Search Results (84)

James Sterba has recently argued against Divine Command Theory (DCT). Sterba also offers, as a preferable alternative to DCT, a metaethical account which he has developed over a number of years (culminating in Sterba’s 2013 book), which attempts to ground ethics in rationality. Both his case against DCT and his alternative metaethical theory are worth considering, but in this paper I will argue that both fail. This is not of course to say that DCT is either true or the most promising account of metaethics, or that the project of trying to ground ethics on rationality is a dead-end. I do conclude, however, that Sterba’s own unique approach, which involves trying to derive morality from rationality by appeal to a non-question-begging requirement, is doomed to failure, and also that his new arguments against DCT are ineffective. Full article

This paper will respond to James Sterba’s paper “An Ethics without God That is Compatible with Darwinian Evolution”. In his paper, Sterba argues that God cannot be the source of morality. Sterba maintains this position because he believes that his problem of extreme suffering entails that God cannot exist. Furthermore, Sterba argues that divine command theory has a number of serious problems confronting it. Alternatively, Sterba maintains that one can account for objective morality without appealing to God’s nature and/or commands. In response, this paper grants that Sterba presents a logically consistent account of objective morality without appealing to God’s nature and/or commands. However, this paper also cites a couple of reasons why one might think that God is still the better explanation for objective morality. This paper furthermore argues that Sterba’s objections do not demonstrate that divine command theory is false. The main thrust of this paper, though, focuses on Sterba’s argument about horrendous suffering. This paper argues that Sterba’s argument on horrendous suffering (while challenging) does not prove that a morally perfect God could not exist. Full article

James Sterba recently presented arguments against theories which ground morality in God and attempted “to provide an account of the norms on which an ethics without God can be appropriately grounded ….” In particular, Sterba noted that “Robert Adams is best known for his attempt to ground morality in God’s nature” and “[r]ecently, Adam Johnson significantly developed Adams’s view ….” In 2024, Sterba and I had a public debate concerning this issue at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in which I argued that the trinitarian God of Christianity provides the best explanation for objective morality whereas Sterba argued that morality can be objective without God and proposed a nontheistic account. In this paper, I argue that my theistic theory, which I call Divine Love Theory, is a better explanation of objective morality than Sterba’s nontheistic theory. First, I provide a summary of both my theory and Sterba’s. Second, I respond to Sterba’s arguments against theories which ground morality in God. Third, I provide reasons to conclude my Divine Love Theory is a better explanation for objective morality than Sterba’s theory. Full article

This essay is a response to James Sterba’s “An Ethics without God That Is Compatible with Darwinian Evolution.” As an atheist philosopher I show that atheist morality is essentially and thoroughly a secular morality, and that the most reasonable ethics are secular systems in that they do not require a God, gods, or goddesses. I go on to defend an atheist morality based on polls showing that countries with atheist populations are healthier than religious ones. Then I point out the sources of human morality, arguing that there is a common neighborly morality that matters, based on facts about who we are as a species, which includes the pre-human sources in the animal world. Finally, I mention how that Sterbaian Ethics, as it should henceforth be called, can succeed. Full article

Harrison has argued that ethics requires a god and, thus, keeps ethical norms from being threatened by evolutionary debunking. This paper argues that consensus is a better guarantee for ethics than gods, and ethics compatible with evolution is necessary for us to achieve consensus. To reduce the divide between theists and atheists and to prevent us from losing our pursuit of the common good, I start from the key consensus already achieved by Sterba and Harrison, that is, ethics does not specifically require God. It follows that ethics does not require gods and is our own affair. The Darwinian evolutionary theory shows that, when we are adapting to the environment, we develop different behaviors. This provides a common ground for understanding our differences and motivates us to adapt to a new environment where we, who are vastly different, have to live together. Finally, I take Confucian ethics as an example to show how ethics that begins with blood relations has given rise to our golden rule. Thus, the Darwinian evolutionary theory should not be seen as a threat. Full article

This paper engages with James Sterba’s arguments from an Islamic theological perspective, particularly drawing on the Mu‘tazilite tradition. It focuses on three central themes: (1) the position of God in the face of horrendous evils, (2) the relationship between divine command theory and moral objectivity, and (3) the compatibility of Darwinian evolution with objective morality. First, I challenge Sterba’s claim that the existence of a wholly good and powerful God is logically incompatible with horrendous evils by proposing a “theistic structuralist” framework inspired by the Mu‘tazilite scholar Qadi Abd al-Jabbar. Second, while largely agreeing with Sterba’s critique of divine command theory, I incorporate a Mu‘tazilite view that grounds moral objectivity in God’s inherently good nature. Third, I support Sterba’s argument—against Sharon Street—that Darwinian evolution does not undermine moral objectivity, but I further argue that a consistent defense of this view ultimately requires the existence of God. Full article

