Rethinking the Environmental Virtue of Ecological Justice from the Interdependencies of Non-Human Capabilities and Synergetic Flourishing

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The opening sentence: “Neoliberal philosophy and market capitalism have caused huge social inequalities and led to a definition of “wellbeing” that bears no connection with caring for non-human nature [4].”

Although it’s true that the better known philosophers working on the “capabilities approach” apply it to human wellbeing (HWB), there is actually a lot of philosophical work that addresses “environmental wellbeing,” which comprises both abiotic (air, water, rocks and minerals) and biotic (plants, animals, fungi, bacteria, etc.) systems. There is also a lot of scientific work that ties biodiversity to both human wellbeing (HWB) and environmental well-being (EWB) and of course EWB impacts HWB, which the author recognizes. Scientists have developed numerous tools to gauge EWB, the primary one being ecosystem functioning. Furthermore, implicit in liberalism, while explicit in Libertarianism; is the view that human actions should not harm others. Even if one interprets “others” narrowly so that it includes only human beings, one could make the case that neoliberal policies that engender harms to either local people (food/water shortages, degraded lands, droughts/flooding) or workers (terrible working conditions) are not only immoral (by definition), but they delegitimize the value of “choice” inherent in the “capabilities approach.” If people’s poor choices routinely harm others than “choice” is no longer an option for a philosophical system whose “constraint” is “harming others.”

While I wholeheartedly endorse the notion of a “flourishing planet,” I recommend dropping the capabilities approach, even though Robeyns’ version claims a robust social justice component. The capabilities approach has two flaws: 1) It’s just too individualistic. How can we account for the individual capabilities of billions of beings? You need an approach that evaluates everything as an interdependent unit, such as an ecosystem. 2) Human beings make terrible choices and most lack the discipline needed to adopt ecological lifestyles. Given people’s lack of self-discipline, one cannot appeal to “environmental virtue ethics.” If we really want to solve this problem, we must assume that human beings don’t care about virtues. Otherwise, we are expecting the people who do the most damage to act in ways they never will (turn off AC, stop first class tourism, avoid SUVs, become vegetarian, etc). People earn the big bucks so they don’t have to think, so we can’t expect the rich to aspire to virtues justified by reasons and judgment. For example, the recent heat waves led people to blast their ACs, not turn them off. Humans think only about what they deserve, given what they can afford. That is the mentality philosophers must address.   

Another point that needs to be made here is the distinction between ecosystems servicing, which is entirely anthropocentric, and ecosystems functioning, which is not. The author needs to discredit ecosystems servicing in order to explain what motivates our erroneous anthropocentric orientation.

This sentence (lines 73-75) seems odd:

However, while we might agree with the environmental virtue of ecological justice, it presents the difficulty of assessing which capabilities are more important from an ethical point of view, those of humans and sentient beings or those of ecosystems, in situations of conflicts between capabilities.

It sounds like the humans and sentients are not part of the ecosystem. By “sentients” do you mean non-human beings? Why don’t you use the term “all living beings” to include human and non-human beings?

2. The value of ecosystems from a green capabilities approach   

I find it odd that this entire section is framed in an anthropocentric manner. The author is trying to convince the reader that nature boosts human wellbeing and human flourishing, so we ought to value nature. Consider this passage (lines 132-138):

And if the focus of our appreciation is not only an individual but a whole ecosystem, with all its interdependencies and dynamic processes, then our basic capability is boosted. This is because our “Self”, that is, our personal and atomized identity (due in part to the neoliberal values that Western culture has instilled in us during the last decades), is silenced [26]. Thus, our cognitive inertia of anthropomorphization and instrumentalization is weakened when we respectfully admire an ecosystem environment and learn from it [27].

 While I don’t disagree, I worry that this approach rather cements cognitive inertia, so long as the capabilities of human beings are emphasized over the benefits to nonhuman beings whose capabilities human beings depend upon. We need to change how people think about boosting benefits. This is perhaps a third problem with the capabilities approach- it cannot lose its anthropocentric orientation. Moreover, nonhuman beings don’t depend on human beings, yet the capabilities of human beings depend on the capabilities of nonhuman beings. Nature does depend on human beings to remediate (to their best abilities) whatever human beings have destroyed. Otherwise, we have an “oppression of capabilities.”

Who is “they” in Lines 179?                                                                                                                        This also holds for our right to be well nourished, because they wear down the crop fields, increase temperatures, capture less CO2 and increase pollution, among other devastating effects.

Line 232-244, the odds seem higher of rainforests becoming savannahs than the other way around. Since loads of people attribute rights to nonhuman beings, I’m not sure why the author messes around with “integrity,” “dignity” or “autonomy.” We can defend and legally protect an Other’s rights. With integrity and autonomy, we must respect their choices/decisions but when it comes to environments, they largely respond to external factors (human interference, weather, seasons, migrations). If we grant environments integrity we can attribute whatever changes happen to their choice, which covers up human beings’ roles in forcing said choices. Don’t such terms reify neoliberal values? Attributing rights engenders a much-needed legal force, since too few grant human beings, let alone sentient and non-sentient beings inherent value. 

The point isn’t whether a savannah is better or worse than a rainforest. The point is whether the former or latter provides greater stability. Presumably, the transition happens as a result of reduced biodiversity and increased entropy, making stabilization difficult. Is the author’s worry that human beings might try to transform a savannah into a rainforest in order to extract more resources? That sounds like a dangerous gameplan unless the primary purpose is carbon storage. Here’s a relevant article: The natural comeback of tropical rainforests in the savanna region (phys.org)

3. Addressing the moral conflicts between human and ecosystem flourishing from 270 environmental decolonial thoughts and virtue ethics

Define ecological justice? Environmental values? How is the former different from environmental justice or global environmental justice?  

To me lines 282-284 ask the most important point. How do we change people’s actions and behaviors?

Others have advocate for non-distributive demands of justice and emphasizing changing the private and citizen behaviors, beyond social or institutional claims, and thus have suggested environmental virtues like mindfulness [47] or cheerfulness [48].

Who decides the trade-offs and choices (lines 303-304)?

What ecological justice does imply is adopting a holistic, rather than just individualistic, ontology when evaluating the trade-offs of a choice.

Now the author claims rainforests “choose” to become savannahs, which is the more common transition, but rainforests are no more “free to choose” than ordinary human beings. This is the ultimate neoliberal paradigm. Rainforests that become savannahs did so as a result of severe environmental changes/external forces.  

For example, from a holistic view, in understanding why a rainforest wants to become a savanna, we may realize that it is partly due to external human pressures.

I’m all for “degrowth,” but how will you convince aspirational citizens and ambitious politicians to consider, let alone adopt such a program. They prefer to produce and sell as much as possible to keep the machine alive. I really don’t understand how this author thinks that “adopting virtues” is sufficient to stop people from behaving badly! If people actually valued being virtuous they wouldn’t commit so many harmful acts.

4. Towards a synergetic flourishing based on ecological justice

How does “synergetic flourishing” differ from ecosystem functioning. Why do we need two terms?  

The English is mostly very good.

Author Response

Please see the attachment (pages 3-9 of the document).

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

I have had the opportunity to review the paper titled "Rethinking the Environmental Virtue of Ecological Justice from the Interdependencies of More-Than-Human Capabilities and Synergetic Flourishing."

Overall, I find this paper a valuable contribution to the field, with well-defined arguments and a well-written presentation. However, I would like to highlight a few minor issues that could enhance the paper's quality.

Firstly, the clarity and organization of the paper are commendable. The introduction effectively establishes the context, and the subsequent sections build a strong case for reevaluating the environmental virtue of ecological justice. The argumentation is logically structured and supported by relevant literature.

The paper explores the interdependencies of more-than-human capabilities and synergetic flourishing and is thought-provoking and innovative. It challenges conventional perspectives on ecological justice, providing a fresh lens to understand and address environmental issues. Incorporating ethical and philosophical dimensions into the discussion adds depth to the paper's overall thesis.

However, there are a few areas where the paper could benefit from minor improvements. Firstly, while the argumentation is well-structured, it would be helpful to provide more explicit transitions between sections to guide the reader through the logical progression of ideas. Some concepts and terminology may require further clarification for readers less familiar with the subject matter. For example, meta-capability, flourishing, homeostasis, autopoiesis or resilience, and (eco)republican point of view. On the other hand, “decolonizing” is explained very well.

The concept of “wonder” is presented as an environmental virtue: “wonder at the evolution and flourishing of what or who we do not perceive as an instrumental materialistic interest [line: 389-390].

However, I think Rachel Carson must be mentioned and consulted in this context as a pioneer who presented wonder as a radical state of mind. In the 1940s, Rachel Carson began developing an ethic of wonder that stood at the centre of her ecological philosophy. As we know, Carson, as a trailblazing marine biologist, sparked the modern environmental movement with Silent Spring (1962), Carson’s lesser-known writings – Under the Sea-Wind (1941), The Sea Around Us (1951), The Edge of the Sea (1955) and the posthumously published The Sense of Wonder (1965) – encouraged her readers to consciously cultivate habits of awe, to pay careful attention to the often-overlooked ‘beauties and mysterious rhythms of the natural world’.

Another book I recommend is Glenn Willmott's Reading for Wonder: Ecology, Ethics, Enchantment, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, which offers a bold and compelling alternative to reading literature and art through the lens of wonder and not critique. The book opens up wonder not as a theoretical approach but as a vital mode of thought for educational, interdisciplinary, and environmental purposes.

Another key concept of the work at hand is “Synergetic flourishing,” which is defined as the “Capabilities approach may benefit from concepts like synergetic flourishing because it collects ideas provided by decolonial thought and environmental virtue ethics, which help to understand flourishing from a relational and non-domination viewpoint.” (Lines, 562-563)

I think this thesis can be defended and supported by Martin Seligman’s book Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-being, which is a thought-provoking in its implications for education, economics, therapy, medicine, and public policy – the very fabric of society.

The author may also consult Kate Raworth’s book “Doughnut Economics”. The idea developed by University of Oxford economist Kate Raworth envisions a world where everyone has enough to meet their needs (the inside circle of the doughnut). Still, we don’t exceed the biophysical world's capacities (the doughnut's outside circle).

In conclusion, "Rethinking the Environmental Virtue of Ecological Justice from the Interdependencies of More-Than-Human Capabilities and Synergetic Flourishing" is a well-written and intellectually stimulating paper contributing to the discourse on ecological justice. While there are minor issues to address, the paper's well-defined arguments and innovative perspective make it a worthwhile read for scholars and practitioners interested in environmental ethics and justice. I recommend that the authors consider the suggested improvements to enhance the paper's clarity and impact.

As an Eco philosopher, I enjoyed reading the paper and looking forward reading the published version.

I wish all success.

Author Response

Please see the attachment (pages 9-10 of the document).

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf