1. Introduction
Among admixed African-European American descent groups, European genetic ancestry is associated with higher socioeconomic status (SES) and generally better social outcomes (Kirkegaard, Wang, and Fuerst, 2017) [
1]. So too are skin color (or brightness) and other phenotypic indices of European ancestry (Hunter, 2007) [
2]. Attempts to explain this pattern have come primarily from two contrasting paradigms: the discrimination model and the distributional model.
The discrimination models focus “on social and institutional practices that discriminate against members of one group (or favor members of another), thus tilting the playing field” (Rushton and Jensen, 2005, p. 281) [
3]. In context to the association between racial phenotype and outcomes, the discrimination model comes in the form of “colorism”. The term “colorism” was first coined by Pulitzer Prize winner Alice Walker, who defined it as “prejudicial or preferential treatment of same-race people based solely on their color” (1983, p. 290) [
4]). The concept of colorism has since been expanded to refer to color-based discrimination regardless of race (Dixon and Telles, 2017) [
5]. According to contemporary colorism theorists, there is pervasive color-based discrimination that results in worse workplace and labor market-related outcomes and generally worse socioeconomic circumstances for darker-colored individuals (Marira and Mitra, 2013) [
6]. These theorists place “primacy on the causal role of skin tone [discrimination] in engendering the colorism phenomenon” (Marira and Mitra, 2013, p., 103) [
6]. Light skin color is viewed as “bodily capital” (Monk, 2015, p. 415) [
7], which is conceived as a form of social capital, like beauty, that incurs advantages. According to this model, color-based discrimination directly results in associations between lighter color and better treatment. Insofar as it is acknowledged that measures of human capital, such as intelligence, covary with color in certain populations, these covariances are attributed to the indirect effects of color-based discrimination. For example, adverse discrimination is posited to result in cognitive inhibiting environments for darker colored individuals (Hailu, 2018) [
8]. Moreover, insofar as associations between genetic ancestry and both socioeconomic outcomes and human capital traits are recognized, these are explained as indirect effects of phenotypic discrimination (Conley and Fletcher, 2017) [
9].
In contrast to discriminatory models, distributional models account for outcome differences in terms of mean group characteristics. The characteristics could be “deep-rooted cultural values and family structures endemic to certain populations, as well as biological variables such as body type, hormonal levels, and personality and temperament” (Rushton and Jensen, 2005, pp. 281–282) [
3]. Human capital (e.g., cognitive ability, knowledge, skill, experience, talent, etc.) models are a subset of distributional ones. Human capital models come in a number of forms depending on the specific groups in question. In context to admixed American groups, they come in the form of the cognitive human capital (i.e., cognitive capital/ability) and related models (e.g., racial ~ cognitive ability-socioeconomic (R~CA-S) hypothesis; Fuerst and Kirkegaard, 2016) [
10]. According to these models, there are cognitive ability and other human capital differences between parental populations; these differences are transmitted vertically from parents to offspring. As a result, admixed groups have intermediate levels of skills and abilities. Moreover, individuals within admixed groups have different levels of skills and abilities depending on their admixture proportions. According to these models, socioeconomic differences are largely (but not entirely) downstream of human capital ones. Furthermore, associations with racial phenotype are secondary to associations with genetic ancestry. Some suggest that it is nearly impossible to disentangle genetic vs. cultural models of vertical transmission (e.g., Conley and Fletcher, 2017, p. 107) [
11]. However, this concern is not directly relevant to the model in its general form, which does not specify whether the relations between ancestry and traits are mediated by either vertically transmitted genetic or cultural factors (Fuerst and Kirkegaard, 2016) [
10,
12].
Figure 1 shows the theoretical path model. The colorism model proposes that phenotype-based discrimination directly leads to social outcome differences. These differences, in turn, lead to differences in cognitive ability and other forms of human capital. Because racial phenotypes are correlated with genetic ancestry, both social outcomes and human capital traits will tend to be indirectly correlated with genetic ancestry in admixed populations. The racial ~ human capital model, on the other hand, posits that genetic and cultural factors are correlated with global ancestry both between and within self-identified racial groups. These genetic and cultural factors cause human capital differences and these trait differences are antecedent to social outcomes. Because genetic ancestry is correlated with racial phenotypes, both social outcomes and human capital traits will tend to be indirectly correlated with racial phenotype in admixed populations.
