The Palisades Fire of Los Angeles: Lessons to Be Learned

Abstract

In 1961, Los Angeles experienced the disastrous Bel Air fire, which swept through an affluent neighborhood situated in a hilly, WUI (wildland–urban interface) location. In January 2025, the city was devastated again by a nearly-simultaneous series of wildfires, the most severe of which took place close to the 1961 fire location. Disastrous WUI fires are, unfortunately, an anticipatable occurrence in many U.S. cities. A number of issues identified earlier remained the same. Some were largely solved, while other new ones have emerged. The paper examines the Palisades Fire of January, 2025 in this context. In the intervening decades, the population of the city grew substantially. But firefighting resources did not keep pace. Very likely, the single-most-important factor in causing the 2025 disasters is that the Los Angeles Fire Department operational vehicle count shrank to 1/5 of what it was in 1961 (per capita). This is likely why critical delays were experienced in the initial attack on the Palisades Fire, leading to a runaway conflagration. Two other crucial issues were the management of vegetation and the adequacy of water supplies. On both these issues, the Palisades Fire revealed serious problems. A problem which arose after 1961 involves the unintended consequences of environmental legislation. Communities will continue to be devastated by wildfires unless adequate vegetation management is accomplished. Yet, environmental regulations are focused on maintaining the status quo, often making vegetation management difficult or ineffective. House survival during a wildfire is strongly affected by whether good vegetation management practices and good building practices (“ignition-resistant” construction features) have been implemented. The latter have not been mandatory for housing built prior to 2008, and the vast majority of houses in the area predated such building code requirements. California has also suffered from a highly counterproductive stance on insurance regulation. This has resulted in some residents not having property insurance, due to the inhospitable operating conditions for insurance firms in the state. Because of the historical precedent, the details in this paper focus on the Palisades Fire; however, many of the lessons learned apply to managing fires in all WUI areas. Policy recommendations are offered, which could help to reduce the potential for future conflagrations.

1. Historical Context

Wildland fires can occur anywhere there is significant vegetation. Meanwhile, WUI (wildland–urban interface) fires occur in areas where residential developments abut onto—or intermix into—wildland areas (for the purposes of this paper, we will not distinguish intermix and interface types of areas). Problems tend to be more severe in areas where the climate is dry and urban growth has resulted in sizable populations located near densely vegetated areas. This describes California, and California has repeatedly suffered from major wildfires and WUI fires. The latter have sometimes progressed into urban conflagrations of the sort that will be discussed here.

Historically, until around 1970, forest fires and house fires were considered as two different, totally unrelated phenomena, addressed by professionals whose professions did not overlap. In 1971, after major California fires in 1970, Carl Wilson [1] suggested, “the commingling of urban and rural fires is a national problem.” Very shortly after that, in 1974, Pres Butler [2] wrote what effectively was the first engineering analysis of the WUI problem. Based on extensive research at the US Forest Service (USFS), in 2008 Jack Cohen published a systematic analysis [3], while a recent overview of the WUI problem was provided by Johnston et al. [4].

On the morning of 6 November 1961, disaster struck southern California as the Bel Air Fire ignited in the Santa Monica mountains of Los Angeles (Figure 1). By the time the fire was suppressed two days later, some 2465 ha (6090 acres) were burned and over 513 homes were destroyed, with total losses of around USD 252 million (in 2025 dollars). The fire resulted in a benchmark study, “The Devil Wind and Wood Shingles” by Rex Wilson [5], which was one of the earliest efforts to understand the diverse aspects of a fire in the WUI (wildland–urban interface). In his study, Wilson identified the following as being the main factors which can create a disaster:

• High winds, specifically, the fierce Santa Ana winds [6,7,8];
• Dry weather;
• Mountainous terrain;
• Narrow curving roads;
• Problems in radio communications;
• Lack of ignition resistance in homes;
• Brush-covered homes;
• Wooden roofs.

Figure 1. The 1961 Bel Air Fire (Photo: Los Angeles City Fire Department).

Figure 1. The 1961 Bel Air Fire (Photo: Los Angeles City Fire Department).

Most severe wildland or WUI fires are driven by fierce winds. In the Bel Air Fire, there was severe danger due to extremely low humidity and Santa Ana wind conditions two days prior to the fire. Wilson noted the severe dangers of the predominant chaparral vegetation: “Under low humidity conditions, it is thought to be the most combustible brush in North America.” Furthermore, many homes had this vegetation “within 10 to 15 feet of the house.” But there was also house-to-house spread. In other areas, “No brush was burning in the area,” yet houses kept igniting. This was due to flying brands, commonly coming from wood shake or wood shingle roofs, but also from other burning materials.

He also explained some proactive measures that can be taken, and that can save homes:

• Clearance of vegetation away from structures;
• Use of less-combustible types of vegetation;
• Prepositioning fire engines where greatest need might be anticipated;
• Banning wood shake or wood shingle roofs. This had not generally been done in the affected areas, but efforts were subsequently mounted due to lessons having been learned from the 1961 fire.

One of the ways that the LAFD was able eventually to stop the Bel Air Fire was to put online a brand-new, not yet commissioned pumping station, the East Ridge Pumping Plant.

In a pioneering analysis effort, Wilson was able to quantify the combined role of brush clearance + roof safety. Figure 2 shows that, for a 30 ft (9.1 m) brush clearance distance, 34% of wood-roof houses were destroyed, but only 8% of houses with fire-rated roofs. Conversely, with a wood roof and no brush clearance, the probability was 55% for house destruction.

Wilson also found that, in the Bel Air Fire, firefighting was often made more difficult or less effective due to lack of urban planning focus concerning firefighting operations. Fire apparatus are large and bulky, compared to normal residents’ vehicles. Yet, most streets were not laid out with due regard that, in a wildfire, both a massive evacuation of occupants will need to be accommodated, along with the ability to quickly and effectively bring in needed fire apparatus.

A few years later (1974), Butler wrote [2] “One of the ironies of the interface problem is that most of the technical aspects of fire control of wildland have already been solved.” But by “solved,” he meant understood, not that the problem was actually solved for the communities involved. In his assessment, there are three main factors [2,9]:

(1)

Extreme weather conditions (very low humidity, along with high wind speeds);

(2)

Hazardous fuels (wildland vegetation and landscape vegetation in proximity to readily ignitable building fuels);

(3)

Rapid fire spread that overwhelms fire suppression resources.

As we shall see, each of these was important in creating the Palisades Fire disaster.

