Manufacturing Legitimacy: Media Ownership and the Framing of the July 2024 Uprising in Bangladesh

Abstract

Bangladesh witnessed its biggest nationwide mass uprising since gaining independence in 1971, which led to the overthrow of an authoritarian government that had existed for a decade. This study employed the protest paradigm to analyze how the protests were framed by mainstream print media and how media ownership influenced their coverage. Drawing on a quantitative content analysis of five major newspapers from different ownerships, the study explores dominant media frames, tone, and legitimacy of protest coverage. The findings indicate that media ownership significantly affects the credibility and tone of the protest coverage. The protest paradigm was applied more strictly by pro-government media outlets. Independent and anti-government outlets, on the other hand, took a more impartial stance. The study reveals how media ownership shaped the framing of dissent, reinforcing the protest paradigm in ways that aligned with the ruling party’s interests. This study adds to the body of knowledge on South Asian media bias and authoritarian information control.

1. Introduction

In 2024, Bangladesh witnessed its most significant mass uprising since gaining independence in 1971, resulting in the collapse of a decade-long autocratic regime but at the tragic cost of nearly 2000 lives. Following the controversial 2014 General Election, which was boycotted by key opposition parties, the nation shifted toward a one-party system under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership of the Bangladesh Awami League (AL). This transition eroded the country’s democratic foundations and increasingly displayed authoritarian traits (Riaz, 2019). The political system became mired in corruption and dysfunction, with intense repression of the opposition fueling widespread socio-political discontent. The regime also tightened its grip on the media through harsh laws, such as the Digital Security Act of 2018 and the Cybersecurity Act of 2023 (Rahman et al., 2024).

Authoritarian regimes consider controlling media as an important function of the government (Abbott & Givens, 2015). Under Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule, media outlets were unable to publish content critical of her government. The regime used several tactics, including legal and extra-legal measures. The government’s control extends to ownership structures, with private media outlets often aligned with political interests, further consolidating a politico-commercial nexus (Rahman et al., 2024). In Bangladesh, most of the media is owned by pro-regime business groups, and thus, the media contributed to the erosion of democracy by creating a metanarrative justifying the actions of the regime (Riaz & Rahman, 2021).

The protest paradigm is essentially a scenario in which news stories highlight violence and disruptive behavior, often damaging the legitimacy of the protest and undermining public support (Mourão & Chen, 2020). The paradigm often relies on official sources (e.g., law enforcement or government officials) while underrepresenting movement voices. This framework has been heavily critiqued in studies covering movements from the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests (Smith & Haenschen, 2024) to the Hong Kong protests (Zannini, 2024), feminist uprisings (Santillana, 2024), and climate justice campaigns (Struve et al., 2024). However, there is a gap in the scholarship on the protest paradigm regarding how media ownership and the politico-commercial nexus affect the representation of protesters.

Furthermore, there is a significant gap among academics regarding how media organizations functioning under authoritarian governments cover anti-government protests. While extensive research has been conducted on media behavior in democratic contexts (Smith & Haenschen, 2024; Santillana, 2024; Struve et al., 2024), particularly concerning the framing of protest movements, comparatively little attention has been paid to how such dynamics unfold within authoritarian media environments. In these regimes, media institutions often function under strict state control or surveillance, which fundamentally shapes the nature and extent of protest coverage. As a result, the role of media in either suppressing, delegitimizing, or selectively amplifying protest narratives remains underexplored. This lack of empirical insight limits our ability to fully comprehend the mechanisms through which authoritarian governments manufacture their legitimacy through strategic media practices. To address this gap, this study investigated the relationship between media ownership and the protest paradigm from an authoritarian country context. Media practices often differ depending on partisanship, region, or the use of visual vs. textual narratives. By using this protest paradigm as a theoretical framework, the aim of this study is to investigate how the ownership pattern contributes to the protest paradigm.

This study pursues three primary objectives. First, it examines the dominant framing strategies employed by mainstream media outlets in Bangladesh during their coverage of the July 2024 uprising. Second, it analyzes how protests were portrayed in terms of tone and perceived legitimacy across mainstream print media outlets, with particular attention to variations associated with media ownership. Third, it investigates the representation of protesters in mainstream print media, focusing on the narrative techniques and discursive patterns used in the coverage.

This study provides an empirical contribution to the Protest Paradigm’s core tenets in the July 2024 uprising in Bangladesh against an authoritarian regime context while also illustrating how media ownership and political alignment significantly mediate its application. Not all protests received the same coverage; while elite-aligned media outlets like Prothom Alo and family and business-aligned Bangladesh Pratidin supported prevailing state narratives, Manabzamin offered a more sympathetic, contextually rich viewpoint. These distinctions are significant because how protest movements are portrayed in the media affects social memory, public legitimacy, and policy discourse.

