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Proceeding Paper

Information Phenomenology: An Informational Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology †

HuaGuang Academy of Information Science, Wuhan 430074, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Presented at Forum on Information Philosophy—The 6th International Conference of Philosophy of Information, IS4SI Summit 2023, Beijing, China, 14 August 2023.
Comput. Sci. Math. Forum 2023, 8(1), 86; https://doi.org/10.3390/cmsf2023008086
Published: 28 August 2023

Abstract

:
As a philosophical distillation of the study of human consciousness, Husserl’s phenomenology reveals the truth and principles of direct experience and is essentially an information discipline, known as “information phenomenology”. The main purpose of this article is to explain the basic ideas and methods of Husserl’s phenomenology based on the basic ideas and methodology of informatics. Our research results mainly include the following aspects: firstly, the misleading effect of physicalism on psychology and Husserl’s criticism of psychologism; secondly, information ontology and the “intentionality” of life information; thirdly, the “suspension” of phenomenology and the “reduction” of essence; fourthly, the world of science and the world of daily life; and finally, the limitations of Husserl’s phenomenology.

1. Introduction

In both nature and society, there are material phenomena and information phenomena that are both interrelated and differentiated from each other. The study of material phenomena has generated a group of material disciplines, with physics as the foundation. Material science has benefited humankind and greatly changed our living world. However, material science has also produced negative effects: in the field of science, so-called “physics envy” and “quantitative complex” have emerged, leading to misleading and shielding immaterial disciplines (information science) [1]. Due to the insurmountable difficulties encountered by physicalism, a contrary trend of thought in the history of modern philosophy, humanism, was inspired. Husserl’s phenomenology is one of the most influential philosophical trends. It held high the banner of critical psychologism and exposed the drawbacks of physicalism, becoming a magnificent philosophical movement spanning five continents over a hundred years [2]. As a philosophical distillation of the study of human consciousness, Husserl’s phenomenology reveals the truth and principles of direct experience and is essentially an information discipline, known as “information phenomenology”. The main purpose of this article is to explain the basic ideas and methods of Husserl’s phenomenology based on the basic ideas and methodology of informatics.

2. The Misleading Effect of Physicalism on Psychology and Husserl’s Criticism of Psychologism

The reasons for and drawbacks of physicalism [3] (pp. 15–17). Physics is a very mature science and can be called a model of material science. The empirical, rational, and aesthetic methods in physics are indeed applicable and effective in the study of material objects. However, so-called physicalism, which overstates the scope of the application of physical concepts, principles, and methods, advocates the unconditional extension of physics to the humanities and social sciences, leading to a misleading understanding of the liberal arts discipline.
The focus of traditional psychological research [3] (pp. 103–104). The so-called “Physical Envy” and “Quantitative Complex” are syndromes in the scientific community. Although there are scientists with this symptom in other fields, they always hope that their subject has an analytically mathematical model like physics. Traditional science takes physics as a model and strives to move closer to physics, seeking to identify the properties of physics from the research objects of this discipline in order to become a branch of “grand physics”. For traditional psychology, the only thing it needs to study is physiological events that can be observed, repeated, predicted, and quantified. Real research on psychology and consciousness has been excluded from the field of psychology. In this way, so-called “psychology” is simply the physiological basis of true psychology. Based on this kind of psychology, for philosophical refinement, the product “psychologism” can only be a physiological version of physicalism, which is of course a variant of physicalism.
Husserl’s criticism of psychologism [3] (pp. 183–185). Psychoticism regards the physiological experience of human psychological activities as the basic object and psychology as the necessary and sufficient foundation of logic. Husserl pointed out in “The Study of Logic” that the fundamental mistake of psychologism is to confuse natural and logical laws, and the reason for making this mistake is to confuse the material process of psychological activity itself with the content involved in psychological activity. Natural laws are laws about the interaction between material events, and they are laws of material science; the logical law is the law of the interaction between concepts, which is the law of informatics. Physical events occur in four-dimensional space-time and can be directly observed, quantified, and expressed using mathematical formulas. Conceptual events occur in people’s thinking processes, just like symbols that occur in computer programs and cannot be directly observed, quantified, or described using mathematical formulas. In computer systems, hardware processes are the subject of microelectronics research in physics, while software processes are the subject of software theory research in informatics.

