Proudhon’s Critique of Nationalism in His Federalism Vision

Abstract

This study first situates the discourse on Proudhon’s federalism and nationalism within the framework of his comprehensive economic, social, and philosophical system. Proudhon attempts to construct a federalism based on an associational and decentralized political structure that could accommodate plural groups and avoid the exclusive interpretation of sovereignty that prevailed in nationalism at the time. Such federalism is not only a design of political institutions but also a reflection of his economic mutualism and the idea of commutative justice. Then, this study proposes a relatively concise and intuitive dual critique framework to focus on how his federalism directly refutes nationalism. Proudhon’s federalism aims to protect the culture, language, and identity of minority groups from the oppression of the unitary nation-state internally, and advocates the establishment of an external confederation beyond national borders to eliminate national conflicts and achieve universal peace.

1. Introduction

Proudhon is renowned for his anarchist stance, but his position in his later years seems less anti-establishment. In his 1863 publication, The Principle of Federation, he introduced his federalism vision, in response to the increasingly autocratic and centralized trend, in the name of sovereignty and freedom, of nation-states at the time. This issue is particularly typical in France. Since the Great Revolution, although the idea of popular sovereignty has been spread widely, the hope for autonomy has been unable to resist the intensification of administrative centralization. The Jacobin period had already begun to strengthen central power. Subsequently, in 1800, Napoleon established a top-down management system of “prefect (préfet)–department (département)–district (arrondissement)–municipality (commune).” Each department was managed by a prefect appointed by the central government, thus losing its autonomy and becoming an administrative extension of the center [1]. This system was continued through the Restoration. Even during the July Monarchy, the municipal laws (loi municipale) of 1831 and 1837 expanded the nominal powers of local institutions, the latter was still highly constrained by the prefect. This subtle parallel and tension between political democratization and administrative centralization was acutely noted by Proudhon. He then pointed out that the latter is precisely one of the reasons for the former’s setbacks [2].

At the same time, with the intensification of centralism, the people’s enthusiasm for freedom repeatedly went astray, leading to nationalism. The slogans of “sovereignty” and “freedom” quickly became pretexts for foreign wars. Guillaume Bacot [3] aptly pointed out that at that time, the principle of nationalities (le principe des nationalités)—mainly understood as the right of nations to self-determination (le droit des nations à disposer d’elles-mêmes)—became a hot topic of public debate. The Greek War of Independence in 1821 and the Polish November Uprising in 1831 greatly aroused the sympathy of liberals (libéraux) and republicans (républicains), and inspired widespread support for the principle of nationalities [3] (p. 147). By the time the Second Republic was established in 1848, revolutionary waves were surging across Europe. Liberals and republicans, on the one hand, demanded to break the centralism of the old system, and on the other hand, showed a kind of fanaticism on the national issue, and even supported “liberating” nations such as Italy and Poland through war [4].

However, the revolutionary wave of 1848 eventually fell silent. As Edward Castleton mentioned, at the annual meeting of the Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Society (Société Pierre-Joseph Proudhon) in 2018, the French philosopher Georges Navet pointed out that “it feels like modern history stopped at some point in late 1848” [5] (p. 245). Castleton accurately described this “stop” as “hope in democracy to rampant disappointment” [5] (p. 245). This setback forced theorists at that time to continuously reflect on social and political change [6] (p. 26). Alan Ritter aptly summarized the dilemma of revolution faced by theorists at that time, for the revolution was “disrupting social order at the same time that it awakened demands for freedom.” However, if the demands for freedom were met, “a tenuous social peace would be endangered” [7] (p. 457).

Proudhon’s federalism, which is mainly crystallized in his The Principle of Federation [8,9], was proposed in such reflection on the reality of the past decades of continuous revolutions and bleak freedom/liberty. The most intuitive advantage of his federal proposal, described by Proudhon himself, is to balance authority and liberty [10,11,12,13,14]. The so-called ‘to balance authority’ is to curb the expansion of centralism. The so-called ‘to balance liberty’ is to curb the uncontrolled enthusiasm for emancipation, especially under the banner of popular sovereignty, freedom, and liberation, which is easy to combine with nationalism and go to the opposite of liberty. As Frederick M. Watkins commented in his analysis of the situation at that time, liberalism could not avoid such a reality: “disorder is the inevitable price of liberal achievements” [15] (p. 431). When the optimistic revolutionary sentiment encountered frustration and thus merged with nationalism, it was easy to mislead the people away from the real social revolution and deviate from the prospect of liberty [16] (p. 130). Proudhon’s federalism is precisely to correct this deviation [15].

However, for a long time, the academic world’s attitude towards Proudhon has been subtle. As Pierre Ansart said, the people’s evaluation of him is a mixture of “approbations and condemnations, enthusiastic readings and indignant refutations (d’approbations et de condamnations, de lectures enthousiastes et de réfutations indignées)” [17] (p. 17). If it cannot be said that Proudhon was completely forgotten, at least it can be said that, as Ansart [17] (p. 94), and Federico Ferretti and Edward Castleton [18] (p. 9) pointed out appropriately, due to the later Marxism’s hostility towards Proudhon, the importance of Proudhon’s theory was largely misunderstood and belittled. Marx criticized Proudhon as a “petty bourgeois constantly tossed between capital and labor, between political economy and communism (petit-bourgeois constamment ballotte entre le capital et le travail, entre l’economie politique et le communisme)” [19] (p. 135). The later split within the socialists is well known [20] (p. 95) [21] (p. 15). As Alain Touraine described, one part tends to organize hierarchical political parties, while the other part tends to support the workers’ decentralized spontaneous actions [22]. In this context, Ansart pointed out that “Proudhon would have been the spokesperson for this second tendency (Proudhon aurait été le porte-parole de cette seconde tendance)” [17] (p. 103). And this tendency was apparently marginalized for a long time.

