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Article

Challenges for NGO Communication Practitioners in the Disinformation Era: A Qualitative Study Exploring Generation Z’s Perception of Civic Engagement and Their Vulnerability to Online Fake News

by
Alexandra-Niculina Gherguț-Babii
,
Gabriela Poleac
and
Daniel-Rareș Obadă
*
Department of Communication Sciences and Public Relations, Faculty of Philosophy and Socio-Political Sciences, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, 700506 Iași, Romania
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Journal. Media 2025, 6(3), 136; https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030136
Submission received: 29 June 2025 / Revised: 28 August 2025 / Accepted: 30 August 2025 / Published: 4 September 2025

Abstract

The growing challenge of disinformation in the digital age poses significant hurdles for NGO communication practitioners, particularly in engaging Generation Z. Low digital literacy among young individuals also offers an explanation for lower levels of civic engagement. This study explores young people’s perceptions of civic engagement and the effects of disinformation through qualitative focus group discussions. Eight focus groups comprising young adults were conducted to gather insights into their motivations, experiences, and perspectives regarding social and political issues as well as fake news combating strategies. Findings from this research will contribute to the existing literature on the relationship between youth, fake news, and civic engagement. The results indicate that youth primarily rely on social media for information, with Instagram emerging as a key platform for real-time updates. While participants recognise the importance of credible sources, many demonstrated superficial strategies for assessing reliability, such as evaluating the number of followers or brand reputation, which may leave them vulnerable to fake news. This tendency highlights a gap between formal digital literacy education and actual media consumption practices. Ultimately, the findings underscore the critical need for education and awareness to equip young individuals with the tools necessary to discern credible information and engage meaningfully in civic discourse, offering valuable insights for civic NGO communication strategies.

1. Introduction

The spread of false information and fake news in the digital age is a serious threat to democratic processes and the welfare of society. Romania presents a particularly concerning landscape regarding fake news consumption. Research indicates that 55% of Romanians believe they have been exposed to fake news recently (INSCOP Research, 2021), while GLOBSEC studies outline that 39% of Romanian respondents believed conspiracy theories, positioning Romania as the European country with the lowest level of basic digital skills compared to the European Union average (Center for Independent Journalism, 2024). The phenomenon has been amplified during crisis periods, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine conflict, when hybrid information warfare tactics significantly increased the circulation of false narratives in Romanian media (Ungur-Brehoi, 2022).
The swift spread of unverified and frequently purposefully false material via digital platforms has highlighted the critical requirement for citizens to possess strong digital literacy skills. News literacy related to digital literacy is frequently understood as part of civic literacy and is an essential foundation for active participation in democratic processes (Swart, 2023). Young people often engage with news to foster social connections rather than to discuss political or social matters. Maintaining relationships and staying informed for personal relevance are more important aspects of news sharing than engaging in deeper political discourse (Swart, 2023). Fostering informed, critical citizenship requires recognising and tackling the intricacies of fake news propagation and its effects on public discourse. Young people often show limited interest in political news and elections because they feel disconnected from these topics, perceiving them as irrelevant to their personal lives. However, as they grow older, their interest in politics tends to increase, potentially due to greater exposure, understanding, and the growing relevance of such issues in their lives (Duvekot et al., 2024).
The widespread spread of fake news on social media platforms in Romania has had a noteworthy influence on the conduct of youth, underscoring the pressing need for improved digital literacy. Social media has greatly impacted the younger generation in Romania by serving as a forum for political speech, particularly during protests and election-related issues. As of January 2024, 15.13 million people used social networks in Romania, with 5.78 million of those users being overwhelmingly young people on Instagram. The age group of 18 to 24 years constituted the largest proportion of Instagram users in Romania (32%), outnumbering all other age groups put together. Similarly, according to Statista (2023), 29.3% of Instagram users in Romania were between the ages of 25 and 34. Compared to real news, fake news travels faster and more extensively on social media, according to existing studies (Meel & Vishwakarma, 2020; Damstra et al., 2021; Obadă & Dabija, 2022). As a result, those who receive their news via social media are more likely to come across misleading information (Aïmeur et al., 2023). Additionally, individuals frequently believe fake news that confirms their prejudices or preconceptions, making it difficult to persuade them to change their minds even in the face of data that refutes the false information, a phenomenon known as confirmation bias (Wason, 1960). Moreover, limited critical thinking skills significantly increase individuals’ vulnerability to fake news content, especially AI-generated (Arikewuyo, 2025). In this context, initiatives aimed at enhancing digital literacy among Romania’s youth must be given top priority to lessen the negative impacts of this phenomenon.
This study explores the topic of young adults’ perception concerning fake news and how it affects civic engagement. Civic NGOs play a crucial role in addressing the challenges posed by fake news, particularly in the context of youth civic participation. As highlighted in this paper, students often struggle to discern credible news from false narratives, which can significantly impact their civic involvement and decision-making processes. Young people engage in civic activities through various channels, influenced by personal motivations and external factors. They respond to causes like climate change and discrimination, but without encouragement or support, and in the face of negative repercussions, they may be discouraged from continuing their civic involvement (Tsaliki, 2022). In Romania, various civic NGOs implement digital and media literacy programmes with young individuals, such as Funky Citizens, The Center for Independent Journalism (CIJ), and Mediawise Society. For example, The Center for Independent Journalism’s programme “I Teach Media Literacy!” (CIJ, 2025) is a large-scale initiative launched in Romania in 2017 to integrate media literacy into high school education. Through teacher training and curriculum advocacy, it has reached over 50,000 students annually, empowering them to critically evaluate media content and recognise disinformation. On the other hand, Mediawise Society’s “Propaganda Lab: Can You Recognise Propaganda?” (Mediawise, 2018) is an interactive workshop designed for young people in Romania. Participants learn to identify visual and rhetorical techniques used in contemporary propaganda by analysing real local examples via the Mind Over Media Romania platform. These programmes’ focusing on youth as end beneficiaries align with our research, which explores young students’ perceptions of civic engagement in relation to their experience with fake news.
In the context of the increasing exposure of Romanian youth to fake news (Ungur-Brehoi, 2022; Obadă & Dabija, 2022; Moldovan et al., 2025), research shows that such exposure directly impacts levels of civic engagement (Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). Fake news campaigns that promote narratives such as “voting doesn’t matter” or “the vote is manipulated” can discredit NGOs and civic movements and lead to apathy and withdrawal from the public sphere, particularly among young people lacking strong critical thinking skills. Therefore, examining the relationship between young people’s civic engagement and their experience with fake news becomes essential.
To understand how people access and interact with political information in the digital age, this research explores the interactions among fake news combating tactics and the ability to recognise it. This research has the potential to make significant contributions to the larger conversation about civic engagement, information consumption, and the future of democracy in a society that is becoming more and more digitally connected.
Despite extensive research on digital literacy’s role in countering fake news, limited attention has been given to Romanian youth’s unique challenges in developing critical digital literacy skills for civic engagement (Mihailidis & Thevenin, 2013). While prior studies highlight NGOs’ and education’s importance in skill development (Kahne et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013), little focus has been given to how students’ attitudes and obstacles affect their ability to recognise reliable political information.
The paper proposes the following research objectives:
O1:
To explore the perceptions of Gen Z regarding civic engagement.
O2:
To identify the motivations behind Gen Z’s civic engagement.
O3:
To explore the media and information sources Gen Z uses concerning civic engagement.
O4:
To assess Gen Z’s exposure to fake news related to civic topics.
O5:
To examine the cues Gen Z considers when identifying fake news.
O6:
To examine the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses of Gen Z to fake news.
O7:
To explore Gen Z’s perceptions of solutions for combating fake news.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Gen Z’s Vulnerability to Fake News

Opposed to news conceptualised as “independent, reliable, accurate, and comprehensive information” about an organisation (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007, p. 11), fake news is inaccurate, false, or grossly distorted information presented as news to deceive the audience (Figueira & Oliveira, 2017). According to Obadă (2019, p. 160), “online fake news can be defined as false, inaccurate, or misleading information presented as news (i.e., specially designed to be confused with real news) and shared online to deceive the audience to influence their cognition, attitude, and behaviour regarding a specific event, person, or brand.”
Fake news can be categorised into seven types: satire, misleading content, imposter content, fabricated content, false connection, false context, and manipulated content. These types of news are used to deceive and cause damage to recipients. Satire or parody is used to be comedic; misleading content presents an issue or individual in a distorted perspective; imposter content pretends to be someone else; fabricated content disseminates completely false information; false connection has no logical relationship; false context blends true and inaccurate information; and manipulated content alters genuine information or imagery to deceive others (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). In numerous instances, malicious sources blend these types of content, resulting in more effective hybrid forms of fake news (Obadă & Dabija, 2022). Considering the complex process of creating fake news and the various formats in which it can be disseminated, young individuals can easily be exposed and affected by it.
On the other side, the present research also incorporates the broader term disinformation, which includes all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading content (not necessarily in the form of news) that is intentionally designed, presented, and promoted to cause public harm or profit (European Commission: High Level Group of Fake News and Online Disinformation, 2018). The most harmful form is misleading with intent, as it strategically manipulates public opinion and erodes trust in democratic institutions; therefore, this emphasis is relevant in the present study.
Young people are seen to be more vulnerable to fake news (Mercenier et al., 2021), especially due to their poor digital literacy skills. Research indicates that many young individuals exhibit a limited comprehension of how algorithms influence the news they consume. Although young users are aware of algorithmic influence on some platforms (like Facebook), they frequently do not thoroughly understand how comparable mechanisms affect their news on other platforms, such as Instagram or Twitter (Swart, 2023). Moreover, youngsters do not make a concerted effort to curate their social media feeds for relevance or interest. They follow accounts they deem uninteresting but choose not to unfollow them, indicating that breaking these established routines is challenging (Swart, 2021). Studies outline several factors that make it difficult for young people to debunk fake news content and evaluate the credibility of news in the digital era. In addition to being sceptical of mainstream media, believing it to be politically biased or deceptive (Swart & Broersma, 2022), they frequently lack clear knowledge of what defines professional journalism and struggle to discern the financial interests behind news content (Almeida et al., 2023; Duvekot et al., 2024). Furthermore, many young people struggle with critical evaluation of news sources, frequently relying on social networks and friends for news validation rather than professional journalists or established media (Sormanen et al., 2022; Duvekot et al., 2024). Captivated by new, provocative, or suggestive content, they may unwittingly contribute to the spread and even virality of false, misleading, or unverified information (Herrero-Diz et al., 2020). Additionally, instability in emotional regulation can lead to impulsive behaviour, making it more susceptible for young people to share fake news (Shephard et al., 2023). In the current digital environment, young voters need to be able to navigate and critically assess information online. Digital environments now supplement the fundamental critical thinking abilities used in analogue contexts. Digital literacy emerges as “a notion of situated multiple integrated skills and practices (conceptual, attitudinal, procedural, and ethical) that empower people (individuals and groups) to participate and communicate efficiently in society” (Marín & Castaneda, 2022, p. 4). Moreover, media literacy, the ability to critically assess the messages in the media (Media Literacy Now, 2025), equips individuals with the tools to evaluate information, recognise bias and fake news, and make informed choices as media consumers and citizens.

2.2. Civic NGOs and Their Role in Combating Fake News

Civic NGOs are essential in the fight against fake news because they encourage critical thinking, media literacy, and responsible digital citizenship (Tarozzi, 2020). Because they are more likely to be exposed to social media and other digital platforms, where fake news spreads quickly, young people are especially susceptible to disinformation (Howard et al., 2021; Vissenberg et al., 2023). Civic NGOs may address the effects of fake news on youth in two ways: first, by implementing digital literacy programmes directly (Pang et al., 2022; McDougall & Rega, 2022), and second, by encouraging civic participation, civic engagement, and critical thinking about government in a more indirect manner (Fernandez et al., 2022). By focusing on advocacy and civil society participation, civic NGOs can tackle this problem by equipping youth with the knowledge and abilities required to navigate the ever-changing digital ecosystem successfully. Civic NGOs foster political participation indirectly through resource allocation and participatory development, particularly in areas with limited government services. Their frameworks encourage actions such as contacting officials and protesting (Brass, 2022). Civic education initiatives further boost youth engagement by involving them in appealing ways (Pospieszna & Galus, 2020). Moreover, media and digital literacy programmes reduce the spread of fake news and strengthen young people’s ability to detect disinformation (Pang et al., 2022; Bruinenberg et al., 2021; Huang et al., 2024). Recognising this issue, many NGOs have launched digital literacy projects to cultivate educated, active citizens.
Civic-orientated NGOs often focus on youth aged 15–25 and view this age bracket as a formative period for shaping attitudes and beliefs. Young people are considered as more eager to engage civically than their parents, who, having grown up under communism, tend to be more sceptical and disengaged (Pospieszna & Galus, 2020). To attract youth, NGOs employ strategies such as youth work, discussion forums, volunteerism, involvement in sports, arts, media, non-formal education, and digital engagement (Brady et al., 2020). Still, participation levels vary, and not all young people choose to engage (Corney et al., 2020).

2.3. Youth’s Perception of Civic Engagement

Civic engagement is characterised by individuals’ active participation in the social and political lives of their communities (Adler & Goggin, 2005; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Smith, 2022). This concept is broadly divided into two spheres. Social engagement includes activities such as volunteering and participating in environmental initiatives, while political engagement encompasses more traditional democratic actions like voting, protesting, and signing petitions (Chittum et al., 2022). This distinction reflects a comprehensive view of citizenship that recognises both institutional and non-institutional forms of participation, which are critical for a functioning democracy (Gerston, 2021). The theoretical framework of civic engagement, therefore, acknowledges a wide spectrum of activities through which citizens can influence their society.
As for the civic engagement of youth, a young person’s involvement in the political and social sphere can take many different forms. Some examples include volunteering, attending rallies, writing to politicians, voting, being involved in social media, and volunteering or other types of activism. In addition, when youth participation aligns with their interests, it enhances government credibility and strengthens democratic processes (Pospieszna & Galus, 2020). Therefore, we pose the following research question:
RQ1: What are Gen Z’s perceptions of civic engagement?

2.4. Youth’s Motivation for Civic Engagement

Regarding civic engagement, Generation Z faces specific challenges, particularly in addressing disinformation and developing digital literacy. Although Gen Z claims to want to be more involved in the community (Murmuration, 2024), several obstacles stand in their way. One of the main variables affecting young people’s motivation for civic engagement is how they approach things differently from older generations. Gen Z is more likely to volunteer locally and participate in other community-focused activities than in more conventional political activities, such as voting. This inclination raises the possibility that this generation’s incentives for civic engagement are more community-focused.
The idea of motivation can be further extended using self-determination theory (SDT), which distinguishes between autonomous and controlled motivations (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Increased need fulfilment is associated with autonomous motivation, which includes both intrinsic and well-internalised extrinsic motivation. This approach leads to favourable outcomes, including improved performance and well-being. Activities that individuals find engaging, offer novelty and challenge, and satisfy their requirements for competence and autonomy are the source of intrinsic drive. On the other hand, internalising processes, such as identification and integration, allow extrinsic motivation to fluctuate in its degree of self-determination. More independent behaviour may result from well-internalised extrinsic motivation. On the other hand, amotivation is the absence of purpose or drive, frequently brought on by ineffectiveness or a lack of control (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
In the context of civic engagement, intrinsic motivation is demonstrated by young people’s innate desire to give back to their communities, which is motivated by their values, sense of autonomy, and the psychological rewards of meaningful involvement (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Larson (2000) argues that youth develop intrinsic motivation or initiative through personally meaningful and challenging activities, which are key features of authentic civic participation. Amotivation in civic settings frequently results from a sense of inadequacy, when young people believe their efforts will not have a significant impact on complicated societal issues, or from a gap between their ideals and the civic possibilities that are accessible to them (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Information overload, conflicting priorities, and mistrust of conventional civic institutions are some of the particular motivational issues that modern youth encounter. These issues can impair both intrinsic interest and receptivity to extrinsic rewards. However, research consistently reveals that when civic opportunities match with young people’s developmental needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness—the fundamental elements of SDT—long-term engagement increases (Catalano & Hawkins, 1996).
RQ2: What are Gen Z’s motivations for civic engagement?

2.5. Youth Sources of Information Concerning Civic Engagement

Young people use digital media as a fun and engaging way to learn about citizenship and civic participation. These platforms allow youngsters to connect, share ideas, and debate political issues through social networks, impacting their digital citizenship skills (Contreras et al., 2023). There is a positive relationship between social media usage and civic involvement among the younger population. Additionally, specific functionalities of social media, such as using them for news consumption and self-expression, may significantly forecast civic engagement (Pang et al., 2022; Oden & Porter, 2023). There is also a substantial correlation between increased political engagement on the internet and increased political participation offline, such as voting, attending public meetings, and making contributions to political campaigns (Piatak & Mikkelsen, 2021).
However, poorly informed young individuals, who rely on passive exposure to news rather than active information-seeking, are less likely to engage in civic activities (Skurka et al., 2023; Swart, 2023; Duvekot et al., 2024). This disengagement, in turn, increases their vulnerability to fake news, as they lack the critical media literacy necessary to discern credible sources from false information. As a result, the following research question is presented:
RQ3: What sources of information concerning civic engagement does Gen Z use?

2.6. Youth and Fake News Exposure

Youth exposure to fake news has become increasingly prevalent in contemporary digital environments, with research indicating substantial and frequent encounters across multiple platforms. Norwegian survey data reveal that two out of three teenagers had encountered content they suspected to be fake (Selnes, 2024), while broader statistics suggest that younger consumers are often at greater risk of exposure to fake news than older generations by sheer virtue of their higher social media usage (Statista, 2024). The primary sites of exposure align with youth media consumption patterns, particularly on platforms where roughly six in ten teens use TikTok and Instagram. Platform-specific vulnerabilities are particularly concerning, as research indicates that roughly a fifth of TikTok videos contain misinformation (Jain et al., 2025).
The types and mechanisms of exposure reflect the algorithmic and social nature of contemporary media consumption, where disinformation spreads through recommendation systems, peer sharing, and influencer networks. Youth encounter fake news not merely as passive consumers but as active participants in information ecosystems driven by two main factors: youth’s desire to raise awareness among their social circles, especially when the content aligns with their existing beliefs and perceptions, and a simple lack of time to properly verify the information’s accuracy (Valencia-Arias et al., 2023).
The frequency and ubiquity of exposure, combined with the emotional and sensational nature of much misinformation content, create conditions where distinguishing authentic from fabricated information becomes increasingly challenging for young people navigating complex digital information landscapes. Consequently, the subsequent research question has been proposed:
RQ4: Are Gen Z people exposed to fake news concerning social and political topics?

2.7. Cues to Identify Fake News

Research highlights several techniques for developing digital skills, particularly source evaluation. Cognitive psychology emphasises the importance of assessing information reliability (Kumar & Geethakumari, 2014). Users often judge content by examining its source and its influence on opinions. Freiling (2019) found that familiarity with accounts helps users detect false information, with account credibility being especially important for trusted news sources. People tend to believe content from sources they consider reliable, making source credibility a key cue (Pennycook & Rand, 2021).
In the same vein, McGrew and Byrne (2022) suggest that one of the best ways to spot false material is to lateral read, which is the act of leaving a webpage to look for additional information on other reliable websites. According to research by Khan and Idris (2019), users who possess the ability to recognise reliable sources are less likely to be manipulated by false information, which emphasises the value of media literacy education in developing these abilities.
Furthermore, social feedback, such as “likes” on social media, can strengthen trust in news items, even misinformation, since it frequently contradicts powerful persons’ elite messaging (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). However, by using crowdsourcing, social media users can improve their ability to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy content through collective judgement and shared experiences. Checking URLs is another useful strategy for social media users. Suspicious or misleading domain names can signal false content, helping users avoid sharing or engaging with unreliable sources (Roy & Chahar, 2021).
Recent research shows that developing relevant digital skills is linked to positive outcomes, such as enhanced civic participation, academic achievement, and improved online safety behaviours (Livingstone et al., 2023). Yet critical digital literacy encompasses more than just content analysis; it also entails knowing how the internet affects political, social, and economic environments. This more expansive viewpoint aids in the development of mental models that have a major impact on civic engagement (Polizzi, 2023). Similarly, critical digital literacy promotes a more complex understanding of how digital environments influence public discourse and individual agency, as described by Pangrazio and Sefton-Green (2021). Given this context, studies indicate that while youth are digitally savvy and aware of fake news mechanisms, they remain highly exposed to online manipulation and lack awareness of how it influences them (Lilja et al., 2024). Therefore, we propose the following research question:
RQ5: What are the cues Gen Z people take into consideration to identify fake news?

2.8. Reactions After Fake News Encounters in Civic Context

There is a significant research gap in identifying the specific topics that fake news most exploits in civic contexts (Chryssanthopoulou, 2023). While most studies often focus on formal aspects or manipulation techniques (Aïmeur et al., 2023; Rastogi & Bansal, 2023), evidence suggests disinformation campaigns tailor messages by leveraging pre-existing biases, rumours, cultural beliefs, and historical conflicts (Carr et al., 2020). Such an observation implies the topical content of civic fake news likely varies considerably across regions and groups. Some general hot topics are at issue, such as health: COVID-19, vaccines (Balakrishnan et al., 2022); political: globalisation, war (Carr et al., 2020; Kreft et al., 2024); social: immigration, NGOs (Carr et al., 2020; Corporate Europe Observatory, 2025); and environmental: global warming, industrialised pollution (Al-Rawi et al., 2021). However, there are also specific topics that depend on the vulnerabilities of particular groups, including financial scams (Sarno & Black, 2024), the Ukrainian war (Magdin, 2022), and autonomous regions (Pérez Curiel et al., 2022).
After encountering fake news on a topic that interests them, people experience different reactions in the form of emotions or actions (Obadă, 2019; Fârte et al., 2025). People’s emotional responses to fake news hinge on how they manage cognitive dissonance. When fake news aligns with existing beliefs, individuals often feel contempt and satisfaction. Conversely, encountering fake news that contradicts beliefs, without effectively resolving the dissonance, typically leads to feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration (Taddicken & Wolff, 2020). Emotional intensity dictates how people react to fake news. High emotions (positive or negative) correlate with either spreading or suppressing them, while low emotions lead to ignoring or disengagement (Horner et al., 2021).
As for the behaviour triggered by fake news, most of the studies focused on sharing behaviour, emphasising intrinsic motivations such as emotions or beliefs, or extrinsic motivations such as political ideology and conspiracy theories (Melchior & Oliveira, 2024). However, few studies examine youth reactions to fake news, with some noting that people share disinformation mainly due to their inability to detect it and desire to inform others. (Herrero-Diz et al., 2020). Therefore, we propose the next research question:
RQ6: What cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses are triggered by fake news in Gen Z individuals?

2.9. Solutions for Combating Fake News

Another investigation conducted by Pennycook et al. (2020) investigated the efficacy of initiatives aimed at curbing the dissemination of fake news on social media, providing useful guidance on reducing the adverse effects. The empirical study aimed to determine the impact of various interventions, such as accuracy reminders and warnings, on participants’ sharing behaviour. The researchers carefully evaluated the impacts of these interventions using a series of web-based studies. Their research revealed an important direction to follow: some interventions, such as accuracy reminders, were successful in lowering the spread of false information. Pennycook et al. (2020) recommended that social media platforms adopt interventions that promote critical thinking among users regarding the material they come across and disseminate, given the findings.
Finally, current research shows that young people with strong communication and social skills may reduce their likelihood of spreading or falling for false information. This is achieved by increasing awareness of the potential pitfalls of blending news, information, and social interactions, along with a deeper understanding of how social media platforms operate. Moreover, effective peer-to-peer online communication can act as a safeguard against the risks posed by disinformation (Vissenberg et al., 2023).
RQ7: What are Gen Z’s perceptions of the solutions for combating fake news?