From the point of view of the community of residents, however, it is crucial to prevent and mitigate, not just merely describe and document. Thus, Butler also wrote that “the urban/wildland fire interface does not appear to interest anyone in government at any level.” This, of course, is no longer true in that a plethora of governmental entities are “interested”; the question, which we will try to examine here, however, is to what extent have they been fruitful?

Other Historical Fires in the Area

In 1982, Radtke published a brief history [10] of fires in the Santa Monica Mountains area, going back to the 1900–1919 period. Later, a study showed that from 1929 to 2007, there were 20 wildfires which burned in Malibu [11]. More recently, the Woolsey fire of 2018 (Figure 3) and the Franklin fire of 2024 (Figure 4) swept through the area.

2. The January 2025 Southern California Wildfires

Some 63 years later, Los Angeles again erupted in massive fire, this time in several different locations. Due to the prevailing Santa Ana winds (the “Devil Wind” in Wilson’s description), multiple wildland or WUI fires erupted nearly simultaneously, progressing to several urban conflagrations. The most destructive of these were the Palisades Fire and the Eaton Fire; but others in the area included the Hughes Fire, the Sepulveda Fire, Sunset Fire, Lydia Fire, and a number of smaller blazes. The Los Angeles wildfires are projected to become the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history, with total damages estimated at $275 billion. The focus of this paper will be prevention of conflagrations. We will examine the major areas of successes and of failures, and endeavor to offer some recommendations on how successes could be increased. There were some significant differences in the fires that erupted in January 2025, and the primary focus here will be the Palisades Fire, since this took place very close to the area of the 1961 conflagration. But many issues raised are relevant statewide in California, and some also to other Western states.

2.1. The Palisades Fire

The fire was first reported at around 10:30 a.m. PST on 7 January 2025, near the Skull Rock Trailhead, in the City of Los Angeles, specifically the Pacific Palisades neighborhood (Figure 5). The official investigation has not yet concluded, but either a rekindle of a small fire on 1 January (the Lachman Fire) or an incendiary cause is suspected. Railroads, highways, and utility electrical lines were not in the vicinity, thus these are not suspected. The fire was finally fully suppressed on 31 January (Figure 6), after it had burned 9594 ha (23,707 acres) and destroyed over 6800 structures. It has been characterized [12] as being “probably the largest and worst disaster in the history of Los Angeles.” In addition to the Pacific Palisades neighborhood of the City of Los Angeles, the conflagration also destroyed portions of Malibu, a community in Los Angeles County which was incorporated as a city in 1991, along with a number of unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County.

One feature of the Palisades fire was that 12 deaths were recorded. This can be contrasted to the simultaneous Eaton fire, which burned only about half the area (5674 ha; 14,021 acres), yet resulted in 17 deaths. And both of these make a sharp contrast to the 2018 Camp Fire, where 85 lives were lost; however, that fire burned some 62,052 ha (153,336 acres).

2.2. Fire Department Staffing and Operations

During the 1961 Bel Air fire, the LAFD had 3077 firefighters. During the Palisades Fire, the number had increased to only 3902, an increase of 27%. Meanwhile, the city population had grown from 2,479,000 to 3,820,000, an increase of 54%. In other words, the population expanded twice as much as did the number of firefighters. In 1961, the LAFD had 320 pieces of fire apparatus, of which 260 fire engines were in first-line service. But in 2025, the total count dropped to 183. Even more strikingly, Kristin Crowley, the Fire Chief reported [13] “We have over 100 fire apparatus out of service. Having these apparatus, and the proper amount of mechanics, would have helped.” Assuming that 83 fire apparatus were available in front-line service 2025, this means that the per-capita operable fire apparatus count went down to 21% of what it was in 1961. This is striking indeed. Even the number of fire stations (106 in 2025) did not keep up with the 54% increase in population, since there were 99 stations in 1961. This is consistent with the assessment [13] of the LAFD Chief, that the department has been “understaffed, under-resourced, and underfunded.” The chief also noted [14] that “In many ways, the current staffing, deployment model and size of the LAFD has not changed since the 1960s”; however, it would appear that a more realistic assessment would be of significant regress, not stasis. A reporter summarized the situation as follows [14]: “Before the latest firestorm, LA had been warned that its Fire Department is too small.” Also, for the 2024/25 budget cycle, the City of Los Angeles cut $17.6 million from the fire department’s budget [12]; the mayor, Karen Bass, then fired the fire chief after this fact was publicized [15].

The limited availability of in-service fire apparatuses may not be entirely the fault of LAFD. The production and sale of fire trucks are a niche industry, which in recent years has seen monopolistic trends emerge in the U.S. [16] As a result, truck prices have ballooned at rates beyond the cost of living rises, while delivery times have become excessively long [17].

2.3. Pre-Positioning of Resources

As Wilson already explained for 1961, pre-positioning of resources such as fire engines into an area can be of help in making certain that they will be available without delays due to travel distances or traffic problems. The Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) stated [18] that they had done some such preparations for the Palisades Fire. But independent journalist Michael Shellenberger [19] interviewed numerous local persons and concluded that, if this was done, it was not adequate for the challenge. CBS News reported [20] that 19 fire engines were pre-deployed, while another source [21] gave the total as 55, but it appears that none of them were able to respond promptly to the initial stages of the Palisades Fire. And, the Los Angeles Times [22] found that “LAFD officials chose not to order roughly 1000 firefighters to remain on duty for a second shift as winds were building -- which would have doubled the personnel on hand when the Palisades fire broke out the morning of 7 January. Fire officials staffed just five of more than 40 engines that are available to aid in battling wildfires… and that the LAFD could have sent at least 10 additional engines to the Palisades before the fire-engines that could have been on patrol along the hillsides and canyons and potentially put out the fire when it was still small.” Additional engines were pre-positioned as a consequence of mutual aid [23], but the delayed response (see below) suggests that this too was not effective.

