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Article

Motivations, Knowledge, Efficacy, and Participation: An O-S-O-R Model of Second Screening’s Political Effects in China

by
Yiben Liu
1,*,
Shuhua Zhou
2 and
Hongzhong Zhang
3
1
School of Media and Strategic Communications, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA
2
School of Journalism, The University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA
3
School of Journalism and Communication, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Journal. Media 2023, 4(3), 861-875; https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia4030054
Submission received: 31 March 2023 / Revised: 11 July 2023 / Accepted: 28 July 2023 / Published: 2 August 2023
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Abstract

:
TV audiences today are more likely to use an additional media device to further engage with the television content, a phenomenon known as “second screening”. This study takes second screening research into an authoritarian context to investigate what motivates users to search for information, engage in discussions, and post on social media. We apply an O-S-O-R model and demonstrates an integrated procedure of second screening’s political effects among citizens of Beijing. Our findings showed that most of the direct and indirect paths in this model were significantly positive. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are also discussed.

1. Introduction

Empowered by portable digital devices, wireless Internet access, Web 2.0 techniques, and participatory online media, TV audiences in current times tend to engage in emergent events more actively. For example, a recent worldwide survey shows while watching TV, 76% of respondents use a second device (i.e., smartphones, tablets, laptops, etc.) (AdColony 2021). People reported using secondary devices to browse social media, chat, search the Internet, play games, etc., while watching TV (AdColony 2021). Such behaviors are called “second screening.” Ran and Yamamoto (2019) pointed out that second screening activities include “task-relative” activities, which refer to activities that are related to TV content, and “task-unrelative” ones. Due to our research purpose, only task-relative second screening activities are examined in this study.
Scholars found that second screening happens particularly during breaking news, political campaigns, and debates (Giglietto and Selva 2014), because such events are more likely to trigger audiences’ need to obtain more information and their desire to express their opinions. During political TV consumption, second screening for news and for expression are two major types of activities (Chen 2021). Mostly happening on social media platforms, second screening incorporates a series of media practices, creates a hybrid media environment, and allows the audience to shape public narratives alongside news organizations and political elites (Barnidge et al. 2019).
The current state of second screening research uses relatively homogeneous samples from Western TV audiences and barely explores Eastern societies or developing countries. However, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are spreading and developing rapidly worldwide (Barnidge et al. 2019). The phenomenon of second screening is also becoming ubiquitous worldwide (Gil de Zúñiga and Liu 2017). Although China, as an example, does not have official data on the prevalence of second screening, its popularity and significance are still well evidenced (Chan et al. 2017; Chen 2014). The number one Chinese social media platform, WeChat, has more than 1 billion active users and has become the dominant information tool in China (China Daily 2019). Another major social media platform, Weibo, is believed to afford Chinese citizens opportunities to express their opinions, interact with a wide range of people, and present themselves in a way that would be impossible otherwise (Ye et al. 2017; Chen and Chan 2017). We argue that to understand the psychological and political implications of second screening, and whether or how second screening produces pro-democratic results, more country-specific studies are needed.
More importantly, most second screen research approaches the phenomenon from a technological affordance perspective: with availability and opportunity, what content do users generate and what motivates them? We argue that a second screening study in China offers much more. In China, the media is heavily controlled and censored by the government. People often have to read “between the lines” to gauge a story’s implications and there are no alternative voices. By engaging in second screening, individuals in China and similar authoritarian systems can exchange in interpretations, and access and share alternative sources of information. Second screening may also help to counteract propaganda by allowing individuals to cross-reference information and fact check the content they encounter in the mainstream media. Finally, it may facilitate political discussions and dissent by serving as a platform for individuals to express their opinions, exchange ideas, and possibly organize grassroots movements.
As such, this research contributes to current second screening studies in several ways. First, the sample of Chinese citizens provides valuable data on how second screening and new ICTs affect political TV audiences in authoritative systems such as China. Testing the theoretical models in a different political system also provides new theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence for the development of media effects theories. Third, this study uses the O-S-O-R model to comprehensively test the mechanisms from motivations to second screening activities, to the mediating factors, and eventually to the behavioral results. Our model incorporates the uses and gratifications (U&G) approach (Rubin 2009), communication mediation model (McLeod et al. 2001), campaign mediation model (Cho et al. 2009), and cognitive mediation model (Eveland 2001). This is especially constructive when we examine the complicated mechanism of second screening’s political effects. The complete proposed model path is shown in Figure 1.

