Nationalism and Global Citizenship in the Face of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Addressing Inequality and Fostering “Glo-Ubuntu” Citizenship

Abstract

This article examines how the COVID-19 pandemic exposed and intensified global inequalities, particularly through the lens of vaccine distribution, thereby challenging the ideals of global citizenship. While the pandemic highlighted humanity’s interconnectedness and shared vulnerability, the unequal access to vaccines and resources revealed enduring structural disparities between nations. Drawing on a review of the existing literature from three national contexts, this study critiques the limitations of global citizenship as a framework for addressing such inequalities. In response, it proposes “glo-ubuntu citizenship”—a reimagined concept rooted in African philosophy and the idea of shared humanity—as a more culturally grounded and ethically responsive approach. This model blends the global and local dimensions of citizenship while emphasizing solidarity and mutual care. The article argues that while glo-ubuntu citizenship is not without its challenges, it holds greater potential than conventional models for fostering equity in global health governance and guiding more inclusive responses to future crises.

1. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic swept across the globe and wreaked havoc on states throughout the world, including nearly seven million deaths and over 777,000,000 reported cases as of 2 February 2025 [1]. In addition to the loss of life, the pandemic caused severe disruptions in the global supply chain, curtailed mobility, and resulted in a deepening economic crisis at the local, national, regional and global levels [2,3]. While the pandemic affected the entire world regardless of geography or socio-economic status, the extent and depth of pandemic was felt very differently depending on the location and status [4,5]. Many governments implemented restrictive and deglobalizing measures such as closing borders and imposing internal lockdown measures to prevent and contain the spread of the virus [6,7]. The speed with which the virus spread and the devastating consequences of the pandemic raised questions about the fragility of globalization and the ability of our global institutions to respond to deadly infectious diseases [8]. Yet, simultaneously, the pandemic served as a stark reminder to humanity of our interconnectedness [9]. Thus, the pandemic has underscored the need to rethink our concepts of globalization, citizenship, and sovereignty around which our global economic and governance systems are based.

Globalization is a highly contested concept both in terms of definitions as well as its effects [10]. In general, however, most definitions tend towards that offered by Swedish journalist Thomas Larsson: “[globalization] is the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving closer. It pertains to the increasing ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on the other side of the world” [11] (p. 9). This “shrinkage” can be cultural, economic, political, or, in the case of pandemics, epidemiological. The implication of this interconnectedness is a decrease in nationally oriented politics and identity and an increase towards that which exists at the cosmopolitan level, thus resulting in a globally oriented and idealistic (albeit less legally oriented) concept of global citizenship.

Partly as a result of hyper-globalization, which facilitated knowledge transfer regarding vaccine development and was supported by preexisting immunization campaigns through institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO), scientists were able to develop a safe and effective vaccine in record time [12,13]. Unfortunately, the pandemic also laid bare the preexisting structural inequalities and precarious conditions that characterize health systems at the local, national, and international levels [14,15,16,17]. Indeed, these inequalities are deeply enmeshed in the broader structure of globalization itself. There is no better example of the delicate relationship between globalization and nationalism than in the unequal and highly nationalistic approach taken by many states with regard to vaccine distribution [18]. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Director-General of the WHO, underscored this fact during the Special Meeting on ‘A Vaccine For All’ in 2021, arguing that “vaccine nationalism is not just morally indefensible; it is epidemiologically self-defeating and clinically counterproductive” [19]. Vaccine nationalism involves strategies such as early purchasing agreements or export controls, rather than supporting a globally coordinated response [20]. To press home this assertion, Dr. Ghebreyesus inferred that out of the 832 million vaccine doses administered, 82 percent were sent to high- or upper-middle-income countries, while only 0.2 percent were allocated to low-income countries. This means that in high-income countries, one in four people were vaccinated in 2021, while in poorer countries, the ratio dropped to one in five hundred.

To respond to this inequity, the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) facility was launched in April 2020 to ensure equal access to vaccines and diagnostics for all countries. (COVAX is a collaboration including the WHO; Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), UNICEF, the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the European Commission, among others.) Although COVAX eventually distributed 2 billion doses in over 146 countries by the time it closed in December of 2023, the slow distribution of doses in the early phases of the project was largely due to its approach of buying vaccines on the open market, resulting in direct competition with rich countries [21,22]. The hoarding of vaccines adopted by Western countries during the height of the pandemic not only risked prolonging the pandemic but also accelerated the retreat by the wealthy states away from the so-called liberal world order characterized by globalization and cooperative common institutions [23,24,25,26]. Therefore, it seems that COVID-19, along with several concomitant phenomena, brought into question the very tenets of the concept of global citizenship.

Thus, while the concept of global citizenship emerged in the late 1990s, the current challenges to the globalized world as exemplified by the pandemic have sparked a renewed scholarly interest in the international dimension of citizenship [27]. Researchers have explored issues such as the rights and obligations of citizens in a globalized world, the impact of transnational networks on citizenship practices, and the role of international organizations in shaping citizenship norms and policies. This growing body of research reflects a recognition that citizenship is not just a legal definition in reference to a particular nation-state but also a complex and evolving set of practices and identities shaped by global forces [28,29]. Global citizenship thus emphasizes both the increasingly complex and transnational character of citizenship as well as the moral responsibilities of individuals in a global context [30]. Global citizenship requires us to think beyond our national borders and consider the impact of our choices and actions on people and the environment worldwide [31].