Understanding this media ecology is crucial, especially in authoritarian regimes where protest itself is a democratic act and media framing can either amplify or suffocate its political potential. Through their resistance, Bangladeshi youth and the masses continue to challenge the protest paradigm, which is more than merely a pattern of representation. The subsequent sections of this study will delve into the literature review, research methods, results, and a discussion of the findings and their implications.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Protest Paradigm

The study applied the protest paradigm model as a theoretical underpinning. The protest paradigm explains how mainstream media reinforce the marginalization and delegitimization of social protests. Hertog and McLeod (1995) played a key role in developing this concept, arguing that mainstream media uphold dominant power structures by framing protesters negatively. In their study “Anarchists Wreak Havoc in Downtown Minneapolis,” Hertog and McLeod (1995) analyzed how traditional media portray radical protests and the framing techniques they used to delegitimize their claims. Their findings indicate that media coverage tends to emphasize violence and deviant behavior among protesters while downplaying their grievances and demands. The study also revealed that protests are frequently framed as irrational and dangerous, while protesters are rarely depicted as legitimate agents of social or political change. Moreover, the study found that news media heavily rely on official sources, such as government and law enforcement officials, when covering protests. The coverage often highlights law and order narratives, portraying the police as restoring stability while sidelining the protesters’ perspectives. Since the introduction of the protest paradigm, numerous media scholars have applied this framework to examine how the media frames social and political protests.

The protest paradigm was examined in different countries and different contexts. For instance, Harlow and Johnson (2011) investigated the Egyptian protest coverage in The New York Times and Nick Kristof’s Twitter feed, and Global Voices explores whether the delegitimizing “protest paradigm” found in mainstream media is replicated on social media, blogs, and how their coverage of the protests affects their trustworthiness. The New York Times followed the protest paradigm by focusing on the spectacle, citing government sources, and undervaluing demonstrators while maintaining an impartial role. On the other hand, Global Voices and Kristof’s Twitter feed took a different strategy, legitimizing demonstrators and acting as commentators/analysts in the unfolding events.

Lee (2014) analyzed how Hong Kong news media covered protests. The study found that the media often portrayed protesters as deviant and threatening, particularly when demonstrations involved aggressive or unconventional tactics. Additionally, the study highlighted the role of media political alignment in shaping protest coverage, revealing that conservative media were more likely to apply the protest paradigm, framing protests in a negative light.

Masullo et al. (2024) explored how news media reporting on protests influences public perception. Their study found that when the media provides objective background information and depict protesters in a humanizing manner, audiences develop a greater understanding of the protest’s purpose. However, media credibility was also influenced by readers’ political affiliations. Conservative audiences were more likely to perceive protest coverage as negative, reinforcing the protest paradigm, while liberal audiences saw the coverage as legitimizing and humanizing the protesters.

Mourão (2019) investigated the 2013 Brazilian protests to see how media coverage, influenced by the protest paradigm, changes throughout political turmoil. Her study moved away from viewing protest coverage as archetypal and toward a more complicated understanding of the connection between protestors and media. The findings revealed that when top opposition groups supported protests, journalism norms and routines validated the demonstrations. She argued that relationships with political elites and specialists are more effective at restoring media legitimacy than direct engagement with the media.

Similarly, Amenta et al. (2024) explored the factors influencing how social movement organizations (SMOs) in the United States are covered by the media. Their study challenged the traditional protest paradigm, suggesting that media coverage of non-violent protests differs from that of violent protests. Their findings indicated that SMOs receive both positive and negative media attention, whereas the protest paradigm often emphasizes negative portrayals.

Shahin et al. (2016) investigated the extent and applicability of the “protest paradigm” in non-Western contexts by studying domestic news coverage of protests in Brazil, China, and India. Their comparative study found that a nation’s history of informal discussions about politics decreases the chance of its news media adopting the protest paradigm. They also argued that news organizations are more likely to follow the protest paradigm if they have an ideological identification with the running government, rather than any specific ideology. There is a gap in the protest paradigm scholarship regarding how media ownership influences protest coverage, particularly in contexts where the media is regulated by an authoritarian government.

2.2. News Framing and Protest Paradigm

Framing is a widely used yet contested theoretical and methodological approach for studying mediated communication, as it advances our understanding of how media define specific social problems, offer causal interpretations, and make moral evaluations of issues (R. M. Entman & Usher, 2018; Matthes, 2009; R. Entman, 1993). This paradigm illuminates the processes through which hegemonic ideologies and dominant narratives are circulated in mass media, and how individual, group, and social identities are constructed through framing. It has drawn significant scholarly attention in media and communication research, enabling researchers to critically examine the relationship between media content, ownership, and the agendas underlying particular emphases or omissions in coverage.

Robert Entman (1993), one of the most influential early contributors to framing theory, argued that the concept “offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text” and that “analyzing frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness” is exercised (p. 52). He defined framing as the act of “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52).

Framing theory has been extensively applied to the study of social and political protests, with scholars adopting both generic and issue-specific approaches (Brüggemann & D’Angelo, 2018). Brüggemann and D’Angelo (2018) note that researchers can analyze both types of frames when studying texts as news frames; however, examining both simultaneously can be methodologically challenging. Consequently, many studies focus primarily on generic frames, which tend to be more broadly applicable across cases.