2. Literature Review

In the political communication literature, strong but indirect political effects of media use have long been documented, including traditional mass media exposure (Dahlgren 2009), news media consumption (Jung et al. 2011), Internet use (Shah et al. 2005), and social media activities (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2014). It is reasonable to assume that second screening also generates a series of complex mechanisms affecting individuals’ cognition and behavior. The media environment created by second screening embeds citizens in broader conversation spheres (Vaccari et al. 2015a). Compared to normal TV audiences who simply consume TV content, second screeners are engaging with TV content at different levels (Vaccari and Valeriani 2018). Instead of treating second screening as a mere extension of TV viewing or another way of interacting on social media, the implications of second screening on political outcomes should be studied in their own right (Choi and Jung 2016). Based on this argument, we propose our path model (see Figure 1).

3. Digital Media and Political Participation

Political participation has been defined in various ways from restrictive definitions as “those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba and Nie 1972, p. 2) to very broad understandings as “a categorical term for citizen power” (Arnstein 1969, p. 216), or even as broad as “all activities aiming to influence existing power structures” (Van Deth 2016, p. 1). In the field of communication, political participation is either strictly understood as participation in election campaigns, such as voting, attending rallies, and trying to persuade others to vote, or broadly defined as citizens engaging in civic and political activities daily, such as contacting government officials, discussing politics, boycotting, and volunteering in their community (Boulianne 2020). In this study, we use the broad definition because (1) it better fits the way that Chinese people engage with politics, and (2) the diffusion of digital media blurs the distinctions between public and private spheres, and provides abundant political information with easy access, which leads to “a continuous expansion of available forms of participation” (Van Deth 2016, p. 2). When developing our measuring items for political participation, two criteria were used. First, the activity is aimed at a political understanding, and second, the activity is voluntary and not ordered by a ruling power (Van Deth 2016).
Digital media, as it rapidly develops, is believed to have positive impacts not only on political elections and campaigns, but on citizens’ daily civic engagements (Boulianne 2020). Moreover, further implicit impacts are expected and these are described as “more robust over time and not dependent upon a particular historical context” (Xenos and Moy 2007, p. 715). For example, in a meta-analysis of research over 20 years and covering 50 countries, Boulianne (2020) reported that the small, positive average coefficients between digital media use and political and civic participations are turning into substantial, positive coefficients. The increase may be explained by the diffusion of media technology across countries and changes in the types of use, particularly the rise of social networking sites and tools for online political participation (Boulianne 2020). Digital media use, specifically during second screening, has also been evidenced to help users acquire and share information (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2015), facilitate discussion, and maintain networks for collective political actions (Vaccari et al. 2015b). Second screening activities significantly involve social networking sites, including social media, online forums, emails, and interpersonal networks such as texting (Liu et al. 2021). These all contribute to the increase in participation in both political elections and daily civic engagement (Boulianne 2020).
In countries operated under authoritarian political systems such as Tunisia, digital media affords a public space outside of state surveillance for political participation to challenge authoritarian regimes and advance democratic principles (Howard and Hussain 2013). In Egypt and Libya, the communication function is often facilitated by social media (Howard 2010). China offers a unique case. On the one hand, the Chinese government invests heavily in the Internet and digital media as part of its economic development. As a result, the major Chinese social networking app WeChat has reached 827.2 million users in China by 2023, which accounts for 58.9% of the total population (Oberlo 2023). On the other hand, China has built a “great firewall” and blocks most online information from outside of China. Citizen online communications are also under constant and severe surveillance, and any expression of collective action is likely to be censored by the authorities (King et al. 2013). However, second screening is a unique opportunity because the communication is instant and spontaneous, making it hard for censorship to keep up. The time gap helps enhance online expression and political participation (Chan et al. 2017).

