Before engaging with the international level, a brief exploration of Hobbes’ basic political philosophy is in order, as I argue that this foundation is in fact solid and extendable beyond its original formulation to the international level.
4.2. Politics in Hobbes’ State of Nature
In order to use the state of nature analogy in IR, we must first understand what it entails. If one does not agree that states are like humans, a point I return to below, one has to tread extra carefully when using the state of nature as an illustration of the character of international anarchy [
25]. Some argue, as seen in what I labelled the rational choice readings of Hobbes above, that there are certain structural aspects of the state of nature that applies also in international relations, and proceed to say that Hobbes’ theory applies, while removing the foundation which describes why Hobbes believed that very structure emerged. One example is Malnes [
30], who in his
Hobbesian Theory of International Conflict, decides to strip the theory of Hobbes’ “cynical and pessimistic” theory of human nature. However, I argue that if human nature is removed from the theory, there is no longer much need to anchor a theory in Hobbes’ political philosophy. We must consequently see whether Hobbes’ foundation can be retained.
The existence of groups—namely large groups referred to as states—is a fundamental element in the international anarchy. This could lead some to claim that Hobbes’ state of nature is qualitatively different from an
international anarchy, due to Hobbes describing the former as a thoroughly individualistic situation, whereas states are the main actors in the international anarchy. He said, after all, that the state of nature entailed “a war, as is of every man, against every man” [
1]. Such statements might seem to be damning arguments against anyone attempting to equate complete anarchy in the state of nature with international anarchy. However, there is far more to Hobbes’ state of nature than this, and this vital point is too often overlooked.
It is, indeed, a paradox that he describes the state of nature in this way, and there are several ways of trying to resolve the paradox. First of all: the word “war” usually evokes in us a very different situation from the one Hobbes is referring to. One of his few direct examples of the state of nature is the situation of the Native Americans in his own time [
1]. However, Hobbes did not believe that every single Native American fought against every other, that there was no cooperation, or that no coalitions—tribes if you will—were formed. So, what does this war of all against all entail?
It does not entail that everyone engages in war alone, as Hobbes explicitly states that there are coalitions in the state of nature. A key element of his theory is the notion that even the weakest individual can kill the strongest, “by secret machination, or by confederacy with others” [
1]. Even the most powerful, then, must beware, as “others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him” [
1]. This state of competition, combined with the fundamental uncertainty and vulnerability, makes men “use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle” [
1], and the fear of these people makes it reasonable for men to seek to dominate others—as a way to acquire power to defend themselves. All of this takes place in Hobbes’ state of nature.
The possibility of cooperation and the existence of groups and alliances in the state of nature is relatively uncontroversial and reflected in most authoritative analyses of Hobbes’ philosophy [
23,
31]. The problem for Hobbes was not that cooperation in the state of nature was impossible, but that it was precarious, because without a governing body there is no way to gain “assurance of the other’s reliability” [
31]. As should be clear by now, this reading of Hobbes suggests that his state of nature is quite close to what is usually understood as a Lockean state of nature, and that the difference between the two is more rhetorical than substantial on this particular topic. Gauthier [
23] also states that even
political groups existed in the state of nature, and there are many indications of
society in this state [
32]. One possible reason why groups and society in the state of nature were not too heavily emphasised by Hobbes is that he focuses mostly on the creation of the
Leviathan—the commonwealth—through contract and not conquest.
When reading Hobbes, it is consequently quite important to be aware of the rhetoric at play. The war of everyone against everyone might not be as individualistic as it first appears, and even if Hobbes describes this situation as one in which there is “no place for industry”, “no culture of the earth”, no time, arts, letters, or even society [
1], he does at other times acknowledge that these things will to some extent exist, and merely be uncertain and fragile. Life as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” [
1], might, then, be something of an exaggeration, or part of a polemic intended to highlight the need to provide the sovereign with all the authority Hobbes felt was required [
32]. Hoekstra [
32] contextualises Hobbes’ quotes, and argues that his form of writing is a part of a standing tradition:
Most strikingly, his famous litany of what that condition lacks (‘there is no place for industry, …no culture of the earth, no navigation …, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society’) is an adaption of a hyperbolic trope, characterizing uncivilized peoples by a negative list, which became conventional in the century after Columbus landed.