While human capital models may include a number of different forms of capital, cognitive capital (i.e., cognitive ability) is usually focused on, since, among other reasons, it is reliably measured (Fuerst and Kirkegaard, 2016) [
10,
12]. In this paper, we will also focus on cognitive ability. However, it is noted that the human capital model potentially applies to a wide range of traits that differ between the relevant populations.
It is unfortunate, but there has been relatively little research on the relationships between racial phenotypes and cognitive abilities. Huddleston and Montgomery (2010, p. 69) [
13] note:
A great majority of the literature focuses on the intelligence gap between Blacks and Whites. Therefore, more research is needed on intragroup differences among Blacks and intelligence (Averhart and Bigler, 1997) [
14]. Results from this research have huge implications for the skin tone hierarchy in the African American community. Despite the gap in the literature …
The authors go on to summarize research on the social correlates of color. That said, a small body of older research has investigated the association between intelligence scores and mostly phenotypic and genealogical indices of biogeographic (i.e., racial) ancestry [
15]. However, this research has not been systematically meta-analyzed and narrative reports differ as to interpretations. More recently, Kirkegaard et al. (2019) [
16] found that European genetic ancestry was associated with IQ among African and Hispanic Americans (respectively,
r = 0.20,
N = 227;
r = 0.23,
N = 328; Table S10-S11). Factors correlated with ancestry explained the full Black-White and most of the Hispanic-White differences in
g. However, the analysis was based on a relatively small sample (about 1,400 children and youth in total). Nonetheless, these results have been replicated in a pre-registered study of European ancestry and cognitive ability among African and Hispanic Americans (
r = 0.297,
N = 193; Table 2) [
17]. However, this was based on a convenience sample of individuals recruited online.
Additionally, replicating and extending the results of Lynn (2002) [
18], Fuerst, Lynn, and Kirkegaard (2019) found that biracial status and color were associated with crystallized intelligence among African Americans [
19]. This analysis was based on the nationally representative General Social Survey. However, the measure of cognitive ability, Wordsum, was only a 10-word vocabulary test. Moreover, the sample comprised adults, so it is possible that the crystallized intelligence differences were consequent of labor market-based discrimination. Additionally, Kreisman and Rangel (2015) examined the relationship between wages and skin tone among African American males using the same sample that we use here: the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort (NLSY97) [
20]. Their tables show that color is related to Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores. However, the authors do not report coefficients and they only used a subset of the NLSY sample (males in the workforce).
Methods for disentangling the pathways in
Figure 1 have been elaborated in other papers [
10,
12,
16,
19]. Generally, the race ~ cognitive ability model, at least in context to American admixed groups, predicts:
There is an association between racial phenotype and cognitive ability within self-identified race/ethnic (SIRE) groups.
There is an association between reported ancestry and cognitive ability within SIREs.
The associations above are mediated by the relationship between genetic ancestry and cognitive ability.
The associations between phenotype and cognitive ability can be identified prior to completing formal education and entering the labor market, since they are not a result of differences in educational attainment nor are they a result of labor market discrimination.
The associations will be larger on the better measures of general cognitive ability, since the differences between racial groups are largely a result of g, which is the predictive backbone of tests of cognitive ability.
The associations will not appear, to a substantial degree, between full siblings within families, which differ little in ancestry and not at all in shared environment. The potential for linkage between ancestry and skin color implies that there may be a small within-family residual effect. (Briefly: the simpler the genetic architecture of the traits, the less genetic linkage there will be between traits, and the lower the genetic correlation will be among full-siblings; skin color is a relatively simple, but still complex trait.)
In a multivariate model with genetic ancestry, cognitive ability, color, and other race-related phenotypes, the latter will show little independent relation with cognitive ability. This is because color and other race-related phenotype act as proxies of ancestry, not vice versa.
Admixture mapping will not show an association between genomic regions associated with conspicuous race-related phenotype and cognitive ability, as would be the case were the colorism model correct. However, it will still show a relationship between admixture and cognitive ability.
