Abstract
In this paper, we gave an attack on RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) Cryptosystem when has small multiplicative inverse modulo e and the prime sum is of the form , where n is a given positive integer and and are two suitably small unknown integers using sublattice reduction techniques and Coppersmith’s methods for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations. When we compare this method with an approach using lattice based techniques, this procedure slightly improves the bound and reduces the lattice dimension. Employing the previous tools, we provide a new attack bound for the deciphering exponent when the prime sum and performed an analysis with Boneh and Durfee’s deciphering exponent bound for appropriately small and .
Keywords:
RSA; Cryptanalysis; lattices; LLL (Lenstra–Lenstra–Lovász) algorithm; Coppersmith’s method JEL Classification:
11T71; 94A60
1. Introduction
RSA Cryptosystem [1] is the first public key cryptosystem invented by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1977. The primary parameters in RSA are the modulus , which is the product of two large distinct primes, a public exponent e such that and a private exponent d, the multiplicative inverse of e modulo . In this system the encryption and decryption are based on the fact that for any message m in , . The security of this system depends on the difficulty of finding factors of a composite positive integer, which is a product of two large primes. In 1990, M. J. Wiener [2] was the first one to describe a cryptanalytic attack on the use of short RSA deciphering exponent d. This attack is based on continued fraction algorithm which finds the fraction , where in a polynomial time when d is less than for and Using lattice reduction approach based on the Coppersmith techniques [3] for finding small solutions of modular bivariate integer polynomial equations, D. Boneh and G. Durfee [4] improved the wiener result from to in 2000 and J. Blömer and A. May [5] has given an RSA attack for d less than in 2001, which requires lattices of dimension smaller than the approach by Boneh and Durfee. In 2006, E. Jochemsz and A. May [6], described a strategy for finding small modular and integer roots of multivariate polynomial using lattice-based Coppersmith techniques and by implementing this strategy they gave a new attack on an RSA variant called common prime RSA.
In the paper [7], first we described an attack on RSA when has small multiplicative inverse k of modulo e, the public encryption exponent by using lattice and sublattice based techniques. Let and . As there exist unique such that For , and define where . Then the pair is a solution for the modular polynomial equation . Now applying the lattice based techniques given by Boneh-Durfee in [4] using shifts and using only x shifts to the above modular polynomial equation, we get the attack bounds for , are and , respectively. Also, we improved the bound for up to by implementing the sublattice based techniques given by Boneh and Durfee in [4] under the condition and improved the bound for up to by implementing the sublattice based techniques with lower dimension given by J. Blömer and A. May in [5]; this bound is slightly less than the above bound but this method requires lattices of smaller dimension than the above method. All these attack bounds are depending on the prime difference and is the maximum upper bound for .
Later in paper [7], we described that, for , the maximum bound for may be improved if the prime sum is in the form of the composed sum where n is a given positive integer and and are two suitably small unknown integers. Define the polynomial congruence for
where is an inverse of By using lattice based techniques to the above polynomial congruence, the attack bound for is such that where , are the upper bounds for , respectively.
Now, in this paper, we slightly improved the above bound by using the sub-lattice based techniques given by J. Blömer, A. May in [5] to the above polynomial congruence and this method requires lattice of smaller dimension than the above method. The new bound on is and showed that this is a little bit greater than the former bound graphically. Note that this new attack bound is also an attack bound for the deciphering exponent d.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we state basic results on lattices, lattice basis reduction, Coppersmith’s method and Howgrave-Graham theorem that are based on lattice reduction techniques.
Definition 1.
Let be a set of linearly independent vectors. The lattice L generated by is the set of linear combinations of with coefficients in .
A basis for L is any set of independent vectors that generates L. The dimension of L is the number of vectors in a basis for L.
Definition 2.
Let L be a lattice of dimension n and let be a basis for L. The fundamental domain for L corresponding to this basis is the set [8]
Definition 3.