This essay explores the question: can we have an objective ethics without God? This question is raised by James Sterba, who argues in the affirmative. As an atheistic ethicist, Sterba is motivated to maintain an objective morality that is not based in theism and that can withstand the problems with Darwinism. Sterba examines what he sees as one of the most popular theistic attempts to ground human morality, viz., divine command theory. In rejecting both divine command theory and theism, Sterba offers what he believes can offer objective morality: a basic moral norm that all people should adhere to. This article examines Sterba’s criticism of divine command theory along with his own efforts at establishing an objective morality in what he considers a universal abstract principle. In the end, this article argues that Sterba’s axiomatic principle is unclear as to its ontological foundation as well as its causal efficacy in attempting to obligate objective human ethics. It will be argued that Sterba is correct about human nature being the locus of morality, but that atheism fails at providing human teleology to account for such morality. Full article

This article addresses the question, “Is an ethics without God possible?” This question is explored in a special issue, edited by Prof. Dr. James P. Sterba, which directly poses this very inquiry. I argue that an objective ethics without God is epistemically possible. Having addressed this initial point, I then make the case that an objective ethics without God is metaphysically possible. In other words, there are plausible explanations to support the thesis that ethics exists without God. Lastly, I propose that although God is not required for ethics, it is reasonable to postulate God’s existence to realize aspects of justice. Full article

This article examines the assumption that, in order to respond adequately to the question in the title, one must have the classical concept of God in mind. Classical theism is criticized and neoclassical/process theism is briefly defended. Specifically, the classical theistic attribute of omnipotence receives four criticisms. The hope is that these criticisms prepare the way for a more fruitful response to the question in the title than is possible when the classical concept of God is assumed. Full article

Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, for all normative reasons require a god and moral reasons are simply a subset of normative reasons. Sterba’s criticisms of more orthodox divine command theories of ethics are shown to raise no challenge to my view. Furthermore, even if Sterba’s alternative atheistic objectivist ethics is coherent, it would leave moral norms vulnerable to a particular kind of evolutionary debunking threat in a way that my theistic alternative does not. Full article

Background: Actinium-225 (²²⁵Ac) has gained interest in nuclear medicine for use in targeted alpha therapy (TAT) for the treatment of cancer. However, the number of suitable chelators for the stable complexation of ²²⁵Ac³⁺ is limited. The promising physical properties of ²²⁵Ac result in an increased demand for the radioisotope that is not matched by its current supply. To expand the possibilities for the development of ²²⁵Ac-based TAT therapeutics, a new hydroxamate-based chelator, DFO*¹², is described. We report the DFT-guided design of dodecadentate DFO*¹² and an efficient and convenient automated solid-phase synthesis for its preparation. To address the limited availability of ²²⁵Ac, a small-scale ²²⁹Th/²²⁵Ac generator was constructed in-house to provide [²²⁵Ac]AcCl₃ for research. Methods: DFT calculations were performed in ORCA 5.0.1 using the BP86 functional with empirical dispersion correction D3 and Becke–Johnson damping (D3BJ). The monomer synthesis over three steps enabled the solid-phase synthesis of DFO*¹². The small-scale ²²⁹Th/²²⁵Ac generator was realized by extracting ²²⁹Th from aged ²³³U material. Radiolabeling of DFO*¹² with ²²⁵Ac was performed in 1 M TRIS pH 8.5 or 1.5 M NaOAc pH 4.5 for 30 min at 37 °C. Results: DFT calculations directed the design of a dodecadentate chelator. The automated synthesis of the chelator DFO*¹² and the development of a small-scale ²²⁹Th/²²⁵Ac generator allowed for the radiolabeling of DFO*¹² with ²²⁵Ac quantitatively at 37 °C within 30 min. The complex [²²⁵Ac]Ac-DFO*¹² indicated good stability in different media for 20 h. Conclusions: The novel hydroxamate-based dodecadentate chelator DFO*¹², together with the developed ²²⁹Th/²²⁵Ac generator, provide new opportunities for ²²⁵Ac research for future radiopharmaceutical development and applications in TAT. Full article

Building on my recent argument that an all-good, all-powerful God is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world, I explore what grounding ethics can have without the God of traditional theism. While theists have argued that ethics is grounded either in God’s commands and/or in his nature, I show that no such adequate grounding exists, even if my argument—showing that the God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world—were shown to be unsuccessful, and I further show that such a grounding is impossible, given that my argument is successful. I then go on to provide an account of the norms on which an ethics without God can be appropriately grounded and show how an ethics, so grounded, can be appropriately related to our biological and cultural past, present, and future, as understood through Darwinian evolutionary theory. In this way, I hope to undercut a recent attempt to use Darwinian evolutionary theory to debunk ethics. Full article

Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does not exist. In this paper, I offer a penal colony theodicy that will show how the world as we know it is entirely compatible with God’s implementation of such evil prevention requirements. Full article

James P. Sterba has provided a compelling argument to the effect that given the extent of significant, and indeed even horrendous, evil that an all-good and all-powerful being could have prevented, there is no God. There is a hidden assumption in Sterba’s reasoning, involving an inference from God being able to do anything metaphysically possible (omnipotence) to his being, after creation, able to prevent evil. As what follows shows, that isn’t a purely logical matter. It depends on ruling out a determinate theological account of how creation limits what is then metaphysically possible for God, an account set out in detail below. So Sterba’s argument is not deductively valid, unless that account is incoherent. Accordingly, we are back in the realm of total judgments of theoretical plausibility, and the effects of God-given grace on what then will strike one as the right view to live by. Full article