A Model of Complexity for the Legal Domain †
Abstract
:The complexity of the universe can only be defined in terms of the complexity of the perceptual apparatus. The simpler the perceptual apparatus the simpler the universe. The most complex perceptual apparatus must conclude that it is alone in its universe.
1. Complexity in the Legal Domain
2. How to Develop a Model of Complexity in the Legal Domain (Methodology)
3. Models of Complexity in Science
4. A Formal Model of Legal Knowledge (Reasonable Inferences)
5. A Formal model of the Complexity of Legal Knowledge (Parameters for A Reasonable Calculation of Complexity)
- Constructing a number of sets n (the number of parties involved) of labeled formula Hi,l representing the initial positions of each of the parties in a legal discourse, i.e., hypothesesi of partiesl about the (alleged) facts and applicable norms in a legal case;
- Determining the intersection between these sets Hi,l which defines Ai representing the agreed case facts and norms and determining the union of all complements which defines Hi. (Ai, Hi) represents the initial case description;
- Calculating all possible minimal consistent positions Pi that can be inferred from (Ai, Hi) applying a logic, e.g., the LRI, a logical variety that allows each position to be established by its own calculus;
- Calculating all maximal consistent contexts (cf. possible consistent worlds) Ci on the basis of (Ai, Hi, Pi);
- Making a ranking of these contexts on the basis of the application of the metanorms (decision criteria) included in them. A formal description and an example of this process are comprised in [7].
- In the first phase a direct, static measure of complexity is commonly applied. The number of parties and the number of Hypotheses. This is a rough estimate of the number of different positions (interpretations, perspectives, interests).
- In the second phase a direct, relative measure of complexity is commonly applied. The number of Ai and its relative size to Hi. The larger the relative size of Ai the less complex a case is considered to be, because there is supposed to be more consensus.
- In the third and fourth phases all positions Pi and contexts Ci are derived. Given the resulting set of labeled formula (Ai, Hi, Pi, Ci) representing the legal knowledge presented in a certain case, the problem complexity of this set can be defined as follows:
- The subset Ai (agreed case facts and norms) is by definition included in each Pi and Ci so its inclusion as such is not a measure for complexity as it reflects absolute consent;
- The elements of the subset Hi are by definition not included in each Pi and Ci so the relative size of the inclusion of its elements is a measure of complexity as it reflects relative consent. If there is more conformity there is less complexity;
- The relative size of the fraction of subset Ai in (Ai, Hi) relative to the fraction of Ai in other cases is a measure of complexity as it reflects the size of shared (consented) knowledge;
- The relative size of the fraction of subset Hi in (Ai, Hi) relative to the fraction of Hi in other cases is a measure of complexity as it reflects the size of disputed knowledge;
- The relative size of the subset Pi(relative to Pi in other cases) is a measure of complexity as it reflects the number of different minimal positions that can be taken logically;
- The relative size of the subset Ci(relative to Ci in other cases) is a measure of complexity as it reflects the number of different consistent contexts (possible decisions) that can be distinguished.
- In the fifth phase ranking of the contexts takes place. The number of rankings depends on the inclusion of metanorms in the respective contexts. Metanorms that are agreed upon are part of Ai, metanorms that are not agreed upon are part of Hi. The process of applying the metanorms is fully recursive, since the objects of the metanorms are other (meta)norms, which are themselves also part of (Ai, Hi). This means that the determination of the complexity of the application of the metanorms is included in the previous phases. In this phase only the resulting number of rankings is established and can be considered to be an independent measure of complexity.
6. Conclusions and Further Research
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Mestdagh, C.N.J.d.V. A Model of Complexity for the Legal Domain. Proceedings 2017, 1, 192. https://doi.org/10.3390/IS4SI-2017-04040
Mestdagh CNJdV. A Model of Complexity for the Legal Domain. Proceedings. 2017; 1(3):192. https://doi.org/10.3390/IS4SI-2017-04040
Chicago/Turabian StyleMestdagh, Cornelis N. J. de Vey. 2017. "A Model of Complexity for the Legal Domain" Proceedings 1, no. 3: 192. https://doi.org/10.3390/IS4SI-2017-04040
APA StyleMestdagh, C. N. J. d. V. (2017). A Model of Complexity for the Legal Domain. Proceedings, 1(3), 192. https://doi.org/10.3390/IS4SI-2017-04040