Introduction: Special Issue of Philosophies on Forms of Life: The Future of the Concept

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein’s notion of “forms of life” has received recent attention in philosophy, political theory, anthropology, and the sociology and philosophy of new medias. This Special Issue explores the possibilities of developing this notion as a tool of elucidation and analysis of social structures and the importance of forms of life and individual expression to them. “Forms” pertain to the shape and logic of concepts, and concepts and life evolve rapidly in our computationally driven world. The pluralistic embedding of language and biology in life forms establishes a nexus of fundamental importance, and it remains a constant challenge to find appropriate forms of criticism and description. In the past decade, the very concept of “form of life” has indeed turned out to be political and social. This issue, rooted in the Wittgensteinian “agreement in language” ([1], § 241), explores the present consequences and varieties of a concept that has proven very fruitful.

Sensitivity to forms of life requires confronting top-down, essentialist theories of structure, value, and policy with fine details of lived experience. This relates not only to knowledge and expression, but also to ethics and the politics of democracy and value, for these depend crucially upon the formations of life in speech (see [2]), agreement in and critique of forms of life, and ways of living with the pluralities and plasticities of differing forms of life. The focus here is on the transformations of thinking about politics, language, social relations, and experience potentially brought about by the move to “forms of life”: the porosity between the private, social, economic, and political spheres, and the new articulation of the social and the biological it engages with “life forms”.

The pluralism of forms of life is thought to be one of the conditions of democracy. By “forms of life”, we sometimes mean the way in which social relations between citizens are organized on an everyday basis, and the forms of life in their multiplicity and variability come to designate lifestyles. A form of life holds together social practices and institutions, a relationship to the world, and ways of perceiving, attitudes, and behavioral dispositions. It determines the framework of possible ideas of the good life. Politics then becomes the set of activities through which human agents act on their common life, draw the shape of their forms of life, or try to do so, making the adjustments or the ruptures that conflicts make necessary, thus giving their experience a form capable of ensuring a meaningful deployment. Researchers have recently been able to defend a conception of democracy as a form of life, as opposed to democracy as an institutional system, a regime of government, or even a political ideal. Democracy as the exploration of new forms of political life, more egalitarian and appropriate to human expressiveness, is the mark of this conception. Citizens under this view become experimenters of forms of democratic life, or, to speak in pragmatism’s terms, political inquirers [3].

As critical theory thinker Rahel Jaeggi has pointed out, the possibility of criticism of life forms is in fact inherent to politics today.

According to Theodor W. Adorno [4], to whose thought Rahel Jaeggi refers in her Critique of Forms of Life [5], the form and content of everyday ways of living, as well as the orientations expressed in them, have a truth content, a claim to truth, against which they can be criticized. They are also vulnerable to falsity. It is not a question of claiming that truth is then relative to each community but, rather, of supposing that the figure of truth is each time linked to the determined and expressed criticism of social forms and contents. The question then arises of the constraints and rules of this critical exercise. In order to criticize a form of life, is it necessary to lend it a form of rationality? Or are there ineradicable incommensurabilities, as Kuhn argued [6]? If we construe the idea of crisis, with reference to a form of life revealing itself to be problematic, then we make it possible to found the criticism of a form of life and the possibility of disagreement with(in) a form of life [7].

The idea of forms of life is thus articulated alongside that of the transformation of life, which several political movements are calling for today. Thinking about the destruction of a form of life is necessary, because the form imposed on our lives can mutilate them as much as it allows them to unfold. When Adorno defines capitalism as a form of life, he evokes a form of life marked by competitive struggle and the generalization of evaluation phenomena, producing unsurpassable antinomies between the universal and the particular, and systematically preventing the actualization of the moral acts that it nevertheless calls for. This is a call for a transformation of capitalism as a form of life [8].

But what could then be the political horizon of a form of life/forms of life?

The contributions gathered in this issue aim at exploring the future of these kinds of debates, at apprehending the social scope of the notion of form(s) of life in the epistemological and philosophical diversity that characterizes its actuality. Whether they are inspired by Adorno and critical theory, Wittgenstein and Cavell, Foucault and biopolitics, or Dewey and pragmatism, the essays in this issue define Lebensformen as configurations of human co-existence. They insist on the fact that making use of this notion emphasizes the practices or agencies that produce, reproduce, or modify them, thus on the dynamic unfolding plasticity and versatility of the forms of life, as well as their possible destruction. On the other hand, they diverge on the question of the texture—to borrow Veena Das’s concept [9]—of which a form of life is made. Is it the form that our life (lives) take(s)? An aggregate of forms of expressions and connections to others? A bundle of sedimented and partly unavailable social practices? A social organization of biological life?

As notion of form of life has entered the field of political thought, it makes possible the translation of new, perhaps heterogeneous, demands for attention to the forms of everyday life, and this, in turn, allows for the globalization of ethical stakes concerning the preservation of the form of human life or its ongoing deeply historical, aesthetic and anthropological trans-formations, through bioethical engineering, the digital, and AI [10,11,12]. It opens the way for social criticism concerning forms of life that have become unacceptable, or concerning elements of human life that are all too frequently taken for granted [13].