Hoekstra [
32] goes on to provide other examples of writers making similar lists “to prove the importance of a particular art by considering the human race without it”. Aristophanes, Suetonius, and Horace wanted to promote poetry, without which “humans were in a desperate fight for mere survival, and without any of the benefits of civilization” [
32]. Rhetoricians, sophists, and philosophers have also maintained that their area of expertise has saved the world from the condition described in Hobbes’ “litany”; while this does not prove that Hobbes was wrong, it does establish that his description of the state of nature in
Leviathan makes use of a well-known—and quite effective—rhetorical device.
3If we are to understand Hobbes literally, we have to consider the state of nature a state of extreme misery. Just after the quote on the general misery in state of nature, Hobbes says that people, generally, have not lived in such a state, but that there were, in fact, people in his time that lived in the state of nature. When describing “the savage people in many places of America”, he says that they—apart from the rule of small families—are without government [
1]. Hobbes here describes people in the state of nature as organised in families, and this is far less trivial than it may seem. These families are important, considering Hobbes’ statement in
De Cive that “a family is a little city”, and a city in this book is something akin to a commonwealth in Leviathan [
34]. This is clearly not a mistake on Hobbes’ part, since he also later in the book states that a great family is a kingdom, and a little kingdom a family [
34]. These quotes make it reasonable to assume that Hobbes is not simply talking about couples with children when discussing families in the state of nature. Larger groups of people living under a master is by Hobbes construed as families, and even a political group.
The fact that Hobbes equates the state of nature with modern (to Hobbes) states, should be enough to make us cautious about a literal reading of his list of things missing in the state of nature; unless, of course, one is willing to claim that maps, watches, and knowledge in general disappears with the outbreak of war. One could claim that the things just mentioned could not easily be developed in a state of nature, but even this seems like a stretch, considering that the state of nature is, in general, not a condition of continuous war and fighting.
If Hobbes limited the state of nature to a state of utter misery, like the one in his famous quote, much of what he writes elsewhere would become completely meaningless. This is an argument against reading the quote as a literal description of the state of nature. If, however, we view the quote as a description of the worst case, or even an exaggeration to make a point, we (and Hobbes) are better positioned, and, not least, we are in a situation in which Hobbes himself states that the state of nature is a situation in which political groups exist in a sort of anarchy.
As noted, this implies that authors like Bull [
2], who argue that the international anarchy might be similar to a Lockean—but not a Hobbesian—state of nature, might be mistaken. Furthermore, if we accept that the domestic state of nature is far less extreme than it first appears, this also indicates that Hobbes’ argument might indeed be applicable to the current state system despite this system not being characterised by total and utter chaos and war at all times.
Hobbes’ use of rhetoric in Leviathan is a key reason to suspect that the quote about the misery in the state of nature may be an exaggeration.
4 Skinner [
36] points to Hobbes’ statements in
The Elements of Law and
De Cive, regarding scientific arguments being sufficient to convince the reader, and that he seems to have changed his mind when writing
Leviathan, as he is there more liberal in employing rhetorical devices to make his points.
5 This is made clear in the following quote from Leviathan: “Again, in all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary: for without it, the resolutions of men are rash, and their sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerful eloquence [rhetorics], which procureth attention and consent, the effect of reason will be little” [
1].
This begs the question: how does Hobbes describe the state of nature in his two earlier publications? In
The Elements of Law he says the following:
[…] as we know also that it is, both by the experience of savage nations that live at this day, and by the histories of our ancestors, the old inhabitants of Germany and other now civil countries, where we find the people few and short lived, and without the ornaments and comforts of life, which by peace and society are usually invented and procured […].
The description of the state of nature in
De Cive is quite similar:
They of America are Examples hereof, even in this present Age: Other Nations have been in former Ages, which now indeed are become Civill, and Flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroy’d of all that Pleasure, and Beauty of life, which Peace and Society are wont to bring with them.
It is obvious that the problems connected to the state of persistent war were considered dire by Hobbes in these books as well. It is, however, a marked difference between lacking the “ornaments and comforts”, or “that pleasure and beauty”, provided by civilization, and lacking everything Hobbes lists in Leviathan. That life is short and brutal is the main point, and this, considering the rest of Hobbes’ philosophy, is sufficient to explain why individuals seek to remove themselves from this situation.