Yet nationalist tendencies represent a strong counterweight to global citizenship and continue to shape political, economic, and social structures [32,33]. This was particularly evident during the pandemic. In light of both nationalism and the continued primacy of the sovereign nation-state in world politics, it is not altogether surprising that governments prioritized their own citizens during the pandemic. Indeed, the social contract theory of the state is founded on the idea that governments provide safety and security to its people in exchange for obedience and order [34]. Still, it is equally important to recognize the weakness of this model, especially in the face of problems that, by their very nature, do not respect national borders or legal distinctions, as displayed so starkly in the wake of COVID-19. Here, the value of global citizenship and the need for collective efforts in combating common problems is just as stark. Yet, at the same time, vaccine distribution demonstrated how quickly a globalized world can retreat to its sovereign borders, thus undermining the whole globalism project. Further, it is not clear whether some alternative model of governance, with the concept of global citizenship at its foundation, would have achieved better results.

In light of these challenges, a handful of scholars, particularly those from the Global South, have responded by examining a crucial missing link in the nationalism–globalism debate in the context of COVID-19: the local [35,36,37,38]. Indeed, most of the mandates put forth by both international organizations as well as by nation-states had to be carried out by local governments as well as other informal communities [39]. Beyond public health mandates, support systems to connect people to critical services such as transportation and food delivery were often driven by locally organized networks, especially in the Global South [40]. Beyond COVID-19, scholars are only recently grappling with the often contradictory push and pull forces that both globalization and national politics exert on local communities [41]. Still, it remains unclear how local identities can be theorized without erasing global responsibility and consciousness.

What is clear, however, is that there are serious weaknesses in both global and national governance models; thus, new theories of governance that recognize the continued power of nationalism while balancing global, moral responsibilities without undermining the crucial role of local identities and support systems must be developed. To this aim, this article questions the relevance of the global and national citizen within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic by critically examining three divergent case studies with regard to vaccine distribution: the United States, Germany, and China. This case selection is meant to compare three different views on the relationship between the nation-state and globalization: the US as driven primarily by national interests, China as driven by its identity as a “leader” of the non-Western world, and Germany as a middle player driven by both national interests and its identity as a moral leader in the Western world. This discussion reveals that not only is the local a crucially under-theorized concept in the national-globalism debate, but, more importantly, a particular kind of local theorizing is also needed: that of the Global South. This article then goes on to offer an alternative concept rooted in Pan-African philosophy that allows scholars to bring in local identities while acknowledging the humanity that connects us all: glo-ubuntu.

2. Brief Methodological Note

The data analyzed for this article came from a desk review of existing academic and non-academic research publications and datasets, including quantitative and qualitative statistics and administrative data at the national, regional, and supranational levels. A narrative literature review is employed to examine the data to provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges facing global citizenship in the context of the pandemic. We chose to focus our investigation on three carefully chosen cases: the US, Germany, and China. Our case selection represents three distinct strategies around vaccine acquisition and sharing, which are derived in part by each country’s self-identity as well as its approach to citizenship. Although all three (and governments generally) focused on securing vaccines for their own citizens, as one would expect in a world governed exclusively by nation-states, some also contributed to more solidaristic approaches, such as global distribution efforts through COVAX and other humanitarian initiatives [33].

When aiming to design an operational comparison to examine the effects of vaccine nationalism and its link to concepts of citizenship, it is firstly important to discuss the most relevant players in global vaccine distribution and their capabilities. Larger economies inherently have more capability to produce and deliver vaccines. Such nations include the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan, as well as several powerful EU countries and the UK [42,43]. The choice between isolationism and cooperation had a major impact on health outcomes globally, which informs the case selection taken here: We strategically focused on countries whose strategies were globally influential but distinct from one another in their nationalism, effectiveness, and reception. The US, Germany, and China were selected due to their common ability to have a direct effect on health outcomes worldwide due to their economic and political power. However, each state is distinctive in its governance structures, which can be traced to different identities and approaches to citizenship and globalization. This interplay of national identity, views on globalization and citizenship, and resulting political systems provided three important and distinct approaches to vaccine distribution. While the US adopted an initially nationalistic stance, prioritizing American access to vaccines [44,45], Germany, as part of the European Union, leaned more toward a balanced approach between collective action and self-interest [42,45]. China’s response blended domestic vaccine prioritization with a “vaccine diplomacy” strategy that extended its influence globally [46]. Examining these three cases in a comparative framework is by no means meant to be an exhaustive analysis of dominant vaccine producers but offers important insights into how varying political, economic, and cultural priorities shaped the national responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

3. Global Citizenship, Globalization, and the Continuing Appeal of Nationalism

The state, nationalism, and citizenship have a long, complex, and intertwined history [47]. Max Weber provides the most widely recognized definition of the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” [48]. Political scientists trace the modern state to the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. (It should be noted that this standard narrative of the origins of the modern nation-state has recently come under deep scrutiny. Scholars, such as Osiander, Axworthy, and Milton, discuss how this “Westphalian myth” reinforces a common Eurocentric bias in political science that the West “invented” the modern state [49,50].) This marked the beginning of the end of imperialism and the consolidation of empires into sovereign, territorially bound states that eventually consolidated around national identities synonymous with national citizenship [51]. Nationalism is yet another contested concept, but generally, scholars understand modern nationalism to be an identity that aligns with the polity, thus fusing the national and political units [52]. Benedict Anderson famously added a psychological dimension to nationalism, noting that nations are “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” [53]. Finally, citizenship typically denotes a person’s relation to a polity, characterized by its laws and customs governing their lives, giving them a legal status differentiated from non-citizens, and, depending on the system of governance, certain rights of participation in determining the polity’s affairs. Therefore, citizenship typically contains dimensions of membership, rights, and participation [47,54]. Citizenship became a key differentiation that legally and socially reinforces newly established physical borders that separate members and non-members in an evolving nation-state [55].