2.4. Delayed Initial Response

For reasons which may not be unraveled until in-depth investigations are completed, the initial response of LAFD was extremely delayed. An eyewitness, Michel Valentine reported to a news channel [24] that his wife saw smoke from the fire and called 9-1-1 at 10:29 a.m. and stated that the first suppression effort did not take place until 11:23 a.m., when a helicopter came in and started dropping water. Another report stated [25] that “At 10:41, that helicopter dropped water on the western edge of the fire.” A different assessment, but equally problematic, was presented by MSN [26]: “The fire raged for 45 min before a helicopter arrived. A witness reported that the helicopter had no water to extinguish the fire.” It is striking that the first application of water did not take place from a fire engine, since normally engines can be mobilized more rapidly than aerial resources. Other source [27,28] reported different times, but with the same outcome. They specifically noted that “Radio traffic records show that fire trucks were still en route to the fire 25 min after it ignited.” By the time that response did occur, fire growth was exceptionally rapid. The New York Post newspaper [29] reported that “By 11:30 a.m., firefighters were reporting the fire was 200 acres, aided by strong winds that carried embers as far as two miles.” This was already a fire which would be difficult to contain. Yet, the same story reported that a fire department official stated that at 10:48 am, “Currently, it’s a 10-acre brush fire in heavy fuel on top of a ridgeline.” A 10-acre brush fire should be easily handled by a major-city fire department, and without fire hydrants being run dry. But equipment and personnel have to arrive at the site and begin initial attack in a timely manner.

How fast can the response be expected? NFPA 1710 [30] establishes an 80 s turnout time and 240 s travel time (together, 5 min and 20 s response time) benchmark time goal, starting after the alarm has been received and processed. In 2023, the LAFD presented a “Standards of Cover” analysis of their operations which claimed that the department had set a goal of 300 s travel time to 88.7% of its service area, and that, in actual service, it provided 420 s travel time, or less, to 90% of the response incidents. It also offered the conclusion that it should “maintain current response time goals.” Given this optimistic assessment, actual incident performance which entailed a response time which was closer to 1 h than ½ h can be viewed as highly troubling for a major city. The LAFD firefighters union responded [31] by noting that “the fire department can only function today because it spends an extraordinary amount on overtime, paying members of the existing staff to work additional 24-h shifts each month.” This staffing strategy resulted in a system whereby [31] “city pay records showed more than 80 LAFD employees earned more than $400,000 last year by working numerous overtime shifts.”

2.5. Availability of Water

Firefighting water is essential for saving structures in the WUI, so availability of water becomes a crucial issue in large fires. As a consequence of the Bel Air Fire, the Santa Ynez reservoir was constructed during 1965–1970 specifically to provide water to the Pacific Palisades area. US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations mandated that the owner of the reservoir, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), install a cover over it in 2008. It took the agency 4 years to construct the cover. But only 12 years after its installation, the cover developed a hole in it. The LADWP responded by draining the water from the reservoir and starting a planning process for its repair, which had accomplished nothing by the time the Palisades Fire broke out. The LADWP did not notify the LAFD of this situation, and when firefighting water was needed, LAFD forces in the area only had access to three tanks, each holding about 1 million gallons; meanwhile, the empty Santa Ynez Reservoir would have held 117 million gallons, had it been filled [32]. Thus, “hydrants failed after three tanks each holding a million gallons of water went dry within a span of 12 h, officials said.” [33]. Some officials tried to claim that, ostensibly, the empty reservoir was not a problem on the basis that “with extreme Santa Ana winds that prevented the use of planes and helicopters, the Palisades fire was impossible to control, and municipal water systems aren’t equipped for such blazes.” [34]. But Shakespeare [35] answered that objection more than 400 years ago: “A little fire is quickly trodden out; Which, being suffer’d, rivers cannot quench.” Furthermore, helicopters did drop water, even in the early—but not early enough—stages of the fire [20].

Many additional water resources were also grossly inadequate [36]: “Replacements of ‘aging and severely deteriorated’ water tanks were postponed, according to county records, along with upgrades to pumping stations and ‘leak prone’ water lines in the two communities [Malibu and Topanga], whose water system is run by the [Los Angeles] county’s Department of Public Works. A plan to build a new connection to draw water from a neighboring water system during emergencies has also been delayed for years.” And, “Many projects on a list of about three dozen ‘highest priority’ upgrades compiled by county officials in 2013 have yet to break ground in communities devastated by the fires.” Wilson noted for the 1961 Bel Air Fire that one mitigating factor was that the City was able to activate a just-built water plant, which was waiting commissioning; such a saving grace was not available for the Palisades Fire.

It is important to assess the claim of officials that providing adequate water for fighting WUI fires is unnecessary, since it would be an impossible task. Clearly, officials at time of the 1961 Bel Air Fire did not propose such non-action, but rather outlined plans for improving water delivery. It is, of course, true that many cities have neglected to maintain their infrastructure in recent decades. But that is a negative status assessment, not an exoneration. It is the fundamental responsibility of city government to provide for the safety of its residents, and this includes fire safety. What does emerge, is that much more active planning of water resources for firefighting purposes has to become a priority for city governments. One reason that cost of living is higher in cities than in low-population-density locales is that the residents need to pay for city services. And it is inarguable that they should be provided with adequate safety in return for this burden.

In a more general context, the allocation of water and the rates charged therefore have been controlled by California politics, not by supply and demand. A myriad of problems has been created by this politicization, but perhaps the two most severe ones have been the following: (1) Most of the water is allocated to farmers, leaving cities with serious problems; (2) environmental regulations have been used to repress creative solutions to availability and, surprisingly, even to repress certain conservation measures [37]. And, even when the residents of California approved in 2014 a water bond proposition to spend USD 2.7 billion on new water storage projects, 11 years later all that happened was that [12] “those projects have been tied up in absurdly slow-moving environmental reviews and planning processes.”

High-Pressure Water Systems

To make adequate water available for urban firefighting purposes, it can be viewed that there are two related objectives which must be fulfilled:

(1)

An adequate supply of water must be assured for the city or other entity which will conduct the firefighting;

(2)

Sufficient water must be available at the fire hydrants.

Historically, a number of cities undertook to solve the second problem by means of a high-pressure, dedicated system for supplying fire hydrants. The most famous is San Francisco, which, during the 1906 earthquake, experienced uncontrolled fires due to lack of water from hydrants. The solution was a separate, high-pressure system of cisterns and hydrants for firefighting purposes [38]. Rochester, NY; Baltimore, MD; and many other cities [39], mostly on the East Coast, also established such systems. Philadelphia, PA, which was highly influential in establishing fire safety concepts in colonial-era U.S., established such a system in 1903, but abandoned it in 2005 [40], and most other East Coast cities also did likewise. When conflagrations in urban areas occur, a major water supply problem can be the houses themselves. If a house burns down, water is liable to come spurting from the destroyed plumbing system. This could be mitigated by means of special valves, which shut off supply if unrestricted outflow takes place. Such valves have been implemented for natural gas systems as a safety measure for earthquakes; however, it does not seem to have been considered for domestic water supply [41]. But, a separate, high-pressure water supply system which only services fire hydrants and not domestic uses is a more robust solution. The East Coast cities which originally adopted such systems may not be at much risk of conflagrations today. But WUI areas in the western U.S. would be prime candidates for such measures to ensure availability of water from hydrants.

2.6. Urban Planning Aspects

Wilson noted after the 1961 Bel Air fire that the fire department had access difficulties due to narrow, winding, dead-end streets prevailing in the area. The Pacific Palisades area is roughly of similar vintage, similar geography, and similar problems. Thus, firefighters encountered access difficulties there [42]. There are no proposals for viable improvements on this issue. Streets are necessarily winding when the topography is hilly. And, they could only be widened by eminent domain-taking of residents’ land, which is rarely an acceptable solution. The Los Angeles Times [43], however, went further and noted that “They did not stop building on fire-prone ridges and canyons. And there was no major push to radically rethink how they built.” This raises the most fundamental questions of population growth but, unfortunately, does not give answers. Some two decades earlier, Roger Kennedy [44], the former head of the National Park Service, examined the wildfire and WUI fire problem and noted that many of them stem from the trend of U.S. populations to move into areas which are prone to devastating wildfires and are hard to protect. To this observation, there are three possible answers:

(1)

The government should control where people are allowed to live;

(2)

Education efforts will induce people to locate in suitable locales;

(3)

Governmental entities need to recognize the situation and devote sufficient resources to protect the residents from disastrous conflagrations.

The first option is clearly not possible without excessive control of the population. The second option lacks any examples of successful solutions. Thus, the third option is the only one which is feasible. Unfortunately, the Palisades Fire, along with numerous other recent California conflagration disasters, shows that, while feasible, it was not implemented. Instead, both the original developers of the subdivisions and the ensuing City officials “saw fires as freak events” [43]. Even worse, rampant housing development continues in very-high-fire-hazard severity zones [43], while no planning of how to successfully protect the residents of these areas is advanced.

Despite Wilson’s warning that narrow, winding, dead-end streets can lead to disasters, no significant progress has been made on this by 2025. Notably, it was reported that [45] “The traffic jam on Palisades Drive prevented emergency vehicles from getting through and a bulldozer was brought in to push the abandoned cars to the side and create a path.”

2.7. Problems in Radio Communications

In the 1961 conflagration, Wilson wrote that there were problems in radio communications, due to overcrowding of channels, and that radio contact sometimes became “impossible.” In hilly terrain, there can always be communications problems, but it appears that none were serious during the Palisades Fire. This is an area where modern improvements appear to have been fully fruitful, as there were no observations concerning fire department issues related to radio communications.

2.8. Mapping High-Fire-Hazard Areas

In California, the CAL FIRE’s Fire Resources and Assessment Program (FRAP) provides fire hazard severity zone (FHSZ) maps to identify areas which may be especially liable to devastating wildfires [46,47]. In addition, its Public Utilities Commission issues similar maps [48] focused on utility issues. The FHSZ maps initially only encompassed areas which are officially designated as State Responsibility Areas (SRAs), excluding Local Responsibility Areas (LRAs). The Bates Bill (AB 337), passed in 1992, extended the classification system to LRAs. But this is still not complete, and CAL FIRE has announced the intention that the process will be completed in 2025 [46]. If the mapping exercise is to be fruitful, high-loss WUI or wildland fires should predominantly be found in areas mapped as being very-high-fire-hazard severity zones. Nearly all of the spread area of the Palisades Fire was within the very-high-fire-hazard severity zone of the FRAP map. But the Eaton Fire drew attention to the fact that existing FRAP maps may not be adequate. The Los Angeles Times reported [49] “Only 21% of properties within the Eaton fire perimeter were in CAL FIRE’s ‘very high’ fire hazard severity zones. Yet 94% of those properties had ‘severe’ or ‘extreme’ wildfire risk, according to more advanced wildfire models.”

2.9. Wood Roofs, Palm Trees, Plastic Grass

The single most important recommendation of Wilson after the Bel Air fire was to eliminate wood (shake or shingle) roof coverings. Houses started being built in the Pacific Palisades neighborhood in the 1920s, and it had many houses dating to the 1940s or 50s, but not much of new housing, since it has been a built-out neighborhood. Existing home owners in California are required to upgrade to Class A roofs (within any Fire Severity Zone) or at least a Class C roof (other areas) only if the roof is replaced [50]. As a result, a 2018 study [51] found that a sizable fraction of houses in the area still had unremediated wood roofs.

A problem which emerged in recent California wildfires is the torching of palm trees (Figure 7). Most palm trees in residential neighborhoods of California are not native plants, but have been imported as decorative plantings. While they may be visually attractive, they ignite easily and burn readily. With the reduction of wood roofs, planted palm trees have taken their place as fire-promoting generators of flying brands. This is especially problematic due to their great height, which is often higher than neighboring roofs. There have also been concerns about what role plastic grass may play in fire spread. Some products are resistant to ignition, or fire-retardant treated. But there is a possibility of seriously problematic products, and this needs to be considered in future incidents.

2.10. Insurance Aspects

This author has written about the counterproductive nature of insurance regulation in California [52], which has a history of poor choices and unfortunate decisions dating back to 1968. Regulations were initially focused [53] on stopping “redlining” practices and fostering availability of insurance for “underserved communities.” But it makes no sense for state regulators to try to force insurance firms to offer property insurance at rates below cost. The situation became so distorted that, in 2021, the average home insurance premium in disaster-prone California was only USD 1403, compared to the national average of USD 1411, and compared to USD 2437 in Florida, another state with a significant natural-disaster propensity [54]. When faced with the prospect of losing money, the only thing that the firms can do is stop offering insurance in that state [55]. Already prior to the January 2025 wildfires [56], “According to data from the California Department of Insurance, between 2020 and 2022, insurance companies declined to renew 2.8 million homeowner policies in the state. Over half a million were in Los Angeles County.” The State of California charged an investigative body (the “Little Hoover Commission”) in 2024 to reexamine California’s insurance problems, but the Insurance Commissioner refused to participate in the process [54]. Then, as a consequence of the January 2025 Southern California wildfires, the Insurance Commissioner of California, Ricardo Lara, rapidly responded to make a bad situation worse by issuing [57,58] a “Mandatory one-year moratorium prevents homeowners insurance cancellations and non-renewals in affected areas of Southern California.” Attempting to force private-sector businesses to offer services at money-losing rates is not a recipe for success. Of course, the reason for the “cancellations and non-renewals” is precisely because the State of California has, by means of numerous laws and regulations, attempted to force insurance firms to offer property insurance at rates where they will be losing money. And it also makes little sense to expect that insurance carriers can sustain a business where customers from other states have to subsidize money-losing activities in California. A sensible insurance regulation framework would, of course, focus on both macro- and micro-scale risks. In other words, premiums [54] should reflect the community-scale fire risks and firefighting resources, along with the ignition-resistance of the house and vegetation management of the immediate environs, as discussed below. Unfortunately, there has been significant political pressure to require insurance policies to be offered at “affordable,” i.e., below-cost rates [54]. But that is an unsustainable model. One such unfortunate example was the 1988 Proposition 103 [59], which arbitrarily reduced property insurance rates and further restricted the ability of insurance companies to set rates consistent with the risks experienced [60].