The atomistic understanding of the state of nature as all versus all—literally—must be nuanced, and certain larger molecules must be allowed entry into this state. This does not necessarily change the fact that (almost) all people have conflicting interests, and in that respect can be understood as potential enemies. It simply means that everyone does not actively fight everyone at all times. Some people, even in the state of nature, can find interests they share with other individuals. Hobbes also explicitly states that mothers are lords of their children in the state of nature, “For since by naturall necessity we all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such termes afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at once become an enemy; … And thus in the state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a Mother, and a Lord” [
34]. That a mother and her children, or close relatives in general, are at war in a state of nature, does not seem to be a reasonable interpretation of Hobbes’ portrayal of human nature. Gauthier also points to this duality in Hobbes:
There is an apparent incompatibility between Hobbes’s account of the family and his account of the state of nature. If men are born and raised in families, and if each family is a small-scale society, then how can men ever exist in the condition of war of all against all?
Gauthier [
23] “solves” this problem by considering the state of nature a “logical abstraction”; he then claims that the individuals Hobbes places in this abstraction are not creatures “born and raised in a family”. While this solution makes it possible to stick to the image of all versus all in utter misery, I find it inconceivable that Hobbes, with his insistence on discovering the fundamental human nature, knowable to all who examine themselves, suddenly bases his argument on some completely different conception of humans. I therefore consider the state of nature a real possibility for mankind, consisting of real human beings, usually born and raised in families of some kind. Other have gone much further than Hobbes in developing and effectively using a hypothetical state of nature, and the approach mentioned by Gauthier is more reminiscent of, for example, Rawls’ [
37] original position than Hobbes’ use of the state of nature.
That cooperation can occur in the state of nature seems obvious, and objections to this can partly be attributed to another misconception of Hobbes’ writing: that no contracts or agreements can be made in the state of nature. Russel Hardin promotes this view, and claims that “a contract in the state of nature is void” [
38]. That Hobbes was of the impression that such contracts could be entered, however, seems clear:
Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it: for it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it; and consequently, where no other law, as in the condition of mere nature, forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid [
1].
The fear of some (any) spiritual power is also often enough to make contracts reliable, in Hobbes’ view. The same goes for honour and pride in not having to renege on one’s agreements. These factors combined strengthen words and covenants in the state of nature [
1]. There is also a contract between parents regarding the dominion over children [
1]. Ryan [
39] promotes a similar perspective on contracts in the state of nature, and thinks Hobbes “did not think that all covenants in the state of nature are rendered void by the absence of an enforcing power”; if one expects the other contracting partner to honour his part of the contract, and honouring the contract is safe, the contract is valid in the state of nature [
39]. People often honour such contracts, because of fear, something Machiavelli also noted:
For love is sustained by a bond of gratitude which, because men are excessively self-interested, is broken whenever they see a chance to benefit themselves. But fear is sustained by a dread of punishment that is always effective [
40].
Communication, and some degree of cooperation, is in Hobbes’ view possible in the state of nature. Covenants will to a certain degree also be valid there. “To a certain degree”, as Hobbes obviously did not consider the strength of such contracts, or the stability of that cooperation, to be sufficient to make the situation bearable. This is, I argue, also what we find to be the case in the current international system, as we regularly experience acts of outright war, while governments continually sit still as environmental challenges grow to become obvious threats to both individual security and social stability. This is also similar to the argument proposed by Locke, as he argued that the state of nature was not a state to covet [
41]. That coalitions in the state of nature are unstable, however, is not the same as them not existing. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [
42] have emphasised how important coalitions are in any situation in which cooperation of some kind is possible:
E.g., it is clear that if certain great groups of participants will—for any reason whatsoever—act together, then the great number of participants may not become effective; the decisive exchanges may take place directly between large “coalitions,” few in number, and not between individuals, many in number, acting independently. Our subsequent discussion of “games of strategy” will show that the role and size of “coalitions” is decisive throughout the entire subject [
42].
This description goes well with another description Hobbes gives of the state of nature—the state of sovereigns with regard to each other [
1]. While von Neumann and Morgenstern [
42] analyse the relationship between coalitions in cooperative games, Nash’s theory of non-cooperative games, as it appears in his article “Non-Cooperative Games” [
43], is based on the absence of coalitions, as it is assumed that each actor acts independently of, without cooperating with or communicating with, the other actors [
43]. I find no reasons to apply these assumptions to Hobbes’ philosophy; people can obviously communicate, and they also have the opportunity to enter contracts, even if these contracts might at times be precarious.
