# What We Talk about When We Talk about Logic as Normative for Reasoning

## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

## 2. Logic as a Science of Correct Thinking

## 3. Wittgenstein’s Approach to the Normativity of Logic

(…) A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour[9] (244).

Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically[11] (3.03).

It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is that we could not say what an ‘illogical’ world would look like[11] (3.031).

It is as impossible to represent in language anything that ‘contradicts logic’ as it is in geometry to represent by its coordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist[11] (3.032).

## 4. Conclusions

## Conflicts of Interest

## References

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1 | Although Wittgenstein’s term ‘language-game’ has several meanings, in this paper it will refer to the whole language practice of a community. |

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**MDPI and ACS Style**

Skelac, I. What We Talk about When We Talk about Logic as Normative for Reasoning. *Philosophies* **2017**, *2*, 8.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies2020008

**AMA Style**

Skelac I. What We Talk about When We Talk about Logic as Normative for Reasoning. *Philosophies*. 2017; 2(2):8.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies2020008

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Skelac, Ines. 2017. "What We Talk about When We Talk about Logic as Normative for Reasoning" *Philosophies* 2, no. 2: 8.
https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies2020008