The notion of life form responds to the need that has become apparent in recent decades to inscribe politics in globalized tissues, and this in two complementary directions, both environmental and ethnological. The ordinary world is not only the world of institutions or cultures, but it is anchored in an environment, in a set of constraints and natural data. Reciprocally, the human being is part of the causal chain of nature, through the transformations he or she provokes in the world he or she inhabits. What is now called “global change” covers precisely this co-dependence, and the notion of form of life makes it possible to account for this mutation and complexification of the relationship between the social and the natural: the transformation of relations and hierarchies between life forms; the variability of the relationship between nature and culture; new scales of space and time; new social, technological and environmental vulnerabilities; global inequalities and variability of living conditions; even the threat of destruction of human life forms in disasters; or of life forms altogether in “end-of-the-world”-type scenarios. New technologies and AI have also radically transformed the concept of life (see [14]). Life forms allow us to rethink our new situation of dependence on an environment that we ourselves have arranged, and of our community with machines and the artificial. Does the notion presuppose an anthropology, and if so, which one?

One can, thus, with regard to the plurality of forms of life, articulate a concept of the form of human life in its “generality”: it designates the form that life takes (see [15]) Here, central references, very present in the contributions to our issue, are Stanley Cavell’s and Veena Das’ [9] readings of Wittgenstein, with their heterodox interpretation of the notion of form of life—evoked by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations [1]. Often, this has been interpreted as a conservative form of conventionalism which would refer to a normativity of human life. However, “This [this agreement in language] is not an agreement in opinions but in form of life ([1] § 241)”. Wittgenstein’s way of referring to a “fictitious natural history” allows us, according to Cavell, to unlock a conventionalism which, through the normativity of rules, defines constraints on the forms of life even stronger than natural laws. And yet, it may also be criticized and disrupted through the evolution of forms of life [7].

The meaning of life form taken as a set of particular features of social life and human behavior summarized in Wittgenstein’s idea of “agreement in language” escapes conservatism only by being crossed by another, radically different meaning of life form: “But there is another meaning of life form that runs counter to this interpretation. Call the first meaning ethnological, or horizontal. In contrast, there is the biological, or vertical, meaning”.

The biological meaning concerns, for Cavell, “the specific force and dimension of the human body, of the human senses, and of the human voice” ([16] (1989, p. 42). When Wittgenstein indicates: “What must be accepted, the given, is—one can say—forms of life” ([1] II, xi, §345), it is not a question of considering the social structures, the various rituals, or the economic systems as an unalterable or clear given (see [10], §4.6). But it is not a question either of opposing two forms of life, the social life and the biological life: Cavell means, rather, a reciprocal absorption of the natural and the social.

The Wittgensteinian approach illustrated in the various contributions described below points out the depth of this kind of agreement in forms of life, as well as its fragility, the constant possibility of the loss, to which Cavell gives the name of skepticism. However, it is not a question of two different and hierarchical meanings, resp. social and biological, of life; what is at stake in the distinction is the entanglement of the social and the biological in the forms of life, or more exactly the integration of the vital forms (life forms) in the forms of life (forms of life) [17]. The question of form of life reveals itself to be inseparable from skeptical questioning, expressed both traditionally and today in tragedy and in popular culture (science fiction, end-of-the-world scenarios). Further, both skepticism and its overcoming in an ongoing engagement with life rely on the recognition and the metamorphosis of the living forms.

As early as his first book, Must We Mean What We Say ([18]; see also [19]) Cavell emphasized the ways in which the “organic” character, the biological whirl of the life form, mark the permanent possibility of loss of the connection of the speaker to the human community and to ordinary life:

We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and we expect others, to be able to project them into other contexts. There is no guarantee that this projection will take place (…). That we do so on the whole is a matter of the shared routs of interests and feelings, of our modes of reaction, of our sense of humor, of what is important or appropriate, of what is outrageous, of what is the same as something else, of what is a reproach or a forgiveness, of what makes an utterance and an assertion, an appeal, an explanation—the whole whirl of organism that Wittgenstein calls “forms of life”. Human language and activity, human sanity, and community are based on nothing more, and nothing less. ([18], p. 52; see [19]).

This relationship of life forms to biological and technological life defines, in terms of the form of life, a bio-ethics and a techno-ethics shared, although thematized in various ways, by readers of Foucault, Wittgenstein, Cavell, Das, and the contributors to this volume.

This is why the notion of “forms of life” as well as “life forms” is used in various fields, from biology to philosophy, sociology, political science, and anthropology, and it includes collections of practices and customs of various kinds, either explicitly or implicitly present in beliefs, language, institutions, modes of action, and values. Recent work on “forms of life” has ventured a multi-dimensional reworking of the human bodily experience of vulnerability in language and life. From the study of its various contemporary meanings, to its critical and political scope and its ethical implications, this issue unfolds some of the most important the dimensions of this new approach. The eight essays included deal with overlapping themes within these dimensions.