3. Information Ontology and the “Intentionality” of Life Information

The requirements of informatics for ontology. Heidegger, Husserl’s favorite pupil, believed that traditional ontology only studied the “being”, while ontology should pursue the meaning of “being”. Replacing the study of being with the study of the meaning of being is his fundamental principle throughout his implementation. Any being has its own meaning of being. However, the average being in existence is unaware of, or does not pay attention to, why and how they are present. Only human beings, who are special beings, can become the proponents and interrogators of the question of the meaning of being. Only then can one question the being of anyone who is, revealing the meaning of the being of the one who is. He interprets “being” as manifestation, believing that only human beings can comprehend their own manifestation, and only in the process of developing their living state can the meaning of “being” be explored. He referred to the theory of analyzing the state of human existence as basic ontology. In his late period, Heidegger turned from individual survival to the revelation of “being” itself, believing that being is revealed through language, “forming language in thought, and language is the home of being”. He gave ontological meaning to thinking and language, believing that the thinking of this being and the existence of the being are identical. Language is not a tool of humanity, but humanity is a tool of language. From the perspective of informatics, he advocates the existence of consciousness expressed in human language in addition to biological humans, that is to say, that there is also an information ontology in addition to the material ontology. The human individual is nothing but a carrier of human information. The life of a material individual is limited, and information of a human being can be eternal.
Information ontology, epistemology, and axiology. The philosophy of physicalism holds that there is nothing in the universe except moving matter. Human thinking, consciousness, language, culture, scientific knowledge, and so on, are only material attributes. However, after humankind entered the information society, the situation reversed. The production of physical products is secondary, and the information industry is the pillar of the national economy. People who are influenced by computer culture often upgrade their software versions without updating their hardware to achieve better information-processing functions. In the market, where people are “products”, there are two major counters: “labor” and “talent”. The former is mainly engaged in physical labor, while the latter is engaged in intelligent labor. Both scientists and ordinary citizens feel that the transmission, copying, and sharing of information is different from matter. Information is relatively independent of the carrier because information is dependent on materials. In essence, information is not matter, and the driving force of information evolution is not the force of physics. Information, like matter, is the most fundamental existence in the universe. Just as material science sublimates material philosophy, with material as its core category, information science sublimates information philosophy, with information as its core category. Just as material philosophy includes material ontology, epistemology, and axiology, information philosophy includes information ontology, epistemology, and axiology.
The intention to express the vitality of life information. Life materials have vitality, and life information also has vitality. In a certain sense, the expression of the vitality of living materials is directed by the vitality of life information. Biological metabolism, genetics, stress reactions, and so on are all regulated and controlled by life information. The purpose of biology is the directionality of life information. Husserl believed that human consciousness is always a consciousness of what; the prescriptive nature of consciousness consists in the tendency toward certain events, which is the only essential structure that constitutes consciousness. Intentionality is an inseparable correlation between cognitive activity and the being being recognized. A fundamental characteristic of the state of mind and language is that these states have an object and content; that is, they point to an object and involve a substance. The object that the behavior of the mind points to is not necessarily an entity in the physical sense but can be an existence in the mind, just like an existence in computer memory. Intentional objects give the object and meaning of human consciousness. Life information and artificial information are always intentional. Intentionality is the purpose, the vitality of life information, the source of life impulse, consciousness, and creation, and the essential characteristic of life vitality. Life information is “self -serving” information. Natural, non-living information processes are not intentional and are “self-existence” information.

4. “Suspension” of Phenomenology and “Reduction” of Essence

Phenomenological reduction is discontinuing judgment. The “phenomena” studied by Husserl’s phenomenology are not what people usually refer to as natural or social phenomena but rather the phenomena in human conscious activities. The “return to things themselves” advocated by him is not to re-examine things in nature and human society, but rather any “things” that a person is aware of, such as natural objects, mathematical objects, values, desires, emotions, wills, and so on in consciousness. This is the “phenomena” of phenomenology. Consciousness is consciousness, not an entity, and cannot be demonstrated. Therefore, traditional thinking methods must be changed. Husserl called his new method “the reductive method of phenomenology”. In fact, his “reduction” and the reduction of physicalism are not the same at all. His reductionism is to restore abstract consciousness from physical entities. However, instead of saying this, he interpreted it as “suspending judgment” or “suspending” the issue to be judged. Therefore, researchers can turn to “pure consciousness”, turn to the content of consciousness itself, and turn to “things” in consciousness and “phenomena” in phenomenology. How does one achieve discontinuing judgment? One encloses the things to be judged, that is, the existence of the cognitive object, the interaction between mind and body, and so on, in parentheses and leaves them alone.
The reduction of essence is intentional structure [3] (pp. 263–265). The “essence” of Husserl’s idea is not the essence in the commonly mentioned philosophical category “phenomenon and essence”. According to him, phenomenon is essence, and essence is intuition. The phenomena in people’s consciousness are the essence of the object that is experienced. In consciousness, essence is not abstracted from phenomena, nor is it obtained through deduction or induction but through sensation or intuition. Essence is obtained through the reduction of essence, that is, the intuition of essence. “Intuition” here is not the intuition commonly used to describe “inspiration, epiphany, and intuition” but rather the “intuition” of conscious objects in conscious activities, including understanding, experience, value, needs, goals, and so on. The pure “self” is not the “self” of biophysics and biochemistry but rather the executor of the activity of “I think”, that is, the being of “I am”, namely, my consciousness. So, what is the structure of consciousness? Husserl said that the structure of consciousness is intentional, that is, the conscious subject-intentional activity-intentional object. Intentionality does not refer to the biological characteristics and structure of human psychology but rather to the characteristics and structure of a pure consciousness. The intentional object is the internal existence of human consciousness. Psychological phenomena are marked by the interrelationships and actions of their internal objects. It is the phenomenon of the intentional inclusion of objects in itself. Physical phenomena do not have this characteristic.