3. Methodology

To investigate young people’s perceptions of civic engagement and the effects of disinformation, we adopted a qualitative approach in this study, which included focus groups. Focus groups were selected due to their ability to offer comprehensive and profound insights into the attitudes, views, and personal experiences of the participants. Interaction between participants is facilitated by this approach, which can lead to original insights and more in-depth conversations. Focus groups and other qualitative research methods are especially useful for studying phenomena that are still poorly understood since they allow for the exploration of new topics as they come up during the discussion (Busetto et al., 2020).
Purposive sampling was used to choose members for 8 focus groups, each with six to ten individuals between the ages of 18 and 25, to guarantee a diversity of perspectives on social and political engagement. The participants were students enrolled at one major university in Romania and had ages between 18 and 25 years. The purposive sample scheme we used is presented below (Table 1). The youth voluntarily agreed to participate in the study without receiving any reward.
The purpose of the focus groups was to collect information about participants’ motivations, experiences, and how fake news affects their interest in social and political issues. The profile of participants is highly relevant to the present study, as Generation Z represents the primary target audience of civic NGOs. These organisations aim to foster civic engagement among young people and encourage their active participation as responsible citizens. However, their heightened vulnerability to fake news constitutes a significant obstacle to achieving this goal. To guarantee that we recorded unforeseen themes, the inquiry strategy was kept adaptable to enable follow-up enquiries based on participant responses. The conversations that occurred in each focus group were videotaped and transcribed for analysis, with a duration of approximately one and a half hours. Data collection took place during the months of March and April 2024.
The structure of the study presents seven research questions alongside their corresponding objectives, operationalised concepts, and focus group questions. The first three RQs explore Gen Z’s perceptions, motivations, and information sources regarding civic engagement. The following questions investigate Gen Z’s experiences with fake news, specifically their exposure to it, identification cues, recalled topics, emotional reactions, actions taken, and perceived solutions. Each RQ is linked to targeted focus group prompts designed to elicit detailed qualitative insights aligned with the study’s conceptual framework (Table 2).
The research targeted young people between the ages of 18 and 25 and focused on a particular generational cohort. This age group was chosen because they are extremely engaged on social media and are heavily influenced by the dissemination of disinformation (A. Guess et al., 2019; Pospieszna & Galus, 2020). Furthermore, the early stages of civic engagement and political participation in this generation make it an ideal demographic to explore the effects of disinformation. By concentrating on this particular age group, the research project seeks to comprehend the opportunities and difficulties of improving civic engagement and digital literacy at a critical juncture in their development.

4. Results

For the interpretation of the focus group data, we employed a three-stage coding process: open, axial, and selective coding. During open coding, we identified and labelled key concepts emerging from participants’ responses. During open coding, we identified and labelled key concepts that emerged from participants’ responses. Axial coding allowed us to explore relationships between these concepts, grouping them into broader categories based on patterns and connections. Finally, through selective coding, we integrated and refined these categories around central themes that addressed our research questions. This iterative process led to the development of a conceptual map (Figure 1) that visually represents the core dimensions of Gen Z’s civic engagement and their interaction with disinformation.

4.1. Understanding Civic Engagement

The analysis of focus group responses to the first question, “What is civic engagement?” demonstrates that participants have a diverse concept of civic involvement. One prominent theme is political participation, with many respondents linking civic engagement to acts like voting, participating in political procedures, and supporting political candidates. In contrast, T. (20) emphasised that civic engagement means “citizens’ involvement in the political sphere with the purpose of electing representatives.” This political dimension shows the importance of active participation in democratic processes as a fundamental aspect of civic engagement. Another recurring theme is social engagement, particularly community involvement. Participants regularly highlighted volunteering, participation in non-governmental organisations, and social activities as important components of civic engagement. M. N. (20) mentioned the significance of “volunteer activities”, while M. T. (19) emphasised “citizens’ involvement not only in the public sphere, but also in social aspects, organisations, NGOs, and things related to the community they live in.” Similarly, I. (22) describes civic engagement as “an action directly involved in the community, helping communities in general.” This subject reflects a larger definition of civic engagement, which includes contributing to the well-being and progress of one’s community through many types of social activity. Care for the environment emerged as an important part of civic engagement. A. N. (24) broadened the term to include environmental responsibility, saying, “Civic engagement, in my opinion, can also mean helping the environment, being a citizen who respects the environment, not littering, and so on”. Others related civic involvement to activities such as beautifying the city and participating in environmental clean-up initiatives. The topic in question accentuates the link between civic responsibility and environmental care, implying that civic participation requires a commitment to both societal and ecological well-being.

4.2. Motivation for Civic Engagement

Participants demonstrated a strong intrinsic motivation driven by selfless aspirations and personal fulfilment gained from civic engagement. Some of them identified their main motivator as the innate “desire to help” (T., 20), which reflects the psychological fulfilment that comes from meaningful community involvement and the desire to “do something more useful with my free time” (M. T., 19), showing engagement motivated by own ideals and autonomy rather than outside demands. Participants like A. R. (21) and G. E. (18) attended educational festivals and student leagues, and these genuinely motivated activities spanned from volunteering for student organisations to working for community foundations. When paired with civic responsibility and personal relevance, external motivations become powerful motivators. Specifically, extrinsic motivations were responsible for driving political engagement, with M. C. (19) stressing “knowledge that every vote counts” and others referring to voting as “a responsibility of every citizen.” Participants emphasised the importance of external support and personal relevance in fostering engagement. Mentorship and structured opportunities, as seen in cases of early involvement in politics and activism, were key factors in encouraging deeper civic participation and enhancing extrinsic motivation.
The perception of opaque or ineffective political procedures posed major barriers, leading to a lack of enthusiasm. L. C. (23) noted that political decisions were “frequently made by a small number of people”, resulting in a sense of helplessness F. N. (22) characterised political procedures as only “formality”, illustrating how amotivation might result from a gap between one’s personal values and the civic chances that are accessible (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Participants also suggested that increased transparency, clarity, and relevant information could overcome these motivational barriers.

4.3. Sources of Information on Civic Topics

The main sources of information that were mentioned were new media, legacy media, official sources, and word-of-mouth. However, respondents showed a clear preference for online channels when discussing civic concerns, either social or political. Social media tools, particularly Instagram, were frequently identified as ways to stay updated about civic issues. For example, M. C. (19) stated that “NGOs generally have Instagram pages where they usually post in real time what they are doing”, accentuating the real-time updates provided by these platforms. They also mentioned using “news aggregation sites”, such as Google News, to provide a holistic view of the current environment. The importance of credible and transparent information was repeatedly stressed throughout the responses, with some participants reporting a tendency to rely on sources they considered trustworthy. The quality assessment of sources used for civic involvement was a frequent topic, with participants expressing caution about the material they consume. Many responses addressed the need for objectivity and transparency. T. (20), for example, said, “I always look for the information received to be as objective as possible and to have some concrete sources”. Others, such as M. N. (20), shared this opinion, valuing “official sites, again, from which we can inform ourselves”, demonstrating a desire for official and validated information sources. Participants such as R. N. (24), on the other hand, acknowledged the possibility of disinformation on social media but suggested a technique of cross-referencing several sources to determine the truth: “I prefer to be interested in a field that informs me from several sources”.

4.4. Fake News Exposure

Younger focus group participants frequently encountered fake news, yet they primarily recalled well-known and highly visible examples rather than recent ones. Most of these remembered instances were recognised as disinformation from the outset. When questioned about the sources of this recalled fake news, participants cited Social Network Sites (SNS), particularly Facebook and TikTok, as well as TV shows that were further amplified through word-of-mouth.
Participants demonstrated a profound understanding of potential biases and the significance of source trustworthiness in the political domain. Many others mentioned the practice of comparing information from multiple sources to ensure correctness. As A. F. (19) observed, “usually, if it’s a big, impactful story, it appears on multiple news sites”, implying that cross-referencing aids in trustworthiness. A. N. (24) expressed concern about the influence of media bias, stating that it would be a great idea “if we could look for some news pages that have a bias meter”, demonstrating an awareness of the necessity to negotiate political bias in the media.

4.5. Reactions After Fake News Encounters

Concerning the cognitive responses, participants were asked to recall topics of fake news related to civic matters, and their responses largely fell into three categories: shock and sensationalism, global crises, and political subjects. Under sensationalism, they mentioned celebrity death hoaxes (especially Romanian artists) and fake financial earnings linked to scams. For global crises, the most cited examples involved COVID-19 and conflicts like the Israel–Palestine and Russia–Ukraine wars. In the political category, participants primarily recalled fake news about elections and political events.
The respondents also reported a range of emotional responses when encountering fake news, including feelings of shock, indignation, and confusion, often leading to growing distrust of the media. One respondent, a 22-year-old male, noted: “I began to question my trust in all media sources”.
As for the behavioural reactions, when encountering questionable content, most of the respondents’ checked comments, then verified through original sources or lateral searches. While some admitted to sharing fake news, only one participant reported believing and acting on it, citing a viral false claim about gas prices: “Of course, I followed my dad’s lead and went to the gas station, waiting 4 h just to fill up my car.” Others reported content they immediately recognised as fake.

4.6. Cues on Fake News Identification

The main characteristics of fake news that the participants in the focus group recognised were its use of deceptive language, including clickbait headlines, alarming rhetoric, framing, ambiguity, and a highly subjective style. They brought up the manipulation of visual elements, citing the use of old photographs taken out of context, altered images, or excessively structured text. It is interesting to note that some youths mistakenly believe that a lack of graphics indicates false information. Most participants also emphasised how phoney news frequently lacks credibility since it comes from a single source, leaves out important details, or appears in dubious or biased publications. Additionally, low-quality signs were highlighted, like misspelt words, blatantly edited photographs, evident ghost websites, or issues that look too ridiculous to be true.

4.7. Solutions for Combating Fake News

The responses revealed two levels of proposed solutions: individual and systemic. At the individual level, they emphasised self-education and critical thinking as key tools for verifying information and supporting informed civic actions like voting. One respondent called critical thinking essential for a “functional democracy”.
Systemic solutions focused on education, regulation, and sanctions. Respondents called for media literacy programmes in schools and adult education, led by relatable peers. “I would trust younger individuals more to explain the phenomenon than older people,” said I. V., male, 21. They also demanded stricter regulation of both journalism and social media, including transparency and professional standards. Proposed sanctions included fines, platform bans, AI regulation, and identity verification to prevent fake news.

5. Discussion

The results indicate that members of Generation Z have a complex view of civic engagement that goes beyond conventional political activity to include environmental responsibility and more general community involvement. While voting and supporting candidates are important aspects of political participation, participants also placed equal emphasis on social engagement through community service, volunteering, and involvement in non-governmental organisations. Participants see activities like rubbish collection and environmental protection as essential parts of civic duty, and this broadened conceptualisation also includes environmental stewardship. This thorough comprehension involves both social and political aspects, as outlined by Chittum et al. (2022), and is consistent with the more expansive definition of civic involvement proposed by Gerston (2021). According to the findings, young people in Romania view civic engagement as a comprehensive approach to citizenship that crosses the political, social, and environmental domains. This perspective integrates both official democratic procedures and unofficial community-focused activities.
The investigation shows that intrinsic motivations, including the innate “desire to help” and the pursuit of personal fulfilment through meaningful community involvement, are the main drivers of Gen Z’s civic engagement. Volunteering for community foundations and student organisations, as well as attempting to “gather experiences” and “do something more useful with spare time”, were examples of the participants’ independent motivation. This is consistent with the self-determination hypothesis (Deci & Ryan, 2000), which makes a distinction between regulated and autonomous motivation and holds that the latter produces better results. Extrinsic incentives that are well internalised and can lead to more autonomous behaviour include civic duty and the conviction that “every vote counts”—especially when it comes to politics. However, there were notable obstacles to motivation that surfaced, such as participants’ descriptions of political decisions being made by “a small number of people” or simply being “formal”, as well as their views of political processes as opaque or ineffectual. Both Larson’s (2000) claim that young people develop intrinsic motivation through personally relevant and challenging activities, and Wigfield and Eccles (2000) claim that perceived inefficacy reduces motivation are supported by these findings. According to the research, opportunities that meet young people’s developmental needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness lead to sustained civic involvement (Catalano & Hawkins, 1996).
When it comes to the information sources that Gen Z uses for civic engagement, they show a strong preference for digital sources, especially social media sites like Instagram, for political and civic information. This tendency is consistent with larger trends in Romania, where young people use Instagram as a platform for political discourse (Statista, 2023). Participants highlight reliable, open sources and express awareness of potential biases, and they prefer real-time NGO updates via Instagram. Although they are aware of the dangers of false information on social media, they nonetheless use news aggregators and specialised news websites (Meel & Vishwakarma, 2020). Participants in Generation Z are often exposed to fake news about civic issues, which is in line with studies that indicate younger generations are more vulnerable to exposure hazards as a result of their heavy social media use (Statista, 2024). Participants were more likely to recall well-known, highly visible cases than more recent ones, and the majority were immediately identified as deception, suggesting some detection capability. The main sources of fake news are social networking sites, including Facebook and TikTok, as well as TV programmes that distribute information through word-of-mouth. This conclusion is consistent with studies that demonstrate fake news spreads more quickly and widely on social media than actual news (Meel & Vishwakarma, 2020; Damstra et al., 2021). Even when participants use cross-referencing techniques and show knowledge of biases, their passive news intake through algorithms and peer sharing makes them more likely to come across and possibly disseminate false information (Aïmeur et al., 2023).
The respondents recognised several essential cues for identifying fake news across a variety of categories. Clickbait headlines, scary rhetoric, framing strategies, ambiguity, and highly subjective writing styles are examples of language aspects. Visual manipulation was another important cue, with participants noting the use of old photographs taken out of context, altered images, or excessively structured text formatting. Source credibility emerged as a crucial factor, with participants flagging single-source stories, missing important details, or content appearing in dubious or biased publications, which aligns with research showing that source credibility is a key cue in information evaluation (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). Quality indicators such as spelling errors, edited photographs, ghost websites, or stories that seem “too ridiculous to be true” were also commonly mentioned. The findings support Kumar and Geethakumari’s (2014) emphasis on assessing information reliability and Freiling’s (2019) research showing that familiarity with accounts helps users detect false information. However, some participants mistakenly believed that a lack of graphics indicated false information, and the continued reliance on social media feedback, such as comments for validation (Pennycook & Rand, 2021), suggests gaps in media literacy that could lead to misidentification of legitimate content. The participants’ cross-referencing behaviour reflects McGrew and Byrne’s (2022) recommendation for lateral reading as one of the best ways to spot false material.
Responses to fake news among Gen Z individuals are characterised by a mix of emotional, cognitive, and behavioural reactions. Gen Z primarily remembered different types of fake news about global disasters, politics, and shock/sensationalism. Gen Z frequently mentioned scams, unusual local news, celebrity deaths, and inaccurate information about the epidemic. Elections, political manipulation, and conflicts such as Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine also received frequent mentions. This trend is consistent with research showing that disinformation frequently makes use of pre-existing biases and emotional triggers (Carr et al., 2020), and that immigration, war, and health are popular subjects (Balakrishnan et al., 2022; Kreft et al., 2024). Content that is emotionally charged or civically relevant implies that disinformation efforts should deliberately target young people to increase their impact and dissemination (Carr et al., 2020).
The focus group participants also reported emotions of amazement, perplexity, and outrage, with a particularly strong sense of mistrust toward established media when false information originated from sources they once considered reliable. This aligns with research on cognitive dissonance, where inaccurate or contradictory information can lead to discontentment and weaken trust in credible news organisations (Taddicken & Wolff, 2020). Such emotional responses have the potential to reduce civic engagement and influence how young people participate in political discourse (Swart & Broersma, 2022). Behaviourally, participants primarily reported taking steps to verify information, such as checking comment sections, the initial sources, and cross-referencing on social media. However, some also acknowledged sharing false information impulsively before verification, with only one participant reporting having acted on it. These actions are consistent with studies indicating that individuals may spread misinformation not because they believe it, but because they feel compelled to inform others (Herrero-Diz et al., 2020; Valencia-Arias et al., 2023). This highlights an ongoing vulnerability to emotional reactivity and a reliance on social approval over a methodical verification process (Pennycook & Rand, 2021; Shephard et al., 2023).
Gen Z valued both systemic and individual solutions to counteract false information. In line with their research on digital literacy, they each placed a strong emphasis on critical thinking, cross-referencing sources, and exercising informed scepticism (Pangrazio & Sefton-Green, 2021; Polizzi, 2023). They suggested sanctions, control, and education as a system. Similar to how schools and NGOs promote media literacy, education encompasses both official and informal programs (Tarozzi, 2020; Pang et al., 2022; Bruinenberg et al., 2021; Huang et al., 2024). The regulation included AI and media supervision, while the sanctions included identity verification and fines. These are consistent with studies on how peer education, digital literacy, and institutional accountability can lessen the spread of false information (Pennycook et al., 2020; Vissenberg et al., 2023).

6. Managerial Implications

The perspectives of the youngsters that participated in this study highlight the opportunities and challenges NGOs face in reaching and engaging Gen Z. The results suggest that NGOs, particularly those focusing on civic activities (either social or political) need to adapt their communication strategies to better align with the media habits, expectations, and vulnerabilities of younger audiences. Civic NGOs can harness social media platforms to tap into social movements that resonate with young people. By creating campaigns that raise awareness of issues relevant to youth and the impact of fake news, NGOs can stimulate interest and foster community. Featuring credible individuals who share their professional expertise on current events can further enhance the organisation’s credibility and encourage participation (Swart, 2023).
Encouraging positive perceptions of online civic engagement is crucial in combating fake news. Civic NGOs can facilitate this by sharing well-researched news articles and initiating discussions that promote civic participation. Research indicates that individuals who view online civic engagement positively are more likely to share content fostering dialogue around misinformation and its societal impacts (Bhagat & Kim, 2023). By creating platforms for critical discussions on news literacy and the implications of fake news, NGOs can empower youth to navigate online spaces responsibly.
Civic NGOs should focus on developing digital literacy skills among young people by emphasising the ability to identify and combat fake news. Training programmes should include strategies for evaluating the credibility of sources, recognising biased information, and employing fact-checking tools. Ultimately, bridging the gap between digital literacy and civic participation will be vital in cultivating a generation of engaged, informed citizens who can navigate the complexities of the digital landscape while actively participating in democratic processes. By doing so, NGOs can both mitigate the risks associated with fake news and advance their broader mission of cultivating informed, active, and resilient citizens.

7. Theoretical Implications and Future Studies

The study’s theoretical ramifications highlight the importance of young people improving their digital literacy, especially with regard to social media news consumption. The results are consistent with previous research that shows how passive news consumption can expose young people to fake news, especially when they base their judgement of the reliability of news on weak indicators like follower counts or social media comments (Swart, 2023; Pennycook & Rand, 2021). Additionally, the data support McGrew and Byrne’s (2022) assertion that critical thinking and lateral reading are important tactics. There is a clear demand for educational interventions targeted at closing the gap between formal digital literacy instruction and actual media use patterns.
Despite some unique national characteristics, the digital literacy issues facing Romanian youth reflect a wider European problem, with 32% of Europeans lacking fundamental digital skills (European Commission: Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, 2022). While digital media literacy training has been shown to improve discernment between real and fake news, even digitally savvy individuals in various countries remain susceptible to spreading misinformation (A. M. Guess et al., 2020). This underscores the need for context-specific, national-level approaches to digital literacy within the broader framework of EU policy.
Future studies should examine how digital literacy interventions affect young people’s capacity to assess news critically and their general level of civic involvement over the long run. Further research should look at how specific media literacy programmes affect young people’s ability to improve their lateral reading, fact-checking, and source evaluation abilities, given the findings that they frequently rely on surface-level cues to determine the reliability of material. Additional investigations could also look into how social media influencers and peer pressure affect young people’s views on civic and political problems, and their capacity to protect themselves against misinformation. Future studies could also further explore the relationship between young people’s perceptions of civic engagement and their direct or indirect exposure to NGO initiatives. Examining the ways in which NGOs integrate media literacy components into their campaigns, or how they collaborate with schools, universities, and influencers, would provide valuable insights into the effectiveness of such interventions.