Some of the details pertinent to rational rate-setting for insurance premiums rely heavily on data for fire risk and for fire losses. Thus, the LHC recommended [54] that “The Legislature should require the creation of a data commons to enable insurers, fire officials and emergency responders, city planners and developers, and the public access to the same risk information.” Since rate-setting should also be based on projections of losses for catastrophic events, they also recommended that California should establish a Public Catastrophe Model for the state.

3. Hazard Reduction Programs

How can hazards be reduced, so conflagrations such as the 2025 Palisades Fire be less likely to recur? This is a very complex issue and no simple, easy solutions can be offered. But what can, or cannot, be done can be better understood by looking at roles of the entities involved separately. Here, we will consider the primary entities, federal, state, and local government agencies, and finally the homeowners themselves.

3.1. Vegetation/Fuel Management

In 1961, it was already appreciated that it can be beneficial to keep vegetation away from houses. And only a little while later—in 1974—noted wildfire specialist Countryman [61] taught that vegetation management at the federal or state level is the crucial component for preventing wildfire disasters. (Here, we shall refer to schemes at all levels as “vegetation management” and “fuel management” as synonymous terms, even though some entities make a distinction, based on program objectives). For federal or state entities, vegetation management can include mechanical thinning, timber harvesting, establishing fuel breaks, and prescribed fire. But each costs money and requires personnel capable of performing these activities. For completeness in establishing “lessons to be learned” for future disasters, we discuss mitigation strategies for all levels of government here. It is acknowledged, however, that federal holdings within the Palisades Fire perimeter were limited, and, for this particular incident, improved federal hazard reduction policies would not likely have ameliorated the outcome.

3.1.1. Federal Level

While much of the Palisades fire occurred on private land, it also burned were portions of the Sant Monica Mountains National Recreation Area, a unit of the U.S. National Park Service (NPS). The federal government is, by far, the largest landowner in California, with control of about 47% of the land, primarily under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the NPS. Yet, in 1961, these agencies only considered vegetation management in the context that, if fires occur on their holdings, they need to suppress the fires. This, by itself, was a novel idea. Prior to the coming of white settlers, native peoples coexisted with fire and it was not specifically seen as a threat. But once a plethora of permanent structures were erected, it became evident that these are not a viable part of an ecology where wildfires are permitted to periodically run through the landscape. The federal agencies all came into existence after this change, so their initial focus was simply suppression. From its 1905 inception, the Forest Service (FS) had a strong component of fostering commercial logging; thus, logging was seen as an integral part of their land management. In 2006, a book titled Wildfire: A Century of Failed Forest Policy was published [62], which documented in detail many of failures of federal policies for vegetation management on their lands. More recently (2023), the Congressional Research Service [63] published an assessment. They concluded that “Many forest health issues have been ongoing for decades” and noted that the agency is bogged down in a bureaucratic mire: “federal agency decisionmaking processes as preventing FS from implementing projects at their desired pace and scale, particularly related to NEPA compliance, public involvement, and administrative and judicial challenges to agency decisions.” And they confirmed an earlier assessment “that hazardous fuels are accumulating three times faster than the rate of treatment.” They also concluded that NEPA (see below) is likely the dominant factor why the bureaucracy is not achieving forest health goals, including the fact that the NEPA is so configured as to encourage interested parties to sue in order to stop forest management activities from proceeding successfully.

There are three different federal agencies managing the bulk of the non-military federal lands. Why? The reasons are basically historical and related to funding, although presumably agency personnel today would focus on differences in mission. But a single, merged agency would be both less costly and more efficient [64,65].

In October 2024, the FS directed its staff in California to stop prescribed burning “for the foreseeable future”, primarily due to resource limitations [66]. This particular stoppage would not have affected the Palisades Fire, but the history of the FS repeatedly shutting down prescribed burn activities should be viewed as having long-term consequences. The recurring FS policies pertaining to prescribed burns have been described as [66] “always choosing short-term risk over long-term vision and strategy.” Meanwhile, the National Park Service even argued [67] that there is no need to enact prescribed burns in Southern California—while offering no viable alternatives for vegetation management. Even worse, they argued that vegetation management is not needed at the federal level, and that tried-and-failed prevention and suppression activities are entirely adequate. It appears that they have not recognized that, as early as 1974, Countryman [61] was explaining that ignition-prevention only has limited value and cannot be used as a tool to stop disasters.

For around a century, the largest problem facing the U.S. forests has been overgrowth of vegetation. This was permitted to occur, since natural fires were vigorously suppressed, and prescribed burns were nowhere near sufficient, while logging and mechanical thinning were not sufficient to keep up with the progressive increase in the fuel load. But, in more recent years, many U.S. forests have been, effectively, killed by attack of beetles or other insect pests, so that what was a forest becomes a large stand of dead trees. Since dead trees burn much more readily than live ones, this can become a serious fire hazard. Yet, both the FS and other federal agencies have mounted responses which are notably inadequate [68].

3.1.2. State Level

The State of California owns vast tracts of forests, parks, and other vegetated areas within the state. In addition, the State has a role in managing additional lands of which it is not the official owner. If vegetation management were better accomplished, this might have had a beneficial effect when the January 2025 fires erupted. Yet, one news magazine [69] summarized as follows: “How Red Tape Strangled California Forest Management Before LA Fires.” The article noted that “if prescribed fires have been conducted at the rate they should have, the damage would have been lessened.” But they were not, since NEPA and CEQA (see below) created extensive bureaucratic delays and obstructions.