Let L be a lattice of dimension n and let be a fundamental domain for L. Then the n-dimensional volume of is called the determinant of L. It is denoted by [8].
Remark 1.
If L is a full rank lattice, which means then the determinant of L is equal to the absolute value of the determinant of the matrix whose rows are the basis vectors .
In 1982, A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr. and L. Lovasz [9] invented the LLL lattice based reduction algorithm to reduce a basis and to solve the shortest vector problem. The general result on the size of individual LLL-reduced basis vectors is given in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1.
Let L be a lattice and be an LLL-reduction basis of L. Then
for all [10].
An important application of lattice reduction found by Coppersmith in 1996 [3] is finding small roots of low-degree polynomial equations. This includes modular univariate polynomial equations and bivariate integer equations. In 1997 Howgrave-Graham [11] reformulated Coppersmith’s techniques and proposed a result which shows that if the coefficients of are sufficiently small, then the equality holds not only modulo N, but also over integers. The generalization of Howgrave-Graham result in terms of the Euclidean norm of a polynomial is defined by the Euclidean norm of its coefficient vector i.e., given as follows:
Theorem 2.
(Howgrave-Graham): Let be an integer polynomial that consists of at most ω monomials. Suppose that
- for some m where , and
Then holds over the integers.
Definition 4.
The resultant of two polynomials and with respect to the variable for some , is defined as the determinant of Sylvester matrix of and when considered as polynomials in the single indeterminate , for some .
Remark 2.
The resultant of two polynomials is non-zero if and only if the polynomials are algebraically independent.
Remark 3.
If is a common solution of algebraically independent polynomials for , then these polynomials yield resultants in variables and continuing so on the resultants yield a polynomial in one variable with for some i is a solution of Note the polynomials considered to compute resultants are always assumed to be algebraically independent.
3. An Attack Bound Using Sublattice Reduction Techniques
In this section, an attack bound for a small multiplicative inverse k of modulo e when the prime sum is of the form , where n is a given positive integer and and are two suitably small unknown integers using sublattice reduction techniques is described.
In a previous paper [7], we proposed an attack on RSA when has small multiplicative inverse modulo e and the prime sum is of the form , where n is a given positive integer and and are two suitably small unknown integers using lattice reduction techniques.
For is an inverse of , define =
If , then is a solution and if then is a solution for the modular polynomial equation .
Now define the set is a monomial of and is a monomial of , where l is a leading monomial of f and define the shift polynomials as
and for the coefficient of l. For , divide the above shift polynomials according to and . Then for , the shift polynomials are
and for , the shift polynomials are
Let L be the lattice spanned by the coefficient vectors and shifts with dimension [7]. Let M be the matrix of L with each row is the coefficients of the shift polynomial
and each column is the coefficients of each variable (in shift polynomials)
As is the leading monomial in with coefficient 1, the diagonal elements in the matrix M are
Note that the matrix M is lower triangular matrix. Therefore, the determinant is
where , , and are the number of e’s, X’s, Y’s and Z’s in all diagonal elements respectively, and
Let , and be the upper bounds for X, and respectively, then the bound for in which the generalized Howgrave-Graham result holds given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.
[7] Let be an RSA modulus with . Let and k be the multiplicative inverse of modulo e. Suppose the prime sum is of the form , for a known positive integer n and for and one can factor N in polynomial time if
To improve this bound in a lower dimension than the above dimension, first we construct a sublattice of L and after that we apply the sublattice based techniques to the lattice given by J. Blömer, A. May in [5], and are described in the following sections.
3.1. Construction of a Sublattice of L
The construction of a sublattice of L in order to improve the bound for is given in the following.
- First remove following rows in M corresponding to g-shifts,,⋮,.Therefore the remaining rows in M corresponding to g-shifts are,,⋮,and its corresponding g-shifts can be written as
- Now remove some rows in M corresponding to h-shifts are,⋮Therefore the remaining rows in M corresponding to h-shifts are⋮, and its corresponding h-shifts can be written as
Now, let be the sub-lattice of L spanned by the coefficients of the vectors and shifts and be the matrix of the lattice .
Note that the matrix is not square. So apply the sublattice based techniques to the basis of or the rows of to get a square matrix. Using that square matrix, the attack bound can be found and is given in the following section.
3.2. Applying Sub-Lattice Based Techniques to Get an Attack Bound
In [5], J. Blomer, A. May proposed a method to find an attack bound for low deciphering exponent in a smaller dimension than the approach by Boneh and Durfee’s attack in [4]. Apply their method based on sublattice reduction techniques to our lattice to get an attack bound and is described in the following.
In order to apply the Howgrave-Graham’s theorem [11] by using Theorem 1, we need three short vectors in as our polynomial consists of three variables. However, note that is not a square matrix. So, first construct a square matrix by removing some columns in , which are small linear combination of non-removing columns in . Then the short vector in lead to short reconstruction vector in .
Construction of a square sub-matrix of .
Columns in M and are same and each column in M is nothing but the coefficients of a variable, which is a leading monomial of the polynomial g or h-shifts. The first and remaining columns are corresponding to the leading monomial of the polynomials g and h-shifts respectively. Therefore,
- the first columns are the coefficients of the each variable for and and remaining columns are the coefficients of the each variable for and . So the variable corresponds a column in first columns if and corresponds a column in remaining columns if .
- As are the monomials of f, the set of all monomials of for is . Therefore, the coefficient of the variable in is non-zero if and only if , i.e., .
Remove columns in corresponding to the coefficients of the variable for all and note that every such column is multiple of a non-removed column, corresponding to the coefficients of and is proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.
Each column in corresponding to the coefficients of the variable , a leading monomial of the polynomial g or h-shifts, for all is multiple of a non-removed column, represents the coefficients of the variable .
Proof.
First assume that , then .
For , the -shifts corresponds first rows in and for , the -shifts corresponds remaining rows in . We prove this theorem in two cases.
Case(i): Any column in first columns of . i.e., a column corresponding coefficients of a variable with , from the above analysis in (1).
Given that . From the above analysis in (1) and (2), the coefficient of is non-zero in -shifts if and only if and . As , and , and also as for , is such that
Therefore, the coefficient of is non-zero in -shifts if and only if and .
Similarly we can prove that, the coefficient of is non-zero in -shifts if and only if and using the inequalities , and analysis in (1) and (2), and say
The formula for finding a coefficient of a variable for in is
and coefficient of in is nothing but a coefficient of in .
Note that a column corresponding to a variable is in the non-removing columns in and coefficient of is zero for in -shifts, in -shifts. The columns corresponding to a variable and a variable only with non-zero terms is depicted in Table 1.
Table 1.
A column in first columns of and a column corresponding to coefficients of a variable only with non-zero terms.
Therefore, from Table 1 the result holds in this case.
Case(ii): Any column in remaining columns of , i.e., a column corresponding coefficients of a variable with , from the above analysis in (1).
The coefficient of is non-zero in -shifts if and only if , and note for , as in -shifts. So the coefficient of is zero in all rows corresponding to -shifts.
The coefficient of is non-zero in -shifts if and only if and . For and from the inequalities , , we have the coefficient of is non-zero in -shifts if and only if and , . Take .
Note that coefficient of is zero in all -shifts as and for in -shifts. The columns corresponding to a variable and a variable only with non-zero terms is depicted in Table 2. Therefore, from Table 2 the result holds in this case.
Table 2.
A column in the last columns of and a column corresponding to coefficients of a variable only with non-zero terms.
Now apply the above analysis to the polynomial for , then this result is obtained. □
From the above theorem, all columns corresponding to a variable for all are depending on a non-removed column, corresponding to a variable in . Let be a matrix formed by removing all above columns from the matrix and be a lattice spanned by rows of . Then the short vector in lead to short reconstruction vector in , i.e., if is a short vector in then this lead to a short vector (same coefficients ) in where B and are the basis for and respectively.