Sandra Laugier’s “Forms of Life and Public Space” delves into the complexity of “public space” in our descriptions of forms of life today. She traces the evolution of the idea of ordinary language (see [15]) from rule-constituted meanings to individually voiced claims that speak to democracy. This shift underscores the importance of dissent and individual expression in democratic life, as emphasized by Cavell, Emerson, and Thoreau, moving beyond the rule-based theory of democracy urged, e.g., by Habermas. Laugier highlights the role of popular culture in expressing democratic forms of community and the transformative potential of public movements like #MeToo and Black Lives Matter. She explores how forms of life, influenced by political movements, shape and are shaped by public discourse and democratic practices.

In “Wittgenstein and Forms of Life: Constellation and Mechanism”, Piergiorgio Donatelli emphasizes the evolving nature of everyday life as the home of “forms of life”, requiring constant creativity and spontaneous response. He argues that modern science often denies this need, stressing the importance of everyday practices and habits in defining concepts like “care”. Donatelli highlights the risks posed by AI and the breakdown of communal resonance, advocating for a continuous transformation of our relationship to ordinary forms of life. This aligns with Laugier’s exploration of public space and democratic life, emphasizing the need for individual expression and creativity in sustaining democratic forms of life.

In “Artificial Forms of Life”, Sebastian Sunday Grève explores whether mentality requires biological life, challenging John Searle’s view that it does. He argues that the question “What is life?” remains unanswered, and suggests that machines could achieve human-like mindedness. Grève contends that Wittgenstein’s notion of “forms of life” does not imply biological prejudice, allowing for machine mentality. He emphasizes the importance of empathy in extending human-mindedness to others, including machines, and suggests that future developments in forms of life may lead to converging trajectories of human and machine evolution.

In “Facts, Concept and Patterns of Life—or How to Change Things with Words”, Jasmin Trächtler connects Wittgenstein’s notion of what she calls a “pattern of life” with issues of injustice in current forms of life. She emphasizes how concepts reflect our interests and environments, and how they can perpetuate exclusion and discrimination. Trächtler argues for the importance of feminist epistemology in addressing “conceptual injustices” embedded in our forms of life, and highlights the role of language in imagining and creating new, more just patterns of living.

In “Forms of Life, Honesty and Conditioned Responsibility”, Chon Tejedor emphasizes Wittgenstein’s notion of “forms of life” in articulating value and responsibility in situations where individual responsibility is unclear, and the assignment of responsibility escapes traditional theories such as Kantian deontology or consequentialism. She describes “agency stultifying situations” like climate change, where individual actions seem insignificant, though intuitively not fully right, and involving individual choices and responsibilities. Appealing to the early Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics, Tejedor argues that responsibility emerges from the conditions individuals find themselves in, rather than their intentions. She critiques traditional ethical approaches and suggests, following Wittgenstein, that a commitment to honesty about one’s place in the world can help navigate these complex responsibilities.

In “Forms of Life and Linguistic Change: The Case of Trans Communities”, Anna Boncompagni construes Wittgenstein’s notion of Lebensformen as a methodological tool to explore innovative language-games. She argues that Wittgenstein’s methodology allows us to highlight the embeddedness of language in our lives and practices, potentially in progressive ways, emphasizing the importance of examining the details of “forms of life” to understand disagreement, conflict, and injustice. She focuses on how trans and gender non-conforming communities use language creatively to express gender, showing the deep interconnections between forms of language and of life.

Edward Guetti argues that “forms of life” can respond to contemporary challenges to the philosophical focus on human being, drawing on Cavell’s interpretation of Lebensformen as cultural and biological expressions. He explores the concept’s authority in philosophical discourse, particularly in the context of the Anthropocene. Guetti emphasizes the subjective and political concerns in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, arguing that human dissatisfaction with forms of life reflects a natural-historical description of human life as such. He suggests that Wittgenstein’s concept of Lebensformen can evolve to address new forms of inhabiting the world, characterizing the open-endedness and ongoing dissatisfactions that drive human openness forward through history and philosophy.

Michael Lambek’s “The Wrong Question?” argues that understanding alien forms of thought requires rich hermeneutic and contextual work, rather than logic or rationality. Drawing on Gadamer, Wittgenstein, and others, Lambek emphasizes the importance of humility and gradual understanding in ethnographic fieldwork. He describes his experiences with Kibushy and Malagasy speakers, highlighting the need for self-reflexivity and continuous practical judgment on the part of the anthropologist. Lambek stresses the importance of recognizing different levels of description and the limits of commensuration among views. This contribution is new evidence of the common ground found and founded together by philosophy and anthropology, which is a new territory for the concept of forms of life and for its futures.