Still, given the size of the state and the importance of reducing catastrophic wildfire losses, there has been dishearteningly little done at the state level. In 2020, CAL FIRE started a Forest Health Program. This is a modest program, which consists mainly of community grants for reforestation activities. It does not appear to include a state-wide assessment of priorities and needs. Its stated objectives [70] include carbon sequestration and climate-change policies. The California Wildfire and Forest Resilience Task Force was established in 2021 to improve forest health and community resilience. It has, thus far, issued an Action Plan [71] and provided a Treatment Dashboard [72]. Another program which has been formulated but which has not progressed much is the California Vegetation Treatment Program (CalVTP), which was approved by the California Board of Forestry and Fire Protection at the end of 2019 [73].

3.1.3. Community Level

Cities and towns in California may enact their own fire safety ordinances requiring vegetation management. The City of Los Angeles had in effect its Fire Code, which is based on the 2019 California Fire Code. In Sec. 4906.3 it specifies that vegetation management is required in LRA areas which are very-high-fire-hazard severity zones. The actual regulations are then given in Public Resources Code Sec. 4291, California Code of Regulations 14 CCR § 1299.03, and California Government Code Sec. 51182. The requirements, however, are not necessarily clear. For example, Sec. 51182 specifies that “Fuels shall be maintained and spaced in a condition so that a wildfire would be unlikely to ignite the structure.” This requirement would lack specificity to a fire safety expert, and certainly provide no guidance to the layperson. 14 CCR § 1299.03, while similarly vague, directs the user to CAL FIRE’s “Property Inspection Guide” [74].

California Government Code Sec. 51182 requires that, in very-high-fire-hazard severity zones, a “defensible space of 100 feet” be maintained around the structure. “Fuels shall be maintained and spaced in a condition so that a wildfire would be unlikely to ignite the structure.” But, “The intensity of fuels management may vary within the 100-foot perimeter of the structure, with more intense fuel reductions being used between 5 and 30 feet around the structure, and an ember-resistant zone being required within 5 feet of the structure, based on regulations promulgated by the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection, in consultation with the Office of the State Fire Marshal, to consider the elimination of materials in the ember-resistant zone that would likely be ignited by embers.”

The City of Los Angeles could, in principle, promote vegetation management both on city property and among its homeowners. But it was recently reported [75] that “in Los Angeles the urban forest has become City Hall’s lowest priority.”

3.1.4. Homeowner Level

Motivated to a significant extent by the Bel Air conflagration, Klaus Radtke started an extensive homeowner education campaign in Southern California. In 1982, under the auspices of LA County, he published a guide [76] for homeowners describing methods to promote safer landscape management and also to improve the ignition resistance of their homes. In 1983, he then issued another guide [77] under the auspices of the USFS. An important additional message in his campaign was the importance of avoiding the potential of landslides on fire-ravaged terrains.

NFPA offers its Firewise USA^® program nationally [78], with CAL FIRE providing guidance in California [79]. This is a program aimed at homeowners and local communities. The primary focus is to promote sound vegetation management and home hardening strategies by homeowners. This is a well-intentioned program, but it is voluntary. The main incentive to homeowners is that management of vegetation fuels and other combustibles on the property can reduce the likelihood of their house being destroyed by fire. Unfortunately, while the value of this is obvious to fire safety professionals, it is not necessarily obvious to the homeowner, nor is there a mechanism for more concerted education.

In terms of mandatory requirements, California passed legislation in 2020 (AB 3074) for requirements to create “a new ‘ember-resistant’ zone, dubbed ‘zone zero,’ that bars things like brush, wooden fencing, furniture, sheds and mulch within 5 feet (1.5 m) of homes.” But as of January 2025, setting up this regulation was at a bureaucratic standstill [80]. And, of course, while protecting the first 1.5 m strip may be crucial, this is unlikely to make a major fire safety impact if this is the only action taken.

The basic summary of actions at the homeowner level was made by a representative of the California Building Industry Association [81]: “enforcement of the defensible space law has been spotty at best [and]…most property owners don’t understand how to maintain their yards. The state doesn’t impose penalties for non-compliance, and only a few local governments have chosen to do so…”

One aspect of the 1961 fire that the 2025 blazes did not repeat was the dominant fire propagation mechanism. In the 1961 fire, firebrands launched from burning wood roofs were the dominant ignition mechanism. By contrast, by 2025 the dangers of wood roofs had been widely recognized, and this was no longer the dominant roofing material. But most houses were still built without “ignition resistance” being a consideration. Thus, they would readily ignite from burning houses in the neighborhood. By and large, in the Palisades Fire, houses burned more often due to radiant heat or flame exposure, rather than burning brand attack [82], even though spot fires also did occur [83]. A similar finding had been made for the disastrous 2018 Camp Fire [84].

3.1.5. NEPA and Other Environmental Constraints

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was signed into law on 1 January, 1970. NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental effects of their proposed actions prior to making decisions. Over the years, this Act has been used to obstruct diverse actions by federal agencies. Both mechanical treatments and prescribed burns have been deemed to fall under the NEPA purview, thus putting these activities in a quagmire of bureaucratic delays. A study by the PERC (Property and Environment Research Center) [85] produced the results shown in Figure 8. But this just considers delay times. Large sums of money need to be allocated for salaries of staffers performing these bureaucratic activities, funds which could otherwise be spent in mitigating wildfire hazards. NEPA is not the only environmental-focus legislation obstructing progress in wildland fire safety. There are numerous other federal and state laws and regulations, and the 1963 Clear Air Act (CAA) may be the second-most important factor in hamstringing prescribed burns. This Act regulates “pollutants” emitted into the air, and while it has no power to suppress natural fires, it greatly restricts prescribed burn options for forest managers. In California, the CEQA (California Environmental Quality Act), enacted in 1970, is the equivalent legislation that mandates environmental assessment processes for actions which could have an environmental impact [86].

The LADWP started a project in 2019 to improve the fire safety of some of their electrical facilities in an area through which the Palisades Fire swept through, Topanga State Park. But, as the New York Post reported [87], “California’s eco-bureaucrats halted a wildfire prevention project near the Pacific Palisades to protect an endangered shrub.” The shrub in question was a weed named Braunton’s milkvetch, which is evidently an uncommon weed.

3.1.6. Ignition-Resistant Homes

Losses of homes can be minimized, if they are constructed—or upgraded—to possess a certain level of ignition resistance. Homes can get ignited by various ways, but the two primary mechanisms are firebrand attack (also referred to as ember attack) and flame radiation or flame impingement. In general, it is accepted that the single most important ignition mechanism is firebrand attack [88].