3.1. Citizenship in Antiquity

The earliest accounts of citizenship are found in the ancient Greek city-states, with the prime example being Athens, where political participation was the key element of citizenship. Membership was quite exclusive along the lines of gender, economic status, and heritage, in that only men of Athenian origin with enough wealth to sustain themselves were given access to the “politeia” [47,56].

In the Roman Republic, the conception of citizenship shifted towards a focus on legal status and protection. Roman citizens, particularly those in the elite classes, held certain legal rights, distinguishing them from slaves and foreigners, such as the right to a trial. This legal equality enabled factions within Rome to balance their members’ interests, which is still the basis of democratic interaction today [47,56]. The Roman Empire expanded the idea of citizenship beyond the city-state and introduced a more inclusive approach to membership, offering citizenship to various conquered peoples to secure loyalty and manage an expanding territory. This broadened sense of citizenship laid the early foundations for modern statehood, although the empire lacked a unified national identity typical of modern nation-states, as people retained regional “citizenships” relevant for partaking in local decision-making processes [47].

3.2. Modern Citizenship

In modern social science, especially political science, Marshall’s 1950 work “Citizenship and Social Class” serves as the basis for understanding citizenship and its dynamic nature [57]. He argued that citizenship emerged over time and with different aspects dominating at various stages of the UK’s modern history. From the 18th to the 20th century, he first observed the development of civil rights, followed by political rights and finally social rights that extended to citizens [57]. Marshall’s model suggests that full citizenship entails an interlinked set of civil, political, and social rights, which together provide individuals not only with legal protection and opportunity to contribute to governance but also enable a quality of life supported by social institutions, which in turn allows for the realization of the other types of rights.

This sequence of rights reflects a historical progression where each phase aimed to rectify inequalities in society, thereby creating a more inclusive notion of citizenship. As many critics pointed out, however, this logic is only narrowly applicable, as it relates to the British case and specifically to adult men, with women and children receiving “social rights” first instead of civil and political rights in many cases [58].

As Marshall, Gellner, and Anderson all envisage, nationality and citizenship become nearly interchangeable by the mid-20th century [53,57,59]. This process is intimately linked to the solidification of the modern nation-state, with its origins in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which established sovereignty as the basis for a legitimate government over a given territory and the people within that territory. As governmental power becomes more centralized over a clearly defined area, citizenship becomes a necessary part of this system to differentiate the government and the land to which individuals belong.

However, Westphalia leaves open the question as to how citizenship is acquired, and as sovereignty consolidated throughout the 18th and 19th centuries on the European continent, various models of citizenship emerge. For example, the French conception of citizenship is based on linguistics and culture, while the German conception is based on ethnicity. Regardless, citizenship increasingly became linked to national identity, and an implicit expectation of cultural and often ethnic homogeneity within these newly consolidated territories developed. To be a citizen was to belong to a nation defined by shared history, language, and cultural symbols [60]. This is in sharp contrast to pre-Westphalian criteria for membership in a political community; city-states and empires often absorbed any number of ethnic and linguistic groups. This identity-based citizenship structure often meant that immigrants and minority groups faced significant barriers to full membership, as national belonging was tied to ethnic or linguistic heritage [61]. Ethnically exclusive models of citizenship have remained influential in many contemporary states, while others have since moved towards more inclusive models based on multiculturalism or cultural assimilation [62].

Koopmans and Statham developed a model that systematizes the varying dimensions of national citizenship across countries, offering a framework to categorize and understand the nuances of national approaches to integration and membership [63]. They first distinguish ethnic- and civic-territorial citizenship, which examines whether access to citizenship is based on ethnic descent or territorial birth and residency, which correlates to more restricted or inclusive pathways to citizenship, respectively. Secondly, citizenship may be articulated in terms of cultural monism and pluralism, which address the extent to which countries enforce cultural uniformity. Cultural monism requires conformity to a dominant national identity, while pluralism allows or encourages cultural diversity within the nation. The Koopmans and Statham model highlights that citizenship is never static but is shaped by the policies and cultural narratives that define a society’s sense of identity and inclusion. One might argue that the respective national approach to citizenship would coincide with differing attitudes towards “post-national” conceptions of citizenship as well, especially when globalization challenges preconceived notions of the nation’s role [64].

3.3. Post-National Conceptions of Citizenship and Glo-Ubuntu

Since the 20th century and increasingly in its latter half, economic and cultural globalization is changing perceptions and ideas of what citizenship means or could mean [63,65]. It is in this period that the concepts of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship emerge. While cosmopolitanism became the philosophical underpinning of global citizenship in this period, it should be noted that the idea stems from the ancient Greek for “citizen of the world”. It originally derived from Diogenes and was elaborated upon by the stoic philosophers who aspired to transcend the traditional boundaries of the polis and live by egalitarian notions of wisdom and goodness defined by natural law over political law. Cosmopolitanism finds expression in a variety of political, philosophical, and religious veins throughout the centuries, as various thinkers grappled with their own age of globalization as trade routes deepened and the values of enlightenment conflicted with colonization. Throughout these periods, cosmopolitan thinkers largely argued for concepts such as universal brotherhood, boundless migration, and global philanthropy [66].

Modern conceptions of cosmopolitanism may be divided into several categories, distinguished by the balance they strike between boundless universalism and more fixed local identities. Moral cosmopolitans, most notably represented by Thomas Pogge, argue that the state cannot be the sole source of justice [67]. Ethical cosmopolitans, such as Martha Nussbaum, focus on the value of education in fostering young people with a sense of universal goals and a duty to the whole human community, albeit with little attention to personal, familial, cultural, or national identities [68]. (It should be noted that while Nussbaum is often associated with cosmopolitanism, her work in 2007 makes it clear that her stance should be thought of merely as an aspect of cosmopolitanism and that her “capabilities approach” is a much more minimalistic political doctrine rather than a comprehensive ethical doctrine [68]. Furthermore, in another later work, Nussbaum explicitly rejects cosmopolitanism in favor of “globally sensitive patriotism”, in which fervently nationalist states harness their patriotic passion to pursue justice both internally and globally [69].) A broad debate took place in response to several global crises in the early 1990s, mostly amongst European scholars, and hinged on the idea of cosmopolitan democracy, influenced largely by Jürgen Habermas [70]. Rooted cosmopolitans attempt to reconcile a desire for moral obligations to those beyond national borders while also celebrating local ties [71]. Bikhu Parekh also tries to reconcile this balance between the local and global by distinguishing between cosmopolitanism and global citizenship, emphasizing that while cosmopolitanism is primarily an abstract ethical stance and risks being too devoid of political and cultural character, global (or “globally oriented”) citizenship involves practical political engagement in transnational issues from originally local or even national viewpoints [72].

3.4. Global South Perspectives

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Global South perspectives in the literature often most closely align with the “rooted cosmopolitan” approach, as states in this region are seeking a form of decolonial cosmopolitanism or conviviality beyond the nation-state [73]. While there are a plethora of theories throughout the literature that attempt to conceptualize this balance between rootedness, cosmopolitanism, and marginalization, which is perhaps the best encapsulation in the concept of Ubuntu. Originating in Nguni Bantu languages throughout Southern Africa, it is often loosely translated to English as “I am because we are”. More specifically,

“[…] that refers to human interdependence and humanness and, as such, constitutes a philosophical approach to human interaction. […] Ubuntu views the world as a complex and interdependent ecosystem of humans, nature, and the planet, in which all elements are supposed to coexist in harmony”

[73] (p. 155).

Importantly, the moral argument put forth by Ubuntu is not a universalizing view of humanity in the vein of moral and ethical cosmopolitanism above. Rather, it is embedded in various Bantu and other African philosophies, but it also refers to a collective value of reconciliation and “humanity to others”. Thus, it attempts to bridge the local with the global by “explaining collective self without rejecting self-being” [74] (p. 44).

Similarly, Chandhoke argues that post-colonial thinkers such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Kwame Nkrumah, the first respective leaders of their countries upon independence from colonial control, rightly challenged the Eurocentric concept of a “global citizen” that turns away from local affiliations and blood ties [75]. Instead, they favor a globally oriented sense of solidarity rooted in the worldwide decolonial movement and also in the resurrection of local, pre-colonial, and authentic identities that are both nationalist in their quest for independence and post-nationalist in their search for cosmopolitan justice. To this end, she anchors Pan-Africanism within the larger framework of “rooted cosmopolitanism”.

Similarly, Mosima locates Pan-Africanism as a particular type of radical cosmopolitanism, despite the failures and limitations this concept has faced in forging a post-colonial African identity [76]. In a contemporary reimagination of Pan-Africanism, such an identity is not only rooted in African communities and traditions but also transcends it in reaching out to the diaspora as well as other decolonial peoples and states beyond the continent. Such approaches seek to bridge the local, state, nation, and region, without having to shed these vital identities, while also attempting to reconcile genuine concerns for international human rights with the reality of the racialized world order. Thus, it seems that a framework drawing on the concepts of Ubuntu, Pan-Africanism, and rooted cosmopolitanism may provide a positive path forward for the Global South in facing global challenges such as COVID-19.

3.5. Nationalist Resurgence

Despite these approaches growing in popularity, there is another important dimension to consider. Nationalist backlash against globalization is on the rise, specifically as a reaction to the increasing rates of immigration into highly developed economies [77]. This has resulted in the rise in far-right parties and leaders, especially in the Global North [33]. Parekh’s critique of cosmopolitanism offers a possible explanation: nationalism, especially its more exclusionary form and not the revolutionary sort that inspired philosophies such as Pan-Africanism, is a response to the perceived threat of cultural dilution and the loss of control that sovereign states are supposed to maintain within their territory [72]. Parekh argues that individuals feel a need to belong to a stable community with shared values and traditions, and globalization threatens this desire. Additionally, others such as Forst argue that economic globalization has led to anxieties and inequalities, which nationalists exploit to rally support against both external influences and internal diversity [78].

The resurgence of nationalism reflects a broader crisis of identity, where the nation-state tries to reassert itself as a protective entity against the forces of global change and their perceived dangers [60]. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the policies adopted to stem the tide of the virus were actually quite convenient to latent nationalist and authoritarian sentiments, especially in the Global North, such as strict border control measures and even strict controls over internal movement [79]. Hence, the pandemic likely contributed to the legitimation of hyper-nationalism justified by the idea of caring for “one’s own” at the expense of global solidarity [80,81]. Examining one such phenomenon, vaccine nationalism, is the aim of the following section.

