, B.; Park, M.; Jeon, S.; So, H.; Kim, G.; Kee, C. Spoofing Attack Results Determination in Code Domain Using a Spoofing Process Equation. Sensors 2019, 19, 293.

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