8. Conclusions

The present research reveals a critical interconnection between digital media literacy, fake news vulnerability, and civic engagement levels among Generation Z, raising questions about how young people’s civic participation is directly undermined by their susceptibility to fake news. Fake news poses specific challenges to youth, who are often more vulnerable to its impact due to their heavy reliance on social media for information. Young people may struggle to discern credible news from fake news, which can lead to a range of negative consequences, such as reducing political participation and civic engagement, making poorly informed decisions, and creating more fragmented, polarised opinions among youngsters.
The findings of this study underscore the complex landscape of youth civic engagement in the digital age, particularly concerning the challenges posed by the fake news phenomenon and the need for enhanced digital literacy. The research reveals that young individuals increasingly rely on online platforms, especially social media, for information concerning civic and political issues. This reliance is coupled with a significant vulnerability to fake news, as many youths exhibit poor digital literacy skills, resulting in a limited understanding of how algorithms shape their news consumption. The study shows that participants who exhibit gaps in media literacy are more susceptible to fake news exposure, which in turn generates emotions of mistrust, perplexity, and outrage toward established media and institutions. This erosion of trust has profound implications for civic engagement, as research demonstrates that exposure to fake news can reduce young people’s willingness to participate in political discourse and democratic processes.
Digital literacy programmes run by NGOs will not only help young people make informed decisions but also increase their confidence in participating in democratic processes. It ensures that they can engage in civic discourse with greater awareness, resisting manipulation and contributing positively to the integrity of democratic societies. The findings of this study emphasise the need for a multifaceted approach to support young people in becoming proactive, informed contributors to their communities.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, A.-N.G.-B. and D.-R.O.; methodology, D.-R.O., G.P. and A.-N.G.-B.; software, A.-N.G.-B.; validation, D.-R.O.; formal analysis, A.-N.G.-B.; investigation, G.P. and A.-N.G.-B.; resources, G.P. and A.-N.G.-B.; data curation, G.P. and A.-N.G.-B.; writing—original draft preparation, G.P. and A.-N.G.-B.; writing—review and editing, A.-N.G.-B., G.P. and D.-R.O.; visualization, D.-R.O.; supervision, D.-R.O.; project administration, A.-N.G.-B.; funding acquisition, D.-R.O. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

The study was conducted in accordance with Law no. 677/2001 in Romania on the protection of individuals concerning the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data; EU Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) on the protection of personal data; Law no. 206/2004 regarding good conduct in scientific research, technological development, and innovation.

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are not openly available due to securing the anonymity of the respondents. However, anonymized data sets are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Figure 1. Conceptual map exploring Generation Z’s perception of civic engagement and their vulnerability to online fake news.
Figure 1. Conceptual map exploring Generation Z’s perception of civic engagement and their vulnerability to online fake news.
Journalmedia 06 00136 g001
Table 1. Purposive sampling scheme.
Table 1. Purposive sampling scheme.
Focus Group No.Female ParticipantsMale ParticipantsTotal Participants per Focus Group
1516
2437
3819
46410
5729
6538
7729
85510
Table 2. Research questions, objectives, concepts, and indicators.
Table 2. Research questions, objectives, concepts, and indicators.
Research QuestionResearch ObjectiveOperationalised ConceptFocus Group Questions
RQ1: What are Gen Z’s
perceptions of civic engagement?
To explore the perceptions of Gen Z regarding civic engagement.Civic engagementWhat understanding do you have of “civic engagement”?
Describe a situation you were civically engaged in.
RQ2: What are Gen Z’s motivations for civic engagement?To identify the motivations behind Gen Z’s civic engagement.Types of motivation (for civic engagement)What motivated you to get involved in civic actions?
If not, what would motivate you to become involved in civic actions?
RQ3: What sources of information/media sources concerning civic engagement does Gen Z use?To explore the media and information sources Gen Z use concerning civic engagement.Sources of informationWhat sources do you use to inform yourself on civic (social and political) subjects?
RQ4: Are Gen Z people exposed to fake news concerning social and political topics?To assess Gen Z’s exposure to fake news related to social and political topics.Fake news exposureDescribe the situation when you have encountered fake news on social/political topics.
RQ5: What are the cues Gen Z people take into consideration to identify fake news?To examine the cues Gen Z considers when identifying fake news.Cues on fake news identificationWhat are the characteristics by which you identify fake news?
RQ6: What cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses are triggered by fake news in Gen Z individuals?To examine the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural responses of Gen Z to fake news.Recall of fake news topicsDescribe the situation when you have encountered fake news on social/political topics.
Triggered emotionsWhat emotions did you experience when you encountered the fake news?
Triggered actionsWhat actions did you take when you encountered the fake news?
RQ7: What are Gen Z’s perceptions of the solutions for combating fake news?To explore Gen Z’s perceptions of solutions for combating fake news.Solutions for combating fake newsHow do you think the phenomenon of fake news could be limited?
Which entities do you think would be responsible for fake news?
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Gherguț-Babii, A.-N.; Poleac, G.; Obadă, D.-R. Challenges for NGO Communication Practitioners in the Disinformation Era: A Qualitative Study Exploring Generation Z’s Perception of Civic Engagement and Their Vulnerability to Online Fake News. Journal. Media 2025, 6, 136. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030136

AMA Style

Gherguț-Babii A-N, Poleac G, Obadă D-R. Challenges for NGO Communication Practitioners in the Disinformation Era: A Qualitative Study Exploring Generation Z’s Perception of Civic Engagement and Their Vulnerability to Online Fake News. Journalism and Media. 2025; 6(3):136. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030136

Chicago/Turabian Style

Gherguț-Babii, Alexandra-Niculina, Gabriela Poleac, and Daniel-Rareș Obadă. 2025. "Challenges for NGO Communication Practitioners in the Disinformation Era: A Qualitative Study Exploring Generation Z’s Perception of Civic Engagement and Their Vulnerability to Online Fake News" Journalism and Media 6, no. 3: 136. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030136

APA Style

Gherguț-Babii, A.-N., Poleac, G., & Obadă, D.-R. (2025). Challenges for NGO Communication Practitioners in the Disinformation Era: A Qualitative Study Exploring Generation Z’s Perception of Civic Engagement and Their Vulnerability to Online Fake News. Journalism and Media, 6(3), 136. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6030136

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