3.6. Vaccine Nationalism and the Demise of Global Citizenship

Governments initially invested billions in research and development for COVID-19 vaccines, often partnering with or subsidizing private companies to ensure rapid availability for their populations [82]. These investments were mainly taken by financially powerful Global North nations, as others were unable to. This heavy financial investment was used as a justification for the later hoarding of the vaccine and the prioritization of domestic populations over global distribution, particularly in the US [83]. States faced increasing pressure to act quickly in protecting their citizens by developing and securing vaccines, as well as implementing border controls and other restrictions. This tension gave rise to “vaccine nationalism”, a term that encapsulates the competitive and often insular approaches taken by powerful nations to secure vaccines for their own populations, often at the expense of equitable global distribution [82,84]. “Vaccine nationalism” is the practice of countries prioritizing the procurement and distribution of vaccines and medicines for their own citizens over those of less wealthy nations. To illustrate, prior to the completion of Phase III clinical trials for the COVID-19 vaccines, wealthy countries such as the United States and the European Union had already secured large quantities of the vaccines that appeared to be the most promising [20]. Unfortunately, vaccine nationalism is not a new phenomenon and has been observed during previous health crises [23]. It is an ethically questionable practice where high-income nations prioritize their own population’s access to vaccines, neglecting the needs of poorer countries. This can have severe consequences, especially in the midst of a global pandemic, as it hinders the efforts to achieve global herd immunity and puts many vulnerable populations at risk. The impact of vaccine nationalism is far-reaching, exacerbating global health inequities, prolonging the pandemic, and fostering conditions for new COVID-19 variants to emerge [85].

Wealthy nations’ monopolization of vaccine supplies (see

Table 1. Case selection comparison (see [87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100]).

Country	US 2021	US 2023	Germany 2021	Germany 2023	China 2021	China 2023
Population	337 m	340 m	83.4 m	83.3 m	1.425.9 bn	1.425.76 bn
GDP	23.6 tn	27.36 tn	4.28 tn	4.46 tn	17.82 tn	17.8 tn
Vaccination Rate	62%	70%	71%	76%	83.6%	87%
Doses pledged	1.1 bn	1.1 bn	175 m	175 m	850 m (incl. sales)	2 bn (incl. sales)
Doses delivered	272 m	687 m	24 m	122 m	89 m	170 m/1.653 bn

below) hindered the efficacy of international mechanisms like the COVAX initiative. While immensely important in combatting the pandemic in the Global South, the program fell short of promises made and meeting needs [43]. Furthermore, vaccine nationalism contributed to strained diplomatic relations, with some countries leveraging vaccines as political tools. For example, the EU accused the UK of hoarding millions of doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine, leading the European Union to briefly consider invoking Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol in an extension of post-Brexit tension and a temporary diplomatic crisis threatening the open border policy at the core of the Good Friday Agreement [86].

These developments contributed significantly to preexisting and intensifying anti-globalization and hyper-nationalist sentiments, thus eroding the promise of global citizenship even further. Ultimately, the liberal rules-based order could not withstand the Westphalian governance model grounded in competition and self-interest over cooperation and solidarity. Wealthier nations sidelined global citizenship and cosmopolitanism in favor of domestic priorities. Even in the European Union, a codified institution meant to promote cooperation and post-national citizenship, vaccines became diplomatic in the service of classic realpolitik. These patterns deepened mistrust, fueled anti-globalization sentiment, and exposed the fragility of global citizenship as an operative ideal in moments of crisis. We now explore these dynamics further, using the comparative framework as outlined in Section 2 (brief methodological note).

4. Comparative Analysis

4.1. The United States

The United States was covered and criticized extensively by both the scholarly literature and the non-academic media for its heavy focus on national protection over foreign aid. Beaton et al. describes how the US, then still under the first Trump administration, made deals with pharmaceutical companies to purchase an antiviral drug, as well as hijacked the supply of medical equipment, going so far as to ban exports of N-95 masks even to American allies such as Canada [44]. This is in line with the exclusive form of nationalism Bieber observed as a general tendency in the actions of North American and European actors [33]. Apart from the pre-vaccine actions taken by the US discussed above, once vaccination began, domestic coverage was prioritized over foreign at-risk groups, with 15.1 million doses expiring from March to August 2021 alone amid excess demand [84]. He and Chen argue that the American strategy in vaccine research and development was nationalistic as well as motivated by geopolitical considerations such as positioning itself in opposition to other major players such as China [42]. The US administration discredited Chinese developments and refused to participate in jointly funded research projects with the EU or those headed by the WHO [101].

What the US did do, especially once their domestic population’s vaccination distribution was underway, was pledge and deliver large numbers of doses to COVAX and other schemes such as the newly revived “Quad”, a strategic alliance between the US, India, Japan, and Australia aimed at countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region [102]. (The Quad’s COVID-19 strategy was aimed at distributing vaccines primarily manufactured in India with US financing, foreign assistance from Japan, and logistical support from Australia. This was largely seen as a “thinly veiled attempt to combat China’s vaccine diplomacy”; thus, while the initiative was able to deliver over 200 million doses in the Indo-Pacific region while also supporting a Global South economy, its primary target was playing realpolitik vis-à-vis China [102]). The fact that vaccine distribution became intertwined with a classic collective defense alliance demonstrates how nationalist self-interest was the primary consideration. The Quad pledged over a billion doses between various vaccine delivery frameworks, delivering just over 40 percent of those until the end of 2022 [43]. This quota is low as compared to their EU counterparts; however, in absolute terms, the US is still the leading vaccine donor. One may see these actions as evidence of a semi-nationalist strategy that, once immediate domestic coverage was secured, could be supplemented with foreign aid in a charitable setup that still mostly kept vaccine production and patents with US companies [43].

Lastly, the effect of the Biden administration taking over the US pandemic response in 2021 is relevant, as the Democratic Party may have had different incentives as compared to the right-wing nationalist Republicans [33]. Still, while Biden’s party may be somewhat less nationalist in its ideology, many of Biden’s important COVID-19 responses were still very much aimed at protecting Americans first. For example, he invoked the Defense Production Act, which incentivized the production of medical supplies and ensured equitable distribution to US states while, at the same time, restricting the export of vaccines. Biden publicly expressed frustration with Moderna, Inc. for not doing more to provide its vaccines to poorer nations while also profiting off government investment; yet Biden was criticized as he could have done more to force Moderna, Inc. to provide its vaccine to vulnerable populations both domestically and globally [103].

4.2. Germany

The German case differs from the US mainly in that its strategy was embedded in the EU and cannot be disentangled from the larger EU strategy. Overall, the German vaccine policy was slightly less nationalistic but with a strong nationalist bend as it pertained to patents. He and Chen assert that Germany had a more globalist approach in the pandemic regarding vaccine research and development than the US, as it cooperated with other EU states in research and participated in the 7.5 billion “coronavirus global response” plan as well as collective procurement [42]. This is not necessarily indicative of German attitudes, as these actions were often led by the European Commission or other supranational actors. Similarly, vaccine donations were pledged and organized collectively in what the Oxfam report calls “Team Europe”, which pledged roughly half of the doses the US did but delivering on 67% of those, or over 330 million doses by mid-2022 [43]. Given Germany’s dominant position as Europe’s largest economy, this strategy is somewhat representative of the German position. However, the same report also mentions that European nations, including Germany, were, alongside the US, against patent sharing through the WHO’s C-TAP initiative (COVID Technology Access Pool) aimed at enabling independent vaccine production in the Global South. This seems to be related to economic self-interest, since German pharmaceutical companies, especially BioNTech, stood to profit enormously from their early developmental successes by retaining exclusive rights [104]. Across the EU, the phenomenon of pre-ordering and overbooking vaccines was also visible, albeit to a lesser extent than in North America. However, the EU population could still be immunized twice over with vaccines secured before their availability, and as seen in the US case, this practice led to inefficiencies in allocation and subsequently subpar vaccinations for people in need elsewhere [84].

Lastly, Wang observed resurgent nationalist rhetoric and action, as well as the strengthening of far-right political actors across Europe in the wake of the early pandemic [45]. This was particularly acute in Germany, where the far-right AfD party pushed anti-lockdown campaigns and vaccine skepticism, often invoking extreme nationalist rhetoric and conspiracy theories blaming immigrants for the pandemic. While this discourse did not immediately translate to more popular support, the AfD has enjoyed an alarming increase in influence in Germany’s Bundestag since the pandemic, achieving the second most votes in the 2025 election [105,106].

Beyond Germany, border closures were commonplace, an especially interesting development in the EU which was founded on the principle of freedom of movement between member states. Also commonplace was the hoarding of medical supplies. To the extent that solidarity was displayed, it was shown mainly toward other EU nations and only until most domestic needs were met and vaccine donation through COVAX began. While not as fervently nationalist as the US, Germany’s strategy still displays a permutation of Bieber’s “exclusive nationalism” in states within the EU framework [33].

4.3. China

Another important vaccine developer, producer, and distributor was China, but it tackled the pandemic quite differently. It developed its own vaccines, cooperated with other countries in research, and later also provided many doses to Global South countries by employing so-called “vaccine diplomacy” [46]. Vaccine diplomacy can be defined as “a nation’s vaccine efforts that aim to build mutually beneficial relationships with other nations” [107] (pp. 5–6). It should be noted that according to this definition, this form of diplomacy is as old as the vaccine itself. While “vaccine nationalism” implies the prioritization of domestic populations over global populations, “vaccine diplomacy” implies the prioritization of relationship-building with other nations in balance with prioritizing domestic populations. Still, “vaccine diplomacy” should not be immediately conflated with altruism or the lack of foreign policy objectives (Su et al. call this “vaccine empathy”) [107]. Indeed, China’s strategy was part of its larger foreign policy framework that seeks to be seen as a credible “leader” of the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as its domestic “biosecurity” goals [46].

And yet, at the same time, using vaccine distribution as part of a larger foreign policy framework is not necessarily ill intentioned. While many criticized China’s vaccine diplomacy, especially in the US, several researchers have found that China’s strategy was not especially influenced by Beijing’s trade interests and was rather more motivated by cultivating preexisting friendly relations [108]. Others also found that, in contrast with the mass media, a majority of the scholarly literature discovered that the net benefit of vaccine diplomacy is positive, even if the practice also achieves other “soft power” aims [107,109].

China’s domestically developed vaccines were criticized on the grounds of weak efficacy; however, these supplies still enabled their own population’s immunization earlier than in other Global South countries. They also engaged in foreign aid, especially with African and Central Asian nations as part of their vaccine diplomacy efforts (states with which China had good preexisting diplomatic and economic ties). However, they also sent aid to particularly hard-hit Western states such as Italy early during the height of the pandemic, but only after prioritizing domestic resources [42]. Once vaccines were available, China followed its strategy of vaccine diplomacy, which can be interpreted as both globally oriented and nationalist in sentiment. This is because, on the one hand, China committed to delivering vaccines to countries underserved by Western nations as well as states that were unable to provide for their own populations. This promotes positive outcomes because, as discussed above, broad access to vaccination enables better protection of vulnerable groups and slows the spread and development of new strains of the virus [85].

The nationalist impetus behind vaccine diplomacy is twofold: Firstly, acknowledging the long-term benefits of a world that is immunized faster might have swayed China to promote it, as China’s economy and public health was of course not shielded from the pandemic [44,46]. Secondly, which was also the prominent criticism leveraged against China, targeting countries in need of help but insufficiently provided for by Western-led international aid can be seen as an effort to garner their support and loyalty in future economic and geo-political endeavors [46]. Another angle from which to assess China’s strategy as nationalist would also be that their provision of vaccines to other countries was by and large marketized and thus potentially directly profitable to the Chinese economy. For example, the Chinese state signed a deal arranging the sale of 550 million doses with Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance in 2021 while only pledging 10 million doses to COVAX, the main donation-based channel of vaccine provision used by Western actors [46].

4.4. The Dilemma of Modern Nationalism

Nations like the US, Germany, and China each adopted particular strategies that reflected a degree of vaccine nationalism, whether through prioritizing domestic supply, refusing to share patents, or utilizing vaccines to expand diplomatic influence [43,44,46,84]. While nationalism undermined the commitment to international human rights, vaccine nationalism did perhaps speed up development and production in the early phases of the pandemic, and the examined countries were responsible for a large part of vaccine supply later on in regions without their own capacities [82]. The heart of the problem seems to lie in the unresolved conflict embedded in the Westphalian system as it confronts the era of globalization: sovereignty, along with nationalism, provides an effective and centralized system of internal government but leaves little in the form of solutions to global problems that care little for sovereign borders. The lasting impact of these strategies shows that nationalistic responses to global crises can undermine the collective good, prolong emergencies, and complicate diplomatic relationships. Where reflection and planning for future global health crises are concerned, the COVID-19 experience demonstrates the need for stronger frameworks that balance national priorities alongside local identities and capabilities with international solidarity to ensure faster, more equitable, and ultimately, more effective responses. The next section explores such a framework.

5. Pandemic Inequities: A Call for Global South Agency

These challenges faced by Global South states throughout the COVID pandemic include having to rely on global initiatives such as COVAX for vaccines, being at the behest of wealthy states for vaccine development and efficacy, a lack of other supplies such as personal protection equipment (PPE), dealing with nearly expired vaccines once they finally arrived, and in some cases exacerbating an already weak public health system [110]. The pandemic response, along with several post-pandemic developments such as the US withdrawal from the WHO and the rise in a far-right party that utilized COVID conspiracies to bolster its popular support in Germany, should make it clear that the world is currently on an anti-globalization trajectory [111]. Leaving aside the question as to what extent Global South nations have benefited from globalization, these developments have led to increasing calls for the Global South to chart a new course for their own development, health, security, and beyond. This section discusses the possibilities for these new paths forward, drawing on the previous framework which brings together the concepts of rooted cosmopolitanism, Pan-Africanism, and Ubuntu.

First, it is prudent to consider the underlying reasons that countries in development are uniquely affected by global pandemics and the aftermath of said crises. While COVID-related mortality rates were significantly higher in the Global North than the Global South, the so-called “bottom billions” experienced more diffuse socioeconomic effects both during and after the worst of the pandemic [112]. Large concentrations of poverty pose significant barriers to complying with policies like social distancing, handwashing, masking, and stay-at-home orders. Many countries in development, especially those in Africa, rely heavily on low-skilled labor and the informal economy, which are incompatible with work-from-home orders. Poverty-stricken areas without ready access to technology and the Internet suffered from a lack of information as well as the inability for children to continue to go to school, leading to a generational lapse in education with far-reaching implications. Global South economies were especially vulnerable to commodity price volatility, supply-chain disruptions, and debt overhang [113]. Foreign direct investment declined and has remained down. Farm produce was left unattended without the ability to transport the goods to more urban areas due to lockdown orders, leading to food shortages, increased prices, and challenges regarding food waste management. Global South economies are the least resilient to this kind of sudden contraction and will likely feel the impact for a much longer period of time than the Global North [114].

Ironically, while the West was better prepared pre-pandemic, it is perhaps this preparedness that led to the larger death toll. States like the US and the UK assumed that the quick spread in China was due to governmental ineptitude and a lack of preparedness, leaving Western officials with a false sense of security, and this resulted in the delay of proper pandemic management protocols. Even the UK, with a unified public health system, was taken by surprise. While the Global South suffered and continues to suffer at the hands of the pandemic, these states were perhaps better prepared socially and culturally due to the unfortunate preponderance of more localized health crises that afflict the developing world such as Zika, Ebola, and malaria [115]. Thus, Khoo suggests that the epistemology of the pandemic might be reframed away from Eurocentric narratives of the West “helping” or “teaching” the Global South about pandemic preparedness and more towards a regionally specific development path that recognizes the unique realities of the Global South while also situating local and regional knowledge as having value for the good of all [116].

This approach follows the philosophy of Ubuntu and rooted cosmopolitanism, which could also be conceptualized using the term glocalism [117]. While Ubuntu is found primarily in South African philosophy, it can be readily applied to global challenges especially in the face of de-globalization. Ubuntu is an ethic of care that was invoked explicitly in the post-apartheid constitution of South Africa as a path towards the rehumanization of both victims and perpetrators of global injustice [118]. Elsewhere, Ubuntu has been applied to social work, psychology, and nursing [119,120,121]. The concept is both a moral and dynamic framework that emphasizes the coexistence of both self and the collective, which is not unlike the glocal strategy of decentering citizenship practices away from the sovereign nation-state towards local centers of authority; thus, using cosmopolitan appeals to international human rights law and global moral norms [122]. Hence, Terblanche and Waghid coin the term “glo-ubuntu” [123].

Specifically, what would a “glo-ubuntu” approach to future pandemics and development, more generally, look like? The first strategy that might be more fully developed throughout the world, but especially in the Global South, would be to better connect global guidelines to local capacities. As Wilkinson argues, informal settlements in developing states found it difficult to adhere to strict social distancing and hand-washing guidelines [36]. However, these communities often have traditional leadership structures that are in the best position to implement global guidelines in ways that serve the local community’s needs. Global guidelines should be filtered through these local leadership structures because it is these authorities that often have the most legitimacy in localities in the Global South more than regional or national leadership.