4. The O-S-O-R Model

This paper incorporates Markus and Zajonc’s (1985) O-S-O-R framework. In the O-S-O-R model, the first O stands for “the set of structural, cultural, cognitive, and motivational characteristics the audience brings to the reception situation that affects the impact of messages (S)” or stimuli, and the second O signifies “what is likely to happen between the reception of messages and the subsequent response (R)” (McLeod et al. 1994, pp. 146–47). In this paper, we believe motivations are strong pre-orientations driving TV viewers to second or third screens. According to the literature, the two most frequently conducted task-relative second screening activities are searching for additional information and discussing the TV content (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2015). After being exposed to TV (stimulus), TV audiences comprehend and reflect on the TV content, and choose to take actions on a supplemental device to fulfill their cognitive and communicative needs triggered by the reflection or interpretations in the Chinese case. These second screening actions cause psychological changes and other post-orientations, which lead to response/behavior. Please see Figure 1 for our proposed model.

5. Motivations of Second Screening

Different people use the media for different purposes. The U&G approach believes media users are active and individuals’ media selections are driven by explicit needs (Rubin 2009). The U&G approach attempts to explain why audiences choose certain media channels and media content—what are the psychological and social motivations and the subsequent effects on their attitude and behaviors (Rubin 2009; Smock et al. 2011). Accordingly, second screening has been studied to examine (1) what and (2) how different second or higher devices and functions are used during TV watching due to (3) what motives, and with what effects (e.g., Dias and Serrano-Puche 2020; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2015).
When developing motivations for second screening, Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2015) asserted that the need for more information (surveillance) and the need to discuss (utility) were two major motivations. Surveillance has long been documented as a positive predictor of political news exposure (Eveland 2002). Based on surveys conducted in both Brazil and the United States, McGregor et al. (2017) reported the major motivation for second screening was to learn more about the TV content. Kaye and Johnson (2002) also brought up guidance (i.e., how to evaluate a political candidate) and social utility (to discuss politics with others) as two supplementary motivations. Additionally, Macafee (2013) proposed self-presentation as an important motivation for political activities on social media. Entertainment, on the other hand, is also a vital motive of political news use, but usually with negative effects (McLeod et al. 1999). By conducting qualitative interviews with over 300 TV audiences in Portugal and Spain, Dias and Serrano-Puche (2020) also identified two major motivations for multi-screening: entertainment and information.
Taking all these into account, we propose surveillance, self-presentation, utility, and entertainment as the pre-orientations for second screening, which also fit in the Chinese context (Chen and Chan 2017). All four motivations are expected to guide political participation. With surveillance, audiences are expected to gain political knowledge, and more knowledge may, in turn, increase political efficacy and participation. Utility and self-presentation should encourage online expression and discussion, which are forms of online political participation and are evidenced to raise offline participation (Jung et al. 2011). One may also argue that, even with the entertainment motivation, users may develop increased interest in the event covered, which could lead to new knowledge, engagement with other people, and possible expression. The following hypotheses are proposed:
H1. 
Surveillance is positively related to second screening activities during political TV watching.
H2. 
Utility is positively related to second screening activities during political TV watching.
H3. 
Self-presentation is positively related to second screening activities during political TV watching.
H4. 
Entertainment is positively related to second screening activities during political TV watching.