As we removed all depending columns in to form a matrix , apply the lattice based techniques to instead of to get an attack bound and this lattice reduction techniques gives a required short vectors in for a given bound. The matrix is lower triangular with rows same as in and each column corresponding to coefficients of one of the variables (leading monomials of and -shifts)
Therefore is a lattice spanned by coefficient vectors of the shift polynomials and where
Since is full-rank lattice, where are denotes the number of in all the diagonal elements of respectively. As is a leading monomial of with coefficient 1, we have
Take , then for sufficiently large m, the exponents and the dimension reduce to
Applying the LLL algorithm to the basis vectors of the lattice , i.e., coefficient vectors of the shift polynomials, we get a LLL-reduced basis say and from the Theorem 1 we have
In order to apply the generalization of Howgrave-Graham result in Theorem 2, we need the following inequality
from this, we deduce
As the dimension is not depending on the public encryption exponent e, is a fixed constant, so we need the inequality i.e.,
Substitute all values and taking logarithms, neglecting the lower order terms and after simplifying by we get
The left hand side inequality is minimized at and putting this value in the above inequality we get
From the first three short vectors and in LLL reduced basis of a basis B in we consider three polynomials and over such that . These short vectors and lead to a short vector and respectively and and its corresponding polynomials. Apply the same analysis in paper [7] to the above polynomials to get the factors p and q of RSA modulus N.
Theorem 5.
Let be an RSA modulus with . Let and k be the multiplicative inverse of modulo e. Suppose the prime sum is of the form , for a known positive integer n and for and one can factor N in polynomial time if
Proof.
Follows from the above argument and the LLL lattice basis reduction algorithm operates in polynomial time [9]. □
Note that for any given primes p and q with , we can always find a positive integer n such that where . A typical example is as [12]. So take and in the range (0, 0.25).
Let and be the bounds for in inequalities (1) and (2) respectively. Then note that is slightly larger than and is depicted in Figure 1 for and 1.
Figure 1.
The region of and for ; (a) ; (b) ; (c) ; (d) .
In the Figure 1, , z-axis represents , bound for respectively and yellow, red regions represents , receptively. From this figure, it is noted that the yellow region is slightly above the red region, i.e., is slightly grater than and this improvement increases when the values of increases.
As the dimension of L is for [7] and is for , note the dimension of is , for smaller than the dimension of L.
3.3. A New Attack Bound for Deciphering Exponent d with a Composed Prime Sum
In this section, we apply the same analysis for getting bound for d which we have earlier obtained resultant bound for k.
From the relation , we get
for and the prime sum .
Now define
From Equation (3), note that if then is a solution and if then is a solution for the modular polynomial equation .
As the polynomials , differ by signs only, we can implement the above argument for to and obtained new bound on d for , , and for is
For , the Boneh and Durfee’s bound for is . The new bound on d may overcome this bound for and for some values of and and that values are depicted in Table 3.
Table 3.
For , the values of bound on in terms of and .
4. Conclusions
In this paper, another attack bound for k, a small multiplicative inverse of modulo e is given when the prime sum is of the form where n is a given positive integer and and are two suitably small unknown integers using sublattice reduction techniques and Coppersmith’s methods for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations. This attack bound is slightly larger than the bound, in the approach using lattice based techniques and requires lattice of smaller dimension than the approach given by using lattice based techniques. Also, we gave a new attack bound for the deciphering exponent d with above composed prime sum and compare it to Boneh and Durfee’s bound.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization P.A.K. and L.J.; Methodology P.A.K; Software L.J.; Formal Analysis P.A.K. and L.J.; Investigation L.J.; Writing—Original Draft Preparation P.A.K. and L.J.; Writing—Review & Editing P.A.K. and L.J.; Supervision P.A.K.
Funding
This research is part of research project funded by the University Grants Commision (UGC) under Major Research Project (MRP) with P. Anuradha Kameswari as Principal Investigator and L. Jyotsna as the Project Fellow.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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