Similarly, while recognizing local capacities, local communities should be the primary source of care for the most marginalized when faced with crises. This approach is widely practiced throughout the Global South already, as many of these communities are built around collective agency over hyper-individualism. Since the globalization agenda has been largely driven by individualistic neoliberalism and global free trade, a more glocal approach would require a paradigm shift towards more regionalized supply chains and community-driven healthcare networks. It would also require alternative ways to understand and experience development. In what McCloskey calls the “tyranny of GDP”, development in the era of globalization is primarily understood as profit-driven, even at the expense of community health and well-being [124] (p. 40).

A glocal approach to development would recognize the need for responsible and careful economic growth while also balancing non-profit-driven measures of community vitality. This would require more programs such as debt forgiveness, equitable taxation systems, social protection for the most marginalized and radical democratization that encourages the participation of the poorest in society. Economies in the Global South must diversify away from external dependence by focusing more on regional trade agreements such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement. However, such agreements should also commit to equitable development so that the wealthiest are not the sole beneficiaries. Yaya et al. suggest that this would require cost-sharing agreements especially in the health sector such as vaccine production and the trade of other vital supplies such as ventilators [125]. The African Union’s African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) demonstrated how regional cooperation could improve access to vaccines, offering a model for future efforts. Indeed, local and regional vaccine development is especially crucial, but this can only be achieved if international patent regulations are relaxed. While some temporary waivers were granted during the initial deployment of vaccines, broader structural changes to global patent rules are needed to ensure equitable access to essential medicines in future health crises.

Finally, while a glocal path forward based on the philosophy of Ubuntu places a special priority on local capacities and listening to local voices, it is also recognized that Global South states and communities are not yet in a position to provide for their own welfare independent of global partners. Still, a glocal approach will likely require Global South states to form their own systems that are less dependent on traditional Western partners. As reviewed above, China became a lifeline for many states in development during the pandemic. There are opportunities to engage with other emerging economies such as India and Brazil. This has the potential to create on-going networks of economic, political, and, above all, ethical support amongst the states and communities of the Global South.

6. Discussion and Conclusions: Nurturing “Glocal Citizenship”

The COVID-19 pandemic has fundamentally challenged prevailing notions of global citizenship by revealing the deep-seated structural inequalities in global health governance and crisis response. The disproportionate impact of vaccine nationalism on the Global South demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric of shared responsibility, states prioritized national interests over international solidarity. This is not altogether surprising given the dependence the modern sovereign state has on nationalism to solidify the state’s power internally and draw boundaries externally. Sovereignty and cosmopolitanism have at times been at odds with one another, and at other times, the nation-state has been seen as the best possible vehicle for global justice and equality. COVID-19 certainly proved that we are currently in a time characterized by the former. Thus, the weaknesses of the ideal of global citizenship have become clearer than ever, and any hopes to recover in the near future seem naive in the wake of increasing nationalist tendencies and deglobalization trends.

The comparative analysis of the US, Germany, and China demonstrates three very different approaches to vaccine distribution, which is also reflective of various notions of national and international identity. While the US initially adopted a protectionist stance by prioritizing domestic vaccine distribution and limiting exports, which demonstrates an internal-facing and individualistic understanding of national identity, it later engaged in a mild program of vaccine diplomacy through donations, albeit in ways that still reinforced its geopolitical interests. This can also be interpreted as an attempt at reinforcing the US’s understanding of itself as a global leader that deserves to help itself first. Embedded in the EU’s collective approach, Germany exhibited solidarity and self-interest, aligning its vaccine strategy closely with broader EU policies. However, resistance to patent-sharing suggests that economic self-interest outweighed humanitarian concerns. Thus, while EU membership may temper hyper-nationalism, it could be argued that COVID-19 exposed cracks in the European identity in one of the core EU countries. China, on the other hand, pursued vaccine diplomacy as a strategic tool to expand its influence, particularly in the Global South, providing an alternative model of global health engagement but one that was still embedded in nationalistic and geopolitical motivations. China strategically used the pandemic to bolster its identity as an emerging global leader with an established standing as a trusted partner in the Global South. China’s calculation emphasized an alternative support system outside the Western liberal order primarily for its Global South partners.

In response to the failure of global citizenship, the concept of “glo-ubuntu” offers a compelling alternative that reconciles global solidarity with local agency. Rooted in the African philosophy of ubuntu, emphasizing communal well-being and interconnectedness, this approach advocates for strengthening local and regional governance mechanisms to address global health challenges. Rather than relying on the traditional paradigm of global citizenship, which has largely been shaped by Eurocentric ideals, “glo-ubuntu” promotes a model of global cooperation that is decentralized, participatory, and responsive to local needs while still recognizing the value of a universal humanness.

A “glo-ubuntu” approach to global health governance would prioritize the integration of local knowledge systems, community-based healthcare networks, and regional cooperation over dependency on Western-dominated international institutions. Strengthening regional trade agreements, such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), could reduce reliance on external actors while fostering intra-regional economic and health resilience. Additionally, local vaccine manufacturing must be scaled up to prevent future dependence on wealthier nations. A Global South vaccine and a public health exchange system with some of the more capable states taking a lead, such as China, India, and Brazil, could prove fruitful.

Despite its potential, a “glo-ubuntu” or glocal framework faces several challenges. Many Global South nations continue to depend on international financial institutions and foreign aid, which complicates efforts to achieve true regional sufficiency. Additionally, the rise in nationalist policies globally could undermine efforts to create inclusive, multilateral solutions. Global South nations are certainly not immune to extreme nationalism, and indeed, many anti-colonial independence movements were successful in part due to both the appeal of a pre-colonial identity as well as the creation of a post-colonial national sovereign identity. Ideologies such as Pan-Africanism were intended to overcome the divisions created by these nationalist appeals in the post-colonial space, but too often this project gave way to self-interested state-building. This is why variations in Ubuntu may be more promising.