It was not until the 1930s and 1940s that the highly respected sociologist Georges Gurvitch brought Proudhon back into the academic limelight and called for a reassessment of Proudhon’s place [23]. Gurvitch reassessed Proudhon from the perspective of social law (droit social) and legal pluralism (pluralisme juridique), liberating Proudhon from the narrow definition of anarchism and transforming him from a marginalized author into an important figure in sociology and political philosophy, even calling him “the greatest French social thinker (le plus grand penseur social français)” [24] (p. 267). According to Georges Balandier, Gurvitch regarded Proudhon as the Descartes and Pascal of the social sciences, dedicated to discovering a unity of sociology and philosophy from his theory [25] (p. 5). In The Idea of Social Law (L’idée du droit social) [26], Gurvitch argued that law does not emanate unidirectionally from state sovereignty but is the product of spontaneous order of multi-level associations. He emphasized the importance of spontaneous social groups, especially in the workplace [27] (p. 10). This corresponded to Proudhon’s idea of establishing an associational and federal network through contracts to replace the centralized nation-state [28]. In this regard, Gurvitch regarded Proudhon as a pioneer of legal and sovereign pluralism [29,30,31,32], even calling him the “father of sociology” [33] (p. 4). Gurvitch also pointed out in The Bill of Social Rights (La Déclaration des droits sociaux) [34] that social rights should come from associated groups and individuals, thereby bringing Proudhon’s federalist plan back to the public agenda. In the postscript, he particularly lamented Proudhon’s long-term obscurity in the English-speaking world, and he advocated correcting this bias. Entering the 1960s, in his later years, Gurvitch even more directly promoted the revival of Proudhon’s theory through various lectures and seminars. His 1965 lecture—later published as a manuscript in 1966 after his death, Proudhon and Marx (Proudhon et Marx) [30]—paralleled Proudhon’s collective force with Marx’s theory, attempting to reshape Proudhon’s important place in the history of European thought. In fact, Gurvitch believed that Proudhon was even more revolutionary than Marx in his conception of decentralized collectivism [24] (p. 275). Charles Turgeon [35] (p. 358) also commented in this way: Proudhon “admits the unity of collective life, but also recognizes its plurality of constituent elements (admet Yunité de la vie collective, mais il lui reconnaît une pluralité d’éléments constitutifs).” Through Gurvitch’s efforts, Proudhon’s federalism and pluralism discourse were reconstructed into a systematic theory from the perspective of sociology. It was no longer a fragmented moral protest but was transformed into a sociological critique of monism and nationalism. This laid a solid foundation for later discussions.

To understand how Proudhon’s federalist plan criticized nationalism, contemporary scholars cannot bypass the structure of Proudhon’s vision: an associational agro-industrial federation based on mutualism and commutative justice. It can provide an economic basis for opposing centralism and transcend the limitations of national borders. Understanding Proudhon’s federalist ideas needs to be placed in the context of Proudhon’s broader comprehensive thinking on the economy, society, and other aspects. Georges Guy-Grand [36] (p. 104), in highly concise language, constructed the logical relationship between Proudhon’s balance of authority and liberty, mutualism, social justice, federal principle, and nationalism:

“In all fields, Proudhon seeks a balance, which is the form of social justice. This balance is called mutualism, guaranteed by the mutual assistance of sovereignties, that is, federation, through the link that freely unites agro-industrial groups and political groups... The condition is that this spontaneity is not disturbed by ‘subversive passions.’ But these passions do exist. In foreign policy, these passions are manifested as the principle of nationalities and the principle of natural boundaries, which divert citizens from the only thing that matters: the preparation for the social revolution (Dans tous les domaines, Proudhon cherche l’équilibre, qui est la forme sociale de la justice. Cet équilibre s’appelle mutualité, garantismo par l’aide réciproque des souverainetés, fédération par le lien qui unit librement les groupes agricoles—industriels et les groupes politiques.... à la condition que cette spontanéité ne soit pas troublée par les « passions subversives ». Mais ces passions existent. Elles s’appellent, en politique extérieure, principe des nationalités et principe des frontières naturelles, qui détournent les citoyens de la seule chose qui importe, la préparation de la Révolution sociale).”

[36] (p. 104)

This logic has also been inherited and deepened by later scholars. Samuel Hayat [37] further pointed out that for Proudhon, the nation is more of a fact than a normative principle. The plural coexistence of nations is not a manifestation of nationalism, but rather a strong support for federalism. In addition, Hayat [37] pointed out that for Proudhon, the aspect of nationalism as the uniqueness of culture and history can be safeguarded through federalism to avoid being destroyed by bourgeois politics. On the other hand, nationalism as a political process of national unity is rejected by Proudhon and replaced by his federalism. How bourgeois politics destroys plurality will be further discussed in the following paragraphs. Through the discussions of Hayat [37] and Guy-Grand [36] and others, Proudhon’s federalism’s interpretation of nationalism is appropriately and, to some extent, complexly placed in Proudhon’s broader discourse on society, economy, justice, and other issues.

Although Proudhon’s federalism is no longer buried by history and existing research has discussed its connection to anti-nationalism, most studies are carried out indirectly through his economic or social thought. This study believes that, on the one hand, it is crucial to understand the connection in the context of his broader economic and social thinking. On the other hand, based on the original text of The Principle of Federation, sorting out how Proudhon’s federal principle directly and explicitly serves the anti-nationalism discourse helps to establish a more intuitive understanding framework. The main contribution of this paper is that, first, it places Proudhon’s federalism and anti-nationalism discourse in a broader historical context and clarifies its connection with Proudhon’s economic, social, and other theories. In addition, it integrates Proudhon’s scattered anti-nationalism discourse in The Principle of Federation and proposes a “dual critique” framework as follows: one is “internal,” Proudhon’s federalism aims to solve the oppression of nationalism on the culture, language, and identity of minority groups internally; the other is “external,” Proudhon’s federalism seeks to resolve national conflicts caused by nation-states. Proudhon also puts forward the vision of establishing a European union of states. This simplified framework helps later researchers to more intuitively understand Proudhon’s federalism discourse on nationalism. Although The Principle of Federation [9] was partially translated into English by Richard Vernon in 1979, a complete English version remains unavailable to date. Therefore, this research also refers to the original French edition published in 1863, titled Du Principe Fédératif [8].

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly introduces the meaning and structure of Proudhon’s federalism, how it serves as Proudhon’s positive political vision, and the challenges it faces. Section 3 systematically situates Proudhon’s federalist critique of nationalism within his economic and social philosophy. Section 4 constructs a concise dual framework, both internally and externally, to abstract Proudhon’s critique of nationalism in The Principle of Federation. Section 5 concludes the findings.

2. Federalism as Proudhon’s Positive Vision and Its Challenges

When people hear Proudhon labeled as the “father of anarchism,” their reaction often carries a condescension, assuming “he was too naive and idealistic to be taken seriously” and overlooking the depth of his thought [38] (p. 142). Hannah Arendt, for example, once criticized anarchists like Proudhon, arguing that revolutions should not end with “abolition” but with the “foundation” of new forms of state and government [39] (p. 265). In fact, Proudhon never rejected government. He did not advocate “boycotting it in its legitimate functioning,” nor did he call for “overthrowing it by violence” [40] (p. 13). What he opposed was government usurping the space in which people themselves should act. This position is not at odds with Arendt’s own concerns. As Gurvitch observed, Proudhon is “actually much more realistic than is generally thought” [41] (p. 220).

Actually, far from ending in “abolition” as Arendt claimed, Proudhon—in his 1863 work The Principle of Federation—gave out his full Proudhonian federalism as a comprehensive vision of his political founding. By this time, he had already recognized that “the State was absolutely and eternally necessary for social life,” and aimed to “accept the State and then try to restrict and balance its powers” [13] (p. 23).

In Chapter 3 of Part III of The Principle of Federation, titled “National Opinion. Mr. Guéroult’s Rocking Policy,” Proudhon even accused one of his critical opponents, Guéroult, of belittling his ideas. As Proudhon stated, Geraud “uses my past anarchism to interpret my present federalism (expliqué mon fédéralisme actuel par mon anarchie d’autrefois)” [8] (p. 223). Contrary to the disorder associated with anarchism, what Proudhon actually wanted to convey was the application of “positive anarchism” [42] (p. 144) [43]. Ingram [43] discussed the distinction between positive and negative anarchism. The negative, individualistic version advocates maximizing individual freedom and opposes authority that restricts freedom. However, the positive version requires an institution [44] (p. 36). As George noted, Proudhon developed a vision of “a just and right synthesis of order and anarchy” [45] (p. 542).

On the one hand, Proudhon was clearly critical of any supporters of governmental centralism, for dreaming only of the reorganization and extermination of politics and power instead of proceeding to social reform (procéder à la réforme sociale par l’extermination du pouvoir et de la politique) [46] (p. 271). On the other hand, at the outbreak of the 1848 Revolution, Proudhon also criticized the democrats for neglecting social reform and only trying to organize the government through representative institutions [46] (p. 271). In Proudhon’s view, representative government, draped in the cloak of liberty, is still essentially an unjust authority. Anne-Sophie Chambost has also repeatedly mentioned Proudhon’s criticism of the liberty based on bourgeois representative system reflects a kind of atomism [47] (p. 104) [48]. For Proudhon, political order is based on two opposing principles: “authority” and “liberty” [9] (p. 6). Centralism corresponds to authority. The enthusiasm for democracy corresponds to liberty, but under bourgeois representative government, it can also be transformed into authority. Decades of revolutionary failures have proved that neither authority nor liberty can be fully realized in a “complete and uncompromised form” [9] (p. 12). Therefore, Proudhon offers a federal framework to balance the two [10,11,12], and summarized federalism as the culmination of his lifelong political vision. He stated: “All my political views may be reduced to a parallel formula: political federation or decentralization” [9] (p. 74).

For Proudhon, the word “federal” originates from the Latin word “foedus,” meaning contract, treaty, agreement, and alliance [9]. This contract, by its very nature, acknowledges the “value of individual liberty” and the “legitimacy” of its components [49] (p. 58). The foundation of the federal system lies in the associations based on “commutative (commutatif)” and “synallagmatic (synallagmatique)” contracts [8] (p. 64–65, in French) [9] (p. 36), assuming “reciprocal and equal commitments” [9] (p. 38). The terms “commutative” and “synallagmatic” highlight the two key elements of the contract: equality and reciprocity.

Proudhon specifically referred to these associations as “agro-industrial associations/federations.” Linked together, they form higher-level bodies and ultimately a composite federal system of communes, cities, provinces, and even nations [9,42,50,51]. Constituted by producers, the associations create a self-managed network whose reciprocal economy relations provide the material backbone of political decentralization [52]. Proudhon’s aim was not to abolish property or the division of labor, but to strip them of their exploitative forms. Knowles [42] observes that this economic base prevents localism from sliding into narrow parochialism, instead forging a vibrant local system. Elazar refers to such system as a “cooperative society as Utopia” [53] (p. 7). The term “association” used by Proudhon was called the “communal council” by his anarchist colleague Bakunin [54].

Opposing oppression is the core issue that Proudhon’s federalism attempts to address [45,55]. In a federal government based on associations, “the independence of groups is best respected, and provincial, state, and municipal authorities are best served by central authorities” [9] (p. 72). Moreover, it is essential to ensure that the power of any higher-level entity does not exceed the power of its components to prevent subordinate associations from becoming appendages of centralization [9,56]. Administrative functions are subject to “all the constraints of publicity and control” [9] (p. 49). This is considered by Proudhon to be key to ensuring freedom and autonomy [13,14,57].

For Proudhon, local or small governments are the “bulwark against abusive power,” while “centralized bureaucracies... erode the liberty of citizens” [58] (p. 333). Compared to centralization, local units can grant individuals greater decision-making autonomy [59,60]. For individuals, autonomous units create “more rights protection than the national norm” [61] (p. 319). Overall, Proudhon’s ideal vision of federalism is a non-centralized structure in which “the center is everywhere, its circumference nowhere” [9] (p. 282). At every level of the structure—most concretely, the agro-industrial associations—units are economically and politically self-governing. As for Proudhon’s vision of the agro-industrial associations in his federalism, which reflects his economic and social philosophy, we will further elaborate in the following Section. Autonomy and plurality are realized precisely through such a decentralized framework.

This framework had to first confront the rising, nationalism-driven centralism of the nation-state in nineteenth-century Europe. Across the continent, nationalism had become the dominant political ideology, forging collective identities around “imagined communities” defined by shared language, culture, and historical narratives [62,63]. In Italy, Mazzini and Garibaldi regarded nationalism as a moral and political imperative, seeking liberation from Austrian rule and creating an independent nation-state. In the German lands, Herder emphasized the uniqueness of the national spirit (Volksgeist). His idea, later called cultural nationalism, partially formed a theoretical basis for national unification through cultural and linguistic bonds [3].

However, such emerging nationalism was regarded by Proudhon as a new form of despotism, and it inevitably came at the cost of national autonomy and pluralism [64]. Proudhon was especially critical of Garibaldi’s military campaigns in Italy, dismissing them as reckless adventurism that would only intensify national conflict [9]. The same criticism was of course also used against Napoleon III. The latter frequently invoked the principle of nationalities as a pretext for foreign intervention. In the Second Italian War of Independence in 1859, France supported Piedmont in the unification of Italy. At that time, both Proudhon and Thiers opposed intervening in the Italian war under the principle of nationalities and also believed that the principle was not compatible with freedom. Thiers’ opposition was mainly out of realism, fearing the possible threat to France from the latter’s unification. This was, of course, also one of Proudhon’s concerns [3] (p. 151).

However, in addition to this, Proudhon also saw the more extensive and social aspect of this event. Within the state, it would strengthen the centralization of state power and marginalize local communities, guilds, and associations. For Thiers, liberty mainly meant representative government and constitutional guarantees of order and property, but for Proudhon, this was far from enough, as it only served the upper class [3] (p. 156). Proudhon was more concerned with how the working class could gain the basis for political emancipation in economic mutual aid and social reform. In the book The Political Capacity of the Working Classes (De La Capacité Politique Des Classes Ouvrières) [65], which was published after Proudhon’s death, Proudhon clearly linked his economic and social mutualism with his federalism in his later years [66] (p. 39). On the other hand, Proudhon rejected the idea of isolated individuals as the collective body of politics. However, it was precisely the vision that nationalist sovereign states want. By declaring that all citizens are equal and solitary individuals before the state, the state actually strips them of their identities as members of communities, guilds, or associations. On the contrary, Proudhon’s theory rests on “the mutual dependence and relations among the individuals composing it” [67] (p. 322). Phillip Bosserman [68] also notes that Proudhon’s federalism creates the bonds that hold society together by establishing a shared collective consciousness.

Furthermore, Daniel Halévy [69] and Bernard Voyenne [70] both argued that Proudhon’s federalism is a counter-offensive against both monarchic absolutism and Jacobin democracy, aimed at a society without a state. Chambost [71,72] goes further, arguing that Proudhon’s federalism offers an alternative model for the rule of law in which the source of law and order is shifted from state sovereignty to contractual relations within society. By dispersing power and forming contract, Proudhon’s federalism offers a framework that reconciles liberty with order for modern plural societies [73,74]. Considering this, Célestin Bouglé sarcastically retorted to those who stereotyped Proudhon: “Is Proudhon not the father of anarchism? (passe-t-il pas pour le père de l’anarchie même?)” [75] (p. 614). In another article by Chambost [48], she further regarded Proudhon’s works as a constructive exploration beyond mere electoral representation, inspiring contemporary participatory and deliberative democracy.

Robert Graham [76] also observes that Proudhon’s effort to restore the autonomy of social groups—cooperatives, associations, and local communities—challenges the nation-state’s political atomism. In Proudhon’s many works, one can see the defense of individual value and its close connection with pluralistic society [75] (pp. 614–615). If Proudhon’s unpublished manuscript Chronos, or the Need to Base the Economy on Time (Chronos, ou de la nécessité de fonder l’économie sur le temps) is taken into account, his understanding of plurality, especially in terms of nations, would be more clearly known. Castleton [77] (pp. 90–95), based on the now-available manuscripts revealing Proudhon’s early interest in languages and national studies, reflected Proudhon’s affirmation of the diversity of national origins, in which each nation could find its own creativity.

In Proudhon’s view, when the life of plurality was eliminated and a unified abstract concept of the nation was established, liberty was minimized [18] (p. 12). This was precisely what was happening in the mid-19th century. Outside the state boundary, nationalism, by linking the nation with sovereignty and under the banner of national unity and liberation, would continuously provoke wars across Europe [50]. For anarchists, there was an essential conflict between autonomous associations and sovereign nation-states [78,79,80]. As the later anarchist Rudolf Rocker [81] put forward in Nationalism and Culture: nationalism, by elevating the nation to the highest mission, provided moral justification for national expansion and war. This critique was in line with Proudhon’s critique of the Italian unification movement. Similar arguments can also be seen in Proudhon’s War and Peace (La guerre et la paix) [82]. In fact, in a sense, it was the events of 1859 that greatly promoted Proudhon’s thinking on nationalism, prompting him to successively publish War and Peace (La guerre et la paix) in 1861, Federation and Unity in Italy (La fédération et l’unité en Italie) in 1862, The Principle of Federation (Du principe fédératif) in 1863, and New Observations on Italian Unity (Nouvelles observations sur l’unité italienne) in 1865 [66] (p. 36).

3. Proudhon’s Federalism Against Nationalism: Social and Economic Explanations

As we have briefly mentioned several times, the relationship between Proudhon’s federalism and nationalism should be understood in the context of his broader intellectual system, specifically his economic mutualism and the philosophy of commutative justice. When Daniel Guérin [83,84] situates Proudhon’s federalism within the currents of nineteenth-century labor movements and socialist thought, he finds that Proudhon’s critique of nationalism is, in fact, a refute to on all forms of statism (étatisme)—whether bourgeois nation-states or state-socialist states. His federalism is a strategy for returning economic power to producers’ associations and local communities. It is finally embodied in a decentralized agro-industrial federal network [9,50,85]. This emergence of political institutions based on an economic governance structure has its historical context. Proudhon grew up in the turbulent years following the French Revolution. The ups and downs of the revolutionary situation and the restoration of the old order forced theorists at the time to reflect the revolution. Castleton mentioned that in France at that time, people began to realize that the emerging new regimes, although in the name of liberty, often “overlapped with the inward aspirations for power of those who felt wealthy and entitled enough to campaign for office,” but were “hostile to seeing the unpredictable working classes fully integrated into political life” [5] (p. 255). Therefore, for some scholars, “the realization of economic and social justice” seemed to be a priority beyond politics [86] (p. 303). Proudhon was one of them.

According to Lederman, “the socialist and anarchist thinkers and revolutionaries did not distinguish, as a principle, economy from politics” [87] (p. 253). Instead, they viewed politics as “more or less a reflection of social-economic relations” [87] (p. 253). Ansart also mentioned that for Proudhon, humans are social beings. The interaction between humans and society is first reflected in productive labor and exchange relations, and the oppression in this field makes political oppression possible [88] (p. 237). Therefore, the plurality of politics and the liberation and plurality of productive activities that Proudhon pursued are inseparable [89] (p. 24). More specifically, the economic function of the agro-industrial association is indispensable to federalism [50,85]. As Proudhon stated at the beginning of Chapter 11 in Part I of The Principle of Federation: “However impeccable in its logic the federal constitution may be, and whatever practical guarantees it may supply, it will not survive if economic factors tend persistently to dissolve it” [9] (p. 67). This argument was summed up incisively by Gaëtan Pirou: “Without real social reform, the change of political systems is meaningless” [90] (p. 140). Therefore, for Proudhon, federalism is not merely a political system; it also represents a “social doctrine, a philosophy, and a global view of society... an ism like liberalism or socialism” [91] (p. 245).

In Proudhon’s groundbreaking 1840 work What Is Property? (Qu’est-ce que la propriété?), he famously declared that “property is theft,” exposing the exploitative nature of the private-property regime under capitalism [92]. Yet he did not simply demand the abolition of property; rather, he criticized the existing distribution system for its inequality [93]. In Proudhon’s eyes, the contemporary property system “bases itself around authority and privilege” [38] (p. 153). According to the three-stage theory of Proudhon’s life put forward by some scholars—although in his 1855 autobiography, Proudhon usually divided his life into two stages [66] (p. 31), here we refer to the three-stage theory—the first stage is characterized by “démolir” (to demolish), especially towards the property system. It was also in this stage that Proudhon declared himself an anarchist [46] (p. 270). This label was so eye-catching that it overshadowed Proudhon’s more profound idea transformation later on. After 1848, Proudhon gradually entered the second stage, which is characterized by the defense of liberty and the recognition of property as a necessary counterbalance to the tyranny of centralism [94] (p. 330) [95] (p. 6). After 1855, Proudhon entered the third stage: constructive stage [95] (p. 6). During this period, in his 1857 publication The Stock-Exchange Speculator’s Handbook (Manuel du spéculateur à la Bourse) [96], he depicted capitalism as a modern form of authoritarianism that is incompatible with liberty and equality [97]. Hence, he judged it necessary to seek an alternative to the centralized statist and capitalist order. To that end, he proposed his mutualist economic philosophy, arguing to replace distributive justice that presupposed on central authority—with the commutative justice of decentralized associations [51,98]. These decentralized associations, which Proudhon designated as an agro-industrial federation/association, progressively assemble a non-centralized federal system through multi-layered compacts, thereby resisting the centralizing impulses that arise within the nation-state. Failing to achieve it will repeat the mistakes of the revolutions [24] (p. 277).

As mentioned, Proudhon’s federalism reflected his pursuit of a social justice [98] (p. 229). Such justice is based on mutualism. Furthermore, the federalism he proposed in his late career is the “final flowering of Proudhon’s mutualism” [51] (p. 798) [99]. Mutualism dismantles the economic foundations of the nation-state. From then on, the state is no longer the authority in the old sense [46] (p. 301). The centralized economy would be replaced by decentralized associations of farmers and workers. These associations would run enterprises themselves and exchange goods and services on the principle of commutative justice, supplanting the distributive justice that nationalism relies on [14,51,100]. These arguments are not only stated in The Principle of Federation, but also elaborated in General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century (Idée générale de la révolution au XIXe siècle) and The Political Capacity of the Working Classes (De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières), together constituting the philosophical basis for Proudhon’s federalist theory, which is laid by his mutualism and commutative justice replacing distributive justice.

More specifically, distributive justice assumes the existence of a central authority [100,101,102,103]. This essentially reflects Rousseau’s understanding of sovereignty in the social contract, which creates the authority to make laws and extends “distributive justice” from this authority to citizens who obey orders. Aimé Berthod [46] (p. 288) very aptly pointed out that this idea was inherited by Proudhon’s contemporary Louis Blanc. And Blanc was precisely the object of Proudhon’s fierce refutation in debate—their differences will be mentioned later. By comparison, commutative justice holds that power arises from the interactions between contracting parties and is thus inherently non-centralized, making it suitable for a highly autonomous federal structure.

Closely related to economic mutualism and commutative justice is Proudhon’s concept of property. His famous shift from “property is theft” to “property is liberty” in his late years draws a line between absolute property right and usufruct (right of use) [92]. The latter, he argued, undercuts the nation-state’s economic monopoly [40,92,97]. A nation whose holdings are conceived as “national property” inevitably grow a single central state-owner endowed with an absolute monopoly. All citizens can do is petition this center for a distribution of resources—it actually presupposes the central authority. In the end, citizens can expect nothing but dispossession and servitude [97] (p. 46). In contrast, usufruct constitutes a system grounded in equality and justice, since no single monopoly owns the property. For Proudhon, distributive justice, once founded on force rather than conscience, is inherently unjust [38] (p. 154). However, nation-states are driving this unjust centralized system even further, under the pretexts of sovereignty, freedom, and national liberation. Proudhon’s federalist theory is designed to correct this deviation. William Reichert aptly commented on the revelation Proudhon brought to the world, saying that as more and more people become aware that “the only proper basis of law is the free agreements arrived at by social groups acting in the spirit of voluntarism, federalism, and reciprocity, the foundations will have been laid for a genuine social order in which justice will be possible” [23] (p. 90).

Compared with other French thinkers of the same period, Proudhon’s federal vision based on mutualism, association, and decentralization is particularly unique. In Chambost’s [48] view, the American town meetings mentioned by Tocqueville in Democracy in America [104] undoubtedly inspired Proudhon’s idea of association. In addition, in The Old Regime and the Revolution [105], Tocqueville revealed France’s administrative centralization and emphasized that only local freedom could support modern democratic institutions. However, Tocqueville was still seeking reform within the framework of the nation-state without questioning the premise of national sovereignty (souveraineté nationale). Proudhon, on the other hand, attempted to fundamentally weaken the nation-state’s monopoly on political order through the association of producers.

On the issue of the nation and sovereignty, Proudhon’s theory challenged Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, who was extremely influential at the time. In What is the Third Estate? (Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État?) [106], Sieyès proposed that the true nation is a collection of the public interest, which is constituted by the Third Estate, thus laying the foundation for modern French national sovereignty (souveraineté nationale). Here, the Third Estate mainly includes the citizens and the bourgeoisie [107]. Sieyès rejected the privileged classes (nobility and clergy) as part of the nation, criticizing them as parasitic. At the same time, Sieyès also rejected the Fourth Estate (quatrième ordre), that is, the proletariat and the working-class, as the bearers of national sovereignty. Proudhon’s federalism clearly rejects this logic. On the one hand, in Proudhon’s view, sovereignty should not be monopolized by the unitary nation. On the other hand, Proudhon’s mutualism and commutative justice attempt to include the Fourth Estate, which was excluded by Sieyès in the political contract, to become the basis for the construction of the federation. In short, Proudhon’s federalism rejects Sieyès’ definition of a unified national sovereignty and instead attempts to enable the coexistence of diverse social forces through a federal contract.

Proudhon’s critique of centralism is also distinctly different from that of his contemporary socialist thinker Louis Blanc. In 1848, Blanc proposed the state as the engine for socio-economic reform, which was sharply criticized by Proudhon. In Proudhon’s view, Blanc clearly inherited the Jacobin tradition, showing the “withered shadow of Robespierre (ombre rabougrie de Robespierre)” [46] (p. 273). This centralized plan, a “top-down (par le haut)” revolution, would only put workers back into the predicament of resource allocation by the center, strengthening the control of power over workers [108] (p. 231). The alternative proposed by Proudhon instead, based on mutualism and association in the workplace [17] (pp. 103–105), emphasized social organization from the grassroots.

On this point, the difference between Proudhon and Auguste Blanqui is even more evident. In the latter’s view, revolution cannot rely on the self-organization of the people and must depend on a small group of revolutionary elites to establish a temporary dictatorship (dictature provisoire) [109]. Only under such a highly centralized short-term system can the old order be destroyed. However, in Proudhon’s view, this model is doomed to fail. In fact, this is precisely Proudhon’s deepest lament for French society over the past few decades: revolutions only keep overthrowing one centralism with another, while freedom is shrinking. As Georges Guy-Grand keenly pointed out, for Proudhon, the so-called democratic and free government at that time, if it only replaced the divine right with popular sovereignty and the Jacobin style state with the monarchy, then freedom has not been enhanced at all [110] (p. 112). The fundamental reason is that there is no establishment of order based on mutualism and commutative justice—that is, the federalism advocated by Proudhon.

The same logic of centralism is also revealed in Saint-Simon’s conception of the reorganization of Europe. Like Proudhon, Saint-Simon [111] proposed a European federation plan (fédération européenne). However, his conception is also closer to a top-down rational project, relying on technocratic governance rather than the associational contractual network advocated by Proudhon [112]. Essentially, Saint-Simon’s plan still falls into the logic of centralism criticized by Proudhon and the old path of “distributive justice”.

4. The Dual Critique of Nationalism in the Principle of Federation

In addition to situating Proudhon’s federalism and its relationship with nationalism within his broader economic, social, and justice-oriented philosophical framework—which indeed requires a rather complex argument, as we have shown above—it seems beneficial to construct a more intuitive framework. Proudhon’s late work, The Principle of Federation, is regarded as a synthesis of his economic, political, and social ideas and, of course, mentions the topic of nationalism. However, the fragmented nature of the text poses difficulties for readers in terms of comprehension—much like the writing style of Proudhon’s other works. This study attempts to distill a concise and intuitive framework from it, systematically organizing the scattered discussions in the book.

After sorting out the text, this study proposes a “dual critique” framework as follows: the first is “internal,” in which Proudhon’s federalism aims to address the oppression of minority cultures, languages, and identities by nationalism; the second is “external,” in which Proudhon’s federalism seeks to resolve national conflicts caused by nation-states. This simplified framework helps future researchers to more intuitively understand Proudhon’s critique of nationalism in his federalism.

4.1. Guarding Against Nationalist Oppression of Internal Minorities

Saul Newman has made an elegant and concise argument, claiming that: “The anarchists’ concern for the protection of minorities is reflected in their pessimistic forecasts regarding the monolithic nationalism that leads to the persecution of minorities” [79] (p. 1414). Indeed, for Proudhon, “the principle of nationality, which has become... synonymous with the principle of unity (Le principe de nationalité, devenu... synonyme du principe d’unité)” [8]. Thus, for Proudhon, criticizing nationalism is equivalent to criticizing unitarism and defending federalism. Proudhonian federalism inherently assumes the existence of pluralism [113], and Proudhon primarily discusses the necessity of federalism in terms of two types of oppression: internal and external. Internally, the nationalist vision tends to infringe upon the rights of minority groups within the country; externally, nationalism may incite conflicts between nations.

Proudhon believed that throughout history, nationalism—even before the term was formally raised—had been a theory that perpetuated the conquest and mistreatment of ethnic and cultural minorities. He cited historical examples, such as Ferdinand and Isabella’s expulsion of Jews and Moors since 1793 [8] (pp. 298–300, in French). Regarding France, Proudhon lamented that the once-free Gaul, which “nature gave its original constitution of free nations” [8] (p. 117, in French), had become “unfortunate” due to the conquest by a unitary state. This conquest stripped the people of their “original language, faith, freedom, and uniqueness” [8] (p. 117, in French).

Correspondingly, at least at that time, the Austrian Empire (and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire) was praised by Proudhon as being “composed of so many heterogeneous peoples,” yet as a federation, it was “indivisible” [8] (p. 84, in French). Within it, each nation preserved its own unique traditions, culture, and language. This appreciation aligned with the Austrian Empire’s continuous concessions to Hungarian nationalism, which ultimately led to the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867. However, Proudhon failed to recognize that the national tolerance of Hungary did not necessarily extend to other minority groups within the empire. The federal solution of the Austrian Empire ultimately could not prevent the empire’s eventual disintegration.

Proudhon also criticized the United States, claiming that the liberal nature of the federation was undermined by the enslavement of Black people [8] (pp. 72–74, in French). He argued that the framers of the U.S. Constitution exaggerated the country’s racial uniformity, ignoring the recognition of Black people as a distinct minority. The founding fathers declared, “providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion” [114] (No. 2). Thus, the American model was not designed for cultural and national diversity from the outset [115,116]. Instead, it was designed for a centralized, uni-national system [117].

For Proudhon, a genuine federation first requires equality among nations, then equality of conditions, and ultimately equality of wealth [8] (pp. 131–132, in French). However, the inequality of national policies reduced the United States to a “slave democracy” [8] (p. 301, in French). This inappropriate situation would sooner or later lead to consequences, as demonstrated by the Civil War. Although Abraham Lincoln later formally declared the emancipation of Black people, Proudhon [8] (p. 303, in French) commented that if their “equal dignity and national identity” are not truly recognized, they would still be in a state of slavery. Proudhon insists that any suggestion a nation can be “liberated by any machinery whatsoever, governmental or other” is untrue. A nation must “liberate himself by his fellow men, in the course of common life and common effort” [93] (p. 27). Here too, we see the link between Proudhon’s support for national pluralism and his idea of association.

Essentially, Proudhon’s federalism advocates two key principles: (i) the protection and celebration of cultural diversity of minority groups, and (ii) the recognition that federal democracy must include the political participation of minorities; otherwise, it would devolve into a “slave democracy” [8] (p. 303, in French). These arguments give Proudhon’s federalism an astonishing modernity, reflecting the dual paradigm of federalism that contemporary researchers such as Kincaid [118] and Watts [119] strive to understand federalism in the modern context.

Anarchists like Proudhon also defended national freedom by advocating for the protection of cultural, linguistic, or historical diversity [78], which inclined them toward federalism and systems of autonomous communities [79]. Proudhon’s preference for the Swiss Federation at the time serves as an example. Proudhon [8] (pp. 143–144, in French) highlighted the oppression of minority languages by unitary states and cited the two following cases: (1) In the Netherlands (1814–1830), French speakers lost their rights and nationality; (2) In Belgium under King Leopold in 1830, Flemish was treated as a foreign language. In contrast to these two examples of discrimination, Proudhon [8] (p. 143, in French) praised the Swiss Federation’s introduction of three official languages as “one of the most remarkable provisions I have encountered in any constitution” (est un des most remarquables que j’ai e rencontrés dans aucune constitution).

Proudhon’s pluralism resonates with the cultural nationalism of the German thinker Johann Gottfried Herder, who likewise celebrates the uniqueness and diversity of national cultures [18]. Herder has even been called one of “the avatars of contemporary multiculturalism” [120] (p. 167). His most influential contribution was to elevate the term Volk into “radiation-point in the nineteenth century for the new gospel of nationalism” [121] (p. 722). Through the concept of national spirit (Volksgeist), Herder emphasized each nation’s cultural distinctiveness and the value of its language, arguing that “every language bears the stamp of the mind and character of a people” [121] (p. 726). Language, for Herder, both reflects and safeguards Volksgeist [122] (p. 401) [123] (p. 59). He regarded national diversity as “an insurance against despotism,” not as “a licence for the creation of states” [123] (p. 48). It is actually an argument that parallels Proudhon’s idea. Moreover, scholars called Herder “the advocate of unity in diversity par excellence” [123] (p. 77), while “unity in diversity” is unquestionably a federalist term [124,125,126]. It is also precisely the objective of the federalism championed by Proudhon.