6. Second Screening’s Relationships with Political Knowledge, Internal Political Efficacy, and Political Participation

Driven by various motivations, TV audiences mainly use a complementary device to gain additional information or express their opinions (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2015). Conversations unfold simultaneously alongside TV programs during second screening. Most communication effects in political studies cluster around two main pro-democratic outcomes: increased political knowledge and participation (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). The former indicates to what extent our citizens know about the current political systems, while the latter shows how much they actually contribute.
TV audiences are not only exposed to the information on TV, but also the opinion cues on social media (Bode 2015). The discursive content during second screening is a mixture of television news, user-generated conversations and content, and elite opinion cues (Barnidge et al. 2019). Such distinctiveness is assumed to produce unique psychological, cognitive, and behavioral effects. Political news exposure is evidenced to be a strong predictor of political expression and discussion (Shah et al. 2005), and mobile devices enhance TV audiences’ capability to do so in a real-time manner. Westerman et al. (2014) discovered a positive route from the recency of a message to cognitive elaboration. It is plausible to assume the recency cues during second screening also elevate individuals’ desire to express and hence prompt online political interactions. Along this line of reasoning, TV audiences learn about politics and public affairs from the news media, which mobilize political activity (Verba et al. 1995).
The cognition mediation model (Eveland 2001) indicates how the self-reflecting process fosters better knowledge gaining. Purposeful second screening steered by particular motivations brings about a series of thinking and reflecting procedures, which are also required in the online interaction phase. Engaging in politics on social media, such as acquiring political information and expressing political perspectives, directly increases users’ political knowledge and offline participation (Vaccari et al. 2015a). Early research on the Internet and social media use also established that political discussion and civic messaging exerted mediating roles between online news exposure and political participation (Shah et al. 2005; Jung et al. 2011).
Political efficacy, on the other hand, is defined as “the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell et al. 1954, p. 187). Internal political efficacy is one dimension of political efficacy and describes the extent to which individuals believe they are capable of making changes in politics (Niemi et al. 1991). According to Kenski and Stroud (2006), media news use and interpersonal communication are two major contributors to internal political efficacy. Jung et al. (2011) also asserted that online political messaging had positive impacts on political efficacy, both directly and indirectly, through political knowledge. We believe that, during second screening, exposure to information and discussion with others increase second screeners’ efficacious belief.
H5. 
Second screening is positively related to political knowledge.
H6. 
Second screening is positively related to internal political efficacy.
H7. 
Second screening is positively related to political participation.
H8. 
Political knowledge is positively related to internal political efficacy.

7. Political Knowledge, Internal Political Efficacy, and Political Participation

As stated above, during task-relative second screening, people mainly seek additional information and discuss TV content with others on a second device (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2015). These activities lead to increased knowledge and, in turn, internal political efficacy. Internal political efficacy has been well evidenced in the literature as a positive predictor of political participation, including in most of the studies examining O-S-R-O-R models (Chan et al. 2017). With the enhanced belief that their acts can make the desired changes in politics, individuals are more likely to take action (Chen 2021; Kenski and Stroud 2006). In this study, we also assume political knowledge and internal political efficacy positively affect political participation.
H9. 
Political knowledge is positively related to political participation.
H10. 
Internal political efficacy is positively related to political participation.
Our overall O-S-O-R model aims to incorporate four phases and test the direct and indirect paths from motivations of second screening whilst watching political TV programs to cognitive and behavioral political outcomes. Moreover, by putting this examination in the Chinese context, we also intend to increase the diversity of the current literature.
H11. 
Political knowledge and internal political efficacy positively mediate the relationship between second screening and political participation.

8. Method

8.1. Sampling

An online survey was deployed during the 2018 National People’s Congress and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (also referred to as “the two conferences” in China) in Beijing, China. Held every year, the two conferences are the most important political events in China. Elected delegates from the whole country gather in Beijing, the capital of China, and attend a number of meetings in two to three weeks. During these meetings, delegates propose, discuss, debate, and vote on a series of national policies and, occasionally, even laws. The policies decided at the two conferences cover every aspect of citizens’ lives including politics, economy, diplomacy, education, health care, entrepreneurship, and technology. These policies cover issues as big as the development of the country and as detailed as the retail market prices. Chinese people’s lives are profoundly impacted by the two conferences both in short-term and long-term manners. Therefore, Chinese citizens follow the two conferences closely and discuss the decisions made at the two conferences actively online. Second screening while watching TV news and programs about the two conferences is a valuable scenario to study media use and its political outcomes in China.
In total, 332 Beijing residents completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was created via Qualtrics. Respondents were interviewed via phone by trained research assistants in the media effects lab of a major university in Beijing. All phone numbers were randomly retrieved via the Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing System. The 2018 two conferences were held from 3 March to 20 March. Our survey interviews were conducted from 15 March to 5 April 2018. According to the 2018 census in China (Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 2018), our sample generally represents the demographic attributes of Beijing residents. Please see Table 1 for a detailed description of the demographic attributes of our sample.

8.2. Measures

Descriptive data of all variables and their measurement items are listed in Table 2.
Motivations: Adapted from Kaye and Johnson’s (2002) work and Chen and Chan’s (2017) scale, four types of motivations—surveillance, utility, self-presentation, and entertainment—were developed to test why people engaged in second screening activities while watching TV news about the two conferences. Participants were asked how much they agree with the reasons they used a second screen while watching TV programs about the two conferences (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Scores were averaged for each motivation. (Surveillance, M = 3.09, SD = 1.08, ɑ = 0.93. Utility, M = 3.11, SD = 1.09, ɑ = 0.95. Self-presentation, M = 3.12, SD = 1.09, ɑ = 0.92. Entertainment, M = 3.14, SD = 1.16, ɑ = 0.89).
Second screening: The measurement items (n = 9) of second screening integrated prior to second screening studies (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2015; Giglietto and Selva 2014; Vaccari et al. 2015a) and a social media study (Hyun and Kim 2015). Items were averaged to create a score for second screening (M = 3.02, SD = 0.99, ɑ = 0.96).
Political knowledge: Ten questions closely related to some widely discussed political topics brought up during the 2018 two conferences were developed to test respondents’ level of political knowledge. The correct answer was coded as 1 and all the wrong answers were coded as 0. All scores of the ten questions were summed as the indicator of political knowledge (M = 4.47, SD = 2.31). Please see Appendix A for the political knowledge questions.
Internal Political Efficacy: Adapted from measurement items used by Hocevar et al. (2014) and Velasquez and LaRose (2015), internal political efficacy was measured by three items. Scores were averaged (M = 3.29, SD = 1.20, ɑ = 0.93).
Offline political participation: Adapted from Jung et al. (2011), five items were developed to measure offline political participation. Scores were averaged for analyses (M = 2.98, SD = 1.07, ɑ = 0.96).

9. Results

A structural equation modeling test was operated using IBM software Amos 24. The proposed model indicated the acceptable model fit (Hu and Bentler 1999): χ2(461) = 1048.6, p < 0.001, CMIN/DF = 2.28; comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.95; Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = 0.94; root-mean-squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.06; standardized root mean of the residual (SRMR) = 0.07. However, two hypothesized relationships were found to be non-significant: self-presentation and second screening (b = −0.51, p = 0.41), and entertainment and second screening (b = 0.42, p = 0.30). Self-presentation and entertainment were removed to guarantee the model validity. The revised model indicated a better model fit (Hu and Bentler 1999): χ2(323) = 765.9, p < 0.001, CMIN/DF = 2.37; comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.96; Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = 0.95; root-mean-squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.06; standardized root mean of the residual (SRMR) = 0.06. Standardized estimates of direct paths are shown in Figure 2. One relationship not shown as hypothesized was political knowledge and political participation. According to Daniel and Cross (2013), for absolute values of r, 0–0.19 is regarded as very weak, 0.2–0.39 as weak, 0.40–0.59 as moderate, 0.6–0.79 as strong, and 0.8–1 as a very strong correlation. In our case, political knowledge had negative but very weak direct effects on political participation (b = −0.09, p < 0.05). All the other direct relationships between proposed key variables were positive and significant. Surveillance (b = 0.37, p < 0.005) and utility (b = 0.42, p < 0.005) had moderate positive impacts on second screening. Second screening had relatively weak positive effects on political knowledge (b = 0.21, p < 0.001), moderate effects on political participation (b = 0.55, p < 0.001), and strong effects on internal political efficacy (b = 0.70, p < 0.001). Furthermore, political knowledge had a moderate positive relationship with internal political efficacy (b = 0.48, p < 0.05). Internal political efficacy had a weak correlation with political participation (b = 0.23, p < 0.001).
All indirect paths in the revised model were significant and positive, as listed in Table 3. It is worth noticing that the indirect path between political knowledge and political participation mediated by internal political efficacy was also significantly positive. To sum up, except for H3, H4, and H9, all of our hypotheses were supported.

