Search Results (6)

At present, smart contracts are designed based on the application field, and their structure and functions are closely related to specific businesses. Even smart contracts within the same field and the same business have different structures and functions due to different developers, resulting in structural confusion, repeated development, and low levels of sharing. In response to this problem, this study conducts a full investigation of smart contracts in various fields, using big data technology to compare and analyze the structures of each contract and extracting the common content of their main bodies to study each feature, as well as to conduct induction and fusion. This study also generally designs a hierarchical structure and formulates structural modules such as transaction rules and the analysis of rights and responsibilities, as well as a reward and punishment mechanism. Data traceability is established, and the overall architectural specification of smart contracts is constructed. Additions, deletions, and improvements are made based on specific application environments to realize the dynamic updates of the architecture of contracts. Experiments show that the architecture of contracts can realize the various functions required in a transaction, solve the problem of the repeated development of current transactional smart contracts, and improve the sharing level. Full article

The cheap price of carbon sink trading in certification emission reduction (CER) makes it more popular than the carbon emission allowance (CEA); trading in carbon-neutral, enterprises are more inclined to purchase carbon sinks to achieve their own carbon neutrality goals and promote decarbonization of the whole chain. Companies urgently need to figure out how to achieve carbon neutrality with government rewards and punishments. Moreover, as an important factor affecting the effectiveness of supply chain, it is particularly important to study how to coordinate fairness concerns of such objects. Therefore, a centralized and two-stage Stackelberg game model of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of one manufacturer and one retailer is constructed, and the cost-sharing contract, revenue-sharing contract, and cost–revenue-sharing contract are used to coordinate it, taking into account the fairness concerns of downstream enterprises while pursuing carbon neutrality, ensuring the overall benefits of the supply chain, and considering the impact of government subsidies and rewards and punishments on the carbon neutrality of the supply chain. Research shows that (1) compared with the other two contracts, the cost–revenue-sharing contract performs better and can effectively achieve the Pareto optimum; (2) the cost-sharing contract performs better in accomplishing the carbon neutrality of the CLSC; (3) excessively high carbon sink prices are not only detrimental to enterprise efficiency, but also to the realization of carbon neutrality goal; and (4) higher supply chain utility is pursued by enterprises when the unit reward and punishment are not great enough; otherwise, carbon neutrality is pursued. The research results can not only provide decision support for the product pricing, carbon sink reserve and contract design of CLSC enterprises under the goal of carbon neutrality, but can also provide a reference for the setting of government subsidies and rewards and punishment. Full article

In this paper, a blockchain-enabled energy trading method is proposed to deal with the inefficiency and security issues in energy trading for electric vehicles in smart grids. It includes the design of a smart contract and the excitation mechanism of energy sharing. The credit points of each vehicle as a node are considered in the design of the smart contract, which is used to supervise the process of energy trading. A strategy to estimate the credit points of each node and describe the excitation mechanism is illustrated. The connection between the credit points and the probability that a node would be accepted for energy trading has been established. To control the energy trading access, a double auction method is used to choose the part of the nodes participating in energy trading. Only selected nodes with winning bids can supply or request energy from the blockchain-based platform. Then it reaches the conclusion that the higher the credit points they have, the more trading initiative they would have during the energy transaction and transmission. The smart contract design and the excitation mechanism proposed in this paper would reward the vehicles that perform well and punish the beguiling vehicles for regulating the trading process. Full article

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the fundamental of secure digital communications. It provides a secure means to authenticate identities over the Internet. Symmetric or asymmetric encryption schemes are widely used in identity authentication in any kind of PKI. The conventional PKI has several drawbacks due to the centralized and non-transparent design. Several recent research works utilize blockchain technology to overcome the limitations of conventional implementations of PKI. Blockchain-based PKI integrates blockchain technology with PKI to form a new type of decentralized PKI (DPKI). Several works utilize the currency property in blockchains to implement the reward-and-punishment mechanism. In this paper, we propose a smart contract-based PKI which utilizes the Ethereum smart contract to build a new type of blockchain-based PKI with the reward-and-punishment mechanism using ERC-20 tokens. It has several advantages over previous implementations of similar research that use Ethereum’s main currency—Ether. Full article

With the increasing demand for “green” goods, it is necessary for companies to develop green innovation to seize market opportunities. Companies often use the model of supply chain cooperation to carry out green innovation. The standard reward and punishment contract model is constructed based on the green degree of the product provided by the supplier when the manufacturer has a fair preference. The impact of the manufacturer’s fairness preference on the green degree of the product, price, manufacturer’s profit, supplier’s profit, and overall profit when the product green degree standard provided by the supplier is greater or smaller than the manufacturer’s demand standard is analyzed. The impact of the difference in channel power between manufacturers and suppliers is also analyzed on the overall profit of the green supply chain. The research results showed that when the manufacturer’s attention to fairness is equal to the attention to self-interest, the overall profit of the green supply chain is the largest, the coordination of the supply chain can be achieved, and the difference in the channel power of the participants in the green supply chain has a significant impact on the overall profit, which is verified by numerical analysis. Full article

Water rights trading is an effective way to optimize the allocation of water resources. However, the existing practice of water rights trading in China lacks any consideration of the practical value of the exchanged water. This deficiency may lead to disputes between transferor and transferee during the implementation of the water rights trading contract. This paper puts forward the concept of Standard Water (SW). First, getting the original value of exchanged water by the shadow price model based on input-output table; Second, based on the original value, building the economic profits or costs model to obtain the practical value of exchanged water; Third, establishing SW quantity measurement model according to the principle of rewarding excellence and punishing inferiority, so as to convert the water quantity of exchanged water into SW quantity. With the standardization method, this paper takes the water rights transaction between Dongyang City and Yiwu City in 2000 as an example to carry out case study, and provides policy recommendations. The results show that when the contract requires the provision of 49.999 million m³ water of Class I the quality, if the exchanged water quality provided is in Class II-V, the corresponding SW will be decreased to 48.699–37.399 million m³. The application of this research will be conducive to ensuring the fairness and durability of the water rights trading processes. Full article