In this paper, it is examined how, if at all, the logical laws can be normative for human reasoning, wherein the notion of normativity is analyzed primarily with respect to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. During the ancient and the medieval periods, logic was being considered in terms of discourse and dialogical practice, but since Descartes and especially Kant, it has been treated as a system of laws with which the process of individual human reasoning has been compared. Therefore, normativity can be investigated in the private sphere (for thinking and reasoning) and in the public sphere (for dialogic practices in a community). Wittgenstein discussed both aspects of normativity: in his early philosophy, the focus is on the laws of logic that are primarily normative for the state of affairs in the world, while in his later works the emphasis is on a social aspect of normativity (which is closer to Aristotle’s view), which is derived from the adopted rules that have been applied in a certain community. Taken that way, logic is certainly normative in the public sphere, but the more difficult issue is whether logic is normative for thinking, regarding the difference between the logical laws and those of thought.
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