During the Spanish rule of California (1769–1821), the government required certain ignition-resistant features of houses, such a tile roofs and adobe-brick walls [89]. But these were forgotten as American settlers populated the area and adopted ignition-prone construction practices. As an aftermath of the 1961 Bel Air Fire, Wilson described various features of house construction which can make them vulnerable to ignition, such as brand entry into the under-eave areas and into attic vents. Eventually, the California State Fire Marshal (CSFM) assumed a leadership role in attacking this problem. During 2000–2001, they funded the former University of California Forest Products Laboratory (UC FPL) to develop a series of tests for exterior building components potentially liable to wildfire attack [90,91]. These tests formed the basis of changes promulgated by the CSFM for the California Building Code and the California Fire Code during 2005–2006. This resulted in the implementation of WUI building code provisions, with Phase I becoming effective 1 December 2005, and Phase II 1 January 2008. The pertinent requirements and associated test methods were incorporated into Chapter 7A of the California Building Code [92]. The results of these technical measures have been highly effective. A survey [93] showed that Chapter 7A-compliant houses have a 40% lower risk of burning down in a wildfire. Another survey [81] showed that, for the 2018 Camp Fire, houses built after 2008 had a 40% likelihood of surviving, but houses built prior to 2008 only 18% (these statistics exclude mobile homes, which are built to federal, not state requirements). And the authors of the survey pointed out the very serious problem: “there’s nothing forcing Californians to safeguard their existing homes against fire hazards.” The Firewise USA^® program, referred to above, is often the mechanism by which homeowner education can be accomplished. Such a program can be valuable is numerous communities, but was largely irrelevant in the Palisades Fire. The reason was that the land was developed with large swathes of reserved open space, alternating with densely packed houses. As mentioned above, fire spread occurred largely by house-to-house spread, not so much by burning vegetation.

For homeowners who would want to retrofit some ignition-resistant features to their home, CAL FIRE has made available educational material [94]. And some homes in the Pacific Palisades where the owners had taken aggressive measures survived the conflagration [95]. Such measures can, in some instances, allow houses to withstand burning houses adjacent.

4. Rebuilding or Social Engineering?

When mass fires destroy sizable urban communities, the issue of rebuilding arises. In general, burned-out residents are likely to wish to rebuild and to repopulate the area. But government entities may have other ideas. Even if government bodies are agreeable towards letting the neighborhood get rebuilt, an important question arises: to what code? Broadly speaking, there are three possibilities:

• Rebuilding to the former building code level;
• Relaxing code requirements for rebuilding;
• Implementing new or stricter requirements.

The first of these possibilities, in many cases, may not be practicable. In the U.S., there has been a progressive “code creep.” The U.S. building codes typically get revised on a 3-year cycle, and history shows that new requirements are typically added, while existing requirements are rarely relieved or abrogated. Figure 9 shows the progressive growth of the Uniform Building Code (UBC), which was the primary code for the Western states until being replaced by the International Building Code in 2000. Note the beneficial effect (i.e., non-growth) on the code during the World War II years.

In the U.S., new construction is required to adhere to the currently authorized code; thus, option #1 is effectively precluded, since the currently authorized code will be more strict than what an older building was constructed to. Good practice would imply that new code provisions would be enacted only for requirements which have a positive benefit/cost ratio. But, Babrauskas [96] described that this is almost never done. New (or stricter) code provisions are enacted simply by committee vote, on the basis of a persuasive presentation by a proponent. Thus, even with no overt governmental exercise, rebuilding of burned housing would require adherence to more restrictive code provisions. California has a complex system of fire protection jurisdiction, whereby areas are classified as FRA (Federal Responsibility Area), SRA (State Responsibility Area), or LRA (Local Responsibility Area). The WUI provisions are innately mandatory only in SRA areas, and in some LRA areas [97].

In 2017, the Tubbs Fire [98] destroyed massive swathes of territory, including the Coffey Park neighborhood in Santa Rosa. Since it is in a city, it is in the LRA, and the City never required Chapter 7A compliance. For rebuilding after the 2017 disaster, the City of Santa Rosa decided to favor economy over fire safety, and still not require Chapter 7A compliance, on the basis that [99] “the devastation of Coffey Park [is] an event unlikely to be repeated.” As pointed out above, wildfires have repeatedly attacked Malibu and the surrounding areas. Thus, rebuilding houses with ignition-resistant features to protect against another devastation is a prudent policy. In California, since Chapter 7A requirements are optional for local jurisdictions (except for LRA VHFHSZ areas), the appropriate precaution has to be to adopt Chapter 7A, if this was not done previously. As a consequence of the Palisades fire, and the other January 2025 Southern California fires, both the Governor of California and mayor of Los Angeles suggested that building code requirements could usefully be waived to facilitate rebuilding. To this, NFPA’s Michele Steinberg offered a strong countering view that this would be an unwise strategy [100]: “My strong, strong recommendation is that local and state officials not waive those requirements in the rebuilding.”

But jurisdictions can engage in social engineering, rather than focused fire safety measures, if they elect to do so. The Pacific Palisades neighborhood was not a run-of-the-mill Los Angeles neighborhood. The residents varied from middle-class further away from the water to very wealthy closer to the ocean. There were no depressed or low-income areas in Pacific Palisades. Yet, government officials have been considering mandating that the neighborhood be rebuilt to include a large proportion of “affordable” housing [101]. The burned-out property owners have not been reacting well to such proposed mandates [102]: “They want to apply new rules and regulations to force property owners to replace the single-family Palisades and Altadena neighborhoods with multi-family dwellings, while the victims remain displaced. Or at the very least, they want these victims to run a gauntlet of bureaucrats for years just to restore what was lost—at least in part by progressive incompetence and policies that kneecapped fire prevention and firefighting.” Some area residents counter-proposed that government entities should consider strengthening fire safety provisions, rather than attempting to conduct social engineering [103].

Rebuilding by Middle-Class Homeowners

The Pacific Palisades had a sizable segment of very wealthy homeowners. These will presumably be able to rebuild, constrained only by bureaucratic issues. However, even without any social engineering schemes, rebuilding in burned-out areas can be hugely burdensome to middle-class homeowners. If they have been adequately insured, then insurance may pay the pre-existent market value of the house. But if the house is many decades old, it may be impossible to rebuild without incurring a much greater cost of construction than the prior market value of the house. The upshot is that many middle-class homeowners may necessarily have to relocate to less expensive areas [104].