Within this line of inquiry, the protest paradigm model posits that news media often act as instruments of social control, generally adopting an oppositional stance toward social protests by portraying protesters as deviants who violate societal norms (Ophir et al., 2023). In their study of American news media coverage of protests during Donald Trump’s first U.S. presidency, they examined public order frames, political frames, and debate frames that were the most dominant in shaping the narratives.

2.3. Media Ownership and Political Control

Increased corporate control over media outlets erodes democratic discourse by shaping news content to serve political and economic elites (Bagdikian, 2004; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Bagdikian (2004) argues that a few powerful conglomerates dominate the U.S. media landscape, reducing ownership from around 50 companies in the 1980s to just five by the early 2000s. This consolidation, he contends, leads to homogenized content, biased journalism, and a prioritization of profit over public interest. Similarly, Herman and Chomsky (1988) assert that mainstream media operate as a propaganda system, advancing elite agendas rather than functioning as an independent democratic institution. Ownership shapes editorial policy, especially in politically sensitive environments like Bangladesh, where media conglomerates often have direct or indirect ties to ruling or opposition parties (Bagdikian, 2004; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). These studies focus on the American media system, revealing how concentrated ownership distorts journalism even within a democratic context.

Over the past 15 years, until the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime on 5 August, 2024, Bangladeshi media remained largely under state control. According to Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders, 2020), Bangladesh ranked 150th out of 180 countries in 2019 and dropped further to 151st in 2020. Notably, it ranked among the lowest in South Asia in terms of press freedom. Under Sheikh Hasina’s rule, the Digital Security Act (DSA) was enacted in 2018 to suppress freedom of speech and silence dissent against the government. This law enabled authorities to penalize media outlets for publishing content deemed “false” or against national interests, leading to fines, license revocations, and imprisonment of journalists (Rahman et al., 2024; Paul et al., 2018).

Bangladesh’s media industry began to flourish in the late 1990s, but its growth was particularly significant between 2012 and 2016. During the Sheikh Hasina era, the country had 45 private television channels, 1248 daily newspapers, 28 FM radio stations, 32 community radio stations, and over 10 online news portals (Riaz & Rahman, 2021). During this period, privately owned television grew by 200%, print media by 150%, radio by 350%, and digital media access by an astonishing 1500% (Ghosh, 2016). These figures highlight the rapid expansion of Bangladesh’s media landscape over the past 2 decades. However, much of this growth was concentrated among those with political connections, as Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government primarily granted television and newspaper licenses to party leaders and business elites with close ties to her administration.

Riaz and Rahman (2021) identified three key factors shaping media ownership in Bangladesh: family networks, political affiliations, and business interests. Several major business conglomerates, including Bashundhara Group, Jamuna Group, Square, Beximco, S Alam, Gazi, Bengal, and Ha-Meem, dominate the country’s media landscape. These conglomerates own multiple media outlets, including television channels, newspapers, radio stations, and online news portals. Notably, these corporations are not limited to media ownership—they also have significant investments in banking, real estate, power, energy, insurance, and healthcare. For example, Bashundhara Group owns two leading Bengali dailies, Kaler Kantha and Bangladesh Protidin, along with the English-language Daily Sun, television channel News24, news portal Banglanews24, and Radio Capital. Similarly, Beximco Group controls The Daily Independent and Independent Television, while Jamuna Group owns Jamuna Television and the widely circulated Bengali daily Jugantor. Meanwhile, Transcom Group owns The Daily Star and Prothom Alo, the two most widely circulated newspapers in the country. Many of these conglomerates either own commercial banks outright or hold significant shares in them. Furthermore, the owners of these corporate enterprises have been directly or indirectly involved in Awami League politics, further entrenching the intersection of business, media, and political influence in Bangladesh.

Sheikh Hasina’s administration controlled media outlets in myriad ways. For instance, media outlets that aligned with the Awami League’s political ideology and promoted its agenda were prioritized for advertisement funding, while others were sidelined. Riaz and Rahman (2021) argue that this policy was a deliberate strategy used by the government to exert control over the media and suppress press freedom. Rahman et al. (2024) identified several strategies employed by Hasina’s authoritarian regime to manage critical media coverage. These strategies included denying allegations against the regime, undermining the credibility of the media, trivializing investigative reports, and fostering public doubt about the legitimacy of journalistic investigations. Such measures effectively weakened media accountability, functioning more as tools of government control than instruments serving the public interest. In this media environment, most outlets operate primarily to enforce state narratives, leaving little room for independent scrutiny, critical journalism, or public oversight. Moreover, genuine accountability mechanisms—such as press councils or independent regulators—are either weak or entirely absent in the country.

Bangladesh’s media audience is estimated to be around 160 million, with a significant portion comprising young adults who are increasingly engaged with digital platforms (Ghosh, 2016). Despite the rapid expansion of the media industry, only a limited number of newspapers regularly compensate their journalists and employees. According to Riaz and Rahman (2021), only eleven newspapers—seven in Bengali and four in English—consistently pay their staff.

2.4. Quota Reform Movement

The first significant wave of quota reform activism in Bangladesh emerged in 2013, primarily led by job seekers who had failed the preliminary examination for the 34th Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). Protests erupted in Shahbagh, where hundreds gathered to oppose the existing quota system in government recruitment, which they viewed as discriminatory and unjust. Despite the growing momentum, the movement was met with firm resistance from the government. H.T. Imam, then the advisor to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, publicly stated that there were no plans to alter the quota structure (Abdullah, 2024). Although ultimately unsuccessful, the 2013 movement laid an important foundation for more widespread mobilization in the years that followed.

The 2018 movement marked a turning point in the national discourse on quota reform. Students from universities across Bangladesh organized large-scale protests, challenging the quota system that reserved 56% of government job positions for specific groups. At the time, 30% of positions were allocated to the descendants of freedom fighters, 10% to women, 10% to residents of underprivileged districts, 5% to ethnic minorities, and 1% to people with disabilities (Bashar, 2024). Protesters argued that this system disproportionately benefited certain segments—especially the descendants of freedom fighters—while marginalizing meritorious candidates who did not belong to these groups. They demanded a reduction in the total quota allocation to 10%, with a stronger emphasis on merit-based recruitment.

Responding to the unprecedented scale of the protests, the government made a major concession. On 3 October 2018, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced the abolition of all quotas for Class I and Class II government positions, declaring that recruitment would henceforth be entirely merit-based for these roles (Abdullah, 2024). However, quotas remained in place for Class III and Class IV jobs (Grades 14–20), with a provision that unfilled quota seats could be filled from the general merit list. While this reform did not fully address all student concerns, it signaled a rare instance in which grassroots activism directly influenced public policy.

In June 2024, the Bangladesh High Court reinstated the 30% quota for the descendants of freedom fighters, reversing a key element of the 2018 reform. This judicial decision ignited a fresh wave of protests, once again led by students. Protesters contended that the quota system had become a political instrument used by the ruling Awami League to reward loyal supporters and entrench its power.

In response to the growing unrest, the government imposed curfews and suspended internet services nationwide. Despite these restrictions, public demonstrations intensified. On 21 July 2024, the Supreme Court intervened, ordering that the reinstated 30% quota be reduced to 5% (Star Online Report, 2024). Nonetheless, protests persisted in various regions, with demonstrators demanding justice for those killed, injured, or detained during the crackdown.

A pivotal moment in the 2024 movement came with the death of Abu Sayed, a student of Begum Rokeya University in Rangpur, was shot and killed by police during the anti-discrimination student movement. The movement, which called for the reform of the quota system in government jobs, had spread nationwide, and on the afternoon of 16 July, Abu Sayed was shot at Park Mor, in front of the university.

The 25-year-old was a student of the 12th batch of the English Department at Begum Rokeya University. During the student rally, he was at the forefront. As police opened fire, Abu Sayed stood firm with both hands outstretched, holding a stick in one hand. When a video of his shooting, while unarmed, went viral, it sparked a nationwide outcry. His death became a rallying point for the quota reform movement, and his image standing before the police, arms raised, became a symbol of resistance and inspiration for the protesters. Another was Mir Mahfuzur Rahman Mugdho, a 25-year-old mathematics graduate and MBA candidate. Their death became a rallying point, galvanizing public sentiment and drawing widespread sympathy for the protesters’ cause. Unlike previous episodes of dissent, the 2024 protests reached an unprecedented scale. Millions marched to the capital, Dhaka, calling for structural reforms and political accountability. For many, the movement represented not just a call for quota reform but a deeper demand for justice and democratic governance in Bangladesh (Chakraborty, 2024).

In the wake of deaths, mass protests intensified, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on August 5 and the end of nearly 16 years of Awami League rule.

3. Research Questions

There is a gap in the protest paradigm scholarship regarding how media ownership influences protest coverage, particularly in contexts where the media is regulated by an authoritarian government. Hence, this study applied the protest paradigm theory to analyze how the media covered the mass uprising in Bangladesh in July 2024. We proposed the following research questions:

• RQ1: What dominant frames and thematic patterns characterize the coverage of the 2024 anti-discrimination student movement in Bangladesh’s mainstream print media?
• RQ2: In what ways, if any, might media ownership relate to differences in the coverage of the 2024 anti-discrimination protests in Bangladesh?
• RQ3: How were student protesters represented in the coverage of the 2024 anti-discrimination movement in Bangladesh’s mainstream print media?

4. Methods

To address the research questions, a systematic quantitative content analysis was conducted on the protest coverage by five major newspapers in Bangladesh.

4.1. Sampling and Data Collection

The sampling frame was established deductively, drawing on the ownership categories: family member ownership, government ownership, anti-government ownership, business ownership, and independent ownership. (Riaz & Rahman, 2021; Reporters Without Borders, 2025). We have purposefully selected five newspapers, each representing a different ownership type (

Table 1. Newspaper ownership category.

Ownership Category	Newspaper	Number of Items	Sample
Family member ownership	Bangladesh Pratidin	693	99
Government ownership	Ittefaq	672	96
Anti-government ownership	Naya Diganta	597	86
Business ownership	Prothom Alo	840	120
Independent ownership	Manabzamin	1092	156
		N = 3894	n = 539

).

