Self-Transcendence and the Pursuit of Happiness

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The author approaches assumptions inherent in the ways Freud, Maslow, Kahneman, and Lacan relate self-transcendence to happiness.  He claims that Freud and Maslow “both presuppose without question a conventional concept of happiness, according to which happiness is the presence of all positives” (13), a maximal state, which for Freud was represented by the sublimation of libidinal impulses as a way to create civilization and for Maslow was the realization of cosmic consciousness.  The author sees Kahneman as somewhere in-between Freud and Maslow, focusing primarily on everyday happiness through overcoming cognitive biases, yet still occupied with the possibility of attaining a transcendent third state.

Ultimately, the author finds the ideas of Freud, Maslow, and Kahneman equally unpersuasive, arguing that perfect fulfillment of one’s dreams and “overcoming binaries by binding them in Hegelian fashion into a higher unity is impossible” (13).  Lacan is offered as the alternative: “we are actually not satisfied by the fulfilment of our dreams, and we will always, often unconsciously, produce some element of lack or disharmony to keep desire alive, and in this way keep ourselves satisfied and happy” (14).  In other words, desire and lack allow us to feel “satisfied precisely by what remains impossible to master in the Other” (12).

At times the essay appears to reference the work of Freud, Maslow, Kahneman, and Lacan in a superficial and conclusory way.  This seems to be primarily an issue of scope vs. development—the author is trying to make a sweeping argument about the persuasiveness of Lacan based on thumbnail summaries and generalizations.  The controlling idea, essentially that Lacan believes “complete fulfilment will not be the apotheosis of the self but its suffocating death,” (14) is interesting when contrasted with Freud and Maslow in particular.  However, the flaw in the piece is that it is trying too much, too fast, and offering too little. 

Language like, “one may protest” and “can be understood as” also makes the reader suspicious as the essay tries to narrow or widen the reach of certain claims in service to the present argument.  Moreover, the attempt to incorporate Letheby and Gerrans’ work linking neurocognitive networks with self-representation is equally questionable in the sense that, if it were cut, the central argument would not suffer.

Overall, this seems like an admirable attempt, but one that would be better served if it had twice the depth and half the ambition.

Author Response

Thanks very much for useful critique.

To address the comments in the first paragraph, [that the controlling idea of the article is interesting, yet “at times the essay appears to reference the work of Freud, Maslow, Kahneman, and Lacan in a superficial and conclusory way” and the argument from Lacan rests on thumbnail summaries and generalisations], I have modified my description of the scope of the discussion to reflect more clearly that I do not aim to address the work of Kahneman, Freud or Maslow in each case in its entirety. Instead, I consider how happiness is articulated by each in a particular text. I have made it clearer that what links these texts is an account of happiness in relation to the opposition between ego-actualisation and ego-dissolution. Each text takes a different perspective on this relationship. I hope this has clarified how Kahneman’s text fits into the argument. In it, he insists that both ego-actualisation and ego-dissolution must be taken account of, even though they oppose one another; In Civilization Freud prioritises ego-actualisation; In Farther Reaches, Maslow prioritises ego-dissolution. However, all of these accounts leave one pessimistic about our capacity to achieve happiness. The detailed discussions emerging from these specific texts are carefully referenced and do not, I believe, come across as superficial or conclusory.

However, in offering a possible alternative, via Lacanian ideas, I could not make use of a single key text on happiness by Lacan, since he does not offer one, but I had to extrapolate the “controlling idea” of my argument – which is influenced by him – from extensive engagement with different Lacanian texts and with their interpreters. In this case my discussion may indeed have come across as too broad, dependent on thumbnail sketches, and as referenced in a conclusory way. I agree that this discussion of Lacan was over-ambitious since it tried to do far too much in too little space and ended up giving too little. I have tried to address this by amending the discussion along the lines suggested by a remark about yin/yang from reviewer 2, and reducing the scope of the discussion to one example: the distinction between romance and love. I have also added supporting textual evidence for my claims where the references might appear to be conclusory or missing.

To address the second comment [that language like, “one may protest” and “can be understood as” also makes the reader suspicious as the essay tries to narrow or widen the reach of certain claims in service to the present argument], I have modified this kind of language throughout.

With reference to the following comment [the attempt to incorporate Letheby and Gerrans’ work linking neurocognitive networks with self-representation is equally questionable in the sense that, if it were cut, the central argument would not suffer], I would prefer to retain the discussion of Letheby and Gerrans in the article as it provides me with a way to contextualise and describe the opposition between ego-actualisation and ego-dissolution that is central to my interpretation of the texts by Kahneman, Freud, and Maslow. I have, however, revised, shortened and clarified this discussion.

With reference to the following [Overall, this seems like an admirable attempt, but one that would be better served if it had twice the depth and half the ambition], I hope the above revisions, which are quite substantial and thoroughgoing will serve as a sufficient response to this overall comment. I have decreased the ambition and increased the depth by indicating that I am discussing only one specific text per author, and not making claims about a thinker’s work as a whole, and by significantly amending and clarifying the Lacan-influenced argument and referencing it in a less conclusory way.

Reviewer 2 Report

Well-written, but sentence on lines 116-118 doesn't hold together.  As for content, the author may wish to briefly recognize that the concepts of yin and yang in Chinese philosophy may be relevant to the discussion of happiness being comprised of both happiness and unhappiness (maybe as a footnote?)

Author Response

Thanks very much for your affirmative and useful comments.

With reference to the following [Well-written, but sentence on lines 116-118 doesn't hold together], thanks for pointing this out, I have amended the error.

With reference to the following comment [As for content, the author may wish to briefly recognize that the concepts of yin and yang in Chinese philosophy may be relevant to the discussion of happiness being comprised of both happiness and unhappiness (maybe as a footnote?), I am grateful for the interesting connection. I have added the following paragraph to this effect and amended my discussion of Lacan according to it.

It is by no means a new insight that human subjectivity manifests in expressions of such paradoxes. Instead, this reflects what is re-emerging in mainstream thinking from the ancient Tai Chi system created by Taoist scholar Emperor Fu Hsi (Suler 1993: 209). The interlocking yin/yang figure depicting this system is well recognised. In Taoist philoso-phy, according to Suler (1993: 210; 219), the two opposing principles of nature Yin (“negative, feminine, weak, receptive, yielding, darkness, earth, falling, and mother") and Yang (“positive, masculine, strong, firm, light, heaven, rising, and father”) are re-lated as a “dynamic interaction” of inseparable polarities. Importantly, these polarities give form to one another. As Suler (1993: 30) puts it, “opposites blend into and coun-terbalance each other; they give rise to each other and are inseparable.” Again: “Love and hate, joy and grief, ambition and lassitude, hope and despair – all forms of ambivalence have meaning and definition because of the contrast of opposites” (Suler 1993: 219). The conception of opposites as a dynamic interaction differs from the more prevalent tendency to separate opposites into independent, competing spheres.

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

This revision is much improved from the original version, and the authors did a sincere effort at addressing the concerns highlighted.