However, Herder’s claim that “the nation is the ground of the state” [120] (p. 172) could be—and indeed has been—abused by nationalists. Compared with strictly nationalism, cultural nationalism is ostensibly non-politically oriented [127] (p. 398). But in practice, the two are hard to separate. This very ambiguity has generated divergent readings of Herder. Actually, Herder has gotten support from “both the defenders of nationalism and the adherents of multiculturalism” [120] (p. 176). In the historical context of that time, Herder’s idea provided a theoretical basis for the primacy of nation-state sovereignty [123,128]. Although Herder never used the term nation-state [123] (p. 52), his ideas “can be constructed to reinforce the conservative conceptual configuration” [129] (p. 762), and even fuel exclusion and conflict [130] (p. 671).

Proudhon’s federalism, by contrast, builds a de-stated society through contractual and decentralized associations. It can protect the free development of national cultures while minimizing the oppression nationalism can bring [131,132]. Bacot [3] and Hayat [133] show that Proudhon did not reject the nation as such, but only the nationalism that equates the nation with a unitary state. In essence, he endorsed a national pluralism—if we can name it such. It is actually the opposite of national singularity and homogeneity. Hayat [37] has defined the relationship between Proudhon’s federalism and nationalism as a dual response. As an embodiment of plurality, the nation is seen as good in itself, which is opposed to the nationalist unifying political movement that destroys plurality. Proudhon’s federalism is a defense of the former and a substitute for the latter. Chiaromonte [93] likewise observes that Proudhon sought a plural dynamic equilibrium rather than the static rules imposed by the nation-state.

4.2. Guarding Against Nationalism-Driven Wars

Within national borders, the unitary nation-state oppresses its own minority groups. Beyond its borders, it faces the risk of prolonged conflicts due to national disputes. The consequences of abandoning multi-national federalism in favor of the nation-state are perilous. Driven by nationalism, Proudhon [8] (pp. 186–187, in French) argued: “the Greeks would seek the return of Constantinople, the Italians would want the restoration of extinct provinces like Corsica and Ticino, and Poland would demand the return of lost territories.” As Bacot aptly pointed out, this would upset the balance established by the 1815 Treaty of Vienna (Traité de Vienne) and the peace that has been maintained on the European continent since then [3] (p. 149).

In 1859, as a Frenchman, Proudhon strongly opposed France’s intervention to establish a puppet monarchy in northern Italy. Proudhon once was an enthusiastic supporter of this war. For Proudhon, war was “an instinct inherent in the very nature of man” and “the prime source of human progress” [134] (p. 730). He had initially believed that the war could bring revolutionary liberation to the people of northern Italy. However, after the war, Proudhon recognized that Napoleon III’s intentions were not to “serve Italian freedom” but to “save his own despotism from collapse” [135] (p. 223). Consequently, Proudhon became a staunch critic of Napoleon III and called for the French and Italians to unite in a cross-border federation against their common despotism. He argued that establishing a unitary nationalist Italy would not benefit either the French or the Italian people. “The founders of States have never believed in the personality and autonomy of the masses” [136] (p. 29). As long as state power is not in the hands of self-organized federal citizens, no matter how free it initially claims to be, it will ultimately succumb to despotism and centralization. In the end, “liberty shrinks,” while “centralized and anonymous despotism grows” [9] (p. 61).

As Bacot pointed out, when Napoleon III declared in 1863 that the treaties of 1815 had lapsed, Proudhon immediately published the pamphlet Have the Treaties of 1815 Ceased to Exist? (Si les traités de 1815 ont cessé d’exister?) in refutation. Napoleon III went even further in 1866 (by which time Proudhon had died and could no longer refute him), declaring that “an irresistible force is pushing peoples to gather into large agglomerations, causing secondary states to disappear (puissance irrésistible pousse les peuples à se réunir en grandes agglomérations en faisant disparaître les États secondaires)” [3] (p. 149). It was in this political climate that Proudhon put forward his associational federalism in his later years. It is set as the opposite of nationalism, replacing the trinity of nation, state, and sovereignty with contract and autonomous associations to create an order that is genuinely peaceful, free, and plural [40] (p. 3).

For Proudhon, federalism means not only tolerating the plurality of domestic minorities but also achieving a broader liberation of peoples across national boundaries on the international stage [50,85,137]. In fact, Proudhon explicitly stated that if an association only concerns itself with its own members, it would “become a problem” [138] (§122). Production centralization continuously encourages the rise of nationalist, centralized governments across Europe, pushing their citizens into a state of endless conflict [139]. In contrast, federal associations could transcend national boundaries across Europe and establish a “social republic” [138] (§123) to achieve the human liberation of all peoples.

In Proudhon’s view, the successful strategy to prevent the oppression by nation-states is to establish “alliances” between nations, as “a weapon against central power, and... preserve their members from dependency” [14] (p. 786). In this aspect, some scholars have explored the relationship between Proudhon’s views on nationalism and his foray into geography, arguing that Proudhon rejected the use of natural boundaries as a rationale for nations [18,140,141,142]. Similar arguments can also be seen in Proudhon’s later works, Federation and Unity in Italy (La fédération et l’unité en Italie) in 1862, and New Observations on Italian Unity (Nouvelles observations sur l’unité italienne) in 1865 [18] (p. 11). In these works, on the one hand, Proudhon rejected the determinative influence of natural boundaries on national boundaries. On the other hand, he sometimes argued that Italy’s natural geographical conditions assumed a federal system rather than a unitary one [18] (p. 13). A more accurate and sophisticated explanation for this seemingly contradictory statement is that, for Proudhon, natural boundaries such as mountains and confluences are not “lines of separation (lignes de séparation)” but “hyphens that bring together identical human spaces on each side (traits d’union qui rassemblent de chaque côté des espaces humains identiques)” [3] (p. 157).

Through the expansion of cross-border associations, Proudhon [8] (p. 88, in French) creatively proposed the concept of a “confederation of confederations” as the federal architecture for Europe, envisioning a scenario in which this structure would lead to comprehensive disarmament and the establishment of peace. In such a context, “each nationality would recover its liberty, and a European balance of power would be achieved” [9] (p. 53) [8] (p. 88, in French). This vision was strikingly original at that time. It stood in sharp contrast to the prevailing nationalist thought. Proudhon’s ideological contributions greatly shaped the thought of another anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin [143]. The latter further developed the discourse on federalism and transnational solidarity [144,145,146]. According to Bakunin [145] (p. 82), “all organizations must proceed by way of federation from the base to the summit, from the commune to the coordinating association of the country or nation.” Ultimately, this would lead to a federation of nations. At that time, nations will unite in brotherly solidarity in “an unbreakable alliance,” that will finally “embrace the entire world” [145] (p. 85).