10. Discussion

This study builds on previous communication and cognitive mediation theories and seeks to explore different motivations for political second screening and the mediating process of how second screening causes TV audiences’ cognitive, psychological, and behavioral changes. Such a path model including a complete mechanism is an intriguing attempt in second screening research. Furthermore, previous studies are mostly Western-orientated; our evidence adds to the literature in the case of China, a one-party authoritarian country with a distinct political system compared to Western democracies. Our results may also have theoretical implications for second screening studies in the area of political discussions and presentations.
Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2015) presented two major motivations for second screening: to discuss with others and to pursue further information. Our results confirmed their conclusion. These motivations largely explain why TV viewers simultaneously engage with the content in a virtual sphere. Self-presentation and entertainment, on the other hand, did not have any significant impact on this hybrid media use. The reason for this could be we only examined what Ran and Yamamoto (2019) defined as “task-relative” second screen use—activities relative to the TV content, which in our case is a major national political event. In this case-specified scenario, the needs for self-presentation and entertainment were not in line with the overall second screening purposes. In breaking news and live political events, the needs for information and discussion are two major motivations for the use of supplemental media devices (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2015).
In Ran and Yamamoto’s (2019) study, task-relative second screening leads to an improved factual recall. Driven by the need for additional information, second screeners’ relative knowledge is likely to increase after purposeful searching. Chen and Chan (2017) also reported that when second screeners conduct constructive involvement after information searching, such as opinion expression or discussion, they demonstrate a higher level of knowledge gaining, efficacy, and participation. Through a two-wave panel study in Hong Kong, Chen (2021) found that second screening for news enhanced people’s political expression, knowledge, efficacy, and participation. Our findings supported previous studies and showed that even in an authoritative political system, more active second screening and better relative knowledge are positively correlated.
Our findings also showed that increased knowledge positively relates to internal political efficacy. According to Bandura (2001), efficacy is not an inherent attribute of humans. Efficacy could be enhanced or impeded through living experiences, including one’s own experience or the observation of others (Bandura 2001). Our evidence suggested both second screening and political knowledge had positive impacts on internal political efficacy, and the mediating path from second screening to internal political efficacy through political knowledge was also significant. Citizens gain more confidence in taking action and making changes in politics when they are more knowledgeable, and goal-oriented second screening contributes to this. In the Chinese context, this is even more meaningful, in that increased knowledge allows citizens to have a better understanding of political context and to be more active in political expressions that are otherwise unavailable in other platforms.
However, the direct path from political knowledge to offline participation is negative. This is one of the findings that points to the need to extend second screen research to other political systems and other non-Western contexts. In a democracy, political knowledge contributes to confidence and, possibly, subsequent action offline. In an authoritative system such as China, more political knowledge may directly increase efficacy, as we discuss below, but it may not translate directly into political behavior, as such ostensible action may lead to attention and possible prosecution if seen as being deviant from the official line.
Both political knowledge and internal political efficacy were significant mediators between second screening and political participation, despite political knowledge’s negative direct relationship with political participation. When mediated by internal political efficacy, political knowledge positively affected offline participation. The overall paths from surveillance and utility to second screening, to political knowledge and internal political efficacy, and eventually to political participation, were also significant. Both the communication mediation model and the cognitive mediation model argue that efficacy and knowledge play important mediating roles in orienting media use to participatory behaviors. Liu et al. (2021) also claimed that different types of second screening activities lead to offline participation when mediated by internal political efficacy. Second screening helps TV audiences to gain relative knowledge and become involved in interactive and expressive online activities. These activities, combined with augmented knowledge, prompt individuals’ efficacy, which, in turn, mobilize participatory democracy, albeit in the second screening context.