The population of news articles for this study consisted of all front-page protest-related items from selected media outlets that were published between 6 June 2024, and 6 August 2024. This period was chosen to include coverage from the beginning of the demonstrations till the final day of the Sheikh Hasina regime. Using a systematic random sampling technique with proportionate allocation, the final sample of 539 articles was selected from the 3894 total articles to guarantee that each newspaper’s contribution to the sample represented its fraction of the overall protest coverage.

Data were manually collected from print newspapers and online sources on protest-related articles. Since keyword searches on the websites were limited and some articles published in print did not appear online, both offline and online articles were collected between 6 June 2024, when the protests began, to 6 August 2024, the day before the Sheikh Hasina regime abruptly ended. To limit the sample size, only front-page articles were gathered, which indicate higher editorial importance. From a total of 3894 front-page articles, a systematic random sample of 539 articles was drawn for carrying out a content analysis. To create a representative sample, the number of front-page articles sampled from each newspaper was proportional to the total number of front-page protest articles published by each outlet to include a balanced representation of this newspaper’s representation of the protests. The articles were listed chronologically, and a random number generator was used to rank them and select the final sample. No stratified sampling was performed, as we assumed that variations in daily coverage of the protests would not significantly affect the overall portrayal of the protests.

4.2. Codebook, Coding Process, and Intercoder Reliability

This study relied on an extensively researched codebook, applied across various country contexts, including the United States, Egypt, Brazil, China, and India (Harlow & Johnson, 2011; Mourão, 2019; Shahin et al., 2016). Based on these frameworks, coders coded the framing of the protest and protesters, the sources cited in the articles, blame attribution, and the tone towards the protesters.

To analyze RQ1, which dominant frames characterize the coverage of the 2024 anti-discrimination student movement in Bangladesh’s mainstream print media, this study relied on Harlow and Johnson’s (2011) frames: sympathy, legitimizing, delegitimizing, accountability, spectacle, and contextual.

To address RQ2—which examines how the tone and perceived legitimacy of the 2024 anti-discrimination protests vary across mainstream print media outlets in Bangladesh based on their ownership structure—this study employed Mourão’s (2019) codebook. Legitimacy was defined as whether the protest was portrayed as valid or justified by the media. Tone was coded based on whether the coverage was positive, neutral, or negative toward the protest.

To answer RQ3—how student protesters were portrayed in Bangladesh’s mainstream print media during the 2024 anti-discrimination movement—this study used Mourão’s (2019) codebook. The analysis focused on several key variables: whether protesters were labeled as “idiots” (Yes/No), whether they were described as peaceful or violent, whether a cause for the protest was mentioned, the overall tone of the coverage (positive, negative, or neutral), and who was blamed for the unrest (protesters, government/police/military, or international actors).

The coding was conducted by four Bangladeshi media scholars, at least three of whom hold Ph.D. degrees in relevant fields and possess strong contextual knowledge of both the protest and the country’s media landscape. Following an initial round of coding to test the codebook, each coder independently coded 10% of the sample. Inter-coder reliability was achieved with eight variables reaching “substantial agreement” (Kappa between 0.61 and 0.80) and twelve variables achieving “almost perfect agreement” (Kappa ≥ 0.81), as defined by Viera and Garrett (2005). Kappa values for individual variables ranged from 0.61 to 1.0, with an average of 0.87, exceeding the minimum reliability standard recommended by Poindexter and McCombs (2000).

5. Results

This study employed the protest paradigm framework to examine how mainstream Bangladeshi newspapers covered the July 2024 student movement. In response to RQ1, which asked about the dominant frames used in media portrayals of the protests, the analysis reveals distinct patterns across outlets (see

Table 2. Protest Paradigm Frame Used in Bangladesh’s Protest Coverage.

Frame Employed	Prothom Alo		Bangladesh Pratidin		Ittefaq		Naya Diganta		Manabzamin		Total	χ2	df	p
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	531
Sympathy	29	30.5	13	13.1	15	15.8	37	43.0	111	71.2	205	125.02	8	0.001
Legitimizing	29	30.5	21	21.22	16	16.8	19	22.1	102	65.4	187	208.78	12	0.001
Delegitimizing	46	48.4	65	65.7	19	20	12	14	25	16	167	208.78	12	0.001
Accountability	27	28.4	15	15.2	4	4.2	6	7.0	37	23.7	89	35.89	8	0.001
Spectacle	70	73.7	79	79.8	83	87.4	26	30.2	49	31.4	307	141.24	8	0.001
Contextual	11	11.6	5	5.1	28	29.5	10	11.6	26	16.7	80	30.13	8	0.001

).

The sympathy frame, which evokes compassion and support for protesters as underdogs, appeared in 39% of the total articles. However, the use of this frame varied significantly by outlets. Manabzamin (71%) and Naya Diganta (43%) employed sympathy frames far more frequently than Ittefaq (16%) and Bangladesh Pratidin (13%). Prothom Alo stood in the middle at 31%. The legitimizing frame, indicating recognition of the protesters’ grievances as valid and justifiable, was present in 35% of articles overall. Again, Manabzamin led in this framing (65%), followed by Naya Diganta (22%) and Ittefaq (17%). Bangladesh Pratidin and Prothom Alo remained lower, at 21% and 31%, respectively.