A federated nation would not pose a threat to other nations; instead, it would focus on advancing civilization, fostering relationships, and enhancing social welfare [9]. When individuals gather through associations, the connections and common interests between these groups surpass the narrow pride associated with nationalist sentiments. Consequently, European nations become interlinked through trade and cooperation, with national boundaries becoming increasingly blurred. This is consistent with the anarchism described by Proudhon—anarchism is not a state of chaos but the establishment of an order that is independent of nationalism and sovereignty, based on the collective solidarity of associations.

It is worth mentioning that in his works, Proudhon sometimes enthusiastically elaborated on the importance of national culture, language, and history for achieving liberation and freedom. However, this enthusiasm should not be misinterpreted as Proudhon’s support for nationalism, but for national pluralism. This point has once led some scholars to misunderstand and criticize Proudhon as a national monist. Some scholars [147,148,149] had high expectations for Proudhon, to the extent that they criticized Proudhon’s handling of multi-national federalism as regrettably incomplete and flawed. Dimitrios Karmis compared Proudhon with Tocqueville, claiming that both thinkers fell into the trap of a national and unitary paradigm [147]. Karmis also argued that Proudhon became entangled in the polemics about the principle of nationality and “ends up with a competitive and monistic view of patriotism” [148] (p. 847). Jacob Salwyn Schapiro once even labeled Proudhon as a supporter of fascism and racial injustice due to his criticism of the Lincoln administration [134]—it was swiftly and comprehensively dismantled by his contemporary Nicola Chiaromonte [93]. Such critiques may misread the pluralist core of Proudhon’s position. However, even critic Karmis [147] (p. 57) admits that, at first glance, Proudhon’s federalism is “far from being monistic, Proudhon’s federalism emphasizes the value of diversity against the homogenizing tendencies.” This in fact points out Proudhon’s attitude towards the issue of nation/nationalism. Proudhon does not deny the cultural community of the nation, but refuses to regard the nation as a single, exclusive political principle, as Hayat [37] has repeatedly mentioned.

Proudhon’s critique of the nation-state and the concept of national sovereignty has had a significant impact on subsequent academic discussions. Michael Burgess [150,151] has carefully examined the necessity of the nation-state as a fundamental element of the state. Burgess and Gagnon [152] argue that federalism, which transcends absolute sovereignty, represents a “victory” for Proudhon. Ronald L. Watts [103] (p. 122) echoes Proudhon’s anti-nationalist stance, suggesting that federalism reduces dependence on the nation-state and is conducive to increasing “constitutionalized interstate linkages.” If properly implemented, federalism may have positive outcomes in resolving national disputes [153,154], and provides a pluralistic alternative for the autonomy and coexistence of different nations [81]. In this federal vision, the previously mentioned agro-industrial associations/federations ensure that political autonomy rests on economic self-sufficiency, to resist the centralizing power of the nation-state.

Since our discussion of Proudhon’s federal vision began with Arendt’s critique, it seems appropriate to conclude this paper with a response to her critique. Actually, Proudhon’s associational federalist vision, to some extent, echoes the council and federal systems of Hannah Arendt in her work On Revolution [39]. Proudhon’s federalism replaces sovereign authority with contractually linked local associations, so that power is generated within associations [155]. And Arendt insists that local institutions and multi-level associations, through citizens’ direct participation, create the space where political power can emerge [156,157]. Although she seldom mentions nineteenth-century anarchists, her praise for revolutionary councils in fact resonates deeply, and unintentionally, with Proudhon’s associational federal vision. This stress on spontaneous civic action and local autonomy reveals the shared “anarcho-republicanism” of Proudhon and Arendt—to resist centralism of modern nation-state [54].

Proudhon’s claim that power originates in active civic bodies—what Proudhon calls an association, Arendt’s equivalent is a council—not in state monopoly, aligns closely with Arendt’s idea [158]. Like Proudhon, Arendt’s council and federal visions—born of her confrontation with totalitarianism and state violence—seek to disperse power to local communities to build an order free of coercive state force [159]. This model is not merely a bulwark against national violence; it is also an alternative answer to the sovereign nation-state. Will Kymlicka [115], in his analysis of modern federalism, observes its ability to manage multi-cultural societies without sacrificing local autonomy. Michael Ignatieff [160] likewise shows, albeit indirectly, that associational federation among plural entities is a path to peace. Overall, Proudhon’s associational federalism offers insights for the growing national pluralism of the modern world [156]. At least, it shows a key message: the nationalism–sovereign framework should not be regarded as the only path.

5. Conclusions

For a long time, Proudhon’s federalism has been overshadowed by his anarchist thought. It is also difficult to grasp clearly his critique of nationalism from his federal theory. Current scholars have interpreted the relationship between Proudhon’s federalism and nationalism from geographical, economic, and sociological perspectives, respectively. However, due to the complexity of Proudhon’s works and the multi-faceted nature of his intellectual system, the answer to how Proudhon’s federalism refutes nationalism is, if not to say abstruse, at least so logically complex that it requires a comprehensive sort of Proudhon’s integrated knowledge system in economics, society, and philosophy in order to scarcely be considered clear. This paper, on the one hand, tries to sort and clarify this system as much as possible. On the other hand, this paper attempts to propose a concise and intuitive framework to simplify understanding, based on how The Principle of Federation itself specifically refutes nationalism. The framework is built as a dual critique of nationalism as follows: (i) Proudhon’s federalism internally aims to address the oppression of minority groups’ culture, language, and identity by nationalism; (ii) externally, Proudhon’s federalism seeks to resolve national conflicts provoked by nation-state.

This study not only refers to the incomplete English version of The Principle of Federation but also the original French manuscript. We have made every effort to collect the arguments related to “nationalism” in the manuscript and attempted to structure Proudhon’s scattered views. Ultimately, we present to the readers a relatively complete picture of Proudhonian federalism’s response to nationalism.

In Proudhon’s view, unitarism and nationalism are inseparable, while federalism constitutes a common refutation of both. Nationalism oppresses minority groups domestically and incites ongoing national conflicts internationally. Proudhon advocated that, through contracts, citizens build their local autonomous associations and gradually construct a cross-border, cross-national confederation of confederations (European union of states) on a step-by-step basis. This not only achieves the coexistence of national pluralism domestically but also realizes national peace internationally. Based on his associational federalism, for Proudhon, a political framework that safeguards liberty while sustaining national cohesion is not only possible but desirable. Therefore, his federalism is more than a nineteenth-century critique of nationalism: it offers a path beyond the nation-state for plural societies.