This discussion of the structure of the state of nature is particularly important in the efforts to formalise Hobbes’ philosophy, something I will not attempt to do here. The main point of this discussion of the state of nature is to show what Hobbes actually wrote about it. Many of the interpretations of Hobbes that I have disputed here come from writers attempting to use rational choice and game theory to elucidate Hobbes’ philosophy. While I consider that project to be quite valuable for elucidating certain key challenges of human society, it seems clear that there are also some pitfalls one must avoid if one is not to lose sight of Hobbes’ full philosophy in the attempt to simplify it.
Furthermore, this interpretation of the state of nature suggests that a broader set of conditions could be considered a manifestation of the state of nature, and consequently problematic. This is important, because as soon as we define a situation as a natural state, Hobbesian logic suggests that we should take action to escape such a state through the institution of a sovereign. I have shown that the existence of political units is not proof that there is no state of nature, and this opens up for the consideration of whether the current states system is in fact still a state of nature. As I have argued above, the existence of permanent and serious threats to individuals is a key criterion for identifying a situation in need of remedy, and the examples used in this article highlight both permanent and serious flaws with the states system.
One reason often given for rejecting the application of Hobbesian theory to the states system is, as mentioned above, that there are important differences between individuals and states. One obvious point is that a key driver of conflict and diffidence on the individual level is the purported natural equality of individuals, and how this leads to everyone being vulnerable to death, for example by assassination, poison, etc. This, some would argue, does not apply to states. Beitz [
44] provides four reasons why he believes the analogy between individuals and states does not hold. Firstly, he mistakenly argues that individuals are always isolated, and that there are no families, groups, etc., in the state of nature, while coalitions abound in international affairs. I agree with the latter, but I have shown above that this also holds for the former.
Secondly, he argues that individuals are more equal in power than states are, and that certain strong states are not vulnerable in the same way that individuals are in Hobbes’ natural condition. However, globalization, information technology and new weapons have made states increasingly vulnerable. Nuclear weapons, for example, arguably
do make entire states vulnerable to sudden demise. Digital technologies and social media have also been shown to enable foreign powers to discreetly and indirectly undermine and challenge the integrity of states [
45]. Furthermore, what matters in practical political affairs and considerations might not be the survival of some fictional entity called a “state”, as those who consider their situation and political courses of action are always individuals susceptible to the very vulnerabilities described by Hobbes. This is also emphasised by Kant [
7], who suggests that for states to achieve perpetual peace, the very methods discussed by Hobbes as a cause of individual diffidence—such as the use of assassins and poisoners—must be avoided at all costs. This suggests that even before nuclear weapons, state vulnerability—or perhaps more importantly state leader’s vulnerability—was a very real thing.
Thirdly, Beitz [
44] states that individuals are solitary and “completely independent” of each other, something already shown to be false. Fourthly, he argues that there are no means to enforce contracts in the state of nature, while there is on the international level. This has also been discussed and partly dismissed above.
In sum, I have shown that Hobbes’ state of nature is much more complex than simplistic presentations might suggests. While there are certainly differences between individuals and states, the similarities between Hobbes’ natural condition and the condition of states in the states system, are similar enough for the same dynamics to potentially apply.
4.3. States or Individuals—Who and What Matters?
The current international system is the states system, dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 [
2]. The pre-eminence of states is an unavoidable fact of current international relations, and this takes us to a key question for the realist tradition of IR: what is the value of states, and how do we balance the interests and needs of individuals against those of states? Much IR theory concerns itself with the analysis of states as the primary units of interest, and some even treat the state as a unitary and rational actor—referred to as the “rational actor model” [
46]. This easily provides the foundation for exploring the “interests” of states, their “preferences”, and even “goals”. As a consequence, what is referred to as order and a purported goal of international relations is the welfare, protection, and safety of
states [
2]. International order could consequently be concerned with the welfare of states, potentially without any regard to the people living in them. Bull [
2] contrasts international order—the welfare of states—with world order, which concerns itself with individuals, and is based on the realization that “states are simply groupings of men”. Kant [
7] also focuses on “the rights of
peoples in relation to each other”, and also indicates that each “people” has one state. His focus on peoples represents a clear break with the Hobbesian approach based on individuals. While he does acknowledge that a state is a “society of human beings” [
7], his path to peace arguably builds on the pre-eminence of peoples and states over the individuals in them.
The difference of focus between these two approaches is crucially important, and realist IR theory has tended to use Hobbes to analyse IR as an arena in which states take the position of Hobbesian individuals. This leads to theories in which the state of nature is directly transposed to the international anarchy, and in which unitary and rational states are seen to be in a state of war of all against all. This has, consequently, led to controversy, as states are, arguably,
not the same as individuals. Of the three causes of quarrel, competition is still highly relevant, but legitimate suspicion has been cast upon the role of diffidence and glory. States are not quite as vulnerable to sudden and violent death as individuals [
47], and the desire for glory is based on human psychology in a way that is difficult to say would apply equally to a state.
Hobbes [
1] himself did suggest that the international anarchy could be a good analogy for the state of nature. For example, he stated that no actual humans had even been “in a condition of war one against another”, but that sovereigns and kings were in fact in such a position.
… because of their independence, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war.
This quote is a key reason why many seek to transpose the state of nature to international anarchy. However, we must also note that Hobbes explicitly stated that this situation was
not equal to the state of nature for individuals. Since sovereigns still manage to uphold “the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it [international state of war], that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men” [
1]. While interesting, I have already noted that the individualistic state of nature should be understood as less miserable than what is often presumed, and Hobbes’ own admission of the presence of small and even larger groups and societies in the state of nature suggest that some industry will be maintained here as well.
Regardless of how one perceives the state of nature, there are two different ways to build a Hobbesian argument for a world government. Firstly, we might claim that states are similar
enough to individuals for Hobbes original argument to apply. As Hobbes [
1] notes that “the law of nations, and the law of nature, is the same thing”, this would then suggest that states are urged by reason to make a world government by covenant or—that failing to materialize—through conquest. Bull [
47] argues that there is nothing in Hobbes’ writings to suggest that he entertained the notion that sovereigns should make a contract like the individuals in the state of nature. However, he does suggest that Hobbes’ theory “does seem to leave us without any good reason to resist the establishment of a world government by conquest as opposed to one established by contract” [
47].
Secondly, I will propose a quite different path in the remainder of this article, and argue that states are purely incidental, arbitrary, and devoid of intrinsic value—an approach which is drastically different from Kant’s [
7] attempt to find peace through a federation of “civilized” states of peoples. Hobbes, strictly speaking, did not choose states as the form of his commonwealth—states are in a sense chosen for him as he happens to live in a time where they exist, and he chooses to defend the state as the organising unit created to uphold domestic peace. However, if we for a moment remove all historical context from Hobbes’ philosophy, is there any reason to assume that the states system is the natural constellation that would follow from individuals seeking their way out of a state of nature? The historical reasons for the state may have been myriad, valid, and related in large part to the need to defend against external aggression [
1]. Like the emergence of the state-like security firms of Nozick [
48], it is easy to see how a Hobbesian logical argument would support the creation of state-like entities. But is this really where the Hobbesian argument ends? While Kant [
7] defends states, and argues strongly in favour of factoring in practical considerations in the search for lasting peace, I here test an argument where arbitrary historical facts are not allowed to constrain our search for the best solution to humanity’s challenges.
If states are purely arbitrary, and we take Hobbes’ methodological individuals seriously, it follows that the only way to evaluate any political system or entity is as he himself did: by asking to what degree it is conducive to produce peace? The only determinant of value to Hobbes is individual interests and preferences. Peace is instrumentally valuable because it allows individuals to escape the dangers of violent death. States, if they have any value at all, are only valuable to the extent that they enable the reaching of individual goals.
This gives us a reason to ask why individuals should not be assumed to covenant to erect a world government, or to desire one to come into being through conquest? This idea did not, according to Bull [
47], occur to Hobbes, and neither did it “to any of the contract theorists in the long line from Plato to John Rawls”. But if the preceding propositions are correct, a Hobbesian argument is agnostic as to whether the states system or world government is most valuable, and simply refers to the criterium: which is most conducive to peace?
Hobbes states outright that loyalty to the sovereign is dependent on them fulfilling their function—maintaining order—and in his discussions of commonwealth through conquest he even argues that loyalty to the old sovereign dissipates as soon as a greater power renders the old one unable to secure its inhabitants, and also that loyalty is owed to the new conquering sovereign if they actually secure peace [
1]. This suggests that Hobbes had no romantic notions of the commonwealth, or that “nation states”, for example, are the sacred manifestation of
peoples in a political community [
7]. On the contrary, Hobbes “does not provide any reason why an individual person should prefer his own sovereign to a foreign one” [
47], and this separates Hobbes from Kant [
7]. When we proceed to consider the Hobbesian argument for world government, we do that on the basis of an acknowledgement that individuals are the foundation of rights, relevant interests and preferences.