Our findings also support the O-S-O-R model and add to the literature on the model in a Chinese context. Most of our proposed variables have been extensively tested in the Western contexts, in which similar democracy systems operate. Some scholars tested how second screening affects public affair participation in developing countries such as Columbia (Barnidge et al. 2019), but China is an authoritarian one-party state known for the central government’s tight control and censorship over the media, including the virtual sphere (Chan et al. 2017). Scholars are mostly pessimistic while judging the development of citizenry in China, especially the role of media in this process. Chinese media is believed to be incapable of informing citizens properly or engendering civic engagement (Chen and Chan 2017). However, social media still create a relatively “free” discursive space, which has been evidenced to produce pro-democratic outcomes (Chen 2014). As stated above, second screening is not a simple extension of TV viewing or social media interaction. Whether it has the potential to bypass the elite discourse and mainstream censorship in China, and reverse the top-down communication process, in addition to the way that this affects Chinese citizens politically, remains under-explored. This study may contribute seminal evidence to our understanding of this subject. As such, studying second screening in an authoritarian regime is important for comprehending the ways in which individuals navigate the media landscape, exercise agency, and seek alternative interpretations, sources of information, and perspectives. In a larger context, it sheds light on the evolving media ecosystem and its implications for freedom of expression, civic engagement, and the flow of information in an authoritarian context.
Participatory media technologies have altered the experiences of both traditional media exposure and interactions on social media. During second screening, traditional and newer media logic intertwines within TV audiences’ experiences (Chadwick 2017). Scholars claimed that the use of social media apps while watching TV positively mediates TV news’ effects on both conventional political participation (e.g., voting) and activism (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021). Our empirical evidence addresses the pressing questions, including how digital communication technology is impacting the role of traditional media in liberal democracy development and how we understand theoretically the procedure of media political effects.
There are also several limitations of this study, and we present suggestions for future research. First, compared to our cross-sectional survey, data collected from panel studies, in which second screening data are collected at time 1 and the mediating and outcome variable data are collected at time 2, would be more appropriate to explain media effects and establish possible causal relationships. Second, this study relied on self-reported answers, which could be biased as respondents may not be able to express themselves precisely, or may even lie intentionally. In an authoritative regime such as China, the situation could be worse because people are afraid of getting into trouble. An experiment will be more suitable to test the possible causal relations between second screening and political outcomes. Third, more key factors, such as online expression, interpersonal discussion, and online messaging, could be included to further explore the pathways of second screening’s political effects. The O-S-O-R or O-S-R-O-R model in the second screening context is worth scrutiny at multiple levels. The reason for this is that second screening is not simple media exposure but, instead, a bundle of practices including information acquiring, elaboration, expression, and discussion. More integrated models testing possible mediators are suggested, especially in different political systems. Finally, nationwide samples are encouraged to generate more representative data. For future studies, it is noteworthy that negative consequences caused by second screening also exist. For example, topics related to disasters, health, and politics are believed to be main domains of social media misinformation (Muhammed and Mathew 2022). The fast pace of information gathering and discussion during second screening may reduce the audiences’ chance to verify or check facts. Furthermore, people may approach second screening with a hedonic mindset, which leads to repetitive exposure to content that coincides with their pre-existing beliefs, also known as the echo-chamber effect (Cerf 2016). The censorship in China allows government algorithms on social media to enhance this effect (Tiwana et al. 2010). Therefore, more second screening may result in more biased beliefs.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization: Y.L.; Methodology: Y.L., H.Z.; Formal analysis and investigation: Y.L., S.Z.; Writing—original draft preparation: Y.L.; Writing—review and editing: S.Z.; Resources: H.Z.; Supervision: S.Z. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

  • “The two conferences” refers to the National People’s Congress and what conference?
  • In China, the only organization possessing the legislation right is?
  • What is Hu Chunhua’s current position?
  • Who is the current chairman of Chinese People’s Political Consultation?
  • An agency was established in March 2018 to enhance the party’s leadership in anti-corruption work. This organization incorporates the functions of local supervision departments and inspection agencies. What is the name of this agency?
  • Proposed in the 2018 Chinese Government Annual Report, mobile phone service fees will be reduced by how many percent?
  • Proposed by Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council, the individual income tax will be applied to individuals with a minimum monthly income of how many yuan?
  • Chairman Xi Jinping gave a speech at the closing ceremony of the 13th National People’s Congress. In this speech, a word had been mentioned 84 times. The media claims this word represents the core of the party’s leadership. What is the word?
  • People with what identity are not eligible to be an official of Chinese People’s Political Consultation?
  • What is the main function of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference?

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Journalmedia 04 00054 g001
Figure 1. Proposed integrated model.
Figure 1. Proposed integrated model.
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Journalmedia 04 00054 g002
Figure 2. Revised path model. Note. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Figure 2. Revised path model. Note. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Journalmedia 04 00054 g002
Table 1. Sample descriptive data.
Table 1. Sample descriptive data.
Gender
Male46.1%
Female53.9%
Age
Below 205.7%
20–2934.3%
30–3936.7%
40–4918.1%
50–593.9%
Above 601.2%
Final Education Level
Elementary school2.2%
Junior high school11.4%
High school30.2%
Junior college27.5%
Bachelor degree and above28.7%
Monthly Income
None8.7%
500–1499 (in RMB)13.3%
1500–499943.4%
5000–999925.6%
10,000–14,9996.6%
15,000 and above2.4%
Table 2. Descriptive data of measurement items.
Table 2. Descriptive data of measurement items.
VariablesMeasurement ItemsMSDɑ
MotivationsI used a second screen while watching TV programs about “the two conferences” to … [1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree]
Surveillance… gain additional information of the topic.3.091.080.93
… gain extra knowledge about the topic.
… know the latest development of the event.
… know other peoples’ opinions on the topic.
Utility… discuss the topic in the private setting (with friends, family, or other individuals).3.111.090.95
… discuss the topic in the official setting (official forums, discussion boards, discussion sections of official social media accounts, etc.).
… try to “talk” to the political officials directly by leaving comments or sending message to their social media accounts.
… encourage other individuals to express their opinions.
… try to guide other individuals’ opinions.
Self-presentation… reflect on my own thinking via learning new information and discussing with others.3.121.090.92
… express my opinions on the issues.
… present myself.
Entertainment… make the TV viewing more interesting.3.141.160.89
… entertain myself by looking at the funny comments, memes, etc.
Second ScreeningPlease indicate how often you do the following activities using a second screen while watching news about “the two conferences” on TV. [1 = never; 5 = very frequently]3.020.990.96
Search for more information about what I’m watching.
Get additional knowledge about what I’m watching
Search for others’ opinions and thoughts.
Get information about how others react to programs or events I’m watching.
React or comment on what others have posted.
Repost content related to news or programs that was originally posted by someone else.
Encourage others to act.
Express my views and opinions related to what I’m watching.
Express emotions and feelings that I have while watching.
Internal Political Efficacy How much do you agree with the following statements? [1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree]3.291.200.93
I believe my opinions could make impacts on the government’s decisions.
I believe I am capable of participating in political activities.
I know about current political issues very well.
Political participation Please indicate how often during the past 3 months you have engaged in the following activities? [1 = Never; 5 = Very often]2.981.070.96
Voted in campaigns and elections.
Participated in political advertising such as displaying campaign banners, stickers, slogans, and so on.
Attended political meetings.
Attended political rallies.
Donated money to or volunteered in political organizations.
Interacted with political officials or organizations in real life (e.g., writing a letter, speaking) to express your needs and views.
Table 3. Indirect effects of perceived technological attributes on Internet political efficacy through second screening.
Table 3. Indirect effects of perceived technological attributes on Internet political efficacy through second screening.
95% Bootstrap CI
Indirect PathsbSELower LimitUpper Limit
Surveillance 🡪 Second Screening 🡪 Knowledge 🡪 Efficacy 🡪 Offline Participation0.270.110.040.50
Utility 🡪 Second Screening 🡪 Knowledge 🡪Efficacy 🡪 Offline Participation0.310.110.070.50
Second Screening 🡪 Knowledge 🡪 Efficacy 🡪 Offline Participation0.140.050.050.24
Knowledge 🡪 Efficacy 🡪 Offline Participation0.030.010.0020.02
Note. Estimates were calculated using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes in 2013. CI = confidence interval. CIs are based on the bootstrapping of 5000 samples. N = 332.
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MDPI and ACS Style

Liu, Y.; Zhou, S.; Zhang, H. Motivations, Knowledge, Efficacy, and Participation: An O-S-O-R Model of Second Screening’s Political Effects in China. Journal. Media 2023, 4, 861-875. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia4030054

AMA Style

Liu Y, Zhou S, Zhang H. Motivations, Knowledge, Efficacy, and Participation: An O-S-O-R Model of Second Screening’s Political Effects in China. Journalism and Media. 2023; 4(3):861-875. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia4030054

Chicago/Turabian Style

Liu, Yiben, Shuhua Zhou, and Hongzhong Zhang. 2023. "Motivations, Knowledge, Efficacy, and Participation: An O-S-O-R Model of Second Screening’s Political Effects in China" Journalism and Media 4, no. 3: 861-875. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia4030054

APA Style

Liu, Y., Zhou, S., & Zhang, H. (2023). Motivations, Knowledge, Efficacy, and Participation: An O-S-O-R Model of Second Screening’s Political Effects in China. Journalism and Media, 4(3), 861-875. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia4030054

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