In this analysis, we attempt to fill in gaps in the literature by examining predictions 1 through 6. We focus on non-Hispanic White and Black Americans. We do this for two reasons. First, Hannon and Defina (2016) found that the Massey and Martin’s skin color scale, which is used in the NLSY survey, had little to no reliability among Hispanic Americans in the General Social Survey (ICC = 0.079,
N = 88). [
21]. This may simply have been due to sampling given the panel’s small sample size. However, the cause of the unreliability is not clear. As such, we are uncertain about the NLSY color scale’s reliability in context to Hispanics. Second, immigrant generation is a potential confound, since across generations migrants of the same ethnic stock may score differently owing to a host of factors, including linguistic bias in tests, migrant selectivity, etc. [
20]. This problem is attenuated by restricting consideration to African and European Americans, who were predominantly natives in this cohort.
This analysis advances previous research in that we use a national sample, a good, multidimensional measure of cognitive ability, and in that we employ a sibling design. Moreover, it is the first, we are aware of, which looks at the correlation between color and IQ among siblings. Beyond this, we examine some psychometric characteristics of the group differences in cognitive ability. First, we examine sibling differential regression to the mean. This is done to see if the factors causing the Black-White difference have a similar effect across the cognitive spectrum (for logic see: Scarr, 1981; [
22]). Second, using Multiple-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA), we examine whether measurement invariance (MI) holds between groups (Blacks and Whites), in addition to testing whether Spearman’s hypothesis, that group differences are due mainly to
g, is tenable in these data. Finally, we examine absolute differences between full siblings along with full-sibling intraclass correlations. These analyses provide insight into the causes of group differences.
3. Analytic Plan
3.1. Mean Differences
First, we examined mean differences by race and color/ancestry. The groups are: Whites with no African ancestry, Whites with African ancestry, Blacks with no European ancestry, Blacks with European ancestry, and Blacks by color classification (1 to 10, since no Blacks fell in the lightest category of 0). We treat Whites with no African ancestry vs. Whites with African ancestry and Blacks with no European ancestry vs. Blacks with European ancestry as two dichotomous-categorical variables. Based on the data available, we could not ascertain if Whites with African ancestry had more European ancestry than Blacks with European ancestry, so we could not safely treat these four groups as intervals in one continuous variable.
We created IQ-metric (M = 100, SD = 15) AFQT scores for ease of reading, while also providing the untransformed means and standard deviations. In computing these, we set Whites at 100 and used the total Black-White sample standard deviation. The total sample standard deviation was used, as we had several groups and subgroups, making the use of pooled standard deviations unwieldy. An alternative was to just use the White standard deviation; however, doing so was theoretically questionable in context to color differences among Blacks.
3.2. Method of Correlated Vectors
Second, we examined if there are Jensen Effects, that is, correlations between the vectors of g-loadings and the vectors of group differences, for 1) the Black-White subtest race differences, 2) the association between African ancestry and subtest scores among Whites, 3) the association between European ancestry and subtest scores among Blacks, and 4) the association between darker color and subtest scores among Blacks.
To do this, we used Jensen’s MCV (Jensen, 1998) [
25]. This involves six steps. First, ASVAB subtests are corrected for the effect of age (birth year) and sex. Second, the
g-loadings of the subtests are determined using principal axis factoring. In this case, we determined the
g-loadings separately for Whites and Blacks. Third, the
g-loadings are corrected for subtest reliabilities. The reliabilities are given by Moreno and Segall (1997) [
24]. The reliability-corrected
g-loadings constitute the first vector. Fourth, a vector of group differences is created (e.g., the mean subtest differences between races or the point-biserial correlation between subtest scores and ancestry). Fifth, this vector of group differences is corrected for subtest unreliability. Sixth, the two vectors are correlated.
For the MCV analysis of color, we used two alternative vectors of group differences: 1) the Pearson correlations between subtest scores and color and 2) the betas for color and subtest scores based on the full sample multivariate model (discussed in
Section 3.3). Note also that we used the average Black-White
g-loadings [
25], calculated using the formula given by Hartmann et al. (2007) [
26], in the context of the Black-White mean difference analysis, the White
g-loadings in the context of the effect of African ancestry among Whites, and the Black
g-loadings in the context of the effects of both European ancestry and color among Blacks.
3.3. Full African American Sample Multivariate Analysis for Color and Cognitive Ability
Third, we examined the association between color and g-scores among Blacks in a multivariate analysis. In this analysis, we controlled for the effects of age, sex, region, and interviewer race.