A severe distortion of the market for housing in California was created by Proposition 13, passed in 1978 [105]. This unique legislation (it exists in no other state) capped real estate taxes by an artificial formula, intended to negate the consequences of rising real estate prices. With artificially depressed real estate taxes, the state had to enact substantially high income taxes, sales taxes, and other taxes. The relevance here is its effect on rebuilding burned houses. Basically, homeowners are effectively discouraged from selling an existing house and buying a new house by the tax consequences, if they have a low property tax bill locked in. The system also makes complex provisions for rebuilding of destroyed houses, and it is not clear what its overall effect will be on rebuilding consequent to the Palisades Fire. Because the scheme created so many distortions, one study [106] “concluded it has contributed to a widening wealth gap, a severe housing shortage and, for decades, inadequate funding for public schools.” The wealth gap has been, to a large extent, intergenerational. In other words, persons who bought a house decades ago and retained its ownership are subsidized by younger persons who can no longer afford to buy a house. The latter is due to the fact that they would not receive Prop. 13 benefits and would have to pay a much-inflated current house price.

5. Conclusions

A landmark analysis of a California wildfire was published in 1962 by Wilson, after the 1961 Bel Air Fire in Los Angeles. Several major wildfires also took place in January 2025 in Los Angeles. The most severe of these was the Palisades Fire, which took place in similar terrain and only slightly west of the 1961 blaze. In his analysis of the 1961 fire, Wilson made a number of systematic observations which are relevant to wildfires in general. In this, he identified a number of areas where outcomes can be affected either positively or adversely. These can form a broad context for understanding the 2025 fires, and specifically the Palisades Fire. The information presented in this paper has been based largely on contemporaneous news sources. More detailed information is likely to emerge at later times, which may correct or refine the preliminary information presented here. But the information presented here will be helpful towards fostering a better understanding of a disastrous conflagration, as examined in its early aftermath.

The most important aspect of responding to wildfires is the availability of firefighting resources, including adequate water. City officials recognized this during the 1961 Bel Air Fire. But various governmental officials tried to claim during the January 2025 Southern California wildfires that providing adequate water to fire departments is an impossible task. That is obviously an unacceptable position for residents who are paying for municipal services and expect that fire safety will be one of the services delivered. But there is a strong interaction between rapid firefighting response and availability of water. The more that the initial response is delayed or inadequate, the more water will later be needed; and at some point, water will become insufficient in such a case. It appears that one of the primary reasons that the Palisades Fire became such a disaster landmark is because the two failures occurred simultaneously—delayed fire suppression response, coupled to severe inadequacies of water supply. The reasons for the delayed response most likely involved the fact that the city progressively cut back fire department services. Most problematically, an enormous fraction of the fire department’s vehicle fleet was out of service at the time, to the point that the per-capita in-service vehicle count was about 1/5 (sic!) of what it was in 1961.

In 1961, the role of adequate vegetation management at all levels—federal, municipal, and homeowner—was not yet fully appreciated. But, certainly as the 21st century progressed, this understanding is solid and robust. Yet, the Palisades Fire shows complete failure at all levels. Neither the federal government, nor the State of California, nor Los Angeles County, nor City of Los Angeles officials took any fruitful measures prior to January 2025 to provide for adequate vegetation management. Nor did most homeowners, whether from a lack of education, lack of enforcement, or both. At least for the Palisades Fire, the residents knew that they were in a very-high-fire-hazard severity zone (VHFHSZ). But, for the Eaton fire, even the basic mapping information was inaccurate.

In 1961, there was little guidance on how to build houses to be resistant to wildfire ignition. But research since the early 2000s has resulted in a series of tests and concomitant guidance. Unfortunately, these provisions are only focused on new construction, and most of the housing in the Pacific Palisades area was old, much of it built in the 1950s. Guidance for ignition-resistance retrofitting of homes was available to homeowners prior to the conflagration, but with no incentives for such work, few undertook to do this. It should be a high priority that governmental entities take a more proactive role in this, including permitting “admitted” insurance carriers in the state to adjust premiums in accordance with existence of ignition-resistant features, or the absence thereof.

Individuals should exercise prudent measures to foster fire safety for themselves and their property. But fire protection is primarily a governmental function. Massive, uncontrolled wildfires sweeping though densely populated regions constitute a massive failure of governmental entities to provide adequate fire protection for their constituents. In the case of the January 2025 Southern California wildfires, this involved governmental entities at federal, state, and local levels, but primarily the latter two. Furthermore, this massive failure was anything but unanticipated. If the firefighting fleet is reduced by 80%, no other outcome should have been expected. Governmental entities involved should make explicit, realistic plans for saving the residents and their homes from disastrous conflagrations, given that recurrence of drought conditions and Santa Ana wind conditions are a certainty in Southern California.

Finally, a whole host of governmental policy overhauls should be considered to promote WUI fire safety. The most essential of these are the following:

(1)

Revise California insurance regulations so rates charged can become proportional to fire risks entailed. This would require stopping policies which reward fire-unsafe conditions with below-cost insurance coverage. It would also require that the Insurance Commission foster—instead of forbid—insurance rates tailored to risks represented by the specific property. Following the recommendations of the Little Hoover Commission, the state should also establish a public, open-source catastrophe model, along with a data repository (“data commons”) to support that.

(2)

Overhaul California’s water regulations, so that adequate and reliable water supply is ensured for cities and WUI areas for firefighting purposes. Some areas may benefit from establishing separate, high-pressure water supply systems dedicated for firefighting purposes.

(3)

Re-assess the adequacy of water supplies, since fires cannot be fought without adequate water. This should include evaluating the option of providing dedicated, high-pressure water systems for firefighting purposes, and also retrofitting houses with excess-flow shutoff valves, to prevent water squirting from burned-down houses from draining the water supply.

(4)

Overhaul both Federal and California environmental laws, so that vegetation management projects and water supply projects are not encumbered by vast bureaucratic costs, delays, and obstacles. On a federal level, this should include overhauling the 1963 CAA, the 1970 NEPA, and the 1973 ESA. On the State of California level, the 1970 CEQA fulfills the same functions and has the same issues. These laws should be revised so that fire safety measures are allowed to proceed unhindered by concerns for preservation of obscure biological species at the expense of the safety of human residents.

(5)

Take active, positive steps to improve hazard reduction at all levels. At the federal, state, and local government levels, this should comprise active and ongoing programs of fuel reduction. At the level of local zoning regulations, considerations should be given to reducing incentives to expand housing into forested areas. Finally, and perhaps most important, at the individual homeowner level, while voluntary programs are laudable for the gains they have achieved, local governments should give consideration to taking a much more active role, i.e., mandating additional steps for ignition-resistance of existing housing stock, and instituting more focused measures for restricting vegetation in the vicinity of houses in WUI or forested areas.