In contrast, the delegitimizing frame, which discredits protesters and their actions, was used in 31% of the articles. This frame was most common in Bangladesh Pratidin (66%) and Prothom Alo (48%), with considerably lower usage in Ittefaq (20%), Naya Diganta (14%), and Manabzamin (16%). The accountability frame, referring to narratives calling for oversight or identifying wrongdoing, was employed least frequently (17%). It appeared most in Manabzamin (24%) and Prothom Alo (28%), while Ittefaq and Naya Diganta showed minimal usage at 4% and 7%, respectively. The spectacle frame, emphasizing drama, emotion, crowd size, or violence, was the most dominant across all outlets, present in 58% of articles. Ittefaq (87%), Bangladesh Pratidin (80%), and Prothom Alo (74%) used this frame extensively, while Naya Diganta (30%) and Manabzamin (31%) were significantly less focused on spectacle. Finally, the contextual frame, which provides historical and social background for the protest, appeared in only 15% of total coverage. Ittefaq stood out by applying this frame in 30% of its stories, while all other newspapers used it in fewer than 17% of articles.

Chi-square tests of independence revealed statistically significant associations between newspaper type and each of the six frame categories, suggesting that framing choices varied considerably across outlets (see Table 2). For example, the association between newspaper and sympathy frame was significant, χ²(8) = 125.02, p < 0.001, as were the tests for all other frames (p < 0.001).

In response to RQ2, which asked whether portrayals of the protests differed across newspapers in terms of tone and perceived legitimacy, descriptive and inferential analyses revealed substantial variation across outlets (see

Table 3. Welch ANOVA for Protest Legitimacy and Tone Across Bangladeshi Newspapers.

Dependent Variable	Publication
	Prothom Alo		Bangladesh Pratidin		Ittefaq		Naya Diganta		Manabzamin
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Legitimizing a	−0.23	0.98	−0.51	0.86	−0.08	1.01	0.22	0.99	0.60	0.80
Tone b	−0.22	0.95	−0.45	0.83	0.06	0.52	0.44	0.80	0.65	0.62

a = f(4, 110) = 25.57, p < 0.001. b = f(4, 125) = 39.14, p < 0.001.

).

Bangladesh Pratidin exhibited the most negative portrayal, with a mean legitimacy score of M = −0.51 (SD = 0.86) and tone score of M = −0.45 (SD = 0.83). Prothom Alo also skewed negative on both measures, with mean scores of M = −0.23 (SD = 0.98) for legitimacy and M = −0.22 (SD = 0.95) for tone. In contrast, Manabzamin demonstrated the strongest positive orientation toward the protests, with legitimacy and tone means of M = 0.60 (SD = 0.80) and M = 0.65 (SD = 0.62), respectively. Naya Diganta also leaned positive, while Ittefaq exhibited a mixed pattern—slightly positive in tone (M = 0.06) but negative in legitimacy (M = −0.08).

A Welch’s ANOVA was conducted to account for unequal variances across groups. The results indicate statistically significant differences in how newspapers framed both the legitimacy of the protests, F(4, 110) = 25.57, p < 0.001, and their overall tone, F(4, 125) = 39.14, p < 0.001.

In response to RQ3, which examined how protesters were portrayed across Bangladeshi newspapers, the analysis focused on both protest framing devices and tone/blame attribution (see

Table 4. Protester Representations Across Five Bangladeshi Newspapers.

Protesters’ Portrayal	Prothom Alo	Bangladesh Pratidin	Ittefaq	Naya Diganta	Manabzamin	Total	χ2	df	p
	%	%	%	%	%
Device to frame the protesters
Idiot
Yes	38.9	54.5	8.4	4.7	16.7	129	100.58	8	0.001
No	61.1	45.5	90.5	95.3	83.3	401
Peaceful/Violent
Mostly Peaceful	16.8	1.0	8.4	4.7	39.1	90	183.96	12	0.001
Mostly Violent	12.6	10.1	13.7	12.8	40.4	109
Cause for protest
Yes	38.8	18.2	31.6	19.8	73.1	214	112.78	8	0.001
No	63.2	81.8	67.4	80.2	26.9	316
Tone and blame towards the protesters
Tone
Positive	29.5	18.2	7.4	32.6	57.1	170	155.15	16	0.001
Negative	41.1	57.6	31.6	14.0	12.2	157
Neutral	3.2	10.1	31.6	17.4	14.1	80
Blame for unrest
Protesters	41.1	58.6	15.8	16.3	12.2	145	284.14	32	0.001
Government/ police/military	37.9	15.2	8.4	44.2	56.4	185
International actors	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1
Multiple	4.2	1.0	1.1	8.1	17.3	40

).

Under the “idiot” frame, which characterizes protesters as immature, unserious, or unintelligent, Bangladesh Pratidin applied this frame in over half of its coverage (55%), followed by Prothom Alo (39%). In contrast, Ittefaq (8%), Naya Diganta (5%), and Manabzamin (17%) applied this frame far less frequently.

The peacefulness or violence of the movement was minimally addressed across the board. Only Manabzamin provided notable coverage, labeling the protests as “mostly peaceful” in 39% of its articles. All other newspapers reported on the peaceful nature of the protests in 17% or fewer of their articles. When it came to identifying the cause of the protest, Manabzamin again stood out, acknowledging protest motivations in 73% of its stories. Other newspapers rarely provided such context—Prothom Alo (39%), Ittefaq (32%), Naya Diganta(20%), and Bangladesh Pratidin (18%).

In terms of tone toward protesters, Manabzamin had the highest proportion of positive portrayals (57%), followed by Naya Diganta (33%) and Prothom Alo (30%). Meanwhile, Bangladesh Pratidin (58%), Prothom Alo (41%), and Ittefaq (32%) portrayed protesters negatively in a large share of their content. Neutral portrayals were most common in Ittefaq (32%).

Regarding blame attribution, Bangladesh Pratidin (59%) and Prothom Alo (41%) most frequently blamed the protesters for the unrest. In contrast, Manabzamin (56%) and Naya Diganta (44%) largely blamed the government, police, or military for the social disorder. Attribution to multiple actors was more frequently found in Manabzamin (17%) and Naya Diganta (8%), while international actors were rarely cited.

Chi-square analyses showed statistically significant differences among newspapers for all variables reported under RQ3 (p < 0.001), suggesting that portrayals of the protesters were shaped strongly by outlet-specific editorial tendencies.

6. Discussion

The July 2024 anti-discrimination student movement in Bangladesh revived a long-running battle between youth activism and state-sponsored measures to suppress dissent. This contest revolves around the media’s role in affecting public perceptions of protest. Using the Protest Paradigm Theory and Media Ownership Theory, this study looked at how five significant Bangladeshi newspapers—Prothom Alo, Bangladesh Pratidin, Ittefaq, Naya Diganta, and Manabzamin—framed the movement. The data show considerable disparities in framing, tone, and protester representation, which are consistent with the ownership and ideological leanings of these outlets.

This study found that the spectacle frame was the most dominant across all outlets, in line with protest paradigm expectations. Spectacle coverage, including images of clashes, dramatic crowd descriptions, or emotive reactions, helps render protests entertaining but often strips them of political context (McLeod & Hertog, 1999). Media outlets owned by family members with close ties to the government employed this frame at particularly high rates, likely prioritizing sensationalism over substance. This finding supports Harlow and Johnson’s (2011) study, which found that traditional media emphasized violence and drama far more than themes of injustice, sympathy, or legitimacy. Such coverage suggests that excitement and the volatility of protests were considered more newsworthy than exploring the underlying causes and broader context of the movement.

However, significant variation emerged in the use of sympathy and legitimizing frames—frames that break with the protest paradigm by portraying protester grievances as valid. Anti-government and independent news outlets like Manabzamin and Naya Diganta stood out in this regard. While pro-government and politico-commercial elite media support the protest paradigm. These differences suggest that while the protest paradigm remains prevalent, it is not monolithic, especially in outlets less tied to government interests. Conversely, delegitimizing frames—which depict protests as irrational, disruptive, or criminal—were significantly used by pro-government and business-owned news outlets, aligning with traditional protest paradigm expectations. These outlets frequently shifted focus from protest causes to protest consequences, thereby marginalizing activist voices.

The accountability frame, which challenges powerholders by assigning responsibility for grievances, was notably underused, suggesting an institutional reluctance to challenge authority. Bangladeshi media outlets largely fail to perform the traditional functions of the press, namely serving as a “watchdog” and guaranteeing a check and balance on government operations. Several causes have led to the decline of Bangladesh’s press over the years. According to Rahman et al. (2024), the majority of Bangladesh media owners have reasons other than supporting a strong, independent, and powerful media system. Collectively, these findings confirm that while the protest paradigm persists in Bangladeshi print media, its application varies significantly across outlets—hinting at deeper structural and ideological determinants, including ownership.

To probe deeper into these structural influences, this study used Media Ownership (Bagdikian, 2004; Herman & Chomsky, 1988), which posits that media content often reflects the political and economic interests of media owners. Ownership shapes editorial policy, especially in politically sensitive environments like Bangladesh, where media conglomerates often have direct or indirect ties to ruling or opposition parties.

The investigation revealed significant trends that supported the protest paradigm theory. Bangladesh Pratidin and Prothom Alo, the country’s most widely circulated newspapers and both regarded to be pro-government, portrayed the 2024 anti-discrimination rallies more unfavorably. Bangladesh Pratidin, owned by the Bashundhara Group, which has close ties to the ruling Awami League, depicted the protests with the least legitimacy and the most hostile tone. Although Prothom Alo has a tradition of editorial independence, it has also taken a similarly critical attitude, most likely due to institutional caution during a time of high political turmoil. Manabzamin, who is frequently seen as populist and independent of elite political objectives, provided the most positive representations of the protest. Similarly, Naya Diganta, known for its ties to the opposition Jamaat-e-Islami, portrayed the protests more positively. These differences indicate that the degree of editorial independence—which is largely influenced by ownership structures and political affiliations—plays an important impact on how protest movements are reported in the media.

Student demonstrators were portrayed, with significant variance consistent with the protest paradigm. Pro-government newspapers like Bangladesh Pratidin and Prothom Alo often use the “idiot” concept to delegitimize opposition, presenting demonstrators as naive or manipulative. These publications also tended to downplay the protest’s root causes, portray the movement as chaotic, and blame demonstrators for the unrest. In contrast, Manabzamin and Naya Diganta mainly avoided this framework. They were more likely to recognize the protest’s purpose, describe it as peaceful, and blame the unrest on the government or security personnel. These findings emphasize how media ideology and ownership influence not only event framing but also the production of protest actors, especially under hybrid regimes where the media is a significant tool for control.

The 2024 anti-discrimination protests paralleled previous campaigns, such as the 2018 Quota Reform protests, which were met with repression and media delegitimization. However, the current cycle shows a slightly more pluralistic media landscape, with certain publications providing more sympathetic coverage. This trend may indicate a rising disenchantment with mainstream narratives, as well as the influence of digital counter-publics. Still, the mainstream media is largely influenced by elite interests, especially during times of political instability, and continues to marginalize youth voices through ridicule and delegitimization.

7. Conclusions and Future Direction

This study examined how mainstream Bangladeshi newspapers portrayed the 2024 anti-discrimination student movement through the dual lenses of Protest Paradigm and Media Ownership. By analyzing 539 articles across five widely circulated newspapers—Prothom Alo, Bangladesh Pratidin, Ittefaq, Naya Diganta, and Manabzamin—we identified significant variations in how protest movements were framed. The findings reaffirm core tenets of the protest paradigm: dominant media outlets often focused on spectacle, downplayed protesters’ grievances, and employed delegitimizing frames. However, this pattern was not uniformly applied. Professional journalists owned media outlets like Manabzamin and anti-government media outlet Naya Diganta, which are relatively less aligned with the government or ruling party Awami League’s interests, exhibited greater sympathy toward the protesters and offered more contextual or legitimizing narratives.

The analysis also supports Media Ownership Theory by demonstrating a strong link between a media outlet’s ownership/political alignment and its coverage tone. Pro-government or elite-aligned media such as Bangladesh Pratidin and, to a lesser extent, Prothom Alo were more likely to use negative portrayals, blame protesters for violence, and echo official narratives. Conversely, opposition-leaning and independent outlets showed a greater willingness to present the protesters as peaceful, rational, and motivated by legitimate grievances. These trends highlight the politicized nature of news production in Bangladesh’s hybrid authoritarian media environment.

Moreover, the portrayal of protesters themselves was a key battleground in media discourse. While some outlets depicted them as “idiots” or troublemakers, others humanized their struggles and amplified their demands. This dichotomy not only reflects editorial ideology but also illustrates how the media function as a site of contestation over the legitimacy of dissent in authoritarian contexts.

Despite its contributions, this study has several limitations. First, the analysis was confined to print media, excluding broadcast and digital-native platforms, which may employ distinct framing practices. Given the increasing prominence of online media in Bangladesh’s information ecosystem, future research should incorporate television, digital news portals, and social media to provide a more comprehensive understanding. While existing scholarship has extensively examined the protest paradigm within traditional media, limited attention has been devoted to its manifestation in the “hybrid media system,” where conventional and digital media logics converge (Chadwick, 2017). As most contemporary media systems operate within this hybrid framework, future studies would benefit from adopting this perspective.

Second, the study did not include interviews with journalists or editors, which could provide deeper insight into the institutional and political pressures shaping coverage decisions. Interviews with journalists and editors could provide significant insight into the institutional, editorial, and political processes that shape protest coverage, allowing framing choices to be contextualized within the larger media practices and limits.

Third, the analysis was conducted only in the immediate aftermath of the 2024 protest cycle. Longitudinal research could explore how coverage evolves over time and whether sympathetic or delegitimizing narratives persist or shift as public sentiment and political climates change. Future research should look at protest coverage over time to see how media narratives change beyond the immediate aftermath of mobilization. This method could assist in identifying whether initial depictions remain, intensify, or shift in response to shifting political settings and public discourse. Future research should also examine audience reception of protest coverage—how different groups interpret media portrayals and how these shape public opinion toward social movements. Comparative studies across other regimes would offer valuable regional insights into how authoritarian pressures intersect with media ownership and protest coverage. Additionally, integrating computational methods such as sentiment analysis or networked agenda-setting analysis could expand the empirical scope and capture the dynamic interaction between traditional media and social media narratives.

In summary, this study contributes to understanding how media reinforce or challenge state power during moments of political unrest. By linking media frames to ownership structures and protest paradigms, it underscores the urgent need for media reform, journalistic independence, and robust public discourse in Bangladesh’s fragile democratic environment.