3.4. Sibling Sample Multivariate Analysis for Color and Cognitive Ability
Fourth, we examined the association between color and
g among Blacks between and within families. We used a sibling average and sibling difference design e.g., [
27,
28,
29,
30]. To do this, we identified full sibling pairs which had both
g and color scores. We identified 225 full sibling pairs, in addition to 814 singletons. In 24 cases (or 11%), there was more than one full sibling pair in a family. In these cases, we randomly picked one pair using a random number generator. Using, instead, the average of multiple sibling pair differences produced essentially the same results; as such, we only report the results based on the randomly picked sibling pair method.
For singletons, we look at the association between color and g controlling for sex (Male = 1, Female = 0), age (years and months old, calculated as below), and race of interviewer (White? Yes = 1, No = 0). Of interest is whether relationships between families of full siblings match up with those between singleton families. If this is found to be the case it would suggest that the full sibling subsample is representative of the full Black NLSY sample. This analysis is routinely carried out in behavioral genetic studies due to historical concerns about the representativeness of the family design datasets.
For each household with pairs of full siblings, we computed pair averages and pair differences for g, color, and age. The average is the sum of both sibling’s scores divided by two. The difference is the first sibling of the pair’s score minus the seconds. We additionally computed two sets of dummy variables for the sibling average analysis: sex (both male = 1, otherwise = 0; both female = 1, otherwise = 0) and interviewer race (both White = 1, otherwise = 0; both non-White = 1, otherwise = 0). For the sibling difference analysis, we computed one dummy variable for sex (same sex = 1; different sex = 0) and interviewer race (same interviewer race = 1, different interviewer race = 0). Note, to control for the effect of interviewer race, we used the dichotomously coded “Interviewer Race White” variable since this had the largest effect in both the full sample and the singleton analyses.
For this specific analysis to maximize the sample size, we include both Whites with African ancestry and Blacks. Additionally, prior to analysis, we impute missing ASVAB subtest scores by applying single deterministic imputations to the 12 subtest variables using the SPSS Impute Missing Data Values command, which uses fully conditional specification (FCS). To be clear, we used scores with imputations for this analysis, unlike those discussed in
Section 3.1 to
Section 3.3. We extract
g-scores from the imputed data. To further correct for sex and age effects, since the sibling difference analysis is possibly sensitive to these variables, we regressed out of the
g-scores the effects of sex and age (calculated as: age + month−1/12, e.g., so someone born in December 1977 would be (1997−1977) + ((12−1)/12) = 20.92 years old).
Note, we also ran the model using a between/within fixed effects design at the suggestion of a colleague. This did not produce interpretatively different results, since a fixed effects model is a variant of the same design we used here, so we only include the original design.
3.5. Differential Regression to the Mean
Regression to the mean refers to a broad class of phenomena in which imperfectly measured values if extreme when first measured will be less extreme when measured again. What is sometimes called familial regression to the mean is a type of this general phenomenon. It refers to when deviance from a population mean is incompletely passed on or inherited. The inherited portion of a trait deviation from the mean is the portion conditioned by additive genetics (and shared environment). Regression to the mean is simply the non-transmission of trait deviances. It occurs, for example, when very tall individuals have only somewhat tall siblings. This familial regression to the mean is exploited by biometricians to estimate heritability and other variance components, for example, in the case of regression-based methods like Defries-Fulker analysis. In both circumstances, the reason for the regression is the same: the “luck” factors which caused the extreme scores are not reproduced in the subsequent instance.
In the differential regression to the mean analyses, we compare the familial regression to the mean for White siblings and Black siblings. This comparison can be somewhat informative about the etiology of the differences. It can be informative since members of groups will regress to the mean of the group they belong with respect to the trait. Different causes of the mean difference in the trait will results in alternative regression patterns. A simple additive genetic (hereditarian) model predicts parallel regression lines, with the lower scoring group regressing to a lower mean across the full spectrum of the trait.
