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Keywords = serial dictatorship mechanism

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12 pages, 253 KB  
Article
School Choice in Guangzhou: Why High-Scoring Students Are Protected?
by Yuanju Fang
Games 2021, 12(2), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020031 - 8 Apr 2021
Viewed by 3700
Abstract
Each year, millions of middle school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for high school positions. Unlike other cities, Guangzhou still uses the immediate acceptance mechanism but implements a policy that students in the high-scoring group receive their allocations before [...] Read more.
Each year, millions of middle school graduates in China take a standardized test and compete for high school positions. Unlike other cities, Guangzhou still uses the immediate acceptance mechanism but implements a policy that students in the high-scoring group receive their allocations before those in the low-scoring group. In this paper, we study a class of the Guangzhou mechanisms, including the immediate acceptance (IA) and the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism. We show that, if a collection of groups is refined by splitting its groups into a larger number of smaller subgroups, then the Guangzhou mechanism will perform more stably and less manipulable than before. This result provides a tool for policy makers to improve the allocation outcome of the IA mechanism under homogeneous priorities and justifies the use of a high-scoring student protection policy in Guangzhou’s high school admission. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue School Choice)
15 pages, 361 KB  
Article
Monte Carlo Inference on Two-Sided Matching Models
by Taehoon Kim, Jacob Schwartz, Kyungchul Song and Yoon-Jae Whang
Econometrics 2019, 7(1), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/econometrics7010016 - 26 Mar 2019
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 7926
Abstract
This paper considers two-sided matching models with nontransferable utilities, with one side having homogeneous preferences over the other side. When one observes only one or several large matchings, despite the large number of agents involved, asymptotic inference is difficult because the observed matching [...] Read more.
This paper considers two-sided matching models with nontransferable utilities, with one side having homogeneous preferences over the other side. When one observes only one or several large matchings, despite the large number of agents involved, asymptotic inference is difficult because the observed matching involves the preferences of all the agents on both sides in a complex way, and creates a complicated form of cross-sectional dependence across observed matches. When we assume that the observed matching is a consequence of a stable matching mechanism with homogeneous preferences on one side, and the preferences are drawn from a parametric distribution conditional on observables, the large observed matching follows a parametric distribution. This paper shows in such a situation how the method of Monte Carlo inference can be a viable option. Being a finite sample inference method, it does not require independence or local dependence among the observations which are often used to obtain asymptotic validity. Results from a Monte Carlo simulation study are presented and discussed. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Resampling Methods in Econometrics)
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