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Keywords = ascending-bid auction

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11 pages, 262 KiB  
Article
Fairness and Efficiency in Online Advertising Mechanisms
by Alison Watts
Games 2021, 12(2), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020036 - 15 Apr 2021
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3452
Abstract
Online advertising often involves targeting ads to certain types of consumers where ads are commonly sold by generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are consistently shown different ads or consistently receive different [...] Read more.
Online advertising often involves targeting ads to certain types of consumers where ads are commonly sold by generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are consistently shown different ads or consistently receive different payoffs. Results show that such ascending bid auctions may result in unfair treatment and additionally that uncertainty regarding an ad’s value can result in inefficiency. An alternative way to assign ads to consumers is presented called the random assignment mechanism. Results show that the random assignment can improve fairness while improving efficiency in some circumstances. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social and Economic Networks)
14 pages, 313 KiB  
Article
Auctions Versus Private Negotiations in Buyer-Seller Networks
by Alison Watts
Games 2016, 7(3), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030022 - 31 Aug 2016
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 6397
Abstract
Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. [...] Read more.
Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We consider what happens if sellers can make a take it or leave it offer to one of their linked buyers before the auction takes place and thus such a seller can choose not to participate in the auction. We give conditions on the graph and buyers valuations under which the buyer and seller will both agree to such a take it or leave it offer. Specifically, the buyer-seller pair will choose private negotiation over the auction if the seller acts as a network bridge with power over the buyer and if there are enough buyers with low valuations so that the seller does not expect to receive a high price in the auction. Full article
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47 pages, 825 KiB  
Article
Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions
by Naoko Nishimura, Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Yoshikazu Ikeda
Games 2011, 2(3), 365-411; https://doi.org/10.3390/g2030365 - 16 Sep 2011
Cited by 22 | Viewed by 8662
Abstract
The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences [...] Read more.
The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to reciprocate the spiteful overbidding of the lower value bidders. The model also predicts different bidding behavior in second price as compared to ascending-bid auctions. The paper also presents experimental evidence broadly consistent with the model. In the complete information environment, lower value bidders overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not found in the incomplete information environment, consistent with the model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
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