5. The World of Science and the World of Daily Life

The limitations of the scientific world. In Husserl’s view, the world of natural science (that is, the world of science) is a world constructed by scientists around the utilitarian goal of developing and controlling nature to benefit human survival with the help of the power of reason. Therefore, the scientific world is the entire development plan constructed by humans under the guidance of the theme of “production”. The scientific world is a “themed” or “subject oriented” world. In addition to the scientific world, due to the differences in people’s knowledge, emotions, and intentions, other thematic worlds can also be constructed, such as the ethical world, the aesthetic world, the religious world, and so on. Husserl believes that because this thematic world has eliminated and abstracted out phenomena unrelated to its theme, it is inherently one-sided, narrow, and regional. It elevates the observation, experiment, and quantitative methods of natural science into a dogma, and then the method is everything, the method is science, and it is all of science. The main boundary between science and non-science lies in the method of studying a problem, not in the type of problem or the degree to which it is solved. Therefore, the research object of psychology can only be the human body and physical aspects of psychological activities, and its value, aesthetic, and ethical aspects are excluded.
Return to the world of life. The so-called “life world” is the world that people directly face and experience in their daily lives. Husserl believed that, contrary to the thematic world, the life world is a “non-thematic” world. As the world a specific person is living in, as an undifferentiated world, various purposes, themes, interests, and so on that occur in response to the needs of a specific person’s knowledge, emotions, and intentions can coexist and blend into this world without mutual exclusion. Obviously, the experience of the living world takes precedence over the experience of the scientific world. In the most general sense, the living world takes precedence over the conceptual world presupposed by abstract theory. Here, there is no single theme that can encompass all existence, nor is there an empirical or interpretative approach that can explain everything alone. On the contrary, multiple themes can coexist, and multiple ways can complement each other. For human existence, the concept of natural science does not occupy an absolute position, nor can it solve all the problems faced by human life. Natural science, motivated by theoretical interest, originated in human life. At first, science left the living world, but it returned to the living world in the form of science, technology, and “applications” related to life.

6. Limitations of Husserl’s Phenomenology

Husserl’s two-volume masterpiece “The Study of Logic” was published more than 100 years ago. The phenomenological research he initiated is opposed to physicalism, providing an ideological and philosophical foundation for the humanities and social sciences, especially psychology [4]. However, Husserl’s phenomenology also has its historical, scientific, and discourse-related limitations. During the period when Husserl listened to Brentano’s courses in psychology and philosophy, the physical revolution had not yet begun, the prelude to modern natural science had not yet begun, and extreme philosophical forms such as physicalism had not yet been universalized. For the past 100 years, the development of physics has reached its peak and entered a “saturation period”. Over the past half-century, the rapid development of communication, control, and computer science has propelled all of human society from the industrial era to the information era. If mathematical formulas are models of physics, then logical programs are models of informatics. Philosophers in the information age need to learn from, inherit, and surpass Husserl.
We need not only a phenomenology of consciousness, but also a computer phenomenology, biological phenomenology, and social phenomenology. In a sense, the phenomenological group in the information age may be called “information philosophy”. Information philosophy is a philosophical system that confronts material philosophy. It is opposed to physicalism at the four levels of physical science, biological science, humanities, and social science. It is a more Husserlian philosophy than Husserl. Moreover, information philosophy does not need to wrap up simple and clear theories in “extremely obscure and abstruse” words like Husserl’s. He uses concepts that have opposite meanings to common-sense understanding and circuitously expresses his meaning in antonymous and obscure words. He had to do that. Although it creates difficulties for believers and followers, it also creates great trouble for the opposition and “consciousness” killers.
Nowadays, information society craves basic theories of information science, and the establishment of theoretical informatics requires the support of information philosophy. With the establishment and improvement of theoretical informatics, the entire knowledge system of information science is about to mature and obtain the qualification to enter the scientific palace. The paradigm of information science will gradually become the dominant paradigm of the scientific knowledge system in the information era, ending the dominance of the paradigm of physical science. The current “sphere of influence” of so-called rationalism and irrationalism will change the pattern. The philosophical trend of “physicalism” will gradually fade out of the mainstream of philosophy. The two major scientific systems of material science and information science will be unified. Its abstraction and sublimation will inevitably lead to the unity of philosophy, namely, the symbiosis and complementarity of material philosophy and information philosophy.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, writing—original draft preparation and review, Z.L.; discussion, X.W. and L.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge Lin Xia for English improvement.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

References

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MDPI and ACS Style

Wang, X.; Chen, L.; Li, Z. Information Phenomenology: An Informational Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology. Comput. Sci. Math. Forum 2023, 8, 86. https://doi.org/10.3390/cmsf2023008086

AMA Style

Wang X, Chen L, Li Z. Information Phenomenology: An Informational Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology. Computer Sciences & Mathematics Forum. 2023; 8(1):86. https://doi.org/10.3390/cmsf2023008086

Chicago/Turabian Style

Wang, Xia, Lamei Chen, and Zongrong Li. 2023. "Information Phenomenology: An Informational Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology" Computer Sciences & Mathematics Forum 8, no. 1: 86. https://doi.org/10.3390/cmsf2023008086

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