We examined differential regression to the mean. To do this, we roughly followed the method of Murray (1999) [
31]. The following steps are taken: (1) We identify Black and White full siblings who both had
g-scores; (2) we randomly assign one of the two as a reference sibling and the other as a comparison sibling using the excel RANDBETWEEN function (threefold); (3) we correct the
g-scores for unreliability using the equation provided by Murray (1999), assuming a test-retest reliability of 0.95 for
g; (4) we transform the
g-scores into IQ-metric ones; (5) we calculate the means for the comparison and reference siblings separately by identified race; (6) we sort, highest to lowest, the Black and White sibling pairs by the reference sibling’s IQ; (7) we match Black and White sibling pairs on the reference sibling’s IQ (to the nearest IQ point); (8) we calculate the means of the matched reference and comparison siblings; and (9) we plot the sibling scores. When matching reference siblings, we use the first scores of each race (e.g., if there were five Black and three White pairs with an IQ of 92, we would match the first three pairs, by order of occurrence, and discard the last two pairs for Blacks).
3.6. MGCFA Assessment of MI and Spearman’s Hypothesis
We assessed MI using MGCFA. As we were unable to find a theoretical model for the 12-subtest version of the ASVAB (most published theory models were based on the 10 subtest ASVAB battery) we used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to identify a best fitting model. This led to the following four non-g factors:
Factor I (Technical): SI + AI + EI + MC + GS
Factor II (Mathematical): NO + CS + MK
Factor III (Verbal/Knowledge): PC + WK + GS
Factor IV (Spatial): AR + AO + MC
Testing for MI proceeds by adding constraints to the initial configural model. The following steps are taken: First, the same number of indicators, latent variables, and patterns of constrained and estimated parameters are fitted in both groups (configural invariance), second, the factor loadings are constrained (metric or weak invariance), and third, an additional constraint is placed on the intercepts (scalar or strong invariance). The final step is usually to add a constraint on the residual variances (strict or full uniqueness invariance). If the model fit shows a meaningful decrement throughout the first through third steps, MI is rejected, but partial or approximate MI may still hold [
32].
In addition to testing MI, we assessed Spearman’s hypothesis, which states, in the weak form, that the Black-White difference is primarily due to differences in the
g factor and, in the strong form that the Black-White difference is entirely due to differences in
g. This is in contrast with the contra hypothesis, according to which “there is no Black-White difference in
g” but all differences relate to group factors [
33]. Spearman’s hypothesis is of interest as it is seen as suggestive of the source of group differences in cognitive ability [
34]. In order to investigate this hypothesis, a model in which latent factor variances are homogeneous should hold [
35]. As such, we also assess whether constraining latent variances to equality is tenable.
3.7. Full Sibling Differences in Intraclass Correlations and Absolute Mean Differences
For the intraclass correlation and absolute difference analyses, we used the sample from
Section 3.5. This was based on data with imputed ASVAB subtest scores. We used this data to maximize power. We computed the full sibling intraclass correlations (single measure, two way, mixed) along with the absolute average sibling differences.
5. Conclusions
We set out to test six predictions of the racial-cognitive model and found support for each. Among African American adolescents and young adults, darker color, an index of African ancestry, was negatively related to cognitive ability (r = −0.112). In contrast, parent-reported European ancestry was positively related to cognitive ability (r = 0.137). These results held controlling for age, sex, region of residence, and interviewer race. Further, while parent-reported ancestry was a predictor of color (β = −0.113, N = 1856), the association between the two indices was weak and both had independent effects on cognitive ability. This low correlation is expected given the imbalanced ancestry variable, as imbalance in a dichotomized variable attenuates point-biserial correlations. The corrected correlation would be rc = 0.35. This is still low, perhaps because parent-reported ancestry and skin color are indexing recent and distal admixture, respectively.
In both cases, the relationships with cognitive ability were more pronounced on the more
g-loaded subtests (
rDark_color g-loading = −0.728;
rEur_ancestryg-loading = 0.679). A Jensen effect was also found in regard to the relation between African ancestry and cognitive ability among Whites (
rAfr_ancestryg-loading = −0.593) and in relation to the mean difference between Blacks and Whites (
rBWg-loading = 0.405), too. These findings have practical importance when it comes to research on cognitive ability in relation to social outcomes and ancestry indices such as color. The results suggest that highly
g-loaded measures of cognitive ability are needed to capture the full mediating effect of cognitive ability. Similar results have been found in relation to social outcomes and self-identified race (e.g., Nyborg and Jensen, 2001) [
51].
While some argue that Jensen effects are readily accountable in terms of cultural factors [
52], it so happens that known environmental effects generally do not produce these. This includes adoption gains [
53], gains from educational programs like Head Start [
54], gains from learning potential programs [
55], practice and retest gains [
55], secular gains [
56], the effects of lead exposure [
57], iodine deficiency [
58], prenatal toxins like cocaine and alcohol [
58], or the effect of traumatic brain injury [
58], and environmentality in general [
59]. The reason seems to be that environmental effects tend to have larger effects on specific and broad abilities (i.e., Stratum I and II in the conventional three-stratum model of intelligence) than on general mental ability, as indicated by the negative correlation between vectors [
60]. Of course, it is always possible that some unidentified set of environmental factors, which happen to induce
g-loaded differences whilst also preserving MI, cause the ancestry related differences.
Further, to investigate the association between color and g among African-descent individuals, we conducted an analysis within and between families. We found a robust association among families. This showed up both among singleton families (β = −0.153; N = 814) and among full sibling pair families (β = −0.176; N = 225). However, we found no association within families, between full siblings (β = 0.027, N = 225). This latter finding is inconsistent with a color-based discrimination explanation of the association between color and g-scores. It is consistent, however, with a vertical transmission model.
We looked at differential sibling regression to see if the factors causing the observed group differences acted similarly across the whole range of cognitive ability. This turned out to be the case and the results replicated those of Murray (1999) [
31]. This suggests that African Americans who are apt by White standards are no less affected by the factors inducing the mean difference than their less-acute co-racials. For differing interpretations of this effect, with respect to the nature vs. nurture question, see Scarr (1981) [
22] vs. Flynn (2019) [
52].
As for the mean group differences between Blacks and Whites, we found that strict factorial invariance/MI was tenable. Moreover, we found MGCFA confirmation of the weak version of Spearman’s hypothesis. From a theoretical point of view, MI suggests that group differences are due to the same factors that cause differences within both groups and are thus not due to factors unique to one or the other groups [
61,
62]. Furthermore, MGCFA verification of Spearman’s hypothesis implies that the Jensen effect between groups is not a result of confounding non-
g factors. There are substantial
g differences and an explanation of these is needed. The results suggest that the same holds in the case of color and ancestry within the African American group; however, confirmation of this will require a separate analysis of MI with the continuous variable skin color or ancestry as the group.
Regarding the full sibling differences, the ICCs and absolute differences between full siblings were substantially the same for Blacks and Whites. This indicates that non-shared environmental factors account for the same proportion of variance for both Blacks and Whites.
In sum, both color and reported ancestry are associated with cognitive ability within the African American population, the associations are present in adolescence, they are largest on the most g-loaded subtests and they do not show up to a substantial degree between full siblings within families, which differ little in ancestry and not at all in shared environments (by definition). These results strongly suggest that the ancestry-associated differences are due to either to genetic factors or to intergenerationally transmitted shared environmental factors. The psychometric and biometric nature of the racial group differences (the pattern of differential regression to the mean, the finding of MI, the finding of support for the weak Spearman’s hypothesis, the comparable full sibling ICCs, and absolute average differences) reinforce this conclusion.
Given our results, which are consistent with a cognitive capital model, we argue that the cognitive capital model should be tested against the colorism model using genetic-ancestry data from a large sample. Prediction 7 is that genetic ancestry will be associated with cognitive ability independent of color and that race-related phenotypes, including color, will show little independent relation with cognitive ability. If this holds, it will indicate that color is just or largely just a proxy for genetic ancestry. If this turns out to be the case, we propose that the next step will be admixture mapping, specifically looking at the regions of the genome where the association between
g and genetic ancestry is pronounced. For logic, see for example, Zou et al. (2015) and Norris et al. (2017) in the context of assortative mating and ancestry [
63,
64].
Given the polygenicity of g, it may be difficult to discriminate between a shared environmental model and a genetic one without a very large sample size. Generally, in the latter case, the association between g and ancestry will be pronounced on neurologically related regions, while in the former it will follow neutral variation. With a sample size of several thousand, one should be able to determine if the association between g and ancestry is pronounced on genomic regions that code for conspicuous race-related phenotypes as predicted by the colorism model. Additionally, if colorism accurately explains cognitive ability differences between groups, GWAS-identified SNPs related to intelligence should cause lighter skin and showcase substantially elevated expression in the integumentary system in Blacks, although how they would